Jerry Parker, Trustee of the Parker Family Trust v. Community First Trust Co., Trustee of the Dora Jane Ledgerwood Ellis Revocable Living Trust and the Trice Ellis, Jr., Revocable Trust
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 548
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-25-603
JERRY PARKER, TRUSTEE OF THE Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
PARKER FAMILY TRUST
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
APPELLANT
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 26CV-22-566]
V.
HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS,
COMMUNITY FIRST TRUST JUDGE
COMPANY, TRUSTEE OF THE DORA
JANE LEDGERWOOD ELLIS
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AND
THE TRICE ELLIS, JR., REVOCABLE
TRUST
APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant Jerry Parker, trustee of the Parker Family Trust (“Trustee Parker”), appeals
the August 4, 2025 “Order to Pay” entered by the Garland County Circuit Court in favor of
Community First Trust Company, trustee of the Dora Jane Ledgerwood Ellis Revocable
Living Trust and the Trice Ellis, Jr., Revocable Trust (“Community First”). The appeal arises
from an effort by Community First to collect judgments entered against William David
Parker (“David”) by garnishing an investment account held in the name of the separate
Parker Family Trust. The Order to Pay directed Stephens, Inc., to pay the full amount of the
judgment from that trust account and prohibited Trustee Parker from making any
distributions until the garnishment lien was satisfied. The question on appeal is not whether
Community First has enforceable judgments against David. The record before us supports
that it does. The issue on appeal is which property or legally cognizable rights of David, if
any, were subject to the relevant garnishments.
Because the Order to Pay reaches the assets of the Parker Family Trust without
identifying which property was David’s or which sums had become subject to collection
notwithstanding the trust’s spendthrift provision, we reverse and remand for the circuit court
to determine the existence and extent of any assets or payments attributable to David that
may lawfully be reached by Community First.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Community First serves as the trustee of the Dora Jane Ledgerwood Ellis Revocable
Living Trust and the Trice Ellis, Jr., Revocable Trust. David previously served as trustee of
those trusts. On November 26, 2024, the circuit court entered summary judgment against
David in the amount of $223,828.25 in litigation involving the Ellis Trust. The circuit court
subsequently awarded attorney’s fees of $24,850.00 and costs of $686.59. Those judgments
were against David, not against the Parker Family Trust.
Henry Eugene “Gene” Parker and Mary Nell Parker established the Parker Family
Trust in July 2015. David is one of their four children and a beneficiary, but he was not a
settlor. The instrument provides for distributions of net income to the settlors’ living
children at least quarterly and for distribution of the remaining trust estate upon the
specified termination event. It also contains a spendthrift provision restricting transfer of a
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beneficiary’s interest and involuntary process against that interest. The trust’s investments
included an account maintained by Stephens, Inc., in the name of the trust.
Separate litigation concerning the Parker Family Trust was pending in the probate
division of the Garland County Circuit Court. In that proceeding, some beneficiaries and
trustees sought modification or termination of the trust and negotiated a memorandum of
understanding and amendment contemplating division and distribution of assets. The
proposed arrangement contemplated judicial approval and beneficiary consent, but the
parties dispute whether it independently created enforceable rights. The proposed settlement
was not shown to have been approved by the probate court before entry of the garnishment
order.
On December 10, 2024, Community First obtained writs of garnishment directed to
Trustee Parker and Stephens, Inc. Additional writs were issued in February 2025 concerning
the fee-and-cost judgment. The Parker Family Trust acknowledged that David received
quarterly income distributions but denied that trust principal was available to his creditors.
Stephens denied holding money or property belonging individually to David, although it
acknowledged maintaining the trust account. The Parker Family Trust moved to quash the
writs on the basis of its spendthrift provision. Community First opposed that motion,
arguing principally that the proposed settlement and the beneficiaries’ conduct permitted
creditors to reach assets otherwise held in trust.
David died on April 1, 2025. The circuit court held a hearing on June 17, 2025, at
which it considered the garnishments, the trust terms, the proposed settlement, and
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stipulated testimony. The record also contains an assertion by the trust that a quarterly
payment of $7,225 had been made after service of the writs of garnishment and before
David’s death. Whether that payment was actually received by David, when any right to it
arose, and whether it remained traceable to him were not resolved in the challenged Order
to Pay.
On August 4, 2025, the circuit court entered the previously described Order to Pay
directing Stephens, Inc., to pay Community First $225,223.41 plus accrued interest from
April 2, 2025, “from the Parker Trust Account.” The court further ordered Trustee Parker
to refrain from any trust distributions and to retain all trust property until the lien was
satisfied. The Order to Pay did not identify any particular property owned by David, any
distribution actually received by him, or any presently enforceable entitlement to principal.
Trustee Parker and Stephens, Inc., filed a timely joint notice of appeal on August 15, 2025.
II. Standard of Review
This court reviews probate proceedings de novo on the record, but we will not reverse
the decision of the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. See Hunter v. Est. of Springston,
2025 Ark. App. 167, 710 S.W.3d 468. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. Id. Furthermore, while we will not overturn the circuit court’s
factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, we are free during a de novo review
to reach a different result required by the law. Id. Similarly, in deciding matters or issues of
law, our standard of review is de novo. Id. Questions of statutory interpretation and the legal
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effect of an unambiguous trust instrument are thus reviewed de novo. See id.; see also Warner
v. Ford, 2023 Ark. App. 537, 680 S.W.3d 439.
III. Discussion
Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-73-502(c) (Repl. 2012) recognizes valid
spendthrift provisions and, subject to statutory exceptions, provides that a creditor or
assignee of a beneficiary may not reach the beneficiary’s interest or a distribution by the
trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary. The distinction between trust property and a
beneficiary’s own property is therefore critical. A judgment against an individual beneficiary
does not, by itself, establish that the entire corpus of a trust is property of that beneficiary.
A. The Trust Instrument and David’s Limited Beneficial Interest
Trustee Parker contends that David was an income beneficiary of a third-party trust
and that its spendthrift clause barred Community First from garnishing undistributed
income or principal. He emphasizes that the Parker Family Trust’s account was maintained
in the trust’s name, not David’s, and that David’s interest in future distributions to living
children ended upon his death. Trustee Parker relies on the plain terms of section 28-73-
502(c) and Medical Park Hospital v. Bancorp South Bank of Hope, Ark., 357 Ark. 316, 166
S.W.3d 19 (2004), recognizing spendthrift protections.
Community Fist responds that the Parker Family Trust cannot invoke its original
spendthrift terms while simultaneously seeking to divide and distribute its principal under a
negotiated settlement. In its view, the beneficiaries’ negotiations and asserted rights under
the settlement demonstrated practical access to trust assets and rendered those assets
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reachable by David’s creditors. Community First also points to the trust account’s substantial
balance.
The balance in the Stephens, Inc., account, however, does not establish the value of
David’s property. Nor does his status as a beneficiary or former co-trustee make the corpus
his personal asset. The record does not support the Order to Pay’s implicit treatment of the
trust account as a fund generally available to satisfy the judgments. The circuit court must
instead identify an actual property interest or payment attributable to David and then
determine whether that interest is subject to garnishment under the governing trust and
creditor statutes.
B. The Proposed Settlement and Alleged Rights to Principal
Community First argues that the memorandum of understanding and proposed
modification gave David a right to receive principal, notwithstanding the original
instrument. It characterizes the parties’ negotiations and signatures as evidence of a binding
allocation of trust assets and maintains that David’s interest should not escape collection
simply because the parties did not complete formal approval before his death. Trustee Parker
counters that the documents expressly contemplated additional consent and court approval,
that the proposed modification was never approved, and the negotiations did not amend the
trust or vest principal in David.
Arkansas law provides judicial procedures for modifying or terminating trusts. See
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-73-410 to -411 (Repl. 2012). Section 28-73-411 addresses modification
or termination of a noncharitable irrevocable trust and the significance of a material purpose,
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including spendthrift protection. The parties’ references to section 28-73-416 (Repl. 2012)
do not make that section a general source of modification authority; rather, it concerns
modification to achieve a settlor’s tax objectives.
We need not decide in this appeal every contractual dispute arising from the separate
trust litigation. The operative question is narrower: did the settlement or some other act give
David a present, identifiable right to money or property that Community First could reach?
An agreement to seek judicial approval is not necessarily equivalent to an effective trust
modification or a completed distribution. Conversely, the absence of approval should not
be used to assume, without reviewing the relevant documents and applicable law, that no
separate contractual right could have existed. The circuit court’s Order to Pay simply
contains no findings resolving those distinctions.
C. The Self-Settled Trust and Equitable Theories
Community First further cites decisions addressing trusts used by debtors to place
their own assets beyond creditors, including Halliburton Company v. E.H. Owen Family Trust,
28 Ark. App. 314, 773 S.W.2d 453 (1989), as well as federal trust authorities. It asserts that
David’s and Trustee Parker’s roles in the proposed distribution arrangement were
inconsistent with the protections they now claim. Trustee Parker distinguishes those cases
because David did not create or fund this trust; his parents did. They also note that his
former service as co-trustee did not confer unrestricted ownership of the principal.
The self-settled-trust principle cannot be applied merely because a third-party
beneficiary participated in trust administration or proposed changes to the instrument. The
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necessary question is whether David himself owned or transferred the property at issue or
obtained a presently enforceable right to it. Nor do allegations of inequitable conduct,
standing alone, substitute for proof of an asset subject to garnishment or satisfaction of the
elements of an independently asserted fraudulent-transfer claim. We do not express an
opinion on any claims pending in the separate trust litigation.
D. David’s Death and the Property Potentially Subject to Collection
Trustee Parker contends that David’s right to future quarterly income ended when
he died on April 1, 2025, and that no postdeath right to future distributions can justify the
order. Community First responds that a debtor’s death does not extinguish a lien or other
right that validly attached during the debtor’s lifetime. Both propositions require attention
to the particular property and timing involved.
The court must identify (1) money David actually received and retained or that
otherwise became his property; (2) any existing debt or payment obligation owed personally
to David when the garnishments were served; (3) undistributed trust income subject to the
spendthrift clause; (4) any independently enforceable entitlement to principal; and (5) future
contingent income that ended with David’s death. Whether any one of these particular
categories is reachable turns on the relevant facts and applicable law, not just on the amount
of Community First’s judgments. In particular, section 28-73-502(c)’s prohibition against
reaching a distribution before receipt must be applied to any alleged pre-receipt claim.
The asserted $7,225 distribution warrants specific attention, but we do not
determine, from the record before us, whether it was actually received, whether it remained
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David’s property, or whether Community First acquired a legally effective lien on it. The
circuit court is better positioned to make the necessary initial findings. Any enforceable
rights surviving David’s death must likewise be identified and evaluated rather than
presumed.
IV. Conclusion
The Order to Pay requires payment of the judgments from a trust-owned investment
account and restrains all distributions to beneficiaries without determining which assets, if
any, belonged to David or were otherwise lawfully subject to Community First’s
garnishments. That simply cannot be sustained on the reasoning reflected in this record.
We reverse the Order to Pay and remand for the circuit court to determine, on the
existing record and such further proceedings as are appropriate, which rights to money or
property, if any, were actually David’s or legally payable to him and may be reached by
Community First under the applicable garnishment and trust law. In doing so, the court
shall consider the Parker Family Trust’s spendthrift restriction; the legal effect, if any, of the
proposed settlement; the timing and receipt of any distributions; and the effect of David’s
death. Any renewed relief must be limited to assets or rights found to be legally subject to
collection because the judgments against David do not authorize a general levy on property
belonging to the Parker Family Trust or to other beneficiaries. We express no view on the
ultimate amount, if any, recoverable on remand.
Reversed and remanded.
VIRDEN and TUCKER, JJ., agree.
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Jerry Parker, pro se appellant.
Bryan J. Reis, for apppellee.
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