Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 537 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-25-418 Opinion Delivered November 4, 2026 MIDWAY BLUFFS FRIENDS APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CLEBURNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 12CV-22-250] CCSV PROPERTIES, LLC; LAWRENCE HONORABLE HOLLY MEYER, JUDGE KRUG; TONY BATEMAN; MARGUERITE BATEMAN; THERESA KRUG, CHRISTOPHER KRUG; AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORP OF ENGINEERS APPELLEES REVERSED AND REMANDED KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge Appellant Midway Bluffs Friends (Midway) appeals after the Cleburne County Circuit Court dismissed Midway’s third amended complaint in favor of appellees CCSV Properties, LLC (CCSV Properties); Lawrence Krug; Tony Bateman; Marguerite Bateman; Theresa Krug; Christopher Krug; and the United States of America (USA). On appeal, Midway argues the circuit court erred in holding that the United States Army Corps of Engineers (COE)1 was a necessary party to this suit. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 As explained more fully herein, the circuit court had ordered Midway to amend its complaint to include the United States Army Corps of Engineers (COE) as a necessary party because COE maintains a flowage easement across the land at issue. However, Midway I. Relevant Facts Midway is a nonprofit organization whose membership consists of individuals that own real property in the vicinity of the road that is the subject of this litigation. On December 1, 2022, Midway filed its initial complaint for a public prescriptive easement against CCSV Properties. Midway alleged that its members had been using an established road for decades that had been used by the public for ingress and egress to Greers Ferry Lake (the Lake) until CCSV Properties installed a gate blocking public access. Midway alleged that all the requirements for the public to acquire a public prescriptive easement had been met, and it asked the circuit court to grant a public prescriptive easement to use the road for ingress and egress access to the Lake and to order CCSV Properties to remove any impediments. After CCSV Properties moved to dismiss pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that Midway lacked standing, Midway filed an amended complaint on January 16, 2023, clarifying the factual basis under which Midway claimed it had standing. On February 6, 2023, CCSV Properties accordingly filed a second motion to dismiss the amended complaint or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. CCSV again argued that Midway lacked standing because the names and locations of Midway’s members were not included in the amended complaint. CCSV Properties further explains in its third amended complaint that it named USA as the real party in interest because the “United States Army Corps of Engineers (“COE”) is an agency of the United States Department of the Army, a division of the U.S. Department of Defense, an agent of the Executive Branch of the United States of America.” 2 argued that the amended complaint should be dismissed under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for failure to join a necessary party under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19. It explained that the alleged road traverses across two tracts of land, and CCSV Properties is the owner of only one of the tracts. CCSV Properties therefore argued that the owners of the other tract (“Tract A”), are necessary parties to this action. Midway filed its response on February 20, 2023, generally arguing that CCSV Properties’ motion should be denied. A hearing was held on March 9, 2023. At this hearing, the circuit court sua sponte raised the issue of whether COE was also an indispensable party to this action. It was explained at this hearing that COE owns the Lake and all the land immediately surrounding the Lake. Speaking very generally for the purpose of clarity, there are two “property lines” referred to repeatedly herein. The “white line” demarks the shoreline owned by the government and is the boundary line between the government’s property and private property owned by CCSV Properties. The “red line” is located significantly farther inland and demarks the area referred to as the “flowage easement.” There is no dispute that this red line flowage easement is contained within CCSV Properties’ private property description. Within this flowage easement, COE has been granted the right to periodically flood the Lake to 491 feet above sea level. It was undisputed that Midway sought a public prescriptive easement that traversed not only CCSV Properties’ private property but, necessarily, traversed the flowage easement. Again, for purposes of clarity, the area between 3 the white line and water’s edge is referred to hereinafter as the “shore.” The area between the white line and the red line is referred to hereinafter as the “flowage easement area” or “flowage easement.” The circuit court questioned whether it could give Midway the relief it requested. The court explained that because COE owns the land between the white line and the water’s edge (the shore), the court could not grant a public prescriptive easement across the shore without COE being a party to the suit. Midway countered that it was not asking the court to grant any relief across the shore because COE has never stopped anyone from using the shore as an access point to the Lake at that spot. In essence, Midway argued it requested a public prescriptive easement across CCSV Properties’ property only, which necessarily includes crossing the flowage easement area. The court stated that it would give the matter “careful consideration” and hear arguments regarding the other parties CCSV Properties had claimed were necessary. Moving on, regarding the indispensability of the other owners of Tract A, Midway explained that it did not include the owners of Tract A in the suit because no one had shown an intention to block the portion of the road that crosses Tract A. The circuit court and the parties reviewed maps reflecting the alleged road that Midway claimed was a public prescriptive easement. The circuit court stated that whether the owners of Tract A were necessary depended on where the white line and the road intersected. The circuit court added that it thought COE was necessary because the public prescriptive easement sought crossed the red line (the flowage easement area). After further discussion, the circuit court 4 ruled that it would give Midway an opportunity to show it a map or some other documentation to explain why COE was not a necessary party at a future Zoom hearing, and any other matters would be taken up after it was determined whether COE was a necessary party. A second hearing was held on May 3, 2023. At the beginning of the hearing, the circuit court asked Midway to explain what relief it was requesting. Midway asserted that it was asking for a public prescriptive easement across CCSV Properties’ property down to the white line shoreline, which necessarily includes traversing the red line flowage easement area. Midway acknowledged that if it had asked for an easement past the white line and across the shore, then COE would be a necessary party. Midway argued, however, that because it did not need the easement to extend onto COE’s land (the shore), COE was not a necessary party. The circuit court noted that Midway would have to give it proof of what activities COE had given Midway permission to do on its property. It explained that whether COE allowed vehicles to drive or park past the white line made a difference to the type of easement it could grant over CCVS Properties’ land. The circuit court stated, “[A]t this point, [COE is] a necessary party because you haven’t proven to me they’re not a necessary party.” After some additional discussion, the circuit court orally ruled that, given the information before it, COE was a necessary party and that Midway had ten days to amend its pleadings to join COE as a party to the suit. 5 On May 8, 2023, the circuit court filed a written order finding that COE is a necessary party to this action. The circuit court ordered Midway to amend its pleadings within ten days to join COE as a party. On May 12, 2023, Midway filed its second amended complaint for a public prescriptive easement against CCSV Properties, Lawrence Krug, Tony Bateman, Marguerite Bateman, Theresa Krug, Christopher Krug, and COE. Midway alleged that the road it sought a public prescriptive easement over crossed portions of the properties owned by CCSV Properties, Lawrence, Tony, Marguerite, Theresa, and Christopher. It further alleged that a portion of the road located on land owned by CCSV Properties is located within the COE flowage easement area (the red line). Midway explained that although it sought to use the area within the flowage easement area for ingress, egress, and motorized-vehicle parking while accessing the Lake, any easement sought was to terminate at the point where the road and the white line (the shore) converge. Midway further explained that any relief requested was to be consistent with the existing uses of the flowage easement area and that it was not seeking relief that would violate the terms and conditions of COE’s flowage easement. In addition to asking the court to grant a public prescriptive easement, Midway asked the circuit court to enter a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction enjoining CCSV Properties from taking any action to prevent the public from using the road for ingress and egress to the Lake and parking along the road. CCSV Properties, Lawrence, Theresa, Christopher, and Maguerite filed answers to the second amended complaint. However, on June 12, 2023, COE moved to dismiss on the 6 basis that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over it and its flowage easement. COE explained that it is not an entity that can be sued in its own name but that the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, requires that the United States of America be named for the purpose of adjudicating claims to reap property in which the United States has or claims an interest. Moreover, it claimed that the United States District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f).2 Accordingly, COE asked that it be dismissed from the action. After receiving an extension of time to respond, Midway filed its response to COE’s motion to dismiss on July 25, 2023. Midway did not dispute that COE’s motion to dismiss was “well taken.” However, it argued that COE should not have been considered a necessary party to this case in the first place under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19. It explained that COE has only a flowage easement on the property that is crossed by anyone who wants to gain access to the Lake, whether they are swimmers, boaters, hikers, or walkers. As such, Midway alleged that COE is “at best . . . just a bystander” with no interest in the outcome of the case. Midway reiterated that it was not seeking to compel or restrict COE from doing anything. Instead, Midway argued that the flowage easement allows landowners to use the easement in any way that is not inconsistent with the purposes of the easement, and no new 2 COE additionally argued that service of process was insufficient because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 requires service not only “on the agency, but also service on the United States Attorney for the district where the action is brought, and service on the Attorney general of the United States by registered or certified mail.” COE alleged that Midway served only the Little Rock district office of COE by certified mail, which was also defective under Rule 4. 7 use was being requested: “[A]ccess to the Lake simply involves crossing the flowage easement which happens all the time but does not interfere with, change, add an additional use of or usurp the flowage easement.” Accordingly, Midway argued that because COE was not necessary to “complete relief,” and because COE has no interest in the subject matter of this action, COE was neither a necessary nor an indispensable party under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Alternatively, Midway argued that none of the factors set forth in Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) require either joinder or dismissal of the action because COE had no interest in the outcome of this case. Thus, Midway asked that COE be dismissed from the case as requested but that the case proceed with the remaining parties because COE was not a necessary or indispensable party to this action. On August 23, 2023, Midway filed its third amended complaint for public prescriptive easement. Midway removed COE as a named party and instead named USA as a defendant. Midway further clarified that although it was naming USA in accordance with the circuit court’s order, it reiterated that it did not believe USA was a necessary party. The following allegations are relevant to the issue on appeal: 7. Plaintiffs brings its claim against the United States of America pursuant to The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, which consents to suits against the United States of America for the purpose of adjudicating claims of real property in which the United States has or claims an interest. United States Army Corps of Engineers (“COE”) is an agency of the United States Department of the Army, a division of the U.S. Department of Defense, an agent of the Executive Branch of the United States of America. The COE has been delegated responsibility by the Department of the Army for management and operation of the navigable waters of the United States, including rivers, various lakes and other water resources of the United States of America. The real property at issue is located on the shores of Greers Ferry Lake in Cleburne County, Arkansas, which the COE manages, owns land along, and 8 maintains flowage easements over. Therefore, since the COE maintains a flowage easement across the land at issue, the Court has ordered the United States of America (and by association the COE) as a necessary party to this litigation. Importantly, the prescriptive easement sought by the Plaintiff does not burden the COE’s flowage easement in a manner that is inconsistent with the allowed uses of the flowage easement. 8. The purpose of filing this Third Amended Complaint is to correctly name the United States of America as the real party in interest. Previously, the Plaintiff inadvertently named the “United States Army Corps of Engineers” as the real party in interest, but later learned that the United States of America is the real party in interest. Again, although the Plaintiff has named the United State of America as a defendant herein, the Plaintiff maintains that the United States of America is not a necessary party since the prescriptive easement sought herein will not effect the COE’s flowage easement nor does the proposed prescriptive easement seek uses of the land that are inconsistent with the terms of the flowage easement. .... 11. The Midway Bluffs area, generally speaking, is located along Sunny Slope Road (Highway 225) in Cleburne County, Arkansas at the point where the highway crosses the Lake traveling north and south. 12. This has been a favorite area for the general public to access and enjoy the Lake because for over fifty (50) years there has been a road available to the public for ingress and egress to the Lake, and for parking of motorized vehicles when accessing the Lake. This road is at issue in this lawsuit because the public has satisfied the requirements to establish a public prescriptive easement across said road for parking, ingress, and egress to the Lake, but CCSV Properties, LLC has purposefully blocked the public’s ingress, egress, and parking along the road in violation of said easement. .... 15. The Road crosses through portions of the properties owned by separate defendants CCSV Properties, LLC, Lawrence Krug, Theresa Krug and Christopher Krug, and Tony Bateman and Marguerite Bateman. 16. Additionally, a portion of the Road located on the CCSV Property is located within what is known as the “red line” in which the COE maintains a flowage easement. The COE does not own the land within the “red line,” and the Plaintiff seeks to use the area within the “red line” for ingress, egress, and for motorized vehicle parking while accessing the Lake. 9 17. The public prescriptive easement sought by the Plaintiff terminates at the point where the Road and what is known as the “white line” converge. Therefore, the Plaintiff does not seek to burden land that is owned by the COE with an easement. The Plaintiff, and other members of the general public, do not need an easement to be on the land within the “white line” as that land is public land maintained by both the COE and the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission. A true and correct copy of a picture showing the area within the “white line” on the Lake shore and managed by the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission is attached hereto as Exhibit “C.” 18. The relief that the Plaintiff requests is consistent with the uses of the “red line” in and around the Lake, and the Plaintiff is not seeking relief which would violate the terms and conditions of the COE’s flowage easement. No structures, septic systems, or other permanent improvements are sought to be installed within “red line” and are not being requested in this Third Amended Complaint, meaning the public prescriptive easement requested herein has minimal impact on the “red line” or the COE’s interest in it. The Plaintiff, and the public, seek ingress, egress, and parking on land within the “red line” as they have been doing along the Road for decades. For these reasons, the burden to the COE or any affect on the COE’s interest in the “red line” is minimal. 19. The Plaintiff is also not requesting that motorized vehicle traffic be allowed on the area within the “white line” as historically vehicles have parked along the Road on the land owned by CCSV Properties, LLC, which is outside the scope of the “white line.” (Footnotes omitted and emphasis added). USA filed a motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss on September 7, 2023. USA CCSV, Lawrence, Theresa, and Christopher also moved to dismiss Midway’s third amended complaint on September 12, 2023. argued that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over any claim against USA because the United States District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. §1346(f). Accordingly, USA asked the circuit court to dismiss it from the case. 10 They agreed with USA that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and asked the circuit court to dismiss Midway’s third amended complaint. Midway filed its response to both motions to dismiss on September 16, 2023. Midway adopted its previous response to COE’s motion to dismiss. Midway again argued that COE has no interest in the land in this case. It noted that USA asked that “it . . . be dismissed, not the whole case dismissed.” Therefore, it disagreed with the argument made by CCSV Properties, Lawrence, Theresa, and Christopher that the entire case must be dismissed. Accordingly, Midway asked the circuit court to grant USA’s motion to dismiss. However, it asked the circuit court to deny the motion to dismiss the entire case because COE was not a necessary or indispensable party to this case, and the case could proceed without it. 3 On February 6, 2025, the circuit court filed an order dismissing Midway’s third amended complaint and made the following findings: The Plaintiff in this case requests a public prescriptive easement across the Defendants’ property to access Greers Ferry Lake by vehicle and to park vehicles along the easement. One of those Defendants is the United States of America who owns a flowage easement around the Lake. Plaintiff argues that the impact on USA’s flowage easement is “minimal.” It is undisputed, however, that the USA owns an easement which would be affected by the prescriptive easement Plaintiff’s seek because Plaintiff is requesting a public road and public parking on the USA’s easement. This Court is simply without jurisdiction to address or bind the property rights of the USA in a State Court. This Court cannot presume to know whether the USA would object to Plaintiff’s Complaint if it was properly before this Court. Plaintiff’s argument that the USA probably doesn’t object misses the point that this matter cannot be fully litigated and resolved without the participation of the USA. 3 Although other motions, responses, and orders were filed in this case, they are not relevant to the issue on appeal. Accordingly, they are not discussed. 11 This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review We review the circuit court’s interpretation of our rules de novo. Nolan v. 2600 Holdings, LLC, 2024 Ark. 50, 686 S.W.3d 499. In the context of joinder under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a), we likewise have not given discretion to the circuit court since the rule requires that an indispensable party “shall be joined.” Id. III. Indispensable Party Midway does not dispute that the circuit court properly dismissed USA for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, it challenges the circuit court’s ruling that the entire case must be dismissed because USA is a necessary party under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a), and the “matter cannot be fully litigated and resolved without the participation of the USA.” Midway argues that COE (by naming USA) is not a necessary party because it was not seeking “to compel [COE] to do or restrict [COE] from doing anything.” Instead, Midway argues that COE was “just a bystander,” and complete relief may be granted without joining USA as a party.4 We agree. Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 19 states the following: 4 Midway also argues in its reply brief that Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 5-2(c) should be abolished. Rule 5-2 states, “Opinions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals issued before July 1, 2009, and not designated for publication shall not be cited, quoted, or referred to by any court or in any argument, brief, or other materials presented to any court (except in continuing or related litigation upon an issue such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case).” Midway acknowledges that we have no power to overrule a supreme court rule; however, it asks us to “question” the rule and certify the issue to the supreme court. We decline to do so. 12 (a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or, (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, or, (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff, but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant; or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. (b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. Our appellate courts have consistently recognized the importance of joining indispensable parties. See, e.g., Nolan, supra; Dolan v. Lichtsinn Motors, Inc., 2024 Ark. App. 501, 701 S.W.3d 772. It ensures that all who will be materially affected by litigation are made parties to it. Dolan, supra. The need to join an indispensable party cannot be waived, and the circuit court or appellate court must raise the issue sua sponte if necessary. Vibo Corp. v. State ex rel. McDaniel, 2011 Ark. 124, 380 S.W.3d 411; Morgan v. Turner, 2010 Ark. 245, 368 S.W.3d 888; Walker v. Coleman, 2026 Ark. App. 100. It is well settled that all persons whose rights might be affected by the determination of a controversy involving land must be made parties to an action. Williams v. Hall, 98 Ark. App. 90, 250 S.W.3d 581 (2007); see also Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark. 716, 19 S.W.3d 603 (2000) (reversing and dismissing 13 without prejudice a petition to quiet title when the record owner was not given notice or made a party to the action). In Harrison v. Knott, 219 Ark. 565, 568, 243 S.W.2d 642, 644 (1951), the supreme court explained in interpreting a predecessor to Rule 19 that the purpose of the rule “is to require all persons to be made parties to an action who will be necessarily and materially affected by its result, and to forbid the court from determining any controversy between the parties before it, when it cannot be done without prejudice to the rights of others or by saving their rights.” In Harrison, the supreme court reversed a circuit court’s finding that a public prescriptive easement in an alleyway existed and ordering appellant to remove obstacles he had placed in the alleyway because the property was not actually owned by appellant but by his wife. Because the wife was a necessary party, the supreme court held that the circuit court erred in determining the matter without her presence in the lawsuit. That is not the case here. In its third amended complaint, Midway stated that it sought a public prescriptive easement across the land owned by CCSV Properties, Lawrence, Theresa, Christopher, Tony, and Marguerite that “terminates at the point where the Road and what is known as the ‘white line’ converge.” In other words, Midway made it clear that it is seeking a prescriptive public easement across the land owned by CCSV Properties, which necessarily contains the red line “flowage easement area,” but Midway is not claiming an easement over the shore area owned by COE. Further, Midway specifically states that any request for relief “is consistent with the uses of the [flowage easement area] in and around the Lake, and 14 [Midway] is not seeking relief which would violate the terms and conditions of the COE’s flowage easement. No structures, septic systems, or other permanent improvements are sought to be installed within ‘red line’ [flowage easement area] and are not being requested[.]” Accordingly, we agree with Midway that USA was not a necessary or indispensable party under these circumstances. COE’s interest in the flowage easement was not necessarily and materially affected by the result of this lawsuit as was the case in Harrison. COE would maintain the same flowage easement with the same rights and burdens regardless of the outcome, and Midway could receive complete relief in the absence of USA as a party to the suit. See, e.g., Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., Inc., 2009 Ark. 152, 301 S.W.3d 1 (holding that appellant, MERS, was not a necessary party because it held no authority to act as an agent, held no property interest in the mortgaged land, complete relief may be granted whether or not MERS was a party, and MERS had no interest to protect); Ark. Iron & Metal Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Rogers, 16 Ark. App. 245, 701 S.W.2d 380 (1985) (holding that the corporation was the proper party to be sued in a suit to foreclose a corporate mortgage, and its shareholders and their trustee were unnecessary parties); Cox v. Stayton, 273 Ark. 298, 619 S.W.2d 617 (1981) (holding that the Division of Social Services, Arkansas Department of Human Services is not a necessary party to all adoption proceedings under Rule 19 because the relief sought in an adoption proceeding is the adoption itself, and such relief may be granted whether Social Services is a party or not); Hensley v. Conner, 800 F. App’x 309, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that because “Hensley’s sought-after relief will 15 not affect [Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s)] flowage easements[,] . . . [t]he district court did not err . . . in finding that TVA is not a required party” under federal version of Rule 19). In conclusion, the circuit court did not err in dismissing USA from the litigation; however, the circuit court did err when it dismissed Midway’s third amended complaint against CCSV Properties, Lawrence Krug, Tony Bateman, Marguerite Bateman, Theresa Krug, and Christopher Krug. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As such, we issue no opinion or statement concerning the merits of the underlying petition to grant a public prescriptive easement. Reversed and remanded. HARRISON and THYER, JJ., agree. John Wesley Hall, for appellant. McMullan & Brown, by: Amy Clemmons Brown, for separate appellees CCSV Properties, LLC; Christopher Krug; Lawrence Krug; and Theresa Krug. 16