Roger C. Moore v. Bob Robertson, an Individual; And the Bob Robertson Family Limited Partnership
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 567
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-25-328
Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
ROGER C. MOORE
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BOONE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 05CV-19-26]
BOB ROBERTSON, AN INDIVIDUAL; HONORABLE JOHNNIE COPELAND,
AND THE BOB ROBERTSON FAMILY JUDGE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
APPELLEES REVERSED AND REMANDED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
Appellant Roger Moore appeals the Boone County Circuit Court order resolving a
boundary and easement dispute in favor of his neighbors, appellees Bob Robertson and the
Bob Robertson Family Limited Partnership. He raises nine points for reversal challenging
the court’s boundary determination, its rulings on the parties’ rights to use the road, and its
rejection of his claim to a separate access area near the southwestern corner of his property.
We agree that the circuit court erred, and we reverse and remand.
Moore and the Robertsons own adjoining properties in Boone County. The
properties were originally part of one large tract owned by Charlotte and Johnny Ray Barnes.
In 1974, the Barneses conveyed a forty-acre tract to Lorene and Michael Roberts,
Moore’s predecessors in title. The Barneses still owned the land on three sides of the tract,
and the deed provided that the conveyance was
[s]ubject to a road right-of-way along the south boundary of said property, the benefit
of said existing road shall run with the adjoining lands immediately to the east of the
above described lands which are now owned by the grantors herein, and the grantees
and their heirs and assigns shall also have the right to use said road and both the
benefit and burden of said right-of-way shall run with both tracts of lands above
referred to.
One of the surveys introduced at trial, the Cochrane survey, showed that the southern
boundary of the forty-acre tract generally traces the road’s centerline but crosses it in places,
putting some of the road north and some of the road south of the deeded line.
Fences ran along both sides of the road. The northern fence consisted of wire strung
between trees and steel posts. Michael Roberts testified that this fence was already there when
he bought the property from the Barneses and that leaving it in place made it more
convenient to use the road. He thought the property boundary was south of the road––not
at the northern fence.
Delbert Tharp acquired the larger parcel from the Barnes family in 1976, and Moore
purchased the forty-acre tract from the Roberts family in 1987. Moore’s deed also noted the
road right-of-way. Moore testified that a gate was in place across the road on the western side
of his property when he purchased the land.
Moore testified that he regularly used the road in front of his residence as his
driveway. He also would travel east on the road to reach the creek and feed his cattle,
although he did not use that portion daily. According to Moore, Tharp used the road to
reach his cattle, deliver feed, and place salt. They both kept the gate closed.
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Ty Robertson, Bob’s son, testified that he began helping Tharp with farm work in
2008. The Bob Robertson Family Limited Partnership acquired the larger parcel from the
Tharps in September 2012, after which Ty used the road daily to check cattle. He explained
that two fences lined the road with gates on each end of the segment fronting Moore’s
property. The two fences formed a lane convenient for moving cattle. He said the western
gate was kept locked during the years he worked for Tharp, that he had not encountered
Moore in the disputed area and that to his knowledge, Moore did not have a key. After the
partnership purchased the property, Ty continued locking the gate and did not give Moore
a key.
Moore testified that around 2013 or early 2014, Bob Robertson extended a fence
along the western side of Moore’s property and installed new gates. According to Moore, he
could no longer circle around his house and get out to the county road with his eighteen-
foot trailer. He had previously used the space between his house and the old fence line to
get to the county road with his trailer, but now he could not. He testified that he had asked
Robertson to leave space when putting up the new fences and gates so he could still get out
with his trailer but that Robertson did not.
In 2018, the Robertsons started Hog Wild Adventures and began conducting tours
of their property on utility-terrain-vehicle side-by-sides. The road in front of Moore’s home
was included in the tours. Moore testified that the traffic generated more noise and dust
near his house and caused erosion along the road.
In November 2018, Moore removed the northern fence along the road. Later that
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month, Ty removed the western gate.
Moore filed his complaint on February 5, 2019. He asked the court to (1) declare the
southern fence line the boundary by adverse possession; (2) order the Robertsons to reinstate
the gates they had taken down; (3) bar the Robertsons from blocking his use of the road; (4)
restore the fence west of his house to its former location and remove the new gates installed
there; and (5) limit the easement’s scope to its historical use since 1987.
The Robertsons denied the claims and asserted the following affirmative defenses:
laches, adverse possession, prescriptive easement, and easement by necessity.
At an April 3, 2019 hearing, the court ruled that Moore could, during the ongoing
litigation, reinstall the western fence at his expense.
On the first day of the final hearing, the Robertsons filed an amended answer alleging
that they and their predecessors had adversely possessed the road and land up to the old
northern fence. They asked the court to confirm their ownership of the area between the
northern and southern fences and require Moore to replace the northern fence at his
expense. The pleading did not separately designate a counterclaim. Moore objected to the
amended answer because the Robertsons had not previously pleaded a claim that the
northern fence is the boundary. Moore’s counsel said he was prepared to defend the issue,
but the Robertsons should not be allowed to proceed on it. The court stated that the
boundary had always been an issue, allowed both parties to present their positions
concerning its location, and noted Moore’s objection.
Later in the trial, the issue of abandonment was also raised. The Robertsons asserted
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that Moore had abandoned the road altogether. Moore objected that this was not a pleaded
claim. The Robertsons asked that the pleadings be conformed to the proof. The court denied
their directed-verdict motions concerning ownership and use but did not expressly rule on
the request to conform the pleadings.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the court requested written closing arguments
and proposed orders from both sides. The circuit court entered its final order on December
12, 2024, in which it rejected Moore’s adverse-possession claim and concluded that the
Robertsons had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession. It set the northern
fence as the boundary by acquiescence and concluded that Moore had abandoned his right
and interest in the disputed property by permitting Tharp and the Robertsons to place locks
on the western gates.
The court ordered Moore to reconstruct the northern fence at his expense, prohibited
him from traveling on or otherwise using the road, and prohibited him from interfering with
the Robertsons’ use of the easement.
The court denied Moore’s claim for prescriptive easement along the western fence
line and found that laches barred his request to restore the western fence and corner post.
Finally, of note, it stated that the deeds did not restrict the road to noncommercial use.
Moore appeals from that order. He makes nine points on appeal, but we have
organized them into six: (1) the court’s consideration of affirmative relief Moore contends
was improperly pleaded; (2) the court’s decision to set the northern fence as the boundary
under adverse possession; (3) whether Moore had abandoned his property rights; (4) the
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scope of the easement’s use; (5) whether the circuit court erred in denying Moore’s claim for
prescriptive easement along the western fence; and (6) its applications of laches to his request
to restore the old western fenceline.
I. Standard of Review
We traditionally review boundary-line disputes de novo. Warren v. Porter, 2026 Ark.
App. 395. Following a bench trial, an appellate court asks whether the circuit court’s findings
were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and reviews
questions of law de novo. AgriFund, LLC v. Regions Bank, 2020 Ark. 246, at 6, 602 S.W.3d
726, 730. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. Id. We recognize the circuit court’s superior opportunity to determine the credibility
of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. S. Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. City of Ft.
Smith, 2013 Ark. App. 306, 427 S.W.3d 763. This court reviews the circuit court’s
conclusions of law de novo. Houston v. Houston, 67 Ark. App. 286, 999 S.W.2d 204 (1999).
II. Affirmative Relief and Pleadings
A. Adverse Possession and Rebuilding the Northern Fence
The circuit court granted the Robertsons several forms of affirmative relief. It
established the old northern fence as the boundary between the parties’ properties on the
basis of adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence and ordered Moore to rebuild that
fence at his expense. It found that Moore had abandoned his rights in the disputed property.
The court prohibited Moore from interfering with the Robertsons’ use of the deeded right-
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of-way and, once the fence was reconstructed, from traveling on or otherwise using their
property south of the fence. On appeal, Moore argues that the Robertsons did not properly
plead the claims on which the court granted this affirmative relief. He explains that the
Robertsons never filed a pleading designated as a counterclaim and that neither the original
answer nor the amended answer pleaded boundary by acquiescence or abandonment.
Having reviewed the record, we hold that the theory of adverse possession and the
request for reconstruction of the northern fence are properly before the court. Adverse
possession is an affirmative defense that must be specifically pleaded. Sutton v. Gardner, 2011
Ark. App. 737, at 5, 387 S.W.3d 185, 190. The Robertsons asserted that defense in their
original answer, and their amended answer expressly sought confirmation of their ownership
and reconstruction of the northern fence. Although the amended pleading was styled as an
answer rather than a counterclaim, Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that a
mistakenly designated counterclaim shall be treated as properly designated if justice requires.
Rule 8(f) likewise requires pleadings to be liberally construed to do substantial justice. Here,
the amended answer made clear what relief the Robertsons sought, and Moore’s counsel
acknowledged that he was prepared to defend against the northern-fence claim.
B. Abandonment
Nor did the circuit court err in considering abandonment. During argument at the
close of Moore’s evidence, the Robertsons asserted that Moore had abandoned the right-of-
way through nonuse. Moore explained there was a difference between ownership of a road
and the right to use a road, and he argued the Robertsons had not pleaded any basis on
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which to extinguish his right to use the road. The Robertsons then asked that the pleadings
be conformed to the proof and renewed their abandonment argument. Moore specifically
objected that abandonment had not been pleaded, that its consideration would cause
surprise, and that amendment was not permitted under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure
15. The court denied the motions concerning ownership and use but did not expressly rule
on the request to conform, and the trial continued with the defense’s evidence.
Rule 15(b) governs amendment to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Although
the rule treats issues tried by express or implied consent as though pleaded, it also permits
amendment over an objection:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended in its discretion. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence.
Cross v. Cross, 2016 Ark. App. 327, 497 S.W.3d 712 is instructive. In Cross, the circuit court
considered an unpleaded boundary-by-acquiescence defense over the appellants’ objections.
The court did not expressly grant the motion to conform, but it clearly did so in light of the
relief granted. We explained that the test whether to allow such an amendment hinges on
whether the appellant was prejudiced; that is, “whether the party opposing the motion will
have a fair opportunity to defend after the amendment.” Id. at 7, 497 S.W.3d at 717 (quoting
Travis v. Houk, 307 Ark. 84, 86, 817 S.W.2d 207, 208 (1991)). We review the decision to
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allow amendment for a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 6.
Here, Moore had a fair opportunity to respond after abandonment was expressly
raised. During the defense’s case, his counsel questioned Ty Robertson about whether Moore
could have used the road when Ty was not present and whether Tharp had given Moore a
key to the gate. On rebuttal, Moore testified that he had walked the road during the
Robertsons’ ownership and had used it to feed cattle back when Tharp was the owner. Moore
also submitted a posttrial brief and argument addressing the issue. The circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in considering the issue of abandonment.
C. Boundary by Acquiescence
Boundary by acquiescence, however, must be affirmatively pleaded under Arkansas
Rule 8(c). Jones v. Runsick, 2013 Ark. App. 356, at 6–7. Neither the Robertsons’ original
answer nor their amended answer expressly asserted this claim. The Robertsons’ request to
conform the pleadings to the proof was presented during the argument on abandonment,
and boundary by acquiescence was not raised until the parties simultaneously filed posttrial
briefs. In his brief, Moore maintained his objection but discussed the issue in the alternative.
In McEntire v. Watkins, 73 Ark. App. 449, 43 S.W.3d 770 (2001), the appellee sought
title by adverse possession, but the circuit court instead ruled in her favor on boundary by
acquiescence. We reversed because acquiescence had not been pleaded or tried by consent.
We held that even though there was testimony about the fence line and the boundary, “we
will not imply consent to conforming the pleadings to the proof merely because evidence
relevant to a properly pled issue incidentally tends to establish an unpled one.” Id. at 451,
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43 S.W.3d at 771–72. The same reasoning applies here. Evidence about the northern fence
(purpose, location, how long it had been there) was relevant to the issues before the court,
but the existence of evidence relevant to an issue does not automatically establish consent to
try that issue.
The posttrial briefing did not cure that defect. The posttrial briefs were submitted
simultaneously, and Moore maintained his objection that the issue had not been pleaded,
addressing it only in the alternative. At this point, the evidentiary record, however, was
closed, meaning he was no longer able to present evidence in defense of the unpleaded claim.
Cf. Barnett v. Gomance, 2010 Ark. App. 109, at 6, 377 S.W.3d 317, 322 (allowing amendment
raised in posttrial briefing when addressed by opposing party without objection). The circuit
court therefore erred in setting the boundary at the northern fence under the theory of
boundary of acquiescence, and we reverse on this point.
III. Adverse Possession in Favor of the Robertsons
To establish adverse possession, a claimant must prove actual, open, notorious,
continuous, hostile, and exclusive possession for seven years, accompanied by an intent to
hold against the true owner. Collier v. Gilmore, 2018 Ark. App. 549, at 5, 562 S.W.3d 895,
898. A claimant may tack an immediate predecessor’s adverse possession to his own to
establish the required period. Barnett, 2010 Ark. App. 109, at 9, 377 S.W.3d at 322. In 1995,
the General Assembly added requirements of color of title and payment of taxes on the
disputed property or contiguous property for seven years. Act 775 of 1995 (codified at Ark.
Code Ann. § 18-11-106 (Repl. 2015)). Those requirements apply unless the claimant’s
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adverse title vested before the statutory change. Collier, 2018 Ark. App. 549, at 5 n.2, 562
S.W.3d at 898 n.2.
On our de novo review, we hold that the circuit court’s conclusion that the
Robertsons adversely possessed the easement road and the land between the two fence lines
is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. First, the record does not support the
court’s finding that Cochrane’s testimony and the survey “established that remnants of the
fence along the northern side of the easement road reflected the southern boundary line of
Plaintiff’s property”. Instead, the survey shows, and Cochrane testified to, three different
lines: the old northern fence line, the deed boundary line as established by metes and
bounds, and the centerline of the road itself. He explained, and the survey shows, that
portions of the deed boundary fell within the road, some north of it and some south of it.
Ty described the area between the fences as a lane convenient for moving cattle. Moore
testified that when the Robertsons’ land was still owned by Tharp, they would sometimes
leave the east gate open to give Moore’s heifers access to Tharp’s bull. The circuit court even
found that the gates were erected to keep each owner’s cattle within designated pastures. The
fences therefore did not serve as a boundary marker between properties.
It is also problematic that the Robertsons already had the right to use the road. The
1974 deed expressly preserved use of the road for both tracts and their successors. Tharp and
the Robertsons did not need Moore’s permission to travel it. Exercising their own deeded
right was not adverse to Moore’s ownership. See Terral v. Brooks, 194 Ark. 311, 108 S.W.2d
489 (1937).
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That said, there was testimony that the gate was locked and that Tharp’s use from
2008 to 2012 was exclusive. But when asked whether Tharp had ever given Moore a key, Ty
said only “not to my knowledge[,] I never saw Roger through there and - or use it or whatever.
As far as I know, he didn’t have a key.” (Not knowing whether someone has a key is not the
same as testimony that someone did not have a key.) Moreover, Moore testified that he did
have a key during Tharp’s ownership and had used the road when borrowing Tharp’s tractor
to feed his cattle. Even the circuit court found that the evidence was “not clear” whether the
gates remained locked during Tharp’s ownership or whether Moore had a key. Considering
that both owners had a right to use the road and that the gates and fences served to help
manage livestock, the evidence did not establish hostile intent before 2012.
The court found that the Robertsons replaced the locks in 2012 and that Moore no
longer had a key. Even assuming that this commenced a period of adverse possession, Moore
filed his suit in February 2019, meaning the possession could not have been adverse for the
required seven-year period.
Another barrier to adverse possession on this record is the statutory requirement of
payment of taxes on the disputed property or contiguous property for seven years. Ark. Code
Ann. § 18-11-106(a) (Repl. 2015). Nothing in the record establishes that adverse title vested
before the 1995 statutory change, and no evidence was introduced that either the Robertsons
or their predecessors had paid ad valorem taxes on either the disputed property or the
contiguous property for the required period. It was therefore erroneous for the circuit court
to award the Robertsons title to the disputed property under the theory of adverse
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possession. See Barnett, 2010 Ark. App. 109, at 11, 377 S.W.3d at 324.
IV. Abandonment
The circuit court also concluded that Moore abandoned his right and interest in the
property by permitting Tharp and the Robertsons to place locks on the gates. Title to real
property cannot be divested by abandonment alone. Absent a legal conveyance, an owner’s
intent to relinquish a claim must be accompanied by circumstances of estoppel and
limitation. Hendrix v. Hendrix, 256 Ark. 289, 293, 506 S.W.2d 848, 851 (1974). The party
asserting abandonment must prove it by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence. Fletcher v.
Stewart, 2015 Ark. App. 105, at 6, 456 S.W.3d 378, 382.
C.W. Lewis Lumber Co. v. Fletcher illustrates the type of conduct that can rise to the
level of abandonment. 224 Ark. 464, 274 S.W.2d 472 (1955). In C.W. Lewis Lumber, a
lumber company marked its boundaries with blazes and yellow paint on trees, but some of
its forest land was outside the marked boundary. The company had known about the mistake
since 1939. An employee reported it again in 1951. When adjoining landowners then felled
some trees on their side of the yellow line that was technically property of the lumber
company, the lumber company brought suit for the value of the trees. Our supreme court
held that evidence that the lumber company knowingly maintained an incorrect boundary
was sufficient to submit the issue of abandonment to the jury. The key was the element of
estoppel. Id. at 464–66, 274 S.W.2d at 472–473.
Nothing comparable occurred here. The only conduct the circuit court identified was
Moore’s permitting Tharp and the Robertsons to lock the gates. That is not clear,
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unequivocal, and decisive evidence of an intent to relinquish title. Nor did the Robertsons
establish which circumstances gave rise to estoppel or limitation. Therefore, it was erroneous
for the circuit court to find abandonment.
V. Scope of Use
Moore also challenges the circuit court’s ruling permitting the Robertsons’ use of the
road for commercial utility-vehicle tours. He argues that the easement was intended to
provide access over an existing farm road and that the tour traffic exceeds the use
contemplated by the grant. The circuit court concluded that the deeds did not restrict travel
to noncommercial use and that the Robertsons’ use was reasonable and “consistent with, or
is not calculated to interfere with the exercise of the easement granted.” Given the record
before us, we hold that the circuit court applied the wrong standard under the circumstances.
An easement is a nonpossessory interest in the land of another, which traditionally
involves the grant of a right-of-way over the land of another or the right to use another’s land
for a specific purpose consistent with the other’s ownership. Diamond K Invs., Inc. v. 1330
LLC, 2024 Ark. App. 433, at 12, 698 S.W.3d 653, 662. The land over which the easement
is imposed is known as the servient tenement or estate, and the land having the right of use
is the dominant tenement or estate. Id. In Barnett v. Sanders, we explained the rules governing
both parties’ use:
The rule in this state is that the owner of an easement may make use of the
easement compatible with the authorized use so long as the use is reasonable in light
of all facts and circumstances of the case. The owner of the servient tenement may
make any use thereof that is consistent with, or not calculated to interfere with, the
exercise of the easement granted.
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2014 Ark. App. 702, at 4, 451 S.W.3d 211, 214 (quoting Howard v. Cramlet, 56 Ark. App.
171, 174–75, 939 S.W.2d 858, 860 (1997)). The holder of the dominant estate has a duty
to use the property so as not to damage the owner of the servient estate; conversely, the
servient-estate owner may not erect a barrier that unreasonably interferes with the right of
passage by the easement owner. Id. at 5, 451 S.W.3d at 214.
An easement may be created by an express grant, or it may be created by implication,
prescriptive use, or necessity. Diamond K, supra. The easement at issue here is an express
easement created by the 1974 deed. The extent and limitations of an express easement are
usually fixed by the conveyance and set out in its terms. Id. at 12, 698 S.W.3d at 662. As our
supreme court explained in Jordan v. Guinn,
In the case of an easement by grant, the creation is evidenced by the language and
circumstances of the grant, and the extent of the easement is to be ascertained from
the language construed in the light of relevant circumstances. The relative importance
of the language and the circumstances varies from case to case, depending upon the
completeness and clarity of the language used. The less complete or clear the
language, the more important the circumstances become. Uses by the owner of the
servient tenement made prior to the grant, as well as those made subsequent thereto,
and the actions of the parties with reference to the easement after the grant may be
considered insofar as they aid in the ascertainment of the extent and meaning of the
grant. Comments, Restatement of the Law of Property, Servitude, § 483.
253 Ark. 315, 322, 485 S.W.2d 715, 720 (1972).
The circuit court’s ruling does not follow these principles. Here, the 1974 deed
expressly preserved the grantees’ right to use the road and provides that “both the benefit
and burden of said right-of-way shall run with both tracts of lands.” The parties’ rights and
obligations therefore must be considered together. Where the Robertsons use the road on
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Moore’s property, their use must be compatible with the use authorized by the deed and
reasonable under the circumstances. The absence of an express restriction against
commercial use is not the full inquiry. The deed describes the right-of-way as an “existing
road” but says nothing more about the purposes for which it may be used. When the
language of the grant is incomplete, the surrounding circumstances, including the parties’
use of the road before and after the grant, take on greater importance. Jordan, 253 Ark. at
322, 485 S.W.2d at 720.
In Barnett, we remanded to the circuit court because it had made no findings as to
what constituted reasonable use or restriction of the easement by the servient owner. 2014
Ark. App. 702, at 5, 451 S.W.3d at 214–15. Here, Moore’s property is the servient estate
where the road crosses it, but the circuit court applied the servient standard only to the
Robertsons. The 1974 deed expressly conferred the grantees’ right to use the road and
provides that “both the benefit and burden of said right-of-way shall run with both tracts of
lands.” The parties’ rights, therefore, must be considered together. Considering how this
particular easement falls within the boundaries of both owners’ properties, the circuit court
on remand should consider both parties’ reciprocal rights and obligations and how their use
impacts one another. We therefore reverse and remand for the circuit court to determine
the permissible scope of use considering the express language of the deed, the facts and
circumstances surrounding the grant, the parties’ later use of the road, and the fact that the
easement is a benefit and a burden to both properties.
VI. The Western Fence
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We review the denial of a prescriptive easement de novo, but we will not reverse the
circuit court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Clark v. Eubanks, 2019 Ark.
App. 49, at 3, 570 S.W.3d 506, 508.
Moore’s final two points are interrelated. He argues that he acquired a prescriptive
easement around the old western fence so he can circle his house and pull his trailer out
onto the county road. He also challenges the circuit court’s ruling that laches bars his request
to have the Robertsons restore the western fence and corner post to their former locations.
The extension of the fence is what prevents Moore from getting his trailer out as he used to
do. If Moore does not prevail on his prescriptive-easement claim, we would not need to
discuss the finding regarding laches.
A prescriptive easement may be gained by one not in fee possession of the land by
operation of law in a manner similar to adverse possession. Five Forks Hunting Club, LLC v.
Nixon Fam. P’ship, 2019 Ark. App. 371, at 14, 584 S.W.3d 685, 694. In Arkansas, it is
generally required that one asserting an easement by prescription show by a preponderance
of the evidence that one’s use has been adverse to the true owner and under a claim of right
for seven years. Id. A prescriptive easement may be created only by the adverse use of privilege
with the knowledge of the person against whom the easement is claimed or by use so open,
notorious, and uninterrupted that knowledge will be presumed, and the use must be
exercised under a claim of right adverse to the owner and acquiesced in by him. Id. Unlike
adverse possession, prescriptive use need not be exclusive. Smith v. Loyd, 68 Ark. App. 127,
130–31, 5 S.W.3d 74, 76 (1999).
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This disputed area is separate from the strip between Moore’s deed line and the old
north–south fence. Moore testified that from 1987 until the fence extension in 2013, he
frequently used the space between the old western fence line and his house as a turning area
for his eighteen-foot trailer while hauling hay and wood. He also testified that he maintained
his yard up to the county road and that when the Robertsons extended the western fence, it
narrowed the opening between the fence and his mailbox from approximately twenty feet to
eight feet. According to Moore, he had asked the Robertsons while the work was underway
to leave enough room for him to turn his trailer.
In the order, the circuit court wrote that a prescriptive easement required “actual,
open and notorious, hostile, exclusive, and continuous possession for seven (7) years.”
(Emphasis added.) It then found that Moore had “not provided any information, testimony
or evidence to establish his possession was hostile, exclusive, and continuous for the prescribed
period.” (Emphasis added.) This presents two problems. First, the measure is use, not
possession; second, exclusivity is not a requirement. It is clear the circuit court applied the
test for adverse possession rather than prescriptive easement, and we therefore reverse and
remand for the circuit court to apply the correct legal standard.
VII. Laches
The circuit court treated laches as an independent reason to deny Moore’s request to
restore the western fence line to its location. Because we reverse the denial of his prescriptive-
easement claim, we must also address that independent bar to relief. Moore’s request to
restore the fence line seeks removal of the obstruction to his claimed prescriptive easement.
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He testified that extending the western fence and adding the new corner post narrowed the
opening between the fence and his mailbox from approximately twenty feet to eight feet,
preventing him from circling his house with his trailer and passing through the gap to the
county road. The circuit court’s order explained that
[p]laintiff is barred by laches from asserting a claim that Defendants unlawfully
removed the westside corner post and extended the west boundary fence line on their
property. The defense of laches requires . . . a detrimental change in position by one
party and an unreasonable delay by the other party. Plaintiff’s request to have
Defendants restore the corner post and west boundary fence line is unreasonably
delayed because he waited over six (6) years to assert any legal right or remedy to
correct the issue. Further, Plaintiff refused to communicate his discrepancies with
Defendants or assert any other remedy in an appropriate legal proceeding before now.
To have Defendants restore the fence line and corner post six (6) years after the
change, would impose a detrimental financial change upon Defendants to remove
the new fence line and post, and erect another fence line and post as the original.
Laches is an equitable doctrine premised on some detrimental change in position made by
one party in reliance upon the action or inaction of the other party. Longley v. Gatewood,
2017 Ark. App. 48, at 8, 512 S.W.3d 683, 687–88. The first requirement in laches is that
the party have knowledge of his or her rights and the opportunity to assert those rights. Id.
The doctrine operates to bar an action by a party who has “sat on his rights,” i.e., purposely
or negligently failed to assert a claim for so long that to permit it now would be a prejudicial
disadvantage to an opposing party. Id. The application of laches is based on the particular
circumstances of each case and is a question of fact for the circuit court. Id. We do not reverse
the circuit court’s decision on a question of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Foster v. Est. of
Collins, 2017 Ark. App. 65, at 2, 511 S.W.3d 900, 902.
The circuit court found that restoring the fence and corner post would impose a
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financial burden on the Robertsons because of Moore’s delay in communicating a problem.
But this is not a correct application of the doctrine, which requires the Robertsons to
demonstrate that they took some action in reliance on Moore’s delay. That did not occur
here. Moreover, Moore testified that he objected to the fence changes when they occurred.
Because the record does not support a finding of detrimental reliance, the circuit court
clearly erred in concluding that laches bars Moore’s request, and we reverse on this point.
VIII. Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse and remand. Although the Robertsons’ adverse-possession
and abandonment theories were properly before the court, the evidence supports neither,
and boundary by acquiescence was neither pleaded nor tried by consent. The circuit court
therefore erred in ordering Moore to reconstruct the northern fence under any of these
theories. On remand, the circuit court should consider the easement’s scope of use,
considering the language of the deed, the surrounding circumstances, and the parties’
reciprocal obligations to one another. It should also reconsider Moore’s claim of prescriptive
easement along the western fence under the correct legal standard. And because laches does
not bar Moore’s request to restore the western fenceline, the court should consider that
request in light of its ruling on the prescriptive easement.
Reversed and remanded.
ABRAMSON and BARRETT, JJ., agree.
Jeremy B. Lowrey, for appellant.
Phillip A. Moon Law Office, by: Phillip A. Moon, for appellees.
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