Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 379 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-25-454 Opinion Delivered September 2, 2026 HEIDI SALIBA APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 23DR-24-1070] V. CHRISTOPHER HOLTZ HONORABLE H.G. FOSTER, APPELLEE JUDGE REVERSED BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge Heidi Saliba appeals the circuit court’s grant of Christopher Holtz’s motion for attorney’s fees after finding that Holtz had incurred unnecessary fees and costs defending himself from Saliba’s petition for an order of protection. Saliba says that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-205 (Repl. 2020) does not authorize attorney’s fees because Holtz was not the “prevailing party,” a threshold statutory requirement for a fee award. We agree and reverse. On 6 December 2024, Heidi Saliba petitioned for an ex parte temporary order of protection on behalf of her granddaughter (MC) against Holtz, MC’s father. She essentially alleged that Holtz had left MC in harmful situations; had been arrested for assault and battery against MC’s mother; and was selling drugs. The circuit court issued the temporary ex parte order and set a hearing for 2 January 2025. Holtz responded that he had been granted visitation with MC in a case in Georgia and that Saliba was thwarting that court-ordered 1 visitation. At Holtz’s request, the hearing was delayed until 27 February 2025. On February 24, Saliba moved to voluntarily dismiss her petition, and the court granted the motion on February 25. That same day, Holtz moved for attorney’s fees and costs, alleging that he was the prevailing party under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-205(a)(5) and that Saliba had acted in bad faith to deny him visitation with MC. Saliba denied that Holtz was the prevailing party because there had been no hearing and no finding of domestic abuse. In due course, the circuit court granted Holtz’s motion for attorney’s fees. The court found that Holtz had incurred “unneeded and unnecessary attorney’s fees and costs” and awarded him a total of $1885. Saliba timely appealed from this order. Arkansas follows the American rule, which requires every litigant to bear his or her own attorney’s fees absent a statute to the contrary. Hopping v. Scarborough, 2026 Ark. App. 303, ___ S.W.3d ___. In other words, attorney’s fees are not typically allowed unless a statue permits them. Thomas Invs., LLC v. Huddleston, 2020 Ark. App. 500, 613 S.W.3d 729. We will not disturb a circuit court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees absent an abuse of discretion. Vice v. Vice, 2016 Ark. App. 504, 505 S.W.3d 719. An error of law can be an abuse of discretion. White v. Randolph, 2025 Ark. App. 336. In our view, the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Holtz was the prevailing party and therefore triggered the attorney’s fee provision of Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-205(a)(5). It provides that “[a]t the hearing on the petition filed under this chapter, upon a finding of domestic abuse as defined in § 9-15-103, the court may provide the following relief: . . . (5) Allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of 2 the costs.” Saliba argues that, in this case, neither prerequisite for a fee award—a hearing and a finding of domestic abuse—occurred. So the circuit court had no authority to award attorney’s fees, and it abused its discretion in doing so. We agree. Given the plain language of the statute, attorney’s fees cannot be awarded pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-205(a)(5) unless a finding of domestic abuse has occurred at a hearing on the petition. Neither event occurred here, so the fee award was not authorized. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to Holtz. 1 Reversed. KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and MURPHY, J., agree. Bell Law Co., by: Evan C. Bell, for appellant. One brief only. 1 We recognize that the circuit court’s award was for attorney’s fees and costs, but there is no differentiation between fees and costs in the court’s order or in the attorney invoices filed with Holtz’s motion for attorney’s fees. Holtz chose not to file a brief with this court addressing his entitlement to either attorney’s fees or costs. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s order in its entirety. 3