Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 515 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-25-501 Opinion Delivered October 28, 2026 ANDRE ENIS APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 72DR-24-1213] V. HONORABLE MATTHEW DURRETT, MICHAELA THOMPSON JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge Appellant Andre Enis appeals from a divorce decree, and his only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay retroactive child support for the three-year period before appellee Michaela Thompson filed her complaint for divorce. We affirm. I. Facts and Procedural History Andre and Michaela were married in May 2018 and separated in August 2018. One child, MC, was born of the marriage in March 2019. After the parties’ separation, Andre moved to Oklahoma City, where he presently lives. Michaela lives in Fayetteville with MC and has always been MC’s caretaker. On August 8, 2024, six years after the parties separated and over five years after MC was born, Michalea filed a complaint for divorce. In the complaint, Michaela alleged eighteen months’ separation as grounds. Michaela asked to be awarded primary custody of MC subject to Andre’s reasonable visitation, and she requested child support. The divorce hearing was held on March 25, 2025. At the beginning of the hearing, Michaela’s attorney informed the court that, in addition to prospective child support, she was seeking retroactive child support pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-106(c)(1) (Supp. 2023), which provides: An initial support order for child support may be made retroactive for a period no earlier than three (3) years before the date that the petition, complaint, or other initial pleading was filed or from the birth of the child, if the child is less than three (3) years of age, except as otherwise provided under § 9-14-105 and as provided in subdivision (c)(2) of this section.[1] Andre argued that this statute is inapplicable because it allows for retroactive child support in a paternity action but not a divorce proceeding and that any child support awarded could only be retroactive to the filing of the divorce complaint. Michaela testified that she lives in Fayetteville and works as a “nurse care maker” at a local medical clinic. Michaela stated that MC has lived with her since she was born and that she has always provided for MC. Michaela testified that Andre occasionally came from Oklahoma City to Fayetteville to visit MC and that she never denied his requests for visitation. She stated that Andre had visited seven times over the past three and a half years. Sometimes Andre would be there 1 Arkansas Annotated section 9-14-105 (Supp. 2023) contains the limitation on retroactive child support for a person over eighteen seeking back support, and subdivision (c)(2) pertains to when there is a lack of service of the petition, complaint, or other initial pleading. Neither is applicable here. 2 for a few hours and leave, and other times he would spend the night and go home the next day. On all these occasions except once when Andre took MC to a shoe store, Michaela was present during the visits. Michaela stated that Andre also made phone and video calls to MC from time to time. Over the years, Andre had intermittently given Michaela money to help support MC, but Michaela was unsure how much. Michaela testified that between the parties’ marriage in May 2018 and their separation in August 2018, there were instances of domestic violence committed by Andre against her and her then twelve-year-old son from a prior relationship. Because of Andre’s history of domestic violence, Michaela thought that any visitation awarded to Andre should be supervised. Andre testified that he lives in Oklahoma City and is employed as a service technician; before that, he was in the military for twenty-one years. He stated that he has provided a total of $8000 in financial support for MC and that he carries her (along with his four other children) on his military health insurance. Andre stated that he had visited MC numerous times but had not seen her since her last birthday, which was a year before the hearing. Andre agreed that Michaela should have custody of MC but stated that he wanted reasonable visitation. At the end of the hearing, the trial court found that Michaela would be awarded custody of MC subject to Andre’s local supervised visitation and that Michaela would be awarded child support. The parties argued about whether Michaela could be awarded retroactive child support, and the trial court took the issue under advisement. 3 On April 18, 2025, the trial court entered a divorce decree that awarded Michaela primary custody of MC. The trial court found that due to a pattern of domestic abuse, Andre’s visitation would be limited to one six-hour supervised visitation a month in Arkansas and phone or video visitation at least once a week. The trial court ordered Andre to pay child support, and on the issue of retroactive child support, the court found: [t]hat Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-106 provides for support to be retroactive for up to three years before the filing date of a petition, complaint, or other initial pleading, and the Court hereby finds that this applies to support ordered pursuant to paternity actions . . . and divorce proceedings. Therefore, the order for child support shall be retroactive to August 8, 2021. The defendant will receive credit for the $8,000 he has previously paid. He is also to be credited for the amount he is paying for insurance. (Emphasis added.) The trial court applied the parties’ respective incomes to the shared- income formula prescribed in Administrative Order No. 10 and set Andre’s child support at $937 a month. The trial court calculated the retroactive child support to be $40,759 with a credit for $8,000 and ordered Andre to pay $32,759 at a rate of $187 a month. On April 21, 2025, Andre filed a motion to reconsider. In the motion, Andre argued that the trial court erred in ordering retroactive child support to August 8, 2021 (the section 9-14-106 statutory three-year period), and that child support should have been retroactive only to August 8, 2024, when Michaela filed her complaint for divorce. Andre argued that section 9-14-106 does not apply in divorce proceedings and also that the trial court’s order did not comport with Arkansas caselaw, citing Pardon v. Pardon, 30 Ark. App. 91, 782 S.W.2d 379 (1990), and Grynwald v. Grynwald, 2022 Ark. App. 310, 651 S.W.3d 177. 4 On April 22, 2025, Michaela filed a response to Andre’s motion to reconsider, asking that it be denied. Michaela argued that section 9-14-106 does apply to divorce proceedings, that the needs of the child existed before the commencement of the divorce action, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering retroactive child support for a period of three years. On May 21, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying Andre’s motion to reconsider. The trial court found as follows: 1. The language of Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-14-106(c)(1), codified by Act 623 of 2023, clearly provides for retroactive support for up to three years from “the date that the petition, complaint, or other initial pleading was filed.” In this case, the Plaintiff’s “Complaint for Divorce” was filed on August 8, 2024. 2. Additionally, in Grynwald v. Grynwald, 2022 Ark. App. 310, the Court of Appeals, citing Pardon v. Pardon, 30 Ark. App. 91 (1990), held that: The commencement date of an award of child support is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. . . . Thus, in various instances it has been held proper for the court to fix the effective date of an order of child support from the date of filing of the petition or complaint, or from the date of trial, or from the date of the parties’ separation. Grynwald, 2022 Ark. App. 310, at 9. (emphasis added.) 3. Based on the pleadings, as well as the testimony at the hearing in this matter, the parties separated on or about August of 2018. Therefore, even if Act 623 had not been enacted subsequently to the above-cited cases, a finding of retroactive support would be appropriate pursuant to Arkansas law. Andre timely appealed and designated that he was appealing from both the divorce decree and the order denying his motion to reconsider. II. Standard of Review 5 Our standard of review for an appeal from a child-support order is de novo on the record; however, we will not reverse the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Linkous v. Linkous, 2026 Ark. App. 261. In a child-support determination, the amount of child support lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that court’s findings will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Taylor, 369 Ark. 31, 250 S.W.3d 232 (2007). The abuse-of-discretion standard is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the trial court’s decision but requires that the trial court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Zihala v. Staley, 2024 Ark. App. 269, 689 S.W.3d 82. A trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are given no deference on appeal. Taylor, supra. III. Retroactive Child Support In discussing the retroactive child-support award, to provide clarity, the following dates are pertinent: • August 2018 Date of the Parties’ Separation • March 2019 MC’s Date of Birth • August 8, 2021 Potential three-year Look-Back Period of Section 9-14-106 Commences • August 8, 2024 Date the Divorce Complaint was Filed • April 18, 2025 Date of Divorce In this appeal, Andre argues that the trial court erred in ordering retroactive child support commencing three years before the date Michaela filed her complaint for divorce and that retroactive child support should be limited to only that which accrued after the 6 complaint was filed. In making its ruling that Michaela was entitled to retroactive child support for the three-year period preceding the filing of her complaint, the trial court applied Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-106(c)(1), which provides: An initial support order for child support may be made retroactive for a period no earlier than three (3) years before the date that the petition, complaint, or other initial pleading was filed or from the birth of the child, if the child is less than three (3) years of age [subject to exceptions not applicable here]. An “initial support order” means “the earliest order, judgment, or decree entered in the case by the court or by administrative process that contains a provision for the payment of money for the support and care of any child or children.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236(a)(3) (Repl. 2020). Andre argues that the legislative intent behind section 9-14-106(c)(1), which was enacted in 2023, was to protect unsuspecting parents from a windfall of retroactive child support from unknown children and to cap the retroactive support at three years before the filing of the petition in those cases. Andre contends that, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, this statute is meant to be applied in paternity actions but not in divorce proceedings. Andre asserts that erroneously utilizing section 9-14-106(c)(1)’s three-year retroactivity to serve as a punitive measure in a divorce action, as done here, rather than a necessary remedial measure of recovery, is a gross miscarriage of justice and should not be permitted. Andre argues further that the two cases cited in his motion to reconsider and in the trial court’s order denying that motion—Pardon, 30 Ark. App. 91, 782 S.W.2d 379 (1990), and Grynwald, 2022 Ark. App. 310, 651 S.W.3d 177—do not support the trial court’s 7 decision but rather support Andre’s claim that retroactive child support should not be awarded for any period before the filing of the complaint. In Pardon, the mother was awarded custody, and the trial court awarded retroactive child support to the date the mother’s motion for custody2 was filed. When the mother filed her motion for custody, the child was already living with the mother per the child’s wishes. On appeal, the father argued that the court erred in failing to limit the award of retroactive child support to commence from the date of the hearing. On appeal, in affirming the circuit court we held, “Under the circumstances in this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s ordering child support payments retroactive to the date of the filing of the mother’s petition.” Pardon, 30 Ark. App. at 94, 782 S.W.2d at 380 (emphasis added). In Grynwald, the trial court entered a divorce decree awarding the mother primary custody and child support retroactive to the date of the parties’ separation, which had occurred two weeks after the mother filed for divorce. On appeal, citing Pardon, we affirmed the trial court’s award of child support retroactive to the date of the parties’ separation. To summarize Pardon and Grynwald, in Pardon, we affirmed the award of retroactive child support to the date of the filing of the operative complaint; and in Grynwald, we affirmed the award of retroactive child support to the date of separation, noting in both instances that the commencement date of an award of child support is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Andre notes that in neither of the above two cases, which were 2 In Pardon, the award of retroactive child support was pursuant to a motion to change custody; however, that distinction is not relevant for this discussion. 8 affirmed on appeal, did the trial court award child support retroactive to before the filing of the petition or complaint. He thus posits that these cases do not support the trial court’s retroactive award in the instant case but instead support his position. And, as previously discussed, Andre claims that there is no statutory authority for the trial court’s decision because, according to Andre, section 9-14-106(c)(1) is not applicable in divorce proceedings. What Andre fails to appreciate is that in the case at bar, the dispositive issue is whether, as found by the trial court, section 9-14-106(c)(1) is applicable in divorce proceedings. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-14-106(c)(1) was enacted after both Pardon and Grynwald were delivered. We hold that, under the circumstances presented in this case, this statutory provision is applicable. This issue turns on statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. City of Gurdon v. AT&T Corp., 2026 Ark. App. 346. The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislative intent underlying the statute. Id. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. Id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant and give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. Id. We do not, however, engage in statutory interpretations that defy common sense and produce absurd results. Id. In deciding this issue, we need look no farther than the plain and unambiguous terms of the relevant statutes. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-14-106(c)(1), which was in full 9 force and effect on the date the complaint for divorce was filed, provides in relevant part, “An initial support order for child support may be made retroactive for a period no earlier than three (3) years before the date that the petition, complaint, or other initial pleading was filed[.]” (Emphasis added.) An “initial support order” means “the earliest order, judgment, or decree entered in the case by the court or by administrative process that contains a provision for the payment of money for the support and care of any child or children.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14- 236(a)(3) (emphasis added). There can be no doubt here that the divorce decree is an “initial support order” because it is the first order, judgment, or decree by the court that contains a provision for Andre to pay child support. And under a plain reading of section 9-14- 106(c)(1), an initial support order may be made retroactive for a period no earlier than three years before the date that the complaint was filed. Here, Michaela’s complaint for divorce was filed on August 8, 2024, which means that under the statute, the trial court was authorized to award retroactive child support commencing August 8, 2021, which is precisely what the trial court did. Although Andre contends that section 9-14-106(c)(1) was meant to apply to only paternity actions and not divorce proceedings, the statute contains no such limiting language and does not exclude divorce proceedings, nor does it distinguish among domestic- relations actions. The operative language in section 9-14-106(c)(1) is “an initial support order.” It is undisputed that MC has been in Michaela’s sole care since the parties separated in 2018, and Andre, like all fathers, has a duty to support his child. We think it would be illogical and imprudent to conclude that this statute was not meant to apply to divorce cases 10 such as this where the parties separated, and one party was the child’s sole caretaker before the filing of the divorce complaint. With respect to the Pardon and Grynwald cases cited below and on appeal, we observe that both of these cases were decided before Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-106(c)(1) was enacted, so neither involved an interpretation of that statute. Furthermore, neither of these cases held that retroactive child support could never predate the filing of a petition or a divorce complaint because that was not the issue in either case. In Pardon, we affirmed a decision to award child support retroactive to the filing of mother’s petition to change custody; and in Grynwald, we affirmed a decision to award child support retroactive to the parties’ separation, which occurred two weeks after the mother filed for divorce. In neither Pardon nor Grynwald was this court asked to decide whether, in the proper circumstances, child support could be ordered retroactive from the filing of the petition or complaint. And after these cases were decided, such retroactive support has been expressly authorized by our legislature under section 9-14-106(c)(1). IV. Conclusion In our de novo review, we hold that the trial court committed no error in finding that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-106(c)(1) applied to this divorce action and in ordering Andre to pay retroactive child support for the three-year period before Michaela filed her complaint for divorce pursuant to the terms of the statute. It is undisputed that during this entire time, Michaela was MC’s sole caretaker. We affirm the divorce decree. Affirmed. 11 HARRISON and THYER, JJ., agree. Mostyn Prettyman, PLLC, by: William M. Prettyman III, for appellant. Michaela Thompson, pro se appellee. 12