Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 426 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CV-25-356 MATTHEW MILLICAN Opinion Delivered September 23, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. NORTHERN DISTRICT [NO. 01SDR-24-117] DEBBIE KONECNY APPELLEE HONORABLE DONNA GALLOWAY, JUDGE AFFIRMED BART F. VIRDEN, Judge In this one-brief appeal, Matthew Millican argues that the Arkansas County Circuit Court erred in granting the two-year order of protection against him. We affirm. I. Relevant Facts On November 21, 2024, Debbie Konecny filed a petition for an ex parte order of protection against her brother, Matthew Millican. In the affidavit attached to the petition, Debbie alleged that Matthew had a warrant out for harassment, and he previously been jailed for harassing her daughter. She stated that Matthew had tried to find her and her daughter through Facebook, and she was very scared. Debbie attached several Facebook posts and text messages to the petition, one of which was a post by Matt Alton stating, “Ellen Alexander can you f*** Michael King and his CULT crew up for me? I’ll pay you GOOD $”. She explained that Matthew refers to her and her mother as “the cult” and texts threats to her using different phone numbers and names. The other attached posts directly threaten someone named Michael King with physical violence, refer to a dispute over a will, and threaten to find people. The order granting the temporary order of protection was entered on November 25. A hearing was held on the matter. Debbie testified that Matthew manipulated their mother into signing away her land, and they were currently involved in a civil case in Texas. Since the civil case began, Matthew had threatened her over Facebook using an account belonging to “Matt Alton.” Debbie explained that she knew it was Matthew’s account because Matt Alton had claimed their mother’s address as his own. Debbie testified that Matthew refers to her and her mother as “the cult,” and Matt Alton’s Facebook post asking another Facebook account holder named Ellen Alexander to “f*** up” Michael King and his cult was about her and her mother. Debbie explained that Matthew has repeatedly stated that “he’s going to f*** [her] up” and that he scares her. Matthew, proceeding pro se, cross-examined Debbie. He asked Debbie if she ever threatened to “eff me up,” and Debbie denied ever threatening him. Debbie agreed with Matthew that he had not threatened her “face to face.” Matthew testified on his own behalf that there is no reason for the order of protection to be issued and explained that because of the order, he will not be able to chaperone his nine-year-old daughter’s field trips or his son’s hockey tournaments. On cross-examination, 2 Matthew admitted that Alton is his middle name, and he posted the Facebook posts attributable to Matt Alton. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was an immediate and present danger of domestic abuse and granted the order of protection for two years. The final order of protection was entered on February 25, 2025. The order prohibited Matthew from initiating contact with Debbie and excluded him from her residence in Crockett’s Bluff and from their mother’s residence in Coleman, Texas, when Debbie is there. The agreed amended final order of protection was entered on March 19, and it clarified that Matthew was allowed to enter their mother’s property in Texas on the first Saturday of each month from 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. for inspection. Matthew timely filed his notice of appeal. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law Our standard of review following a bench trial is whether the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Bohannon v. Robinson, 2014 Ark. 458, 447 S.W.3d 585. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Disputed facts and determinations of the credibility of witnesses are within the province of the fact-finder. Id. When there is no evidence that the respondent committed physical abuse or inflicted fear 3 of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, it is an abuse of discretion to issue the order of protection. Willhite v. Willhite, 2024 Ark. App. 147, 685 S.W.3d 329. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-15-205(a) (Repl. 2020) provides that “at the hearing on the petition filed under this chapter, upon a finding of domestic abuse, the circuit court may provide relief to the petitioner.” “Domestic abuse” is defined as “[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103(4)(A) (Supp. 2025); see Smith v. Murphy, 2017 Ark. App. 188, at 12, 517 S.W.3d 453, 460. If the issue amounts to whether the victim was in fear of imminent harm, it is the victim’s fear based on the circumstances that the circuit court is to weigh and ascertain. Stone v. Stone, 2026 Ark. App. 110, at 8, 732 S.W.3d 27, 31. B. Fear of Imminent Harm Matthew asserts that it was unreasonable for Debbie to interpret his Facebook posts as threatening imminent harm to her for several reasons, none of which have merit. Matthew contends that the Facebook posts do not mention Debbie by name; thus, she could not prove the posts were about her. Matthew also asserts that his posts, which were “undated, scattered, vague and directed at various individuals” and only showed frustration over a civil case he was involved in and could not have caused Debbie to feel threatened with imminent harm. Essentially, Matthew’s arguments are a request for this court to reweigh the evidence in his favor; however, the circuit court’s weighing the evidence differently than he wanted it to be 4 weighed is not reversible error. McCord v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 244, 599 S.W.3d 374. As stated above, domestic violence encompasses the fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault. Cases in which the circuit court must determine whether a person fears an imminent threat necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of that particular case. No case is directly on point, but our caselaw provides examples in which this court affirmed the circuit court’s finding that a petitioner proved that he or she feared imminent harm on the basis of similar evidence. In Hopper v. Hopper, 2023 Ark. App. 504, at 7, 678 S.W.3d 602, 607, this court affirmed the circuit court’s decision that a veiled threat was sufficient to support a ten-year order of protection. In Hopper, we held that “[a]ppellee’s testimony that she considered the dead-kitten reference in the many messages sent to her by appellant to be veiled threats was sufficient to support the circuit court’s order.” In Simmons v. Dixon, 96 Ark. App. 260, 266–67, 240 S.W.3d 608, 613 (2006), this court held that threats to “beat” someone were sufficient to instill fear of imminent harm. Here, Debbie testified that Matthew referred to her and her family as “the cult crew,” and she was afraid of him; thus, Matthew’s post to pay “good money” to someone to “f*** up” the cult crew is sufficient evidence that Debbie feared imminent physical harm. Additionally, Matthew argues that the geographic distance between him and his sister proves that he does not pose an “imminent” threat. He is wrong. Debbie testified that she frequently visited her mother at her home in Texas near Matthew’s home and that the order 5 of protection contemplates her presence at her mother’s home; thus, at times, she and Matthew were in close geographic proximity.1 Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and ABRAMSON, J., agree. Gregory E. Bryant, for appellant. One brief only. 1 To be clear, in this opinion we do not hold that geographical proximity is required to affirm the circuit court’s decision that the petitioner fears imminent physical harm. 6