Katrina Murry and Teresa Bloodman v. Kamal Ellis
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 564
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-25-414
KATRINA MURRY AND TERESA Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
BLOODMAN
APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 35CV-24-407]
V.
HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS,
KAMAL ELLIS JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellants Katrina Murry and Teresa Bloodman appeal from an order of summary
judgment that quieted title to a parcel of property at 1711 West 2nd Avenue, Pine Bluff,
Arkansas (hereinafter “the property”), in appellee Kamal Ellis.1 On appeal, appellants raise
numerous arguments: (1) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over appellants because the
summonses were defective; (2) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over appellants because
there was no valid service of process; (3) the trial court erred in granting three motions for
extensions of time to serve appellants; (4) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
because appellants had no notice of the summary-judgment hearing; (5) the trial court erred in
1
The appellants appeared pro se both below and on appeal, and they have filed a single
appellate brief.
dismissing appellants’ counterclaim for trespass; and (6) the trial court erred in denying
appellants’ posttrial Rule 60 motion to vacate its summary-judgment order. We affirm.
This case was initiated on May 20, 2024, when Ellis filed a complaint to confirm and
quiet title to the property. The complaint alleged that the property was formerly owned by Mary
Eagle and John Eagle, who died in 2003 and 2007; that Murry and Bloodman are the Eagles’
known heirs; and that the property was forfeited for failure to pay taxes. Ellis’s complaint alleged
that Clean Sweep Management acquired the property at a tax sale in May 2013 and that Clean
Sweep Management deeded the property to Ellis via a quitclaim deed recorded in May 2022. A
copy of Ellis’s deed was attached to the complaint. Ellis requested an order quieting title to the
property, thereby foreclosing any and all claims of ownership by Murry and Bloodman.
Summonses were issued, and the summons to Murry named the defendant as “Katrina
Murray” (slightly misspelling Murry’s surname) and listed her address as “2405 W 39th Ave,
Pine Bluff, AR 71603.” The summons to Bloodman correctly named the defendant as “Teresa
Lynette Eagle Bloodman” and listed her address as “124 Deauville Dr, Maumelle, AR 72113.”
Over the next few months, there were multiple unsuccessful service attempts on both
appellants. With respect to Murry, a process server’s proof of service filed on June 17, 2024,
stated that on June 10, service was attempted but unexecuted because “Katrina Murray does not
live at this address.” With respect to Bloodman, a process server’s proof of service filed on June
13, stated that on June 8, service was attempted but unexecuted with the following explanation:
“The lady stated that Teresa Bloodman has not lived at this address in over 15 years. She stated
that mail does come to the house sometimes. She also stated that she could take the material
and try to contact her.”
2
On September 17, 2024, Ellis filed a motion to extend time for service. In his motion,
Ellis described his efforts to serve both Murry and Bloodman. He stated that service was
unsuccessfully attempted on Murry twice at her last known address and that multiple attempts
to serve Bloodman at the address listed in the summons and at two other possible addresses
were unsuccessful. Accordingly, Ellis requested additional time to complete service of process
on Murry and Bloodman. On September 17, 2024, the trial court granted Ellis’s motion to
extend time for service and granted Ellis an additional sixty days from the date of the order to
perfect service.2
Ellis filed affidavits of service showing that both Murry and Bloodman had been
personally served by a process server on October 18, 2024. The process server’s proofs of service
stated that he personally delivered the summons and complaint to both defendants on that date
at Dollar Tree at 416 South University, Little Rock.
On October 21, 2024, Murry and Bloodman filed separate motions to dismiss alleging
insufficient process under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and insufficient service of process under Ark.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). In both motions, Murry and Bloodman confirmed that on October 18, 2024, they
each received the complaint and summons. In Murry’s motion, she stated, “On October 18, 2024,
the defendant received a copy of the Complaint and Summons.” In Bloodman’s motion, she
stated, “On October 18, 2024, Defendant Bloodman received the summons and copy of the
complaint.”
2
The motion was timely under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i) because it was filed within 120 days of
the filing of the complaint on May 20, 2024.
3
In Murry’s motion, she argued for dismissal because the summons served on her
misspelled her name and was therefore allegedly defective. In Bloodman’s motion, she argued
for dismissal because the summons served on her contained an incorrect address and was
therefore allegedly defective.
On October 30, 2024, Ellis filed amended affidavits of service showing that both Murry
and Bloodman had been personally served by a process server on October 18, 2024. Under the
“Additional information regarding service or attempted service” section of each of these
documents was the notation “Please see attached document with additional service
information.” The attachment stated:
ADDITIONAL SERVICE INFORMATION:
June 10, 2024 at 4:30 PM, I was told that Katrina Murray does not live at 2405 W 39th
Ave, Pine Bluff, AR and I returned the case as non-served with that information.
June 8, 2024 at 11:00 AM, I was told that Teresea Lynette Eagle Bloodman hasn’t lived
at 124 Deauville DR, Maumelle, AR in 15 years, mail will come to the address sometimes.
The lady offered to take the papers and try to contact the defendant. I returned the case
as non-served with that information.
October 17, 2024 I received a phone call from a lady stating that I was looking for her
with the purpose to serve her. She called from a private number. She stated that the
Jefferson County Court has a summons and a complaint for her and another lady. She
stated that her name was Katrina Murray. She stated she wanted me to serve her in Pine
Bluff on 39th Street. I explained that I did not currently have documents to serve her.
The defendant called me Friday, October 18, 2024 stating she was in Little Rock with the papers
that she needed to be served. I met Katrina Murray and Teresa Lynette Eagle Bloodman at the
parking lot of Dollar Tree at 416 South University, Little Rock, AR around 7:45 pm to properly
serve them the papers for Case #35CV-24-407.
(Emphasis added.)
On October 30, 2024, Ellis filed responses to Murry’s and Bloodman’s motions to
dismiss. In these responses, Ellis alleged that both Murry and Bloodman were properly served
4
in person. Ellis argued further that the misnomer of Murry’s last name on her summons was
not substantial enough to indicate a different person or produce doubt as to the person being
sued and that Bloodman’s motion failed because Rule 4(b)(2) only requires that the summons
contain “the address of the defendant to be served, if known.” (Emphasis by Ellis.) Ellis alleged
that service and process were therefore proper and asked that Murry’s and Bloodman’s motions
to dismiss be denied.
On November 8, 2024—which was before the expiration of sixty days from the first
extension order—Ellis filed a second motion to extend time for service. In this motion, Ellis
alleged that both Murry and Bloodman had been properly served in person but noted that both
defendants had filed motions to dismiss alleging insufficient service that remained pending.
Ellis requested an additional extension to preserve his ability to perfect service on the defendants
should the trial court find that service was deficient.
On November 13, 2024, the trial court granted Ellis’s second motion to extend time for
service and granted Ellis an additional sixty days from the date of the order to perfect service. A
hearing on Murry’s and Bloodman’s motions to dismiss was scheduled for December 2, 2024.
On November 18 and 20, 2024, Bloodman and Murry filed separate responses to Ellis’s
second motion to extend time for service, with each arguing that the motion should be denied
because there was no good cause for the extension as required by Rule 4(i)(2). On November
25, 2024, Bloodman filed a motion to set aside the orders extending time for service, arguing
there was an absence of good cause for either of the extension orders.
The hearing on Murry’s and Bloodman’s motions to dismiss was rescheduled from
December 2, 2024, to February 5, 2025. On January 3, 2025—which was before the expiration
5
of sixty days from the second extension order—Ellis filed a third motion to extend time for
service. As he did in his second motion, Ellis again requested in this motion an additional
extension to preserve his ability to perfect service on the defendants should the trial court find
that service was deficient. On January 7, 2025, the trial court granted Ellis’s third motion to
extend time for service and granted Ellis an additional sixty days from the date of the order to
perfect service.
On January 13, 2025, Bloodman filed a response to Ellis’s third motion to extend time
for service, again arguing that the motion should be denied because there was no good cause for
the extension. On January 21, 2025, Bloodman moved to set aside the third order extending
the time for service, making the same argument.
The hearing on appellants’ motions to dismiss was held on February 5, 2025. Bloodman
first argued that the trial court’s orders that granted the extensions should be set aside for lack
of good cause. Bloodman then argued for dismissal of Ellis’s complaint, alleging that the
summons directed to her was defective because it contained an incorrect address. Murry argued
for dismissal of the complaint as to her because the summons directed to her contained an
incorrect name—her surname was identified as “Murray” instead of “Murry.” During the
hearing, Ellis’s counsel noted that the amended affidavit of service dated October 30, 2024,
stated that both defendants were personally served after one of the defendants had reached out
to the process server, and Bloodman objected to counsel’s statements, arguing that they were
hearsay and that the process sever was not present at the hearing to be cross-examined. Ellis’s
counsel countered that the process server signed his name to the document establishing service
6
and had it notarized. The trial court noted that appellants could have subpoenaed the process
server but did not.
On February 20, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying appellants’ motions to
dismiss and also denying Bloodman’s motions to set aside the orders of extension. The trial
court made these findings:
l. Defendants, Katrina Murry’s and Teresa Lynette Eagle Bloodman’s, motions
to dismiss are DENIED. The Court finds that Plaintiff substantially complied in
accordance with Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) and properly served both
Defendants on October 18, 2024, as shown in the Proof of Service of Separate
Defendant, Katrina Murry, and the Proof of Service of Separate Defendant, Teresa
Lynette Eagle Bloodman, both filed of record on October 22, 2024.
2. Separate Defendant, Teresa Lynette Eagle Bloodman’s, motions to set aside
the Court’s Orders granting Plaintiff extensions of time for service are DENIED. The
Court finds that Plaintiff presented good cause in his motions for extensions of time for
service in accordance with Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 4(i)(2) and properly served
the Defendants in the time allowed and required under the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure.
On March 3, 2025, Murry and Bloodman each filed an answer to the complaint to quiet
title and counterclaim. These answers and counterclaims were substantially the same. Murry
and Bloodman alleged that they were the legal owners of the property, that Ellis’s quiet-title
action should be dismissed, and that they were entitled to damages as a result of Ellis’s trespass
on their property.
On March 5, 2025, Ellis moved to dismiss appellants’ counterclaims under Ark. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted. Ellis argued that the
relevant property records showed that neither appellant had ever held legal title to the property,
either individually or jointly, and that the property has been owned by Ellis since May 2022.
7
On March 19, 2025, Ellis filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting
documents. Ellis’s motion stated that he was the record title holder of the property via a
conveyance from Clean Sweep Management to Ellis in May 2022. Ellis stated that Clean Sweep
Management had previously purchased and gained ownership of the property at a tax sale in
May 2013. Ellis attached the limited warranty deed wherein the Arkansas Commissioner of State
Lands conveyed the property to Clean Sweep Management, and Ellis attached the quitclaim
deed wherein Clean Sweep Management conveyed the property to Ellis. Ellis also attached the
affidavit of Justin Phillips, director of real estate for the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands,
who stated that after the property was recorded as being tax delinquent, the tax sale was
conducted according to statute after proper notice, publication, and process, and the property
was conveyed to Clean Sweep Management after it paid the entire amount of taxes, penalties,
interest, and costs then remaining on the property. Ellis argued in the summary-judgment
motion that there was no genuine issue of material fact to dispute that the tax sale to Clean
Sweep Management was conducted in conformity with the law and stated that Ellis is the grantee
of Clean Sweep Management and the record title holder to the property. Ellis requested that
his motion be granted and a decree entered quieting title to the property in his name. The
certificate of service showed that Murry and Bloodman were served with a copy of the summary-
judgment motion via EFlex or first class mail on March 19, 2025.
After Ellis conferred with the trial court about setting a hearing on his summary-
judgment motion, the trial court confirmed a hearing date of April 17, 2025, and directed Ellis
to prepare a notice and notify the defendants of such hearing. Ellis did so on April 8, 2025,
when he filed a notice of hearing stating that the hearing was set for April 17, 2025 at 9:30 a.m.
8
The notice contained a certificate of service certifying that a copy of the notice was sent to Murry
and Bloodman via Eflex or first class mail, and the certificate listed the addresses of Murry and
Bloodman as those that had been identified by them as their address in their previous court
filings. Copies of the letters to both Murry and Bloodman indicated that they were sent by first
class mail and informed Murry and Bloodman of the date and time of the hearing.
Neither Murry nor Bloodman filed a timely response to Ellis’s summary-judgment
motion.3 However, on April 9, 2025, both Murry and Bloodman filed motions for an extension
of time to file a response, stating that their responses were due on April 12 and requesting an
additional twenty-one days.
The summary-judgment hearing was held as scheduled on the morning of April 17, 2025.
Neither Murry nor Bloodman appeared at the hearing. Ellis stated that he had personally mailed
both Murry and Bloodman the notice of the hearing with proper postage affixed on April 8 and
stated that he had also sent the notices via EFlex. The bailiff sounded the halls for Murry and
Bloodman and stated they were not there.
At the hearing, the trial court considered Ellis’s motion for summary judgment and his
motion to dismiss Murry’s and Bloodman’s counterclaims. After hearing Ellis’s counsel’s
arguments and considering the evidence attached to Ellis’s summary-judgment motion, and
hearing Ellis’s counsel’s arguments on his motion to dismiss appellants’ counterclaims, the trial
court announced from the bench that Ellis had adequately satisfied the requirements to quiet
3
Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that a party opposing summary
judgment shall serve a response and supporting materials within twenty-one days after the
motion was served.
9
title and that the appellants’ counterclaims did not allege that the delinquent taxes were ever
paid by them or their heirs. The trial court stated that it would grant Ellis’s motion for summary
judgment and dismiss appellants’ counterclaims.
On the afternoon of April 17, 2025—after the summary-judgment hearing had been held
that morning—Murry and Bloodman filed an untimely combined response to Ellis’s motion for
summary judgment. In that response, Murry and Bloodman alleged, without supporting
documentation, that the tax sale was fraudulent and invalid, that Ellis was not a bona fide
purchaser of the property, and that Murry and Bloodman were the legal and rightful owners.
On April 24, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment and
confirming title to the property in Ellis. The trial court found:
3. The Court finds that Plaintiff Kamal Ellis is the record title holder of the above
described real property, having been conveyed said property via Quit Claim Deed from
Clean Sweep Management, LLC, who purchased said property in a tax sale from the
Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands. Said Quit Claim Deed was dated April 25, 2022,
and recorded with the Jefferson county clerk on May 26, 2022, instrument number,
2022R-04716.
4. The Court finds that the above-described real property was subject to taxation
and was forfeited by the previous title holders for failure to pay taxes. The Subject
property was then duly certified by the County Clerk/Collector to the State of Arkansas
Commissioner of State Lands for nonpayment of taxes due thereon.
5. The Cout finds that the Commissioner of State Lands, after proper notice,
publication, process, and proceedings did offer for and sell the Subject Property to Clean
Sweep Management, LLC, after it was the highest bidder at public auction.
6. The Court finds that interested parties herein had a period of time for
redemption of the Subject Property of thirty (30) days; however, no redemption of the
Subject property was made and the time allowed by law for such redemption has now
expired.
7. The Court finds that Clean Sweep Management, LLC, derived title of the
above described real property by purchasing said property in a tax sale from the Arkansas
10
Commissioner of State Lands as evidenced by Limited Warranty Deed from John
Thurston, Commissioner of State Lands, State of Arkansas, dated May 7, 2013, being
identified as Limited Warranty Deed Number 178620, and recorded with the Jefferson
County Circuit Clerk on June 19, 2013. The said conveyance from the State of Arkansas
was in conformity with the requirements of Arkansas law.
....
10. The Court finds that Plaintiff has made a prima facia showing of entitlement
to judgment as a matter of law that the subject property be quieted in his name.
Defendants, Katrina Murry and Teresa Lynette Eagle Bloodman, were required to
remove the cloak of formal pleadings and meet proof with proof in order to prevent the
entry of summary judgment.
11. The Court finds that Defendants, Katrina Murry and Teresa Lynette Eagle
Bloodman, have failed to meet proof with proof or sufficiently provide evidence to refute
Plaintiff’s prima facie showing as required by Rule 56(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
procedure. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.
The trial court also found that because Ellis had established proof of ownership of the property
and appellants had provided no such proof, appellants’ counterclaims for trespass were
dismissed.
On May 5, 2025, Murry and Bloodman filed separate motions to vacate the order of
summary judgment that quieted title to Ellis. In these motions, Murry and Bloodman alleged
that they never received notice from the court regarding the scheduling of the April 17, 2025
summary-judgment hearing. Murry and Bloodman argued that the grant of summary judgment
without notice or hearing constituted a denial of fundamental due process and asked that the
judgment be set as void under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60.
On May 6, 2025, Ellis filed a response to appellants’ motions to vacate asking that they
be denied. Ellis asserted that, as shown in the certificate of service in the April 8, 2025
scheduling order filed in the trial court, both Murry and Bloodman were notified by mail of the
11
summary-judgment hearing but failed to appear. Ellis noted that under Ark. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2),
service by mail is presumptively complete upon mailing.
On May 12, 2025, Murry and Bloodman filed a combined reply to Ellis’s response,
denying that they received notice of the summary-judgment hearing despite the filing of the
certificate of service. Both Murry and Bloodman attached affidavits stating that they did not
receive notice of the hearing, and they argued that they rebutted the presumption of service.
On June 4, 2025, appellants’ motions to vacate were deemed denied by operation of law.
Murry and Bloodman filed a timely notice of appeal on June 5, 2025, appealing from the order
of summary judgment and the deemed-denial of their posttrial notions to vacate.
On appeal, Murry and Bloodman argue that (1) the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them because the summonses were defective; (2) the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them because there was no valid service of process; (3) the trial court erred in
granting three motions for extensions of time to serve them; (4) the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because they had no notice of the summary-judgment hearing; (5) the trial
court erred in dismissing their counterclaim for trespass; and (6) the trial court erred in denying
their posttrial Rule 60 motion to vacate its summary-judgment order. We will discuss each
argument in turn.
I. The Trial Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction Over Appellants
Because the Summonses Were Defective
Appellants first argue that the trial court should have dismissed Ellis’s complaint for lack
of personal jurisdiction because both the summons to Murry and the summons to Bloodman
were defective. Appellants state that there must be strict compliance with Rule 4(b), which
12
provides the requirements for the contents of a valid summons. Murry argues that her summons
was defective because it misidentified her last name as “Murray” instead of “Murry.” Bloodman
argues that her summons was defective because it contained an incorrect address.
Our case law is well settled that statutory service requirements, being in derogation of
common-law rights, must be strictly construed, and compliance with them must be exact.
Trusclair v. McGowan Working Partners, 2009 Ark. 203, 306 S.W.3d 428. This court has held that
the same reasoning applies to service requirements imposed by court rules. Id. More
particularly, the technical requirements of a summons set out in Rule 4(b) must be construed
strictly, and compliance with those requirements must be exact. Id. Actual knowledge of a
proceeding does not validate defective process. Id. The reason for this rule is that service of
valid process is necessary to give a court jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. Unless a summons
that meets all the requirements of Rule 4(b) is served on the defendants, the court fails to obtain
jurisdiction over the cause. Jones v. Douglas, 2016 Ark. 166, 489 S.W.3d 648.
Rule 4(b)(1) provides that the summons shall contain in its caption the names of the
plaintiff and the defendant. Murry argues that because the summons issued to her misspelled
her name as “Katrina Murray” instead of “Katrina Murry,” the summons was rendered fatally
defective. For the following reasons, we disagree.
In making her argument, Murry relies on Shotzman v. Berumen, 363 Ark. 215, 213 S.W.3d
13. In Shotzman, the appellant filed a medical-malpractice action, and the summons listed as a
defendant a party named “Sisters of Mercy of the St. Louis Regional Community, Inc., d/b/a
St. Edward Mercy Medical Center.” The actual name of the defendant was “St. Edward Mercy
13
Medical Center,” and the defendant argued that the summons was fatally defective in this regard.
The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint on that basis. On the facts of that case, the
supreme court affirmed the dismissal. The supreme court in Shotzman stated that a misnomer
is only fatal when it is so material and substantial as to indicate a different entity or to produce
doubt as to the corporation to be sued. In finding the summons fatally defective, the supreme
court explained:
In the instant case, the misnomer actually does “indicate a different entity.” It is
undisputed that SEMMC is a corporate entity distinct from Sisters of Mercy of the St.
Louis Regional Community. . . . Because Sisters of Mercy and SEMMC are entirely
separate corporate entities, the Shotzmans’ “misnomer” is fatal because it was “material
and substantial [enough] to indicate a different entity or to produce doubts as to the
corporation intended to be sued.”
Shotzman, 363 Ark. at 225, 213 S.W.3d at 18 (citations omitted).
The instant case presents a different issue than in Shotzman in that we are not deciding
whether a corporation has been adequately identified in the summons; rather, we are deciding
whether an individual has been sufficiently identified. The instant case is more like Macom v.
Di Cresce, 2023 Ark. App. 530, 680 S.W.3d 36.
In Macom, Di Cresce filed a complaint for breach of contract against Macom, and the
summons listed his name as “Robert Macom” instead of his legal name, “James Robert Macom.”
Macom failed to timely answer the complaint, and a default judgment was entered against him.
On appeal, Macom alleged that the default judgment was void because the summons incorrectly
named him, but this court disagreed. We wrote:
A misnomer is a mistake in naming a party. Under our rules, the summons is a process
used to apprise a defendant that a suit is pending against him and afford him an
opportunity to be heard. Where the mistake in naming the party is so substantial or
14
material as to indicate a different entity, it is fatal. Here, there was no mistake in the
misnomer that was substantial or material as to indicate James Robert Macom is someone
other than Robert Macom. In his [untimely] answer to the complaint, (James) Robert
Macom admitted that he represented to plaintiffs he possessed skill and experience—
because he does—and he did at the time, and he admits that he entered into an agreement
as a subcontractor with the Bensons for the express purpose of performing a roofing job
on property as alleged in paragraph 29 of the complaint. Therefore, there was no mistake
that the person who was served is one and the same person sought to be sued for breach
of contract.
Macom, 2023 Ark. App. 530, at 6–7, 680 S.W.3d at 40–41 (citations omitted).
Here, as in Macom, the mistake in naming the party was not so substantial or material as
to indicate a different entity. Although the summons was directed to “Katrina Murray” instead
of “Katrina Murry,” it contained Murry’s address, which was obviously the correct address
because it is the address identified by Murry as her address in her lower court pleadings.
Moreover, the process server’s affidavit stated that Murry had contacted him and asked to be served
with the complaint so she could assert her rights to the property. Under these circumstances,
the minor error did not indicate a different person or produce doubt as to Murry’s identity as
the defendant. There was no mistake that the person who was served is the same person sought
to be named in Ellis’s quiet-title action. Therefore, even under the requisite strict-compliance
standard, the summons was not fatally defective as to deprive the trial court of personal
jurisdiction over Murry.
We next turn to Bloodman’s argument that her summons was defective because it
contained the wrong address. We reject this argument as well. Bloodman does not dispute that
the summon correctly identified her by name. And, contrary to Bloodman’s argument, there is
no requirement that the summons contains the defendant’s correct address because Rule 4(b)(2)
provides only that the summons shall contain “the address of the defendant, if known.”
15
(Emphasis added.) Here, Bloodman’s current address was not known, and the summons listed
Bloodman’s last-known address, where she in fact had formerly been a resident. There was no
doubt or confusion that Bloodman was the intended defendant to be served. Bloodman cites
no authority that a summons is fatally deficient for failure to contain the defendant’s correct
address, and we hold that the summons issued to her strictly complied with the requirements of
Rule 4(b).
Finally under this point, we must address the trial court’s confusion in the order denying
dismissal where the trial court mistakenly stated that only substantial compliance of the service
and summons requirements was necessary. The trial court cited Rule 4(k), which provides, “Any
error as to the sufficiency of process or the sufficiency of service of process shall be disregarded
if the court determines that the serving party substantially complied with the provisions of this
rule and that the defendant received actual notice of the complaint and filed a timely answer.”
Rule 4(k) was not applicable here because neither Murry nor Bloodman filed a timely answer to
the complaint; they instead filed timely motions to dismiss. See Wine v. Chandler, 2020 Ark.
App. 412, 607 S.W.3d 522. Therefore, contrary to the trial court’s finding, Rule 4(k) and the
relaxed substantial-compliance standard was not applicable in this case.
Nevertheless, we have long held that we may affirm the trial court’s order when it reaches
the right result although it announces the wrong reason. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Wyatt, 2018 Ark.
App. 177, 545 S.W.3d 796. Because it is clear under the proper strict-compliance standard that
both summonses identified each defendant and apprised her of the pending lawsuit, and neither
summons was fatally deficient for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s denial
of appellants’ motions to dismiss based on the allegedly defective summonses.
16
II. The Trial Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction Over Appellants Because
There Was No Valid Service of Process
Appellants next argue that the trial court should have dismissed Ellis’s complaint for lack
of personal jurisdiction because there was no valid service. We disagree.
The supreme court has held that a return of service is prima facie evidence of valid
service. Brech v. Bloodman, 2025 Ark. 87, 712 S.W.3d 281. The party claiming that service was
not had, has the burden of proof to overcome the prima facie case created by the proof or return
of service. Id.
In this case, the process server’s proof of service executed on October 22, 2024, stated
that both Murry and Bloodman were personally served with the summons and complaint on
October 18, 2024, at a Dollar Tree store in Little Rock. In the process server’s amended proof
of service executed on October 30, 2024, he expounded and added that both defendants were
served that day after Murry telephoned him and requested that they be served at that location.
And finally, in both Murry’s and Bloodman’s motions to dismiss, they both expressly admitted that
they received the summons and complaint on October 18, 2024. Murry’s motion stated, “On October
18, 2024, the defendant received a copy of the Complaint and Summons.” Bloodman’s motion
stated, “On October 18, 2024, Defendant Bloodman received the summons and copy of the
complaint.” There was prima facie evidence of valid service, and not only did appellants not
overcome the prima facie case, they expressly admitted they were served by the process server.
Also under this point, appellants claim that at the hearing on their motions to dismiss,
Ellis’s counsel attempted to testify about the details of the service and that this testimony was
inadmissible hearsay. However, Ellis’s counsel was not testifying but was merely arguing that
17
service was proper and reciting what was stated in the process server’s proofs of service, which
Ellis introduced as evidence of valid service. And even were we to agree that counsel’s comments
were hearsay, these comments were merely cumulative of what was shown in the proofs of
service, and as previously noted, both Murry’s and Bloodman’s motions to dismiss expressly admitted
that they received the summons and complaint. Appellants also complain that the process server did
not appear at the hearing and was therefore unavailable for cross-examination. However,
appellants had the opportunity to present evidence and subpoena the process server if they
thought they were not properly served as indicated in the proofs of service, but they failed to do
so. The proofs of service showed valid service, both Murry and Bloodman admitted they were
served with the summons and complaint consistent with the proofs of service, and appellants’
argument that proper service was lacking is clearly without merit.
III. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Three Motions for
Extensions of Time to Serve Appellants
Appellants’ next contention is that the trial court erred in granting three motions for
extension of time to serve appellants, arguing that none of the extensions were met with a
showing of good cause. Because the first extension entered on September 17, 2024, extended
the time of service through November 16, 2024, and appellants were personally served with the
summons and complaint within that time frame on October 18, 2024, the second and third
extensions are immaterial to this discussion. Therefore, we confine our analysis to the trial
court’s first extension order entered on September 17, 2024.
Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(2) provides, “The court, on written motion and a
showing of good cause, may extend the time for service if the motion is made within 120 days
18
of the filing of the suit or within the time period established by a previous extension.” We review
a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for lack of compliance with Rule 4(i) under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Nobles v. Tumey, 2010 Ark. App. 731, 379 S.W.3d 639. The
supreme court has indicated that statements made within a motion for extension may be
sufficient to show good cause. See Nelson v. Weiss, 366 Ark. 361, 235 S.W.3d 891 (2006). In
Nobles, we concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in finding good cause for the
extension where appellee stated that she had attempted service on appellant by certified mail
and by a professional process server; that appellant had secreted himself to avoid service; and
that appellee had retained an investigator to locate and serve appellant.
It is undisputed that Ellis timely filed for the first order extending service within 120 of
his complaint. Appellants, however, argue that there was no good cause to grant the extension.
We disagree. In Ellis’s motion for the extension, he described his efforts to serve both Murry
and Bloodman. Ellis stated that service was unsuccessfully attempted on Murry twice at her last-
known address and that multiple attempts to serve Bloodman at the address listed in the
summons and at two other possible addresses were unsuccessful. We conclude that Ellis
demonstrated good cause for the extension and that the trial court committed no abuse of
discretion in granting the extension.
Also under this point, appellants argue that the first order of extension should have been
set aside because, in that order, the trial court did not expressly state that there was good cause
for the extension. For this proposition, appellants cite Henyan v. Peek, 359 Ark. 486, 494, 199
S.W.3d 51, 55 (2004), where the supreme court stated:
19
Here, neither of Appellants’ motions offered any cause, let alone good cause, for
the extensions. Moreover, there is nothing in the trial court’s orders indicating that the
time for service was being extended upon a showing of good cause. Without a
contemporaneous showing of good cause to grant the extensions, appellants have failed
to strictly comply with the service requirements of Rule 4(i).
We do not read Henyan to hold that the trial court must expressly state in its order of
extension that there was good cause for the extension; rather, there must be a showing of good
cause to support the order as required by Rule 4(i). In the trial court’s order of extension now
being challenged, the trial court did not use the words “good cause,” but it did state that the
motion was filed in accordance with Rule 4(i)(2), which contain