Quinta Jones v. Amy Jones (Dowell)
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 546
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-25-656
QUINTA JONES Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 04DR-20-743]
AMY JONES (DOWELL) HONORABLE DOUG SCHRANTZ,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
In this one-brief appeal, Quinta Jones appeals the Benton County Circuit Court’s
denial of his motion to enforce an altered agreement and the award of attorney’s fees and
costs to his ex-wife, Amy Dowell (formerly Jones.) Jones also argues that the circuit court
erred in awarding Amy her entire 401(k) because it is marital property and should have been
divided equally. We affirm the denial of his motion to enforce the altered agreement and
award of attorney’s fees and costs to Amy, and we remand the case for findings regarding the
court’s unequal division of marital property.
I. Relevant Facts
Quinta and Amy were married in 1998 and divorced in 2020. An agreed property-
settlement and child-custody agreement was attached to the divorce decree entered
November 9, 2020. The parties agreed to convert ownership of the family home located at
2805 Simmons Lane in Rogers to tenants in common. Quinta and Amy agreed that Quinta
would retain possession of the home until it was sold, and the proceeds would be divided
equally between them after the sale. The settlement agreement provided that it was a “full
and complete settlement of all property rights, real or personal and mixed, accruing to them
by the marriage, and that the terms of this agreement are contractual.” The agreement also
included a clause that provided if either party failed to comply with the terms of the
agreement and the other party was required to initiate legal proceedings to enforce the
agreement, he or she would be liable for attorney’s fees.
On October 2, 2023, Amy filed a petition for contempt alleging that Quinta had sold
the Rogers home; however, he had not given her half the proceeds as agreed. Amy asked the
court to hold Quinta in contempt and order him to pay her half the sale proceeds as well as
attorney’s fees and costs.
Quinta responded that Amy had been aware of the sale of the home when it occurred.
He contended that around three weeks after the decree was entered, they verbally modified
the settlement agreement, changing the terms. In the new agreement, Quinta agreed to
assume all debt associated with the Rogers home, and in exchange, he would keep the entire
amount of the sale proceeds. He attached the executed quitclaim deed in which Amy
relinquished her rights to the Rogers home. Additionally, Quinta alleged that Amy had
unclean hands because she did not disclose her retirement account during the marriage, and
as her marital partner, he was entitled to half of her 401(k), stock, and stock options. He
requested that the circuit court dismiss her motion for contempt.
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Shortly after Amy filed her petition for contempt, Qunita filed for bankruptcy;
however, the bankruptcy case was eventually dismissed. On December 3, 2024, Amy filed a
motion to reopen the petition for contempt.
In response, Qunita moved to enforce the altered agreement. He asserted that on
November 28, 2020, around three weeks after the divorce decree and settlement agreement
were entered, he and Amy “engaged in a verbal negotiation” regarding the Rogers home and
two additional properties they owned: a rental house in Bella Vista and a condo in Tempe,
Arizona. Quinta explained that they agreed he would retain all real property and remove
Amy’s name from the mortgages and either refinance the properties or pay off the debt.
Quinta contended that Amy’s execution of a quitclaim deed on each property was proof of
the modified agreement. Quinta again claimed that he should be awarded half the value of
Amy’s retirement account and stock interests that “she failed to disclose.”
At the hearing, Quinta testified that, originally, he and Amy entered into the written
settlement agreement that provided the Rogers home would be sold and the proceeds split
between the parties; however, shortly after the decree was entered, Quinta and Amy had a
phone conversation that he recorded in which he claims they reached a different agreement.
Quinta testified that during the conversation, Amy agreed to transfer all three properties to
him via quitclaim deeds.1 In the short section of the conversation played for the court,
1
On October 12, 2021, Amy quitclaimed the Bella Vista property to Quinta almost a
year after the phone conversation. On December 21, 2021, Amy quitclaimed the Rogers
property; and on July 20, 2023, Amy executed the quitclaim deed on the Arizona property.
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Quinta stated that if they never reconciled, all the real property would be his. Amy
responded, “Right, and you can get my name off of it. Yeah.” She suggested that he could
refinance the mortgage, and he responded, “Pfft, maybe one day; I’ll just pay it off, we’ll
figure that out. But you, you are, regardless if we reconcile, you’re okay with that?” Quinta
testified that he sold the Rogers home in December 2021, and he obtained a $5000 loan
from the realtor, taken from the proceeds of the sale. Amy was not involved in the loan and
did not benefit from it. Quinta stated that he also sold the Bella Vista home, which was not
a part of the written settlement agreement, and realized an approximate gain of $63,000
from the sale. Quinta testified that he had known about Amy’s 401(k) from its inception
when she began working for Walmart, and the Arizona property was purchased with a
$50,000 loan from it, which he did not repay. Quinta testified that there was an outstanding
debt of $323,000 on the Arizona property, and it was in foreclosure. 2 The condo was being
sold the day after the hearing, and both he and Amy were responsible for any remaining debt
on the property. He testified that part of his obligation in the verbal agreement was to remove
Amy from the mortgage on the Arizona property, which he had not done. Quinta explained
that in negotiating the written settlement agreement, Amy agreed that he could keep the
excluded real property if they omitted her 401(k) from the settlement agreement. Quinta
testified that, in any event, he could not pay Amy because he spent the proceeds on their
children and expensive vacations, and he lost the money in investments.
2
The property was intended as a starter home for their son who lived in Arizona.
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Amy testified that even though she had no legal obligation to quitclaim the Bella
Vista and Tempe properties to Quinta, she did so because they were “investment properties
that [she had] no interest in,” and she “realized [she] didn’t want any rental property business
at all, that it was going to be all his responsibility.” Amy explained that she quitclaimed the
Rogers house to Quinta so he could sell the home without her participation, and they agreed
she was entitled to half the proceeds. Quinta never paid her half of the approximately
$63,000 proceeds from that sale. Amy agreed that Quinta had always known about her
401(k) because he accessed the account without her knowledge by e-signing as her, withdrew
$50,000 from her retirement account, and put it toward the purchase of the Arizona condo.
She explained that although Quinta initially withdrew the $50,000 without her knowledge,
she later endorsed the $50,000 check. She paid the $50,000 back into her retirement account
without any contribution from Quinta. In the following colloquy, Amy explained that her
understanding of the November 28, 2020 phone call was different than Quinta’s
explanation:
Q The -- at any point in time did you tell Mr. Jones that he got to keep all the
real estate?
A I just agreed to what he was saying, said, “Right. Get my name off of it” when
he said “all of the real estate.”
....
Q So when he’s talking about “all of the real estate is mine”—the exact words in
the transcript—what are you responding—what were you responding to when
you said, “Right”? What properties were you talking about?
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A I was talking about the investment properties, not our family home which was
2805 Simmons Lane [in Rogers].
Q Can you explain to the judge how you see a difference?
A I see a difference because all of my time and emotions and memories are all
within one property, and I never wanted anything to do with the real estate or
investment properties. So, in my mind, there’s a difference between the family
home and real estate that he’s referring to.
....
A I mean, it’s just memories about the home and, like, the measurements of our
kids’ heights on doorways and twenty years of a home that shouldn’t have been
divided.
Q Is that different from -- you always -- how have you always referred to the
investment properties?
A As rental properties and not mine.
Q Okay. Real estate? When do you use that term?
A It’s something that doesn’t have an emotional attachment to it.
Q Okay. So did you ever intend in this agreement—tell the Court what you
intended in this agreement when you said this, if this is in fact an agreement,
because we’re going to argue about that later. But if this in fact is an agreement,
what did you intend by this agreement?
A I meant for it to be the investment properties and rental properties which was
the one location that was in Bella Vista at that time as well as the property that
was out in Arizona where our oldest son lives.
Q Did you have any conditions on that, on him getting that property?
....
A . . . I wanted my name removed from any financial responsibility.
Q Has that happened?
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A No.
....
Q . . . I’m asking you if you did in fact have another agreement two weeks after
the divorce?
A Only that he would get the other investment properties.
Q But that’s not what I’m asking you. Was that an agreement, Amy?
A Of the properties.
Q Okay. So it was an agreement. We got there. You may not both agree on what
the agreement was, but it was an agreement. Yes?
A Yes.
Amy believed she was still “on the hook” for the Arizona property. Amy recalled that
when she discovered that the Arizona condo was in foreclosure and would be sold on
October 10, 2023, she told Quinta by text that she “expected the money that he made from
the sale to come to [her] for what’s owed per the divorce decree[.]” Quinta did not respond
to her text or deny that he owed Amy money from the Rogers house sale. Because Quinta
did not respond, Amy moved for contempt. Amy also recalled a conversation before the
decree was entered in which Quinta said, “Give me the real estate and I won’t disclose your
401(k).” She did not agree to Quinta’s suggestion, and that term was not in the settlement
agreement they signed later and attached to the decree. Amy also testified that they incurred
tax debt from 2018 and 2020. Amy explained that her portion of the income tax was
withheld from her paycheck, and Quinta, who was self-employed, failed to pay his income
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tax. Quinta’s failure to pay his income taxes was the sole reason for their tax debt, and she
believed he alone should be responsible for it. Amy stated that she filed an innocent-spouse
claim for the 2018 tax debt; however, the IRS garnished her tax refund.
The court ruled from the bench that the parties negotiated the settlement agreement
and intentionally left out certain property. The court determined that the section of the
phone call in evidence was a negotiation and that “[i]t’s called, ‘We will agree to agree
sometime.’ There’s no agreement here, none whatsoever.” As to the 401(k) and the Arizona
property, the court found that a portion of Amy’s retirement account was used to make the
down payment, and Amy solely repaid the amount into her 401(k). The court determined
that Amy quitclaimed the property to Quinta; thus, it belonged to Quinta, along with the
debt. The court noted that the Arizona mortgage company might pursue Amy for the debt
because Quinta had not removed her from the mortgage as he promised. As to the marital
home in Rogers, the court found that the written settlement agreement clearly states that the
proceeds from the sale would be split in half. The court held Quinta in contempt for failing
to fulfill the terms of the settlement agreement and ordered him to pay her half the proceeds
from the sale and Amy’s attorney’s fees. Regarding the Bella Vista property, the court found
that there was no agreement, either oral or written; thus, the proceeds from that sale would
be split evenly.
On June 24, 2025, the circuit court entered the written order and made the following
findings:
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The parties testified that there was a negotiation before and after the divorce, but the
court found no agreement resulted from those negotiations. Both parties had
knowledge of the properties, and “there was no fraud, they simply did not disclose it
resulting partial performance maybe, failure of performance largely.”
Amy’s 401(k) and the Arizona condo were not included in the settlement agreement.
A $50,000 loan from Amy’s 401(k) provided the down payment toward the purchase
of the property. Amy quitclaimed the property to Quinta, and Quinta owned the
property and any associated debt. Amy’s 401(k) belonged solely to Amy.
Quinta was in contempt for failing to divide the proceeds from the sale of the Rogers
home with Amy. He was ordered to pay Amy $91,723.09—half the proceeds of the
Rogers home plus the $5,000 loan, divided in half.
Pursuant to the court’s contempt finding, Quinta was ordered to pay Amy’s attorney’s
fees of $2,927.70.
The Bella Vista property was not a “matter of agreement” because there was no
agreement as to that property. Quinta owed Amy half the proceeds of that sale, or
$31,216.11.
Quinta timely filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Enforce Altered Agreement
In his first point on appeal, Quinta argues that the circuit court reversibly erred in
denying his motion to enforce the altered agreement. Quinta contends that, pursuant to the
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phone conversation three weeks after the decree was entered, he and Amy entered an oral
agreement modifying the settlement agreement. Quinta asserts that he and Amy agreed that
he would keep all three real properties and any proceeds from their sale. They also agreed
that he would remove her name from the mortgages and retain any associated debt. In
exchange, Amy would solely own her 401(k), stock, and stock options. We disagree and
affirm.
We affirm the circuit court’s findings unless they were clearly erroneous or clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence. Housley v. Hensley, 100 Ark. App. 118, 265
S.W.3d 136 (2007). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Id. We give special deference to the superior position of the circuit court to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses and their testimony. Id.
An oral modification of a prior written contract must be established by clear and
convincing evidence; however, a requirement that the evidence be “clear and convincing”
does not mean that the evidence must be uncontradicted. City Nat’l Bank of Fort Smith v. First
Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Rogers, 22 Ark. App. 5, 10, 732 S.W.2d 489, 492 (1987).
Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to show that the parties entered into a contract.
Id.
There is a significant divergence in Quinta’s and Amy’s testimony. Quinta
consistently testified that the agreement related to all three properties—the family home
included. Amy consistently testified that the oral agreement involved only the two
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investment properties. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, we
cannot say that Amy’s testimony that she thought of the family home as entirely different
from the rental properties is not clear and convincing. The circuit court’s opportunity to
assess the credibility of the witnesses is especially important where, as here, the testimony is
in conflict. See id. Quinta argues that certain evidence proves that he and Amy orally
modified the written agreement. He asserts that Amy’s execution of the three quitclaim deeds
and the phone call in which she stated she had no interest in the real estate unequivocally
prove that they came to an agreement that he would keep all three properties. He asserts that
Amy waited two years after the sale of the Rogers home to file her petition for contempt and
contends that her delay clearly and unambiguously proves that the oral agreement
superseded the written settlement agreement. The circuit court, however, did not find
Quinta’s interpretation of the evidence and testimony persuasive. The circuit court gave
more weight to Amy’s testimony that the investment properties and the family home were
completely different and not categorized together in their oral negotiation. Under these
circumstances, we hold that the court did not err in finding that the parties never came to
an agreement as to the specific terms.
B. Bella Vista Property
Quinta argues that, pursuant to the oral agreement, Amy disclaimed any interest in
the Bella Vista property, including sale proceeds. Applying the analysis above, we also affirm
the circuit court’s determination that the parties reached no agreement regarding this
property.
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C. Contempt and Attorney’s Fees
We also affirm the circuit court’s finding that Quinta is in contempt of the settlement
agreement. Quinta argues that he is not in contempt because the written agreement was
modified by their oral agreement; however, relying on the analysis above, we hold that his
argument fails. Likewise, because Quinta’s argument regarding attorney’s fees is also
premised on the validity of the oral agreement, we affirm the circuit court’s award of fees to
Amy.
D. Unequal Division of Marital Property
Quinta asserts on appeal that the court’s unequal distribution of Amy’s 401(k) was
clearly erroneous and should be reversed. His argument is not well taken, and we express no
opinion as to whether the circuit court’s distribution of marital property is proper.
With respect to the division of property, we review the circuit court’s findings of fact
and affirm them unless they are clearly erroneous or against the preponderance of the
evidence; the division of property itself is also reviewed, and the same standard applies. See
Conlee v. Conlee, 370 Ark. 89, 257 S.W.3d 543 (2007).
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315(b) (Repl. 2020) defines marital property
as “all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage.” There is a
presumption that all property acquired during a marriage is marital property. Ellis v. Ellis,
2017 Ark. App. 661, 536 S.W.3d 166. Once one party has shown that property was acquired
during the marriage, the burden shifts to the other party to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the property is nonmarital. Id.
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Our appellate courts have consistently interpreted section 9-12-315(a) to grant the
circuit court broad powers in distributing both nonmarital and marital property to achieve
an equitable division. Moore v. Moore, 2019 Ark. 216, 576 S.W.3d 15. We have held that any
exception to the rule of equal distribution will always depend on the specific facts as reflected
by the circuit court’s findings and conclusions. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, 453 S.W.3d
655. The circuit court is vested with a measure of flexibility in apportioning the total assets
held in the marital estate upon divorce, and the critical inquiry is how the total assets are
divided. Jones v. Jones, 2014 Ark. 96, 432 S.W.3d 36. The overriding purpose of the property-
division statute is to enable the court to make a division that is fair and equitable under the
circumstances. Id. Marital property cannot always be divided exactly equally and in kind. Id.
Stated differently, the property-division statute does not compel mathematical precision in
the distribution of property; it simply requires that marital property be distributed equitably.
Id. We will not substitute our judgment on appeal as to the exact interest each party should
have but will decide only whether the order is clearly wrong. Id.
In accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315(a)(1), upon entry of
a divorce decree, the circuit court shall equally distribute all marital property one-half to each
party unless it is determined that such a distribution would be inequitable; if the property is
not divided equally, then the circuit court must state the reasons and bases for not doing so,
and the bases and reasons should be recited in the order entered in the matter. Chambers v.
Chambers, 2017 Ark. App. 429, 527 S.W.3d 1.
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Quinta limits his argument regarding the unequal distribution of marital property to
Amy’s 401(k); however, discussion of all the marital property, including the Rogers home
and the two investment properties, is necessary to address the issue Quinta raises. Although
the circuit court commented on its distribution of the Arizona condo, the Bella Vista rental
home, the Rogers home, and Amy’s 401(k) at the conclusion of the hearing and in the
written order, it did not state the reasons for their unequal division. Because the divorce
decree does not set forth the circuit court’s reasoning for the unequal division of the marital
property, we remand for the court to enter an order that satisfies the requirements of
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315. As stated above, we express no opinion as to
whether the court’s distribution would have been proper had the findings been made. See
Chambers, supra.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the motion to enforce the altered
agreement, the finding of contempt, and the award of attorney’s fees. We remand the case
for the court to make findings regarding the unequal division of the marital property.
Affirmed and remanded.
BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree.
Putman Law Office, by: William B. Putman, for appellant.
One brief only.
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