Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 562 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-26-3 Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 KATRINA HAMLETT APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, CHICKASAWBA DISTRICT V. [NO. 47BDR-23-215] JEREME HAMLETT HONORABLE DAN RITCHEY, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge Katrina Hamlett filed this one-brief appeal from the Mississippi County Circuit Court’s divorce decree awarding her ex-husband, Jereme Joe Hamlett, sole legal custody of the parties’ fourteen-year-old son and eight-year-old daughter, subject to Katrina’s standard visitation, and awarding her Jereme’s 401(k) account in the amount of $62,541.23. Katrina brings three points on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred in awarding an unequal division of Jereme’s 401(k) account; (2) the circuit court erred by not requiring the attorney ad litem’s presence or report at the final hearing; and (3) the circuit court erred in not awarding joint custody. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. I. Facts The parties were married in 2008 and separated in 2022. In his complaint for divorce filed on June 13, 2023, Jereme alleged that Katrina had an extensive history of alcohol and drug abuse, had participated in at least seven rehabilitation programs, had abused their son during the periods of alcohol and drug abuse, was currently in an inpatient rehabilitation facility, and had not seen the children for more than a year. He asked the court to award him a divorce, child support, and an equitable division of property, and he requested ex parte emergency custody of the children with Katrina having supervised visitation. He alleged that the children would be in “immediate and physical harm” if placed with Katrina for any period of time. The court entered a temporary order in September awarding custody to Jereme and supervised visitation to Katrina until the final hearing. On August 22, 2024, Jereme filed a motion to appoint an attorney ad litem to protect the best interest of the children, alleging that he had “serious concerns” regarding Katrina’s extensive history of alcohol abuse and its effect on her relationship with their son. On September 20, the court entered an agreed order appointing an ad litem and on July 28, 2025, held a final divorce hearing. The ad litem was not present for the final hearing, and no ad litem report appears in the record on appeal. Jereme testified at the hearing that the divorce was caused by Katrina’s substance- abuse problems that began around 2012 and continued until the parties separated in January 2022. Jereme said that Katrina sought treatment and got better for a few years, but the issues reignited in 2015. Their daughter was born in 2017, and immediately thereafter, Katrina again began abusing drugs and alcohol, seeking treatment in 2017 and 2018. The situation improved for a year or so, but in 2021, Katrina began drinking and abusing pills and was arrested and charged with DWI. 2 Jereme described one incident in January 2022 that occurred while Katrina was at home with their son, Jereme was at work, and their daughter was in daycare. The parties were talking on the phone when Jereme mentioned Katrina’s drinking. Katrina began yelling at Jereme not to come home or she would “call the cops” on him. He came home with their daughter, and Katrina called the police. In Jereme’s recording of the incident played for the court, Katrina yells that Jereme is “a piece of sh**,” a “fu***** pu***,” and is going to jail. She then tells their eleven-year-old son not to be like Jereme. Jereme asks her not to speak that way in front of the kids, but she yelled that he (Jereme) is “so stupid” and is dealing “meth” out of their garage. Jereme stated that Katrina tried to attack him, and he can be heard on the video telling Katrina, “Get away from me you fu***** psycho.” Katrina continues to scream “pu***, pu***, pu***, pu***.” Jereme testified that he eventually locked himself and the children in his son’s bedroom to escape. Jereme asked the court for sole custody because he had always been there for the children, they were “happy and loved,” and the parties no longer lived in the same town,1 which would render joint custody too stressful on the children during the school year. He admitted, however, that Katrina had been sober for several years and that sobriety was not presently an issue. He added that he and Katrina had been “alternating weeks” with the children that summer and that it “seemed to go good.” 1 Jereme lives in Armorel/Blytheville, and Katrina lives in Rector, which Jereme testified are about 45–50 minutes apart. 3 Jereme testified that he was living with his girlfriend and his children in the marital home purchased by the parties in 2008, that he has always paid and continues to pay the mortgage and all bills on the home, and that Katrina had never helped with any of these payments. He said his 401(k) had a value of $184,379.91 in March 2022, but he had taken withdrawals from the account “to live” after he temporarily lost his job. Even after he secured employment after his job loss, Jereme said that he continued to make withdrawals from the account for food, gas, and other living expenses and to fund an unsuccessful attempt to start his own business. On the day of the hearing, the balance of the 401(k) account was $62,541.23. Jereme asked for an equal division of marital assets, contending that he had supported the family and taken care of the children while Katrina had not contributed to any of the asset accumulation, had not worked during the marriage, was in and out of rehabilitation facilities, and was “just there, drinking up the money.” Katrina admitted she had been in a cycle of abusing alcohol “over and over,” had been to “quite a few” treatment programs, had been in a bad place, and had negatively affected her children by her addiction and consequent behavior. She testified that she had a very damaged relationship with the children when the parties separated. She also admitted that Jereme had made all mortgage payments and had paid other bills. She said that in 2023, she found her “true identity through Jesus,” had been sober since January 2023, and had been witnessing to others since that time. She testified that she had renewed her relationship with the children and had enjoyed alternating weeks of custody during the summer, which 4 had been “absolutely wonderful.” She said that she was licensed to work as a mental-health “first aider” but did not currently have a job in that field because she was waiting to get through the court proceedings. She was working for her father at the time of the hearing for more flexibility. She testified that she desired joint custody and was willing to drive the children forty-five minutes to school during the weeks that she had custody. She asked for an unequal distribution of the 401(k) to account for the withdrawals Jereme made during the separation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit commended Katrina for her recovery effort and noted that she appeared to have found a path out of addiction. But it found that she had caused “significant trauma” to the family and, specifically, to the children, which was not cured by her “present period of sobriety.” Nor was the court convinced that her conduct was related solely to substance abuse. In addition, the court noted that the parties’ residing in separate towns presented a logistical issue. From the bench, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody was not in the best interest of the children and awarded Jereme sole custody with standard visitation to Katrina. On September 11, 2025, the court entered a decree of divorce finding by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody was not in the best interest of the children and awarding sole legal custody to Jereme with standard visitation to Katrina. The court also awarded Katrina the entire balance of Jereme’s 401(k) account of $62,541.23, reduced by a child-support arrearage owed by Katrina to Jereme of $14,707.00, which amounted to a total 5 to Katrina of $42,834.23. The court ordered that the marital home be listed for sale and that upon its sale, the proceeds are to be equally divided between the parties. II. Division of Property For her first argument on appeal, Katrina contends that the circuit court erred in granting an unequal distribution of the parties’ assets, specifically claiming that it erred in “not dividing the retirement-fund assets as of the time of separation equally.” She argues that if the 401(k) account had been divided equally as the law requires, she would have received $98,471.07 (rather than $62,541.23)––that is, half the value of the account at the time the parties separated before Jereme began making withdrawals from it. This court reviews divorce cases de novo, but it will not reverse the circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous or against the preponderance of the evidence. Branscum v. Branscum, 2022 Ark. App. 126, at 2, 642 S.W.3d 270, 273. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. at 3, 642 S.W.3d at 273. In reviewing the circuit court’s findings, this court defers to the circuit court’s superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Jez v. Jez, 2016 Ark. App. 594, at 2, 509 S.W.3d 1, 3. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315(b) (Repl. 2020) defines marital property as “all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage.” In accordance with section 9-12-315(a)(1), upon entry of a divorce decree, the circuit court shall equally distribute all marital property one-half to each party unless it is determined that such a 6 distribution would be inequitable; if the property is not divided equally, then the circuit court must state the reasons and bases for not doing so. Chambers v. Chambers, 2017 Ark. App. 429, at 14–15, 527 S.W.3d 1, 10. The entry date of the divorce decree is the correct date to be used for valuation of marital property. Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark. 420, 425, 40 S.W.3d 768, 772 (2001). Katrina does not dispute that the 401(k) account is marital property. Her argument is that the court erred in not dividing the 401(k) equally on the basis of its value at some unnamed date during the parties’ separation before Jereme withdrew funds from the account. She argues that the court’s unequal division of the 401(k) in favor of Jereme imposes an illegal penalty on her and is not consistent with the factors a court is required to consider in such unequal divisions pursuant to section 9-12-315(a). First, Katrina is incorrect that the court awarded an unequal division of the 401(k) in favor of Jereme. The value of the parties’ property interest in the 401(k) account for distribution purposes under section 9-12-315(a) is the date on which the divorce decree was entered, Skokos, 344 Ark. at 425, 40 S.W.3d at 772, not some undefined point during the parties’ separation or marriage. The 401(k) was worth $62,541.23 on the date of the divorce, and the court awarded the entire amount to Katrina. Moreover, parties in a divorce case must often use marital funds to meet necessary expenses incurred during the pendency of the action, and a circuit court has the discretion to determine when it is necessary to use these funds, whether the amount used was reasonable, whether fraud or overreaching occurred, and whether an offset is appropriate. 7 Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 67–68, 847 S.W.2d 23, 27–28 (1993). Although Katrina cites no authority for her request that Jereme be ordered to reimburse her the marital funds he withdrew from the 401(k) account during the marriage, such reimbursements are rare and based on much more egregious conduct than exists here. See, e.g., Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2025 Ark. App. 613, 725 S.W.3d 901 (affirming reimbursement to the wife of millions of dollars of the wife’s earned income spent by the husband on gold-mining and treasure-hunting ventures that were hidden from the wife); Keathley v. Keathley, 76 Ark. App. 150, 61 S.W.3d 219 (2001) (affirming the unequal distribution to the wife where the husband depleted the marital estate through gambling while the wife was working to accumulate assets); Thakar v. Thakar, 2022 Ark. App. 284, 646 S.W.3d 666 (affirming the unequal division of property to the wife where the husband transferred considerable assets from the parties’ joint accounts to family members in India without his wife’s knowledge or consent). The facts in those cases are inapposite to the facts here. The only testimony presented regarding Jereme’s withdrawals from the 401(k) account was that he used the money to pay the mortgage on the marital home, to pay expenses for him and the children, and to fund an unsuccessful business. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court’s award of $62,541.23— the full amount of the 401(k) account at the time of the divorce—to Katrina is not clearly erroneous. III. Attorney Ad Litem Katrina also argues that the ad litem failed to appear at the final hearing or submit a report. She acknowledges that she did not preserve this objection at trial but submits that 8 the ad litem’s input is necessary to protect the interest of the children. We hold that this issue is not preserved for our review because Katrina failed to bring the matter to the court’s attention, and the court has not ruled on this issue. The burden of obtaining a ruling is on the movant; objections and matters left unresolved are waived and may not be relied upon on appeal. Szwedo v. Cyrus, 2019 Ark. App. 23, at 15, 570 S.W.3d 484, 494. IV. Joint Custody For her third point on appeal, Katrina argues that the circuit court erred in not awarding joint custody. She admits that she had significant issues with alcohol abuse, which led to repeated altercations between the parties during their marriage. But she contends that at the time of the hearing, she had taken extensive steps to correct these issues and turn her life around. She had maintained sobriety for over two years, and Jereme himself testified that “everything seems to be going good” and admitted that she is no longer an unfit parent. Katrina argues that the circuit court’s finding was based on old information and failed to account for the fact that she was a fit parent at the time of the custody determination. We perform a de novo review of child-custody matters, but we will not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McCandlis v. McCandlis, 2024 Ark. App. 339, at 8. We recognize and give special deference to the superior position of the circuit court to evaluate the witnesses, their testimony, and the children’s best interest. Id. In an action concerning an original child-custody determination in a divorce, there is a presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13- 101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(a) (Supp. 2023). This presumption may be rebutted if the court finds by clear 9 and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the child’s best interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b)(1). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Zihala v. Staley, 2024 Ark. App. 269, at 6, 689 S.W.3d 82, 88. If the court finds that the presumption in favor of joint custody has been rebutted, the court shall enter a written order that includes facts, findings, and conclusions of law concerning the basis for the court’s determination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(b)(3)(A). Here, the circuit court’s divorce decree provides: “[T]his Court finds clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the best interests of the minor children. That [Jereme] is awarded sole legal custody of the minor children, subject to [Katrina’s] visitation as set forth below[.]” Although the court’s order specifically finds by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the children’s best interest, it does not contain facts, findings, and conclusions of law concerning the basis for its determination. The child- custody statute clearly mandates that the court include in its written order the facts, findings, and conclusions of law in support of its decision that the presumption of joint custody was rebutted. Thus, we cannot simply presume that the court made the necessary factual findings to support its decision. Porter v. Jackson, 2025 Ark. App. 605, at 6. Without the requisite findings, we have no way to reliably determine whether the court properly analyzed the facts under the statute. Mata v. Reyes, 2026 Ark. App. 229, at 3. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to make the necessary findings concerning whether the joint- custody presumption has been rebutted. 10 Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. VIRDEN and BARRETT, JJ., agree. Jeremy B. Lowrey, for appellant. One brief only. 11