Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 149 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-26-174 Opinion Delivered: October 15, 2026 THERNELL HUNDLEY APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CLARK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 10CR-79-103] V. HONORABLE GRISHAM A. STATE OF ARKANSAS PHILLIPS, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED. COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice Thernell Hundley appeals from an order denying his request for his case records at public expense. The circuit court found that Hundley was seeking the records to pursue claims that had already been addressed and rejected by this court. We affirm. In July 1980, Hundley pleaded guilty to capital murder and rape. The circuit court entered two separate sentencing orders that imposed concurrent life sentences. Hundley v. State, 2025 Ark. 53, 710 S.W.3d 465. Hundley was seventeen when he committed the crimes. Because of his age, Hundley’s life sentence for rape was reduced to fifty years in accordance with the Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Id. Moreover, pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Hundley’s life-without-parole sentence for capital murder was subsequently vacated, and a resentencing hearing was held wherein the jury heard mitigating evidence and resentenced Hundley to life imprisonment. Hundley appealed his new sentence, and we affirmed. Hundley v. State, 2020 Ark. 89, 594 S.W.3d 60. Following his resentencing, Hundley filed claims for postconviction relief alleging that his convictions were void because, under the law in effect when he committed the crimes, he could not have been sentenced for both capital murder and its underlying crime of rape. This court rejected the claims. See Hundley, 2025 Ark. 53, 710 S.W.3d 465 (holding that Hundley’s merger claim was not an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction and was waived when he pleaded guilty and that Hundley’s sentence for rape was legal on its face (citing Hundley v. Payne, 2024 Ark. 19, 682 S.W.3d 665)). As noted above, Hundley challenges the circuit court’s denial of his request for copies of his criminal records at public expense. To be entitled to copies of material at public expense, a petitioner must demonstrate a compelling need for the copies as documentary evidence to support an allegation in a petition for postconviction relief. Scott v. Sullivan, 2025 Ark. 152, 720 S.W.3d 865. Hundley alleges that he is entitled to copies of his records at public expense for the purpose of pursuing a postconviction claim that his rape conviction violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Hundley asserts that rape was the underlying crime for capital murder, which renders his separate conviction for rape void. Hundley’s double-jeopardy claim is essentially the same claim that he raised in the two previously cited cases. Like Hundley’s prior merger claims, his double-jeopardy claim should have been raised at trial or in a postconviction petition filed pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hundley, 2025 Ark. 53, at 3–4, 710 S.W.3d at 468; see also Starling v. State, 2023 Ark. 32. A double-jeopardy claim is an assertion that a judgment was imposed in an illegal 2 manner and does not invalidate its facial legality. Wesley v. State, 2019 Ark. 270, 585 S.W.3d 156. Hundley’s judgment for rape is facially legal, and he does not have a viable claim for a writ of habeas corpus. Hundley argues for the first time on appeal that he must have copies of his records to develop a claim for a writ of certiorari, a federal claim for a writ of habeas corpus, or a claim for executive clemency. We have consistently held that arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. Jackson v. State, 363 Ark. 311, 214 S.W.3d 232 (2005). In any event, for the reasons stated above, Hundley’s double-jeopardy allegation is not a viable postconviction claim for a writ of certiorari or a writ of habeas corpus. That claim was waived when he pleaded guilty without objection and when he failed to raise it in a timely Rule 37.1 petition for postconviction relief. With respect to executive clemency, a plea for clemency must be addressed to the executive branch of our government, which is vested with the sole power of granting clemency to a deserving individual. Coones v. State, 280 Ark. 321, 657 S.W.2d 553 (1983). Executive clemency is not within the purview of the judicial branch. The circuit court did not err when it denied Hundley’s request for copies at public expense. Affirmed. Special Justices CORY COX and BRANCH T. FIELDS join. WEBB and BRONNI, JJ., not participating. Thernell Hundley, pro se appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 3