Arkansas Attorney General Opinion No. 2026-079
CourtArkansas Attorney General Reports
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket2026-079
JudgeTIM GRIFFIN, Attorney General
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Opinion No. 2026-079
November 19, 2026
The Honorable Stetson C. Painter
State Representative
Post Office Box 1198
Mountain Home, Arkansas 72654-1198
Dear Representative Painter:
You report that “the Baxter County Airport Commission filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment against Baxter County … [and the] County Judge,” seeking a judicial determination
regarding the respective authority of the commission and the county judge over the operation,
management, and leasing of airport property. The case was later dismissed with prejudice after
Baxter County dissolved the commission by ordinance. Against this background, you have asked
the following question:
Did the Baxter County Airport Commission have the lawful authority to commence legal
action against Baxter County, which created the commission and which budgets the funds for
it on an annual basis?
RESPONSE
Possibly. Although a county airport commission is not expressly granted general authority to sue
and be sued, a reviewing court could conclude that the commission possesses limited implied
authority to retain legal counsel and seek judicial relief when necessary to protect the
commission’s statutory authority to operate and maintain the county-owned airport.
DISCUSSION
The General Assembly has granted county airport commissioners broad authority over the
operation and management of county airports. Under A.C.A. § 14-357-105, airport commissioners
possess “full and complete authority to manage, operate, improve, extend, and maintain the
airport” and are vested with “unlimited authority” to accomplish those purposes, subject to certain
limitations.
At the same time, Arkansas law does not expressly grant county airport commissions general
authority to sue and be sued. In City of Hot Springs Advertising & Promotion Commission v. Cole,
BOB R. BROOKS JR. JUSTICE BUILDING
101 WEST CAPITOL AVENUE
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
The Honorable Stetson C. Painter
State Representative
Opinion No. 2026-079
Page 2
the Arkansas Supreme Court explained that a governmental entity’s authority to contract or carry
out assigned duties does not necessarily imply a general power to sue in its own name, and it
declined to infer such authority absent a sufficient statutory basis. 1
Nevertheless, there is some basis in case law to suggest that a county-created board or commission
possesses limited implied authority to seek judicial relief when necessary to protect its statutory
powers and responsibilities. In Cole, the court distinguished between an entity’s power to
challenge its termination from its authority to sue on behalf of the governmental entity that created
it. 2 Previous Arkansas Attorney General opinions have also relied on similar reasoning in
concluding that county library boards may challenge actions that improperly interfere with powers
that state law places under the boards’ control. 3
If such authority exists, the commission would be able to use its funds to obtain legal representation
in connection with these disputes. The purpose of the commission is to operate and maintain the
county-owned airport, and judicial remedies may, in some circumstances, offer the only means of
carrying out those responsibilities. Accordingly, to the extent necessary to protect the
commission’s statutory authority to operate and maintain the county-owned airport, a reviewing
court could conclude that the commission may retain legal counsel and seek appropriate judicial
relief.
Assistant Attorney General Jodie Keener prepared this opinion, which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General
1
317 Ark. 269, 273, 878 S.W.2d 371, 373 (1994) (“A power in the Commission to contract with vendors may
reasonably be inferred from the Advertising and Promotion Act but we have not gleaned the power to sue from a
legislative act where the basis for the implied authority is as tenuous as it is in this case.”).
2
317 Ark. at 274, 878 S.W.2d at 373. See also Chaffin v. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 296 Ark. 431, 437–38, 757
S.W.2d 950, 953–54 (1988) (“Allocation of resources and establishment of priorities are the essence of
management…. The facts reflect that the legislature is attempting to substitute its judgment for that of the commission,
on a question of management of resources, something it cannot do.”).
3
Ark. Att’y Gen. Op. 2026-004 (opining that a reviewing court could conclude that a county law library board has
limited implied authority to seek judicial relief and obtain legal representation when necessary to protect its statutory
powers and responsibilities); Ark. Att’y Gen. Op. 2001-012 (opining that “the power to administer the appropriation
resides in the County Library Board, which has an exclusive executive authority that precludes the quorum court from
imposing line-item appropriations that would amount to the setting of policy”); Ark. Att’y Gen. Op. 1990-319 (opining
that a budget restriction by the quorum court that “infringes upon the [library board’s] power to manage and control
the library would … be subject to challenge”).