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Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 365 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CR-25-254 KEATON TAYLOR Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 14CR-16-59] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, JR., APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge In May 2018, Keaton Taylor pled guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to an aggregate of twenty-five years’ imprisonment followed by a thirty- year suspended imposition of sentence. In January 2025, Taylor requested that the Columbia County Circuit Court waive a statutory requirement that he serve 70 percent of his sentence. The circuit court dismissed Taylor’s motion as untimely. On appeal, Taylor argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the relevant statute included a time limitation. We affirm. On May 17, 2018, Taylor pled guilty to the murder and aggravated robbery of Douglas Harwell, and the circuit court entered a sentencing order the same day. The crimes occurred on April 14, 2016, when Taylor was sixteen years old. See Despain v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 32, at 1–2, 539 S.W.3d 613, 615 (recounting the circumstances of the murder). On January 25, 2025, Taylor asked the court to waive the provision set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-618(a) requiring that he serve 70 percent of his sentence before being eligible for parole as authorized by subsection 618(c). The relevant provisions of section 16-93-618 provide: (a)(1) Notwithstanding any law allowing the award of meritorious good time or any other law to the contrary, and subject to provisions requiring that an offender serve a greater percentage of his or her sentence in § 16-93-609 or delayed release under § 5-4-405, a person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to subdivisions (a)(1)(A)–(I) of this section [includes Taylor’s offenses of first-degree murder and aggravated robbery] for an offense committed before January 1, 2025, shall not be eligible for parole or community correction transfer, except as provided in subdivision (a)(3) of this section or subsection (c) of this section, until the person serves seventy percent (70%) of the term of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced, including a sentence prescribed under § 5-4-501[.] .... (c) The sentencing judge, in his or her discretion, may waive subsection (a) of this section under the following circumstances: (1) The defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense; (2) The juvenile was merely an accomplice to the offense; and (3) The offense occurred on or after July 28, 1995. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-618(a), (c) (Supp. 2025). Taylor alleged in his motion that he was a juvenile at the time of the offense, that he was merely an accomplice to the crimes, and that the offense occurred after July 28, 1995. Thus, he contended that the circuit court had discretion pursuant to section 16-93-618(c) to waive the 70 percent service provision. Without addressing the merits of Taylor’s motion, 2 the circuit court dismissed the motion, stating, “Having sentenced [Taylor] in 2018, this Court no longer has jurisdiction to consider the Motion.” Taylor’s appeal followed. We do not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Boykins v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 264, at 1. A finding is clearly erroneous when the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake. Hawkins v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 86, at 3. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a postconviction motion seeking a waiver pursuant to section 16-93-618 is a motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner and therefore subject to the filing deadlines set forth in Rule 37.2 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Johnson v. State, 2014 Ark. 526, at 3, 452 S.W.3d 87, 89 (interpreting section 16-93-618’s predecessor statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-611, which was replaced word for word in 2011 by section 16-93-618). Johnson pled guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated assault in 1997. Id. at 1, 452 S.W.3d at 88. He was fourteen at the time of the crimes. Id., 452 S.W.3d at 88. In 2013, Johnson filed a petition requesting a waiver of the 70 percent service requirement. Id. at 2, 452 S.W.3d at 88. The circuit court treated the motion as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37, found it was not filed within ninety days of the entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 37.2(c), 1 and denied 1 Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(c)(i) (2025) provides: If a conviction was obtained on a plea of guilty, or the petitioner was found guilty at trial and did not appeal the judgment of conviction, a petition claiming relief 3 the motion because it had no jurisdiction in the matter. Id. at 2, 452 S.W.3d at 88. The supreme court affirmed, holding that a pleading that mounts a collateral attack on a judgment is governed by the provisions of Rule 37.1 regardless of the label on the petition. Id. at 3, 452 S.W.3d at 89. Johnson applies here. Taylor’s motion, filed more than six years after he was convicted, was filed well past the ninety-day deadline set forth in Rule 37.2(c)(i) for filing a postconviction petition for relief from a guilty plea. Because Taylor’s motion was untimely, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court’s dismissal was not clearly erroneous. Taylor attempts to distinguish Johnson, arguing that Johnson was sentenced before the statute was amended to allow a sentencing court to waive the 70 percent service requirement for juveniles and that Johnson was asking the court to apply the statute retroactively to his case.2 Taylor’s argument has no merit. The supreme court in Johnson stated that “[i]n addition to the lack of jurisdiction based on the untimeliness” of Johnson’s motion, the motion was also properly dismissed because the statute cannot be applied retroactively to waive the 70 percent requirement. Id. at 5, 452 S.W.3d at 90. The retroactive holding was an alternative under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment. If a petition is filed before the entry of judgment, the petition shall be treated as filed on the day after the entry of judgment. 2 The Arkansas General Assembly amended the statute in 1999. 4 ruling that in no way alters the primary holding in that case, which was that the untimely motion deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction. Affirmed. VIRDEN and BROWN, JJ., agree. Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 5