Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 433 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-25-440 SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU Opinion Delivered September 23, 2026 CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, THIRD DIVISION V. [NO. 60CV-24-7289] BRITTANY ARVIE, SAMANTHA HONORABLE CATHLEEN V. EGGLESTON, KEVIN STACKHOUSE, COMPTON, JUDGE SHEILA HARDISON, AND DWIGHT HARDISON, SR. APPELLEES REVERSED AND REMANDED CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (SFB) appeals a Pulaski County Circuit Court order transferring its declaratory-judgment action to the Phillips County Circuit Court. Finding that the court improperly transferred the case, we reverse and remand. On March 4, 2024, Samantha Eggleston was involved in an accident in Phillips County in which the car she was driving collided with a vehicle being driven by Kevin Stackhouse. It then struck a car and a storage unit owned by Sheila and Dwight Hardison. The vehicle Eggleston was driving at the time of the accident was owned by Brittany Arvie and insured by SFB. After the accident, the Hardisons and Stackhouse filed a negligence suit against Eggleston in the Phillips County Circuit Court seeking damages to their property. Stackhouse also sought damages for injuries he allegedly sustained in the accident. Several months after the Phillips County complaint was filed, SFB filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Pulaski County Circuit Court against Eggleston and Arvie. In the complaint, SFB alleged that, at the time of the accident, Eggleston was driving Arvie’s vehicle without permission and that doing so triggered an exclusion under its policy with Arvie. SFB asserted that, as a result, it was under no obligation to defend or indemnify Eggleston with respect to the Phillips County lawsuit. Arvie answered and admitted that Eggleston had used her car without her knowledge and without her permission. 1 SFB subsequently filed an amended complaint adding Stackhouse and the Hardisons as defendants.2 The amended complaint again asserted that SFB had no duty to defend or indemnify Eggleston and further asked for a declaration that there was no coverage under the policy for the underlying negligence action. Stackhouse filed an answer and motion to dismiss arguing that SFB’s amended complaint should be dismissed under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) because the 1 Eggleston was served, but it does not appear she ever answered the complaint for declaratory relief. 2 SFB indicated that these parties were added to satisfy Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-111-111(a) (Supp. 2025), which states, “When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.” 2 same matters were pending in Phillips County. He claimed that the Phillips County lawsuit had been filed and service had been perfected before the Pulaski County lawsuit was filed; thus, the Phillips County Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the matter. He further argued that Phillips County was the more convenient forum since the underlying accident and all the witnesses to the accident were located in Phillips County, while Pulaski County “had absolutely no connection to the underlying negligence cause of action.” SFB responded, arguing that the Pulaski County lawsuit and the Phillips County lawsuit were not the same—the Pulaski County lawsuit was a declaratory-judgment action related to an insurance policy between SFB and Arvie; the Phillips County lawsuit involved a negligence action between Eggleston, Stackhouse, and the Hardisons. SFB noted that neither it nor Arvie were parties to the Phillips County negligence action, and its duty to defend and indemnify was not at issue there. SFB argued that, as a result, the motion to dismiss should be denied. Like Stackhouse, the Hardisons answered and reserved their right to object to venue. Approximately six months later, they sought to have the action dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3). In the alternative, relying upon Rule 12(h)(3)3 and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101(D),4 3 Rule 12(h)(3) provides that “upon a determination that venue is improper, the court shall dismiss the action or direct that it be transferred to a county where venue would be proper.” 4 Arkansas Code Annotated Section 16-4-101(D) (Repl. 2010) states, “Inconvenient Forum. When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.” 3 they sought to have the matter transferred to Phillips County, which they claimed was the proper and more convenient forum for the action, In June 2025, the court held a hearing on the Hardisons’ motion.5 At the close of the hearing, the court stated that it was denying the motion to dismiss but was granting the motion to transfer to Phillips County. The court agreed that Pulaski County was not a “wholly improper venue” but stated its belief that Phillips County was the “better venue” because (1) the accident occurred in Phillips County and (2) almost everybody involved lived in Phillips County.6 Despite this declaration, the court stated it was not basing its decision on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which it readily acknowledged did not apply between counties. A general order granting the Hardisons’ motion to transfer was filed on June 18, 2025. SFB appealed.7 5 It does not appear that Stackhouse or his counsel attended this hearing or that his motion was considered. 6 The record reflects that SFB has an office in Pulaski County and that Arvie actually lives in Little Rock. 7 Appellees have challenged this court’s jurisdiction, claiming that the motion to transfer was not a final, appealable order. Our supreme court, however, in Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Arkansas v. Gadbury-Swift, found a similar order to manifestly be a final order. 2010 Ark. 6, at 4 n.2, 362 S.W.3d 291, 294 n.2 (stating that order transferring declaratory-judgment action from Pulaski County to Logan County was “manifestly a final order” for purposes of Farm Bureau’s action in Pulaski County, rendering a Rule 54(b) certificate unnecessary); but see Blunt v. Cartwright, 342 Ark. 662, 30 S.W.3d 737 (2000); Heber Springs Lawn & Garden, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 275 Ark. 260, 628 S.W.2d 563 (1982); Ark. Sav. & Loan Ass’n Bd. v. Corning Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 252 Ark. 264, 478 S.W.2d 431 (1972); State v. Langstaff, 231 Ark. 736, 332 S.W.2d 614 (1960) (all holding that orders establishing venue or granting or denying a motion to transfer to another Arkansas court were not 4 The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in transferring the Pulaski County declaratory-judgment action to Phillips County. Here, despite the court stating in its ruling from the bench that its transfer to Phillips County “is not being done under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because it doesn’t apply county to county,” the court relied on the forum non conveniens factors in support of its decision. Specifically, the court noted that almost everyone in both cases lives in Phillips County and the witnesses, including law enforcement officers and investigators, were also located in Phillips County. In essence, the court transferred the Pulaski County case to Phillips County because it found Phillips County to be a more convenient forum. This was erroneous. When the legislative branch of the government gives the plaintiff the choice of venues and the plaintiff diligently exercises the choice, the courts should not apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens to transfer a matter to another county because such application would constitute judicial overriding of legislative action as to venue. See Hicks v. Wolfe, 228 Ark. 406, 307 S.W.2d 784 (1957); see also David Newbern & John J. Watkins, Arkansas Civil Practice and Procedure § 9:1 (4th ed. 2006) (“The doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot be invoked to dismiss a suit when venue is proper but another county is considered more appealable orders) and Evans v. Blankenship, 374 Ark. 104, 286 S.W.3d 137 (2008); Gailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 362 Ark. 568, 210 S.W.3d 40 (2005) (finding that orders transferring a case because of improper venue were to be appealed once a final, appealable order had been issued). Like the order in Gadbury-Swift, the order here effectively transferred the entire action to another county. Thus, pursuant to the supreme court’s most recent declarations, we find this order to be a final, appealable order and that we have jurisdiction over the matter. 5 convenient, for such a result would permit the court to upset the General Assembly’s venue choices.”). Here, SFB elected to file its declaratory-judgment action in Pulaski County, and that choice of venue was proper pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-60-101 (Supp. 2025). Despite the appropriateness of venue in Pulaski County, the circuit court transferred the case to Phillips County, citing from the bench its belief that Phillips County was the “better venue.”8 This was erroneous because it is clear that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be applied between counties of this state. See Gadbury-Swift, supra. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in declining to hear SFB’s complaint for declaratory relief under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and in transferring this matter to the Phillips County Circuit Court. Reversed and remanded. ABRAMSON and HIXSON, JJ., agree. Turner & Jones, by: Kaleb M. Jones, for appellant. WDTC Law, P.A., by: Taylor N. Williams, for appelees. 8 We are aware that the written order was silent as to the basis for the transfer. Generally, a written order controls over oral pronouncements, but that is the case only when there is a conflict or a discrepancy between the oral ruling and the written order. See Camden - Progressive Eldercare Servs., Inc. v. Robinson, 2025 Ark. App. 562, 726 S.W.3d 645 (citing Stills v. Stills, 2010 Ark. 132, 361 S.W.3d 823). Here, there was no conflict or discrepancy between the circuit court’s oral ruling and its written order. Rather, the oral ruling merely explained the simple denial in the written order, and we routinely rely on a circuit court’s oral statements from the bench to inform or to explain the reasoning behind a written order. Id. 6