Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 567 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CV-25-328 Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 ROGER C. MOORE APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE BOONE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 05CV-19-26] BOB ROBERTSON, AN INDIVIDUAL; HONORABLE JOHNNIE COPELAND, AND THE BOB ROBERTSON FAMILY JUDGE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP APPELLEES REVERSED AND REMANDED MIKE MURPHY, Judge Appellant Roger Moore appeals the Boone County Circuit Court order resolving a boundary and easement dispute in favor of his neighbors, appellees Bob Robertson and the Bob Robertson Family Limited Partnership. He raises nine points for reversal challenging the court’s boundary determination, its rulings on the parties’ rights to use the road, and its rejection of his claim to a separate access area near the southwestern corner of his property. We agree that the circuit court erred, and we reverse and remand. Moore and the Robertsons own adjoining properties in Boone County. The properties were originally part of one large tract owned by Charlotte and Johnny Ray Barnes. In 1974, the Barneses conveyed a forty-acre tract to Lorene and Michael Roberts, Moore’s predecessors in title. The Barneses still owned the land on three sides of the tract, and the deed provided that the conveyance was [s]ubject to a road right-of-way along the south boundary of said property, the benefit of said existing road shall run with the adjoining lands immediately to the east of the above described lands which are now owned by the grantors herein, and the grantees and their heirs and assigns shall also have the right to use said road and both the benefit and burden of said right-of-way shall run with both tracts of lands above referred to. One of the surveys introduced at trial, the Cochrane survey, showed that the southern boundary of the forty-acre tract generally traces the road’s centerline but crosses it in places, putting some of the road north and some of the road south of the deeded line. Fences ran along both sides of the road. The northern fence consisted of wire strung between trees and steel posts. Michael Roberts testified that this fence was already there when he bought the property from the Barneses and that leaving it in place made it more convenient to use the road. He thought the property boundary was south of the road––not at the northern fence. Delbert Tharp acquired the larger parcel from the Barnes family in 1976, and Moore purchased the forty-acre tract from the Roberts family in 1987. Moore’s deed also noted the road right-of-way. Moore testified that a gate was in place across the road on the western side of his property when he purchased the land. Moore testified that he regularly used the road in front of his residence as his driveway. He also would travel east on the road to reach the creek and feed his cattle, although he did not use that portion daily. According to Moore, Tharp used the road to reach his cattle, deliver feed, and place salt. They both kept the gate closed. 2 Ty Robertson, Bob’s son, testified that he began helping Tharp with farm work in 2008. The Bob Robertson Family Limited Partnership acquired the larger parcel from the Tharps in September 2012, after which Ty used the road daily to check cattle. He explained that two fences lined the road with gates on each end of the segment fronting Moore’s property. The two fences formed a lane convenient for moving cattle. He said the western gate was kept locked during the years he worked for Tharp, that he had not encountered Moore in the disputed area and that to his knowledge, Moore did not have a key. After the partnership purchased the property, Ty continued locking the gate and did not give Moore a key. Moore testified that around 2013 or early 2014, Bob Robertson extended a fence along the western side of Moore’s property and installed new gates. According to Moore, he could no longer circle around his house and get out to the county road with his eighteen- foot trailer. He had previously used the space between his house and the old fence line to get to the county road with his trailer, but now he could not. He testified that he had asked Robertson to leave space when putting up the new fences and gates so he could still get out with his trailer but that Robertson did not. In 2018, the Robertsons started Hog Wild Adventures and began conducting tours of their property on utility-terrain-vehicle side-by-sides. The road in front of Moore’s home was included in the tours. Moore testified that the traffic generated more noise and dust near his house and caused erosion along the road. In November 2018, Moore removed the northern fence along the road. Later that 3 month, Ty removed the western gate. Moore filed his complaint on February 5, 2019. He asked the court to (1) declare the southern fence line the boundary by adverse possession; (2) order the Robertsons to reinstate the gates they had taken down; (3) bar the Robertsons from blocking his use of the road; (4) restore the fence west of his house to its former location and remove the new gates installed there; and (5) limit the easement’s scope to its historical use since 1987. The Robertsons denied the claims and asserted the following affirmative defenses: laches, adverse possession, prescriptive easement, and easement by necessity. At an April 3, 2019 hearing, the court ruled that Moore could, during the ongoing litigation, reinstall the western fence at his expense. On the first day of the final hearing, the Robertsons filed an amended answer alleging that they and their predecessors had adversely possessed the road and land up to the old northern fence. They asked the court to confirm their ownership of the area between the northern and southern fences and require Moore to replace the northern fence at his expense. The pleading did not separately designate a counterclaim. Moore objected to the amended answer because the Robertsons had not previously pleaded a claim that the northern fence is the boundary. Moore’s counsel said he was prepared to defend the issue, but the Robertsons should not be allowed to proceed on it. The court stated that the boundary had always been an issue, allowed both parties to present their positions concerning its location, and noted Moore’s objection. Later in the trial, the issue of abandonment was also raised. The Robertsons asserted 4 that Moore had abandoned the road altogether. Moore objected that this was not a pleaded claim. The Robertsons asked that the pleadings be conformed to the proof. The court denied their directed-verdict motions concerning ownership and use but did not expressly rule on the request to conform the pleadings. At the conclusion of the testimony, the court requested written closing arguments and proposed orders from both sides. The circuit court entered its final order on December 12, 2024, in which it rejected Moore’s adverse-possession claim and concluded that the Robertsons had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession. It set the northern fence as the boundary by acquiescence and concluded that Moore had abandoned his right and interest in the disputed property by permitting Tharp and the Robertsons to place locks on the western gates. The court ordered Moore to reconstruct the northern fence at his expense, prohibited him from traveling on or otherwise using the road, and prohibited him from interfering with the Robertsons’ use of the easement. The court denied Moore’s claim for prescriptive easement along the western fence line and found that laches barred his request to restore the western fence and corner post. Finally, of note, it stated that the deeds did not restrict the road to noncommercial use. Moore appeals from that order. He makes nine points on appeal, but we have organized them into six: (1) the court’s consideration of affirmative relief Moore contends was improperly pleaded; (2) the court’s decision to set the northern fence as the boundary under adverse possession; (3) whether Moore had abandoned his property rights; (4) the 5 scope of the easement’s use; (5) whether the circuit court erred in denying Moore’s claim for prescriptive easement along the western fence; and (6) its applications of laches to his request to restore the old western fenceline. I. Standard of Review We traditionally review boundary-line disputes de novo. Warren v. Porter, 2026 Ark. App. 395. Following a bench trial, an appellate court asks whether the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and reviews questions of law de novo. AgriFund, LLC v. Regions Bank, 2020 Ark. 246, at 6, 602 S.W.3d 726, 730. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We recognize the circuit court’s superior opportunity to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. S. Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. City of Ft. Smith, 2013 Ark. App. 306, 427 S.W.3d 763. This court reviews the circuit court’s conclusions of law de novo. Houston v. Houston, 67 Ark. App. 286, 999 S.W.2d 204 (1999). II. Affirmative Relief and Pleadings A. Adverse Possession and Rebuilding the Northern Fence The circuit court granted the Robertsons several forms of affirmative relief. It established the old northern fence as the boundary between the parties’ properties on the basis of adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence and ordered Moore to rebuild that fence at his expense. It found that Moore had abandoned his rights in the disputed property. The court prohibited Moore from interfering with the Robertsons’ use of the deeded right- 6 of-way and, once the fence was reconstructed, from traveling on or otherwise using their property south of the fence. On appeal, Moore argues that the Robertsons did not properly plead the claims on which the court granted this affirmative relief. He explains that the Robertsons never filed a pleading designated as a counterclaim and that neither the original answer nor the amended answer pleaded boundary by acquiescence or abandonment. Having reviewed the record, we hold that the theory of adverse possession and the request for reconstruction of the northern fence are properly before the court. Adverse possession is an affirmative defense that must be specifically pleaded. Sutton v. Gardner, 2011 Ark. App. 737, at 5, 387 S.W.3d 185, 190. The Robertsons asserted that defense in their original answer, and their amended answer expressly sought confirmation of their ownership and reconstruction of the northern fence. Although the amended pleading was styled as an answer rather than a counterclaim, Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that a mistakenly designated counterclaim shall be treated as properly designated if justice requires. Rule 8(f) likewise requires pleadings to be liberally construed to do substantial justice. Here, the amended answer made clear what relief the Robertsons sought, and Moore’s counsel acknowledged that he was prepared to defend against the northern-fence claim. B. Abandonment Nor did the circuit court err in considering abandonment. During argument at the close of Moore’s evidence, the Robertsons asserted that Moore had abandoned the right-of- way through nonuse. Moore explained there was a difference between ownership of a road and the right to use a road, and he argued the Robertsons had not pleaded any basis on 7 which to extinguish his right to use the road. The Robertsons then asked that the pleadings be conformed to the proof and renewed their abandonment argument. Moore specifically objected that abandonment had not been pleaded, that its consideration would cause surprise, and that amendment was not permitted under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court denied the motions concerning ownership and use but did not expressly rule on the request to conform, and the trial continued with the defense’s evidence. Rule 15(b) governs amendment to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Although the rule treats issues tried by express or implied consent as though pleaded, it also permits amendment over an objection: When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended in its discretion. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. Cross v. Cross, 2016 Ark. App. 327, 497 S.W.3d 712 is instructive. In Cross, the circuit court considered an unpleaded boundary-by-acquiescence defense over the appellants’ objections. The court did not expressly grant the motion to conform, but it clearly did so in light of the relief granted. We explained that the test whether to allow such an amendment hinges on whether the appellant was prejudiced; that is, “whether the party opposing the motion will have a fair opportunity to defend after the amendment.” Id. at 7, 497 S.W.3d at 717 (quoting Travis v. Houk, 307 Ark. 84, 86, 817 S.W.2d 207, 208 (1991)). We review the decision to 8 allow amendment for a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 6. Here, Moore had a fair opportunity to respond after abandonment was expressly raised. During the defense’s case, his counsel questioned Ty Robertson about whether Moore could have used the road when Ty was not present and whether Tharp had given Moore a key to the gate. On rebuttal, Moore testified that he had walked the road during the Robertsons’ ownership and had used it to feed cattle back when Tharp was the owner. Moore also submitted a posttrial brief and argument addressing the issue. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in considering the issue of abandonment. C. Boundary by Acquiescence Boundary by acquiescence, however, must be affirmatively pleaded under Arkansas Rule 8(c). Jones v. Runsick, 2013 Ark. App. 356, at 6–7. Neither the Robertsons’ original answer nor their amended answer expressly asserted this claim. The Robertsons’ request to conform the pleadings to the proof was presented during the argument on abandonment, and boundary by acquiescence was not raised until the parties simultaneously filed posttrial briefs. In his brief, Moore maintained his objection but discussed the issue in the alternative. In McEntire v. Watkins, 73 Ark. App. 449, 43 S.W.3d 770 (2001), the appellee sought title by adverse possession, but the circuit court instead ruled in her favor on boundary by acquiescence. We reversed because acquiescence had not been pleaded or tried by consent. We held that even though there was testimony about the fence line and the boundary, “we will not imply consent to conforming the pleadings to the proof merely because evidence relevant to a properly pled issue incidentally tends to establish an unpled one.” Id. at 451, 9 43 S.W.3d at 771–72. The same reasoning applies here. Evidence about the northern fence (purpose, location, how long it had been there) was relevant to the issues before the court, but the existence of evidence relevant to an issue does not automatically establish consent to try that issue. The posttrial briefing did not cure that defect. The posttrial briefs were submitted simultaneously, and Moore maintained his objection that the issue had not been pleaded, addressing it only in the alternative. At this point, the evidentiary record, however, was closed, meaning he was no longer able to present evidence in defense of the unpleaded claim. Cf. Barnett v. Gomance, 2010 Ark. App. 109, at 6, 377 S.W.3d 317, 322 (allowing amendment raised in posttrial briefing when addressed by opposing party without objection). The circuit court therefore erred in setting the boundary at the northern fence under the theory of boundary of acquiescence, and we reverse on this point. III. Adverse Possession in Favor of the Robertsons To establish adverse possession, a claimant must prove actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and exclusive possession for seven years, accompanied by an intent to hold against the true owner. Collier v. Gilmore, 2018 Ark. App. 549, at 5, 562 S.W.3d 895, 898. A claimant may tack an immediate predecessor’s adverse possession to his own to establish the required period. Barnett, 2010 Ark. App. 109, at 9, 377 S.W.3d at 322. In 1995, the General Assembly added requirements of color of title and payment of taxes on the disputed property or contiguous property for seven years. Act 775 of 1995 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-106 (Repl. 2015)). Those requirements apply unless the claimant’s 10 adverse title vested before the statutory change. Collier, 2018 Ark. App. 549, at 5 n.2, 562 S.W.3d at 898 n.2. On our de novo review, we hold that the circuit court’s conclusion that the Robertsons adversely possessed the easement road and the land between the two fence lines is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. First, the record does not support the court’s finding that Cochrane’s testimony and the survey “established that remnants of the fence along the northern side of the easement road reflected the southern boundary line of Plaintiff’s property”. Instead, the survey shows, and Cochrane testified to, three different lines: the old northern fence line, the deed boundary line as established by metes and bounds, and the centerline of the road itself. He explained, and the survey shows, that portions of the deed boundary fell within the road, some north of it and some south of it. Ty described the area between the fences as a lane convenient for moving cattle. Moore testified that when the Robertsons’ land was still owned by Tharp, they would sometimes leave the east gate open to give Moore’s heifers access to Tharp’s bull. The circuit court even found that the gates were erected to keep each owner’s cattle within designated pastures. The fences therefore did not serve as a boundary marker between properties. It is also problematic that the Robertsons already had the right to use the road. The 1974 deed expressly preserved use of the road for both tracts and their successors. Tharp and the Robertsons did not need Moore’s permission to travel it. Exercising their own deeded right was not adverse to Moore’s ownership. See Terral v. Brooks, 194 Ark. 311, 108 S.W.2d 489 (1937). 11 That said, there was testimony that the gate was locked and that Tharp’s use from 2008 to 2012 was exclusive. But when asked whether Tharp had ever given Moore a key, Ty said only “not to my knowledge[,] I never saw Roger through there and - or use it or whatever. As far as I know, he didn’t have a key.” (Not knowing whether someone has a key is not the same as testimony that someone did not have a key.) Moreover, Moore testified that he did have a key during Tharp’s ownership and had used the road when borrowing Tharp’s tractor to feed his cattle. Even the circuit court found that the evidence was “not clear” whether the gates remained locked during Tharp’s ownership or whether Moore had a key. Considering that both owners had a right to use the road and that the gates and fences served to help manage livestock, the evidence did not establish hostile intent before 2012. The court found that the Robertsons replaced the locks in 2012 and that Moore no longer had a key. Even assuming that this commenced a period of adverse possession, Moore filed his suit in February 2019, meaning the possession could not have been adverse for the required seven-year period. Another barrier to adverse possession on this record is the statutory requirement of payment of taxes on the disputed property or contiguous property for seven years. Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-106(a) (Repl. 2015). Nothing in the record establishes that adverse title vested before the 1995 statutory change, and no evidence was introduced that either the Robertsons or their predecessors had paid ad valorem taxes on either the disputed property or the contiguous property for the required period. It was therefore erroneous for the circuit court to award the Robertsons title to the disputed property under the theory of adverse 12 possession. See Barnett, 2010 Ark. App. 109, at 11, 377 S.W.3d at 324. IV. Abandonment The circuit court also concluded that Moore abandoned his right and interest in the property by permitting Tharp and the Robertsons to place locks on the gates. Title to real property cannot be divested by abandonment alone. Absent a legal conveyance, an owner’s intent to relinquish a claim must be accompanied by circumstances of estoppel and limitation. Hendrix v. Hendrix, 256 Ark. 289, 293, 506 S.W.2d 848, 851 (1974). The party asserting abandonment must prove it by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence. Fletcher v. Stewart, 2015 Ark. App. 105, at 6, 456 S.W.3d 378, 382. C.W. Lewis Lumber Co. v. Fletcher illustrates the type of conduct that can rise to the level of abandonment. 224 Ark. 464, 274 S.W.2d 472 (1955). In C.W. Lewis Lumber, a lumber company marked its boundaries with blazes and yellow paint on trees, but some of its forest land was outside the marked boundary. The company had known about the mistake since 1939. An employee reported it again in 1951. When adjoining landowners then felled some trees on their side of the yellow line that was technically property of the lumber company, the lumber company brought suit for the value of the trees. Our supreme court held that evidence that the lumber company knowingly maintained an incorrect boundary was sufficient to submit the issue of abandonment to the jury. The key was the element of estoppel. Id. at 464–66, 274 S.W.2d at 472–473. Nothing comparable occurred here. The only conduct the circuit court identified was Moore’s permitting Tharp and the Robertsons to lock the gates. That is not clear, 13 unequivocal, and decisive evidence of an intent to relinquish title. Nor did the Robertsons establish which circumstances gave rise to estoppel or limitation. Therefore, it was erroneous for the circuit court to find abandonment. V. Scope of Use Moore also challenges the circuit court’s ruling permitting the Robertsons’ use of the road for commercial utility-vehicle tours. He argues that the easement was intended to provide access over an existing farm road and that the tour traffic exceeds the use contemplated by the grant. The circuit court concluded that the deeds did not restrict travel to noncommercial use and that the Robertsons’ use was reasonable and “consistent with, or is not calculated to interfere with the exercise of the easement granted.” Given the record before us, we hold that the circuit court applied the wrong standard under the circumstances. An easement is a nonpossessory interest in the land of another, which traditionally involves the grant of a right-of-way over the land of another or the right to use another’s land for a specific purpose consistent with the other’s ownership. Diamond K Invs., Inc. v. 1330 LLC, 2024 Ark. App. 433, at 12, 698 S.W.3d 653, 662. The land over which the easement is imposed is known as the servient tenement or estate, and the land having the right of use is the dominant tenement or estate. Id. In Barnett v. Sanders, we explained the rules governing both parties’ use: The rule in this state is that the owner of an easement may make use of the easement compatible with the authorized use so long as the use is reasonable in light of all facts and circumstances of the case. The owner of the servient tenement may make any use thereof that is consistent with, or not calculated to interfere with, the exercise of the easement granted. 14 2014 Ark. App. 702, at 4, 451 S.W.3d 211, 214 (quoting Howard v. Cramlet, 56 Ark. App. 171, 174–75, 939 S.W.2d 858, 860 (1997)). The holder of the dominant estate has a duty to use the property so as not to damage the owner of the servient estate; conversely, the servient-estate owner may not erect a barrier that unreasonably interferes with the right of passage by the easement owner. Id. at 5, 451 S.W.3d at 214. An easement may be created by an express grant, or it may be created by implication, prescriptive use, or necessity. Diamond K, supra. The easement at issue here is an express easement created by the 1974 deed. The extent and limitations of an express easement are usually fixed by the conveyance and set out in its terms. Id. at 12, 698 S.W.3d at 662. As our supreme court explained in Jordan v. Guinn, In the case of an easement by grant, the creation is evidenced by the language and circumstances of the grant, and the extent of the easement is to be ascertained from the language construed in the light of relevant circumstances. The relative importance of the language and the circumstances varies from case to case, depending upon the completeness and clarity of the language used. The less complete or clear the language, the more important the circumstances become. Uses by the owner of the servient tenement made prior to the grant, as well as those made subsequent thereto, and the actions of the parties with reference to the easement after the grant may be considered insofar as they aid in the ascertainment of the extent and meaning of the grant. Comments, Restatement of the Law of Property, Servitude, § 483. 253 Ark. 315, 322, 485 S.W.2d 715, 720 (1972). The circuit court’s ruling does not follow these principles. Here, the 1974 deed expressly preserved the grantees’ right to use the road and provides that “both the benefit and burden of said right-of-way shall run with both tracts of lands.” The parties’ rights and obligations therefore must be considered together. Where the Robertsons use the road on 15 Moore’s property, their use must be compatible with the use authorized by the deed and reasonable under the circumstances. The absence of an express restriction against commercial use is not the full inquiry. The deed describes the right-of-way as an “existing road” but says nothing more about the purposes for which it may be used. When the language of the grant is incomplete, the surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ use of the road before and after the grant, take on greater importance. Jordan, 253 Ark. at 322, 485 S.W.2d at 720. In Barnett, we remanded to the circuit court because it had made no findings as to what constituted reasonable use or restriction of the easement by the servient owner. 2014 Ark. App. 702, at 5, 451 S.W.3d at 214–15. Here, Moore’s property is the servient estate where the road crosses it, but the circuit court applied the servient standard only to the Robertsons. The 1974 deed expressly conferred the grantees’ right to use the road and provides that “both the benefit and burden of said right-of-way shall run with both tracts of lands.” The parties’ rights, therefore, must be considered together. Considering how this particular easement falls within the boundaries of both owners’ properties, the circuit court on remand should consider both parties’ reciprocal rights and obligations and how their use impacts one another. We therefore reverse and remand for the circuit court to determine the permissible scope of use considering the express language of the deed, the facts and circumstances surrounding the grant, the parties’ later use of the road, and the fact that the easement is a benefit and a burden to both properties. VI. The Western Fence 16 We review the denial of a prescriptive easement de novo, but we will not reverse the circuit court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Clark v. Eubanks, 2019 Ark. App. 49, at 3, 570 S.W.3d 506, 508. Moore’s final two points are interrelated. He argues that he acquired a prescriptive easement around the old western fence so he can circle his house and pull his trailer out onto the county road. He also challenges the circuit court’s ruling that laches bars his request to have the Robertsons restore the western fence and corner post to their former locations. The extension of the fence is what prevents Moore from getting his trailer out as he used to do. If Moore does not prevail on his prescriptive-easement claim, we would not need to discuss the finding regarding laches. A prescriptive easement may be gained by one not in fee possession of the land by operation of law in a manner similar to adverse possession. Five Forks Hunting Club, LLC v. Nixon Fam. P’ship, 2019 Ark. App. 371, at 14, 584 S.W.3d 685, 694. In Arkansas, it is generally required that one asserting an easement by prescription show by a preponderance of the evidence that one’s use has been adverse to the true owner and under a claim of right for seven years. Id. A prescriptive easement may be created only by the adverse use of privilege with the knowledge of the person against whom the easement is claimed or by use so open, notorious, and uninterrupted that knowledge will be presumed, and the use must be exercised under a claim of right adverse to the owner and acquiesced in by him. Id. Unlike adverse possession, prescriptive use need not be exclusive. Smith v. Loyd, 68 Ark. App. 127, 130–31, 5 S.W.3d 74, 76 (1999). 17 This disputed area is separate from the strip between Moore’s deed line and the old north–south fence. Moore testified that from 1987 until the fence extension in 2013, he frequently used the space between the old western fence line and his house as a turning area for his eighteen-foot trailer while hauling hay and wood. He also testified that he maintained his yard up to the county road and that when the Robertsons extended the western fence, it narrowed the opening between the fence and his mailbox from approximately twenty feet to eight feet. According to Moore, he had asked the Robertsons while the work was underway to leave enough room for him to turn his trailer. In the order, the circuit court wrote that a prescriptive easement required “actual, open and notorious, hostile, exclusive, and continuous possession for seven (7) years.” (Emphasis added.) It then found that Moore had “not provided any information, testimony or evidence to establish his possession was hostile, exclusive, and continuous for the prescribed period.” (Emphasis added.) This presents two problems. First, the measure is use, not possession; second, exclusivity is not a requirement. It is clear the circuit court applied the test for adverse possession rather than prescriptive easement, and we therefore reverse and remand for the circuit court to apply the correct legal standard. VII. Laches The circuit court treated laches as an independent reason to deny Moore’s request to restore the western fence line to its location. Because we reverse the denial of his prescriptive- easement claim, we must also address that independent bar to relief. Moore’s request to restore the fence line seeks removal of the obstruction to his claimed prescriptive easement. 18 He testified that extending the western fence and adding the new corner post narrowed the opening between the fence and his mailbox from approximately twenty feet to eight feet, preventing him from circling his house with his trailer and passing through the gap to the county road. The circuit court’s order explained that [p]laintiff is barred by laches from asserting a claim that Defendants unlawfully removed the westside corner post and extended the west boundary fence line on their property. The defense of laches requires . . . a detrimental change in position by one party and an unreasonable delay by the other party. Plaintiff’s request to have Defendants restore the corner post and west boundary fence line is unreasonably delayed because he waited over six (6) years to assert any legal right or remedy to correct the issue. Further, Plaintiff refused to communicate his discrepancies with Defendants or assert any other remedy in an appropriate legal proceeding before now. To have Defendants restore the fence line and corner post six (6) years after the change, would impose a detrimental financial change upon Defendants to remove the new fence line and post, and erect another fence line and post as the original. Laches is an equitable doctrine premised on some detrimental change in position made by one party in reliance upon the action or inaction of the other party. Longley v. Gatewood, 2017 Ark. App. 48, at 8, 512 S.W.3d 683, 687–88. The first requirement in laches is that the party have knowledge of his or her rights and the opportunity to assert those rights. Id. The doctrine operates to bar an action by a party who has “sat on his rights,” i.e., purposely or negligently failed to assert a claim for so long that to permit it now would be a prejudicial disadvantage to an opposing party. Id. The application of laches is based on the particular circumstances of each case and is a question of fact for the circuit court. Id. We do not reverse the circuit court’s decision on a question of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Foster v. Est. of Collins, 2017 Ark. App. 65, at 2, 511 S.W.3d 900, 902. The circuit court found that restoring the fence and corner post would impose a 19 financial burden on the Robertsons because of Moore’s delay in communicating a problem. But this is not a correct application of the doctrine, which requires the Robertsons to demonstrate that they took some action in reliance on Moore’s delay. That did not occur here. Moreover, Moore testified that he objected to the fence changes when they occurred. Because the record does not support a finding of detrimental reliance, the circuit court clearly erred in concluding that laches bars Moore’s request, and we reverse on this point. VIII. Conclusion Accordingly, we reverse and remand. Although the Robertsons’ adverse-possession and abandonment theories were properly before the court, the evidence supports neither, and boundary by acquiescence was neither pleaded nor tried by consent. The circuit court therefore erred in ordering Moore to reconstruct the northern fence under any of these theories. On remand, the circuit court should consider the easement’s scope of use, considering the language of the deed, the surrounding circumstances, and the parties’ reciprocal obligations to one another. It should also reconsider Moore’s claim of prescriptive easement along the western fence under the correct legal standard. And because laches does not bar Moore’s request to restore the western fenceline, the court should consider that request in light of its ruling on the prescriptive easement. Reversed and remanded. ABRAMSON and BARRETT, JJ., agree. Jeremy B. Lowrey, for appellant. Phillip A. Moon Law Office, by: Phillip A. Moon, for appellees. 20