Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 548 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-25-603 JERRY PARKER, TRUSTEE OF THE Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 PARKER FAMILY TRUST APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 26CV-22-566] V. HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS, COMMUNITY FIRST TRUST JUDGE COMPANY, TRUSTEE OF THE DORA JANE LEDGERWOOD ELLIS REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AND THE TRICE ELLIS, JR., REVOCABLE TRUST APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge Appellant Jerry Parker, trustee of the Parker Family Trust (“Trustee Parker”), appeals the August 4, 2025 “Order to Pay” entered by the Garland County Circuit Court in favor of Community First Trust Company, trustee of the Dora Jane Ledgerwood Ellis Revocable Living Trust and the Trice Ellis, Jr., Revocable Trust (“Community First”). The appeal arises from an effort by Community First to collect judgments entered against William David Parker (“David”) by garnishing an investment account held in the name of the separate Parker Family Trust. The Order to Pay directed Stephens, Inc., to pay the full amount of the judgment from that trust account and prohibited Trustee Parker from making any distributions until the garnishment lien was satisfied. The question on appeal is not whether Community First has enforceable judgments against David. The record before us supports that it does. The issue on appeal is which property or legally cognizable rights of David, if any, were subject to the relevant garnishments. Because the Order to Pay reaches the assets of the Parker Family Trust without identifying which property was David’s or which sums had become subject to collection notwithstanding the trust’s spendthrift provision, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to determine the existence and extent of any assets or payments attributable to David that may lawfully be reached by Community First. I. Facts and Procedural History Community First serves as the trustee of the Dora Jane Ledgerwood Ellis Revocable Living Trust and the Trice Ellis, Jr., Revocable Trust. David previously served as trustee of those trusts. On November 26, 2024, the circuit court entered summary judgment against David in the amount of $223,828.25 in litigation involving the Ellis Trust. The circuit court subsequently awarded attorney’s fees of $24,850.00 and costs of $686.59. Those judgments were against David, not against the Parker Family Trust. Henry Eugene “Gene” Parker and Mary Nell Parker established the Parker Family Trust in July 2015. David is one of their four children and a beneficiary, but he was not a settlor. The instrument provides for distributions of net income to the settlors’ living children at least quarterly and for distribution of the remaining trust estate upon the specified termination event. It also contains a spendthrift provision restricting transfer of a 2 beneficiary’s interest and involuntary process against that interest. The trust’s investments included an account maintained by Stephens, Inc., in the name of the trust. Separate litigation concerning the Parker Family Trust was pending in the probate division of the Garland County Circuit Court. In that proceeding, some beneficiaries and trustees sought modification or termination of the trust and negotiated a memorandum of understanding and amendment contemplating division and distribution of assets. The proposed arrangement contemplated judicial approval and beneficiary consent, but the parties dispute whether it independently created enforceable rights. The proposed settlement was not shown to have been approved by the probate court before entry of the garnishment order. On December 10, 2024, Community First obtained writs of garnishment directed to Trustee Parker and Stephens, Inc. Additional writs were issued in February 2025 concerning the fee-and-cost judgment. The Parker Family Trust acknowledged that David received quarterly income distributions but denied that trust principal was available to his creditors. Stephens denied holding money or property belonging individually to David, although it acknowledged maintaining the trust account. The Parker Family Trust moved to quash the writs on the basis of its spendthrift provision. Community First opposed that motion, arguing principally that the proposed settlement and the beneficiaries’ conduct permitted creditors to reach assets otherwise held in trust. David died on April 1, 2025. The circuit court held a hearing on June 17, 2025, at which it considered the garnishments, the trust terms, the proposed settlement, and 3 stipulated testimony. The record also contains an assertion by the trust that a quarterly payment of $7,225 had been made after service of the writs of garnishment and before David’s death. Whether that payment was actually received by David, when any right to it arose, and whether it remained traceable to him were not resolved in the challenged Order to Pay. On August 4, 2025, the circuit court entered the previously described Order to Pay directing Stephens, Inc., to pay Community First $225,223.41 plus accrued interest from April 2, 2025, “from the Parker Trust Account.” The court further ordered Trustee Parker to refrain from any trust distributions and to retain all trust property until the lien was satisfied. The Order to Pay did not identify any particular property owned by David, any distribution actually received by him, or any presently enforceable entitlement to principal. Trustee Parker and Stephens, Inc., filed a timely joint notice of appeal on August 15, 2025. II. Standard of Review This court reviews probate proceedings de novo on the record, but we will not reverse the decision of the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. See Hunter v. Est. of Springston, 2025 Ark. App. 167, 710 S.W.3d 468. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Furthermore, while we will not overturn the circuit court’s factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, we are free during a de novo review to reach a different result required by the law. Id. Similarly, in deciding matters or issues of law, our standard of review is de novo. Id. Questions of statutory interpretation and the legal 4 effect of an unambiguous trust instrument are thus reviewed de novo. See id.; see also Warner v. Ford, 2023 Ark. App. 537, 680 S.W.3d 439. III. Discussion Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-73-502(c) (Repl. 2012) recognizes valid spendthrift provisions and, subject to statutory exceptions, provides that a creditor or assignee of a beneficiary may not reach the beneficiary’s interest or a distribution by the trustee before its receipt by the beneficiary. The distinction between trust property and a beneficiary’s own property is therefore critical. A judgment against an individual beneficiary does not, by itself, establish that the entire corpus of a trust is property of that beneficiary. A. The Trust Instrument and David’s Limited Beneficial Interest Trustee Parker contends that David was an income beneficiary of a third-party trust and that its spendthrift clause barred Community First from garnishing undistributed income or principal. He emphasizes that the Parker Family Trust’s account was maintained in the trust’s name, not David’s, and that David’s interest in future distributions to living children ended upon his death. Trustee Parker relies on the plain terms of section 28-73- 502(c) and Medical Park Hospital v. Bancorp South Bank of Hope, Ark., 357 Ark. 316, 166 S.W.3d 19 (2004), recognizing spendthrift protections. Community Fist responds that the Parker Family Trust cannot invoke its original spendthrift terms while simultaneously seeking to divide and distribute its principal under a negotiated settlement. In its view, the beneficiaries’ negotiations and asserted rights under the settlement demonstrated practical access to trust assets and rendered those assets 5 reachable by David’s creditors. Community First also points to the trust account’s substantial balance. The balance in the Stephens, Inc., account, however, does not establish the value of David’s property. Nor does his status as a beneficiary or former co-trustee make the corpus his personal asset. The record does not support the Order to Pay’s implicit treatment of the trust account as a fund generally available to satisfy the judgments. The circuit court must instead identify an actual property interest or payment attributable to David and then determine whether that interest is subject to garnishment under the governing trust and creditor statutes. B. The Proposed Settlement and Alleged Rights to Principal Community First argues that the memorandum of understanding and proposed modification gave David a right to receive principal, notwithstanding the original instrument. It characterizes the parties’ negotiations and signatures as evidence of a binding allocation of trust assets and maintains that David’s interest should not escape collection simply because the parties did not complete formal approval before his death. Trustee Parker counters that the documents expressly contemplated additional consent and court approval, that the proposed modification was never approved, and the negotiations did not amend the trust or vest principal in David. Arkansas law provides judicial procedures for modifying or terminating trusts. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-73-410 to -411 (Repl. 2012). Section 28-73-411 addresses modification or termination of a noncharitable irrevocable trust and the significance of a material purpose, 6 including spendthrift protection. The parties’ references to section 28-73-416 (Repl. 2012) do not make that section a general source of modification authority; rather, it concerns modification to achieve a settlor’s tax objectives. We need not decide in this appeal every contractual dispute arising from the separate trust litigation. The operative question is narrower: did the settlement or some other act give David a present, identifiable right to money or property that Community First could reach? An agreement to seek judicial approval is not necessarily equivalent to an effective trust modification or a completed distribution. Conversely, the absence of approval should not be used to assume, without reviewing the relevant documents and applicable law, that no separate contractual right could have existed. The circuit court’s Order to Pay simply contains no findings resolving those distinctions. C. The Self-Settled Trust and Equitable Theories Community First further cites decisions addressing trusts used by debtors to place their own assets beyond creditors, including Halliburton Company v. E.H. Owen Family Trust, 28 Ark. App. 314, 773 S.W.2d 453 (1989), as well as federal trust authorities. It asserts that David’s and Trustee Parker’s roles in the proposed distribution arrangement were inconsistent with the protections they now claim. Trustee Parker distinguishes those cases because David did not create or fund this trust; his parents did. They also note that his former service as co-trustee did not confer unrestricted ownership of the principal. The self-settled-trust principle cannot be applied merely because a third-party beneficiary participated in trust administration or proposed changes to the instrument. The 7 necessary question is whether David himself owned or transferred the property at issue or obtained a presently enforceable right to it. Nor do allegations of inequitable conduct, standing alone, substitute for proof of an asset subject to garnishment or satisfaction of the elements of an independently asserted fraudulent-transfer claim. We do not express an opinion on any claims pending in the separate trust litigation. D. David’s Death and the Property Potentially Subject to Collection Trustee Parker contends that David’s right to future quarterly income ended when he died on April 1, 2025, and that no postdeath right to future distributions can justify the order. Community First responds that a debtor’s death does not extinguish a lien or other right that validly attached during the debtor’s lifetime. Both propositions require attention to the particular property and timing involved. The court must identify (1) money David actually received and retained or that otherwise became his property; (2) any existing debt or payment obligation owed personally to David when the garnishments were served; (3) undistributed trust income subject to the spendthrift clause; (4) any independently enforceable entitlement to principal; and (5) future contingent income that ended with David’s death. Whether any one of these particular categories is reachable turns on the relevant facts and applicable law, not just on the amount of Community First’s judgments. In particular, section 28-73-502(c)’s prohibition against reaching a distribution before receipt must be applied to any alleged pre-receipt claim. The asserted $7,225 distribution warrants specific attention, but we do not determine, from the record before us, whether it was actually received, whether it remained 8 David’s property, or whether Community First acquired a legally effective lien on it. The circuit court is better positioned to make the necessary initial findings. Any enforceable rights surviving David’s death must likewise be identified and evaluated rather than presumed. IV. Conclusion The Order to Pay requires payment of the judgments from a trust-owned investment account and restrains all distributions to beneficiaries without determining which assets, if any, belonged to David or were otherwise lawfully subject to Community First’s garnishments. That simply cannot be sustained on the reasoning reflected in this record. We reverse the Order to Pay and remand for the circuit court to determine, on the existing record and such further proceedings as are appropriate, which rights to money or property, if any, were actually David’s or legally payable to him and may be reached by Community First under the applicable garnishment and trust law. In doing so, the court shall consider the Parker Family Trust’s spendthrift restriction; the legal effect, if any, of the proposed settlement; the timing and receipt of any distributions; and the effect of David’s death. Any renewed relief must be limited to assets or rights found to be legally subject to collection because the judgments against David do not authorize a general levy on property belonging to the Parker Family Trust or to other beneficiaries. We express no view on the ultimate amount, if any, recoverable on remand. Reversed and remanded. VIRDEN and TUCKER, JJ., agree. 9 Jerry Parker, pro se appellant. Bryan J. Reis, for apppellee. 10