Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 423 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CV-25-276 BKMJ, INC. Opinion Delivered September 23, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 72CV-14-107] IRA ELLIOT GLASSER HONORABLE JOHN C. THREET, APPELLEE JUDGE REVERSED AND REMANDED RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge BKMJ, Inc. (BKMJ), appeals the Washington County Circuit Court order dismissing its petition for writ of scire facias to revive a judgment entered against Ira Elliot Glasser. On appeal, BKMJ argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing its petition. We agree and reverse and remand. On January 21, 2014, BKMJ filed a complaint against Glasser alleging that he had defaulted on a promissory note. It asserted claims for breach of contract, conversion, and fraud. On February 5, Glasser filed an objection to jurisdiction through his attorney, who was licensed in Texas but not in Arkansas. On February 19, the Texas attorney moved for admission to practice pro hac vice. On March 5, BKMJ moved for a default judgment on its complaint, arguing that Glasser’s time for filing an answer had expired and that his jurisdictional objection was a nullity because his attorney had filed it without being admitted to practice in Arkansas. On March 20, the court admitted Glasser’s attorney to practice pro hac vice. On April 4, Glasser filed counterclaims for tortious interference with contract and fraudulent inducement to contract. On September 12, Glasser amended his counterclaims. On December 5, the court granted BKMJ’s motion for a default judgment, finding that Glasser had failed to timely answer. It awarded BKMJ a default judgment against Glasser in the principal amount of $20,036 plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 6 percent from August 10, 2013. The court also awarded BKMJ $2,500 in attorney’s fees and $215 in costs, and it noted that BKMJ had waived any claim for punitive damages in consideration of Glasser’s waiver of a damages hearing. On January 21, 2015, Glasser filed a “supplemental pleading” on his counterclaims, and on March 19, BKMJ filed additional claims against Glasser for fraud and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. On August 20, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss all pending causes of action, and on that same day, the circuit court entered an agreed order of dismissal stating: “All pending causes of action in this case are hereby dismissed with prejudice.” On December 5, 2024, BKMJ petitioned for a writ of scire facias. It alleged that Glasser had not paid the default judgment from December 5, 2014, and it sought to initiate the procedure for reviving the judgment pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16- 65-501 (Repl. 2005). 2 On February 28, 2025, Glasser moved to dismiss BKMJ’s petition. He argued that a default judgment is not a final order under Arkansas law and that the August 2015 dismissal order precluded further litigation on any claim by either party. He asserted that the default judgment “died” and “cannot be revived.” Also on February 28, the court held a hearing, and on March 31, the court entered an order dismissing BKMJ’s petition for writ of scire facias with prejudice. The court found that a default judgment is not a final judgment and that the dismissal order “resolved the rights to all Parties at the time it was entered.” The court thus concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the claims filed before the entry of the dismissal order on August 20, 2015. This appeal followed. On appeal, BKMJ argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing its scire facias petition on the basis of the dismissal order. BKMJ points out that the default judgment was entered before the dismissal order, and the dismissal order resolved only “pending causes of action.” We agree. When the issue is one of law, our review is de novo. Wadley v. Hatton, 2024 Ark. App. 297, 689 S.W.3d 691. A writ of scire facias requires a person against whom it is brought to show cause why a judgment should not be revived. Middleton v. Lockhart, 2012 Ark. 131, 388 S.W.3d 451. A default judgment is just as binding and enforceable as a judgment entered after a trial on the merits. State v. $258,035.00 U.S. Currency, 352 Ark. 117, 98 S.W.3d 818 (2003). 3 In this case, the court entered the default judgment before the dismissal order, and the order dismissed only “pending causes of action.” Thus, the dismissal order did not set aside the default judgment and did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. Accordingly, the circuit court erred by dismissing BKMJ’s petition for writ of scire facias, and we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and VIRDEN, J., agree. Cox Law Firm, PLLC, by: S. Lance Cox, for appellant. One Brief only. 4