ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA JOHN ACCURSIO, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC, ET AL., Defendants/Appellees. No. CV-25-0028-PR Filed September 10, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County The Honorable Dewain D. Fox, Judge No. CV2023-091725 REVERSED AND REMANDED Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals Division One No. 1 CA-CV 24-0298 Filed Jan. 9, 2025 VACATED COUNSEL: Jill Ormond (argued), Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for BB Group LLC, Justin Brandt, Clark Wu, and Mukunda Shanbhag Kyle O’Dwyer (argued), Fortify Legal Services, Mesa, Attorneys for John Accursio  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court JUSTICE KING authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, and JUSTICES BOLICK and BEENE joined. JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE CRUZ, dissented. JUSTICE KING, Opinion of the Court: ¶1 The rules of professional conduct governing lawyers are in Rule 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona.1 See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42 (setting forth the Ethical Rules). An individual or entity may file a charge with the State Bar of Arizona (“State Bar”) alleging unprofessional conduct by a lawyer or the unauthorized practice of law. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 53, 55(a), 77(a), 78(a). “Communications to the . . . state bar . . . relating to lawyer misconduct, lack of professionalism or disability, and testimony given in the proceedings shall be absolutely privileged conduct, and no civil action predicated thereon may be instituted against any complainant or witness.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 48(l); see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 80(a)(6) (“Communications to the . . . state bar . . . relating to alleged unauthorized practice of law, and testimony given in the proceedings shall be absolutely privileged conduct, and no civil action predicated thereon may be instituted against any complainant or witness.”). Rules 48(l) and 80(a)(6) also provide that certain enumerated people “shall be immune from suit for” their conduct, but that list of people does not include complainants who file charges. ¶2 In this case, we consider whether Plaintiff John Accursio may maintain a wrongful institution of civil proceedings (“WICP”) claim against Defendant Clark Wu on the basis that Wu filed a charge against Accursio with the State Bar. In doing so, we must determine whether the filing of a charge with the State Bar is a “civil proceeding” for purposes of a WICP claim. We conclude the filing of such a charge may serve as the predicate 1 In this Opinion, we refer to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona as the “Rules.” 2  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court “civil proceeding” for a WICP claim. Also, Rules 48(l) and 80(a)(6) do not immunize a complainant from a WICP claim for the act of filing a charge. These Rules merely provide that statements made to the State Bar or given in testimony are privileged, and a civil action may not rely upon such privileged statements. A plaintiff in a WICP action, however, may rely upon relevant, admissible evidence that is not privileged, such as the complainant’s non-privileged communications, the timing of filing, and other background facts. ¶3 We also consider when the “civil proceeding” commences, as such timing is relevant to a WICP claim. We conclude the timing depends on the nature of the charge. When a charge alleges a lawyer admitted to practice in Arizona has violated the Ethical Rules, the “civil proceeding” commences when the lawyer is provided written notice of a screening investigation and required to provide a written response to the allegations. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 55(b)(1). When a charge alleges a person has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, such “proceeding commences upon receipt by the state bar of a charge against a respondent.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 78(a). ¶4 Accursio’s complaint sufficiently alleges that the charge Wu filed with the State Bar commenced a “civil proceeding,” and Accursio alleges non-privileged facts in support of his claims. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of Accursio’s WICP and related aiding and abetting claims under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On remand, the trial court will determine whether Accursio can prove a WICP claim without considering the content of privileged communications to the State Bar, an issue that is not before us. BACKGROUND ¶5 Accursio appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his WICP and aiding and abetting claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For purposes of evaluating this motion to dismiss, we “must . . . assume the truth of the well-pled factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419 ¶ 7 (2008). Therefore, the facts here are taken from Accursio’s complaint. 3  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court ¶6 This case began with a dispute over ownership interests in Tree House Labs, LLC and access to business records. In 2021, Tree House Labs and others filed a lawsuit in Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. CV2021-019322 (the “Underlying Action”). Wu and his law firm, BB Group, LLC, represented the plaintiffs in the Underlying Action. Accursio, a lawyer admitted to practice in New York and Washington, D.C., represented the defendants in the Underlying Action. Two lawyers admitted to practice in Arizona served as co-counsel with Accursio (“Arizona co-counsel”), also representing the defendants in the Underlying Action. At some point during those proceedings, Accursio told Wu that BB Group’s representation of the plaintiffs appeared to violate conflict of interest provisions in the Ethical Rules. In 2022, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the Underlying Action. ¶7 Since 2021, Accursio and Arizona co-counsel have made multiple requests for records from Wu’s clients. More recently, Wu indicated that Accursio’s clients needed to sign a non-disclosure agreement before Wu’s clients would provide the requested records. Wu sent a draft non-disclosure agreement to Accursio and Arizona co-counsel. Accursio reviewed the agreement and sent a second draft version to Wu and Arizona co-counsel. Shortly after, Wu accused Accursio of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Arizona. Accursio replied that his conduct was permissible under Ethical Rule 5.5, as he was associating with Arizona co-counsel. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, Ethical Rule 5.5(c)(1) (allowing a lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction to provide temporary legal services that involve Arizona law under certain circumstances, including when “undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in Arizona and who actively participates in the matter”). ¶8 Accursio contacted the State Bar and was purportedly informed that his representation qualified for the exception in Ethical Rule 5.5. In addition, Accursio discussed with the State Bar Wu’s potential conflict of interest, and filed a bar charge against Wu, Charge No. 22-1747. ¶9 Accursio then informed Wu of the charge that he filed against him. Immediately thereafter, Wu filed a charge with the State Bar against Accursio, Charge No. 22-1748, alleging that Accursio had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Arizona. As a result of this charge, a State 4  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court Bar staff member contacted Accursio and requested information from him. Accursio drafted and delivered a response letter to the State Bar. ¶10 Later, Accursio received a letter from Senior Bar Counsel explaining that “a screening investigation is being undertaken pursuant to Rule 55(b), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.” The letter also stated: Your participation in the screening investigation is extremely important, as Bar Counsel will make a recommendation at the end of the investigation as to the disposition of this matter. Pursuant to [Ethical Rule] 8.1(b) and Rule 54(d), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., you have a duty to cooperate with this investigation. Failure to fully and honestly respond to, or cooperate with, the investigation is, in itself, grounds for discipline. The letter requested that Accursio provide specific information about his alleged involvement in drafting or editing (or providing legal advice about) a memorandum of understanding and various employment offer letters before associating with local counsel. ¶11 Accursio submitted the requested information to Senior Bar Counsel in a redacted letter and an unredacted letter. Due to the sensitive nature of the unredacted information, Accursio simultaneously requested a protective order. The State Bar filed a Request for Protective Order Sealing a Portion of the Record with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, and it was granted. ¶12 While the charge against Accursio was pending, Accursio received and accepted an offer of employment with a New York law firm. Accursio informed the New York law firm of the pending charge against him, and the firm subsequently rescinded the offer of employment. ¶13 Ultimately, the State Bar dismissed the charge against Accursio purportedly because the alleged unauthorized practice of law could not be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Accursio informed the New York law firm of the dismissal of the charge, but the firm did not reinstate Accursio’s employment offer. Although Accursio later secured other employment, the compensation was less than he would have received at the New York law firm. 5  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court ¶14 Accursio filed this lawsuit, which included two claims relevant here: (1) a WICP claim against Wu based on the charge he filed against Accursio, and (2) a claim against BB Group and one of its lawyers, Justin Brandt, for aiding and abetting Wu’s tortious filing of a charge against Accursio.2 Accursio’s complaint alleges he did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law, and Wu filed the charge “without any supporting evidence,” “without probable cause,” and “in retaliation” for the charge Accursio filed against Wu. Wu, Brandt, and BB Group (collectively “Defendants”) moved to dismiss Accursio’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ¶15 The trial court determined that Wu potentially subjected himself to WICP liability by filing a charge against Accursio. But “the State Bar’s disciplinary counsel conducted a screening investigation and dismissed the bar charge before instituting a proceeding.” The court observed the similarities between this case and Goldman v. Sahl, which affirmed the dismissal of an abuse of process claim premised on the filing of a State Bar charge. 248 Ariz. 512, 530 ¶ 64 (App. 2020) (determining “the mere filing of a bar charge is not ‘use’ of a judicial process” and thus plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief for abuse of process). The court determined that “as in Goldman, Accursio fails to state a viable claim for [WICP].” ¶16 Next, the court observed that “aiding and abetting is a theory of secondary liability.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Loc. No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 485 ¶¶ 34, 36 (2002) (stating that one element for aiding and abetting tortious conduct is that “the primary tortfeasor must commit a tort that causes injury to the plaintiff”). Because Accursio failed to state a WICP claim, the court determined that the aiding and abetting claim must also be dismissed. The court dismissed Accursio’s WICP and aiding and abetting claims with prejudice. 2 The lawsuit included several other parties and claims that are not relevant to the issues before us. 6  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court ¶17 The court of appeals vacated the dismissal of the WICP and aiding and abetting claims. See Accursio v. Tree House Labs, LLC, No. 1 CA-CV 24-0298, 2025 WL 52198, at *7 ¶¶ 38–39 (Ariz. App. Jan. 9, 2025) (mem. decision). The court determined that a state bar discipline proceeding may be a civil proceeding for purposes of a WICP claim, noting that a “WICP claim arising out of the alleged misuse of the attorney disciplinary process is consistent with the Restatement.” Id. at *4–5 ¶¶ 25–27 (citing Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 48(a) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 680 (1977) (referring to “the initiation . . . of civil proceedings . . . before an administrative board”)). ¶18 The court also noted that “[c]ommunications to the [State Bar] shall be absolutely privileged conduct, and no civil action predicated thereon may be instituted against any complainant or witness.” Id. at *3 ¶ 20 & nn.2–3 (quoting Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 48(l) and 80(a)(6)). But this did not preclude Accursio’s WICP claim because his allegations are not based on Wu’s communications in the charge. Id. at *3–4 ¶¶ 20–24. ¶19 Finally, the court rejected the argument that Accursio failed to state a claim because the State Bar dismissed the charge before a proceeding commenced. Id. at *5–7 ¶¶ 28–38. The charge against Accursio was based on the unauthorized practice of law (a matter governed by Rules 75 through 80), but the State Bar’s letter to Accursio indicated “a screening investigation is being undertaken pursuant to Rule 55(b).” Id. at *6 ¶¶ 31–32. The court determined that Accursio’s complaint stated a viable claim whether evaluated under Rule 78 or Rule 55. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. Rule 78(a) provides that “[a]n unauthorized practice of law proceeding commences upon receipt by the state bar of a charge against a respondent.” Id. ¶ 31. And under Rule 55, a civil proceeding commenced because the State Bar conducted a screening investigation—twice asking for information from Accursio in response to the charge and obtaining a protective order to seal sensitive information in his responses. Id. at *6–7 ¶¶ 35–37. “Because Accursio was required to respond to requests for information by a regulatory body with authority to compel his cooperation had he resisted, the Bar’s [unauthorized practice of law] investigation was a ‘proceeding’ for purposes of a WICP claim.” Id. at *7 ¶ 37. ¶20 We granted review to determine whether a WICP claim may be predicated on a charge filed with the State Bar and, if so, when that “civil 7  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court proceeding” commences for purposes of the WICP claim. These are issues of statewide importance that are likely to recur. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. DISCUSSION ¶21 We review the interpretation of court rules de novo and according to the same principles we use for statutory interpretation. Contreras v. Bourke, 260 Ariz. 319, 322 ¶ 12 (2025); Phillips v. O’Neil, 243 Ariz. 299, 301 ¶ 8 (2017). We also “review dismissal of a complaint de novo.” State ex rel. Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127, 130 ¶ 7 (2020). Dismissal is appropriate only if “as a matter of law . . . plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 224 ¶ 4 (1998). Looking only to the pleadings, we “must assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts, but mere conclusory statements are insufficient.” Id. A. May A Charge Serve As The Predicate “Civil Proceeding”? 1. WICP Claim ¶22 To state a WICP claim, a plaintiff is required to allege that the defendant (1) instituted a civil proceeding that was (2) motivated by malice, (3) begun or maintained without probable cause, (4) terminated in plaintiff’s favor, and (5) damaged plaintiff. See Stephens v. State, 262 Ariz. 233, 239 ¶ 25 (2026); Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 411, 416–17 (1988); Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 596 (1976). At issue here is whether the filing of a charge with the State Bar constitutes a “civil proceeding” for purposes of a WICP claim. We begin with an overview of the State Bar and the Rules governing the process after a charge is filed. 2. The Supreme Court’s Regulation Of The Practice Of Law ¶23 Under the Arizona Constitution, “[t]he judicial power shall be vested in an integrated judicial department.” Art. 6, § 1. “[T]he Arizona Constitution’s creation of an integrated judiciary gives to this Court the power not just to regulate all courts but also to regulate the practice of law.” Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, 211 Ariz. 282, 290 ¶ 29 (2005); see also In re Riley, 142 Ariz. 604, 607 (1984) (“[T]he Supreme 8  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court Court of Arizona has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission to the practice of the law and the discipline of those admitted.”). ¶24 Early in this state’s history, petitions alleging lawyer misconduct and seeking discipline were filed directly with the Arizona Supreme Court. See In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407 (1926). This Court had original jurisdiction to hear the proceeding and inherent authority to discipline a respondent lawyer who engaged in misconduct. See id.; In re Spriggs, 36 Ariz. 262 (1930). ¶25 But now, the Arizona Supreme Court “maintains under its direction and control a corporate organization known as the State Bar of Arizona.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 32(a); see also State v. Harold, 74 Ariz. 210, 214 (1952). “The State Bar exists only by virtue of this [C]ourt’s rules, adopted under authority of article III and article VI, §§ 1 and 5 of the Arizona Constitution.” In re Smith, 189 Ariz. 144, 146 (1997). Also, the State Bar can have no greater jurisdiction or authority than this Court. See Drummond v. Stahl, 127 Ariz. 122, 126 (App. 1980); In re Riley, 142 Ariz. at 608. ¶26 A person or entity with concerns about a lawyer’s unprofessional conduct or the unauthorized practice of law may communicate those concerns to the State Bar by filing a charge. The charge sets into motion a variety of procedures that may eventually culminate in an action before the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. Const., art. 6, §§ 1, 5(3), and 5(6); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 55–59, 78–79. 3. Charges Relating To An Arizona Lawyer’s Unprofessional Conduct ¶27 Rules 46 through 69 detail the process for addressing allegations of unprofessional conduct by lawyers admitted to practice in Arizona. This process begins with the filing of a charge with the State Bar. If a charge proceeds to the State Bar’s screening investigation stage, “[t]he respondent shall provide a written response to the allegations to bar counsel within twenty (20) days after notice of the investigation is given.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 55(b)(1). “If respondent fails to timely respond,” bar counsel may then “seek an investigative subpoena pursuant to Rule 47(h)(1) to compel respondent’s attendance and production of documents.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 55(b)(1)(B). “The subpoena may compel a respondent to 9  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court provide a written response to the allegations, as required in Rule 55(b)(1), the attendance of witnesses and the production of pertinent books, papers and documents, and answers to written interrogatories.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 47(h)(1). Also, “a deposition upon subpoena [may be] required as result of a respondent’s failure to comply with bar counsel’s request for information,” in which case “the respondent shall be liable for the costs of the deposition.” Id. ¶28 There are significant implications for failure to appear or comply with a subpoena, as “the person may be subject to civil contempt proceedings.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 47(h)(4), 55(b)(1)(B). In those civil contempt proceedings, if a respondent continues to not comply with a subpoena to appear and provide information or documents, the presiding disciplinary judge “may issue an order holding the person in contempt and impose reasonable sanctions to ensure compliance with the subpoena.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 47(h)(4)(B). If a respondent is “found to be in contempt under these proceedings, the presiding disciplinary judge may, among other possible sanctions, summarily suspend the respondent from the practice of law until the respondent complies with the subpoena or order.” Id. Notably, all these provisions apply before a complaint is ever filed with the presiding disciplinary judge under Rule 58(a). See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 58(a) (“Formal discipline proceedings shall be instituted by bar counsel filing a complaint . . . with the disciplinary clerk.”); see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 47(h), 55(b). ¶29 Also, a respondent against whom a charge has been filed “may tender, with the agreement of bar counsel, a conditional admission to the charge . . . in exchange for a stated form of discipline” or “may voluntarily consent to disbarment,” all before a complaint is ever filed. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 57(a)(1), (5). The respondent may agree to various forms of sanctions that are available under Rule 60(a), such as (1) disbarment, (2) suspension, (3) reprimand, (4) probation, (5) restitution “to persons financially injured, including reimbursement to the state bar client security fund,” and (6) payment of costs and expenses. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 60(a), (d); see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 57(a). Moreover, a person harmed by a lawyer’s conduct may file a charge with the State Bar and seek redress from the State Bar’s Client Protection Fund. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 32(d)(8); see also The Client Protection Fund of the State Bar of Arizona, Declaration of Trust (created on Jan. 7, 1961, and amended on Sep. 29, 2017) (describing the Client Protection 10  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court Fund and identifying eligible claims as losses caused by the dishonest conduct of a lawyer arising out of and by reason of a lawyer-client relationship). 4. Charges Relating To The Unauthorized Practice Of Law ¶30 Rules 75 through 80 detail the process for addressing allegations that a person has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Arizona. This process begins with the filing of a charge with the State Bar. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 75(a) (“Proceedings against non-members . . . may also be instituted pursuant to Rules 47 through 60, and such proceedings may be concurrent with proceedings under [Rules 75 through 80].”); see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 78(a). After the State Bar receives such a charge, unauthorized practice of law counsel, volunteer bar counsel, or staff investigators may commence an investigation. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 78(b)(1)–(2). “For purposes of investigation by unauthorized practice of law counsel, the chief bar counsel or the chair or vice-chair of the committee shall have the power to issue investigative subpoenas with the same force and effect as in a civil action in superior court.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 77(c). ¶31 If a respondent fails to comply with any request for information, the respondent’s deposition may be required pursuant to a subpoena, in which case “the respondent shall be liable for the actual costs of conducting the deposition, including but not limited to service fees, certified reporter fees, travel expenses and the cost of transcribing the deposition, regardless of the ultimate disposition of the unauthorized practice of law proceeding.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 78(b)(3)(B). Also, during the investigation, a subpoena may be issued “to compel the attendance of witnesses, the production of pertinent books, papers and documents, and answers to written interrogatories.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 78(b)(4); see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 77(c). A respondent may be subject to sanctions for failure to respond promptly to an inquiry or request from unauthorized practice of law counsel for information relevant to the matter under investigation. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 76(a)(3)–(4). Notably, all these provisions apply before a complaint is ever filed in superior court alleging the unauthorized practice of law under Rule 79(a). See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 79(a) (“Formal unauthorized practice of law proceedings shall be instituted by unauthorized practice of law counsel filing a . . . complaint with the clerk of the superior court.”). 11  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court ¶32 Also, before a complaint is ever filed, the respondent may enter into a consent agreement, “tender[ing] a conditional admission to the charge . . . in exchange for the imposition of a stated sanction,” which may include an agreement to cease and desist certain activities, refund fees collected, pay costs and expenses, make appropriate restitution, or any other lawful sanction agreed to by the parties. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 78(c); see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 76(b)(1). Indeed, in any unauthorized practice of law proceeding, possible sanctions include (1) a cease and desist order, (2) an injunction, (3) a civil or criminal contempt citation, (4) “restitution . . . to any individual for money, property, or other items of value received and retained by a respondent,” (5) a civil penalty up to $25,000, and (6) costs, expenses, and attorney fees relating to the proceeding. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 76(b). 5. Civil Proceeding ¶33 We now consider whether a charge filed with the State Bar may constitute a “civil proceeding” for purposes of a WICP claim. ¶34 The Rules repeatedly identify the process after a charge is filed with the State Bar as a “proceeding”—both for charges alleging unprofessional conduct against an Arizona lawyer and charges alleging the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 46(h)(12) (defining “[d]iscipline proceeding” as “any action involving a respondent pursuant to the rules relating thereto”); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 57(a)(1) (stating “[a] respondent against whom a charge has been made” may consent to discipline “at any stage of the proceedings”); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 75(b)(16) (defining “[u]nauthorized practice of law proceeding” as “any action involving a respondent pursuant to the rules relating to the unauthorized practice of law”); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 78(a) (stating “[a]n unauthorized practice of law proceeding commences upon receipt by the state bar of a charge”). The use of “proceeding” in these Rules is consistent with the term’s definition in Black’s Law Dictionary. See Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Thus, a proceeding exists after a charge is filed with the State Bar. But is it a “civil proceeding”? ¶35 “[C]ourts generally give words their ordinary meaning and may look to dictionary definitions.” DBT Yuma, L.L.C. v. Yuma Cnty. Airport 12  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court Auth., 238 Ariz. 394, 396 ¶ 9 (2015) (internal citation omitted). The term “civil” means (1) “Of, relating to, or involving the state or its citizenry,” (2) “Of, relating to, or involving private rights and remedies that are sought by action or suit, as distinct from criminal proceedings,” and (3) “Of, relating to, or involving any of the modern legal systems derived from Roman law.” Civil, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); Civil, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (to same effect); see also Civil, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civil (last visited Aug. 20, 2026) (defining “civil” as “of or relating to citizens” and “of or relating to the state or its citizenry”). Also, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “civil proceeding” as “[a] judicial hearing, session, or lawsuit in which the purpose is to decide or delineate private rights and remedies, as in a dispute between litigants in a matter relating to torts, contracts, property, or family law.” Civil Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).3 ¶36 As an initial matter, we note that all these proceedings occur through the judicial branch of government. See Goldman, 248 Ariz. at 525 ¶ 40 (recognizing that a discipline proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding). The filing of a charge with the State Bar and subsequent steps occur by virtue of the Rules adopted by this Court. And a complainant who files a charge with the State Bar submits himself to the jurisdiction of this Court and either (1) the State Bar or (2) the superior court. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 53(b), 77(a). If bar counsel ultimately files a complaint against an Arizona lawyer, the presiding disciplinary judge presides over the discipline proceeding, see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 58, and a decision may be appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 59. The presiding disciplinary judge is appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 51(a). Also, an unauthorized practice of law matter may result in a complaint being filed in the superior court, and the superior court’s decision is reviewable by the court of appeals and this Court. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 79. 3 According to our review, Black’s Law Dictionary first provided a definition of “civil proceeding” in 2014, and it is identical to the definition quoted in this opinion. See Civil Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 13  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court ¶37 As discussed, the proceedings that follow the filing of a charge are not mere informal inquiries. Instead, they occur through defined procedures under the Rules. A charge puts into motion an adjudicative process that may result in (1) the respondent being required to respond to a complainant’s allegations with information, documents, or depositions, (2) the issuance of investigative subpoenas, (3) the initiation of civil contempt proceedings, (4) the respondent being required to pay restitution to persons financially injured, civil penalties, or other amounts, or (5) the respondent being subject to significant adverse action, such as disbarment. Supra ¶¶ 27–32. The Rules even use the term “civil” when addressing the initial phase of the proceedings when a charge is merely pending with the State Bar—before a complaint is ever filed. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 47(h)(4), (i); see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 77(c) (stating the State Bar “shall have the power to issue investigative subpoenas with the same force and effect as in a civil action in superior court”). ¶38 Defendants assert that filing a charge with the State Bar is akin to “[f]iling a police report, causing noise citations to be issued, and demanding prosecution of ordinance violations,” which “do not show that a party has used an instrument of the judicial process.” Not so. First, those examples are not proceedings that occur through the judicial branch of government and trigger a quasi-judicial proceeding. Second, Goldman indicated that a bar charge is akin to a police report for which the prosecutor then has discretion whether to proceed. 248 Ariz. at 530 ¶ 63. But Goldman did not recognize that investigative subpoenas may be issued and significant adverse action may be taken against a respondent who fails to comply at the charge investigation stage. The subject of a police investigation does not have a similar obligation to cooperate. Goldman’s comparison is not convincing. ¶39 Defendants rely on other language in Goldman to support their position that a charge filed with the State Bar is not a civil proceeding. Goldman acknowledged that “an action within a disciplinary proceeding may implicate an action for improper litigation conduct,” but determined “the mere filing of a bar charge is not ‘use’ of a judicial process” as required for abuse of process. Id. ¶ 64. Goldman then proceeded to state, “[i]n this case, there was no process, nor was there a proceeding to sustain a claim for the wrongful institution of civil proceedings.” Id. But there was no WICP claim in Goldman, and thus the court did not consider whether a “civil 14  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court proceeding” existed. See id. at 516 ¶ 1. Goldman’s brief mention of WICP was dicta that was unnecessary to its outcome and failed to analyze the substance of the Rules in context with the term “civil proceeding.” See State v. Brown, 260 Ariz. 476, 486 ¶ 49 (2025). Goldman’s perfunctory reference to WICP does not compel us to exclude charges filed with the State Bar from being considered “civil proceedings.” 6. The Dissent ¶40 Our dissenting colleagues do not dispute that a proceeding occurs after a charge is filed with the State Bar. They just dispute the characterization of that proceeding as a “civil proceeding.” ¶41 The dissent points to Rule 48(a), which provides: “Discipline and disability proceedings are neither civil nor criminal, but are sui generis.” Infra ¶¶ 104–105, 109–111, 138. Although Defendants do not rely on Rule 48(a), the dissent contends that this sentence supports the proposition that a State Bar discipline proceeding can never be a “civil proceeding” for purposes of a WICP claim. We disagree. ¶42 First, Rule 48(a) does not state that a discipline proceeding may never constitute a civil proceeding for a collateral legal purpose. The dissent’s construction effectively reads language into Rule 48(a) that does not exist. ¶43 Second, discipline proceedings are unique and are, therefore, sui generis. See Sui Generis, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (explaining “sui generis” is Latin and means “[o]f its own kind or class”). As discussed, a proceeding exists after a charge is filed with the State Bar and that proceeding may (or may not) become a civil proceeding. Supra ¶ 34; infra ¶ 77 (explaining that a civil proceeding does not commence under Rule 55 until a respondent is given the written notice of investigation and must provide a written response to the allegations). A discipline proceeding is not automatically a civil proceeding. Whether a discipline proceeding ever amounts to a civil proceeding depends on the stage and substance of each particular proceeding, which is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. That feature makes discipline proceedings unique. 15  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court ¶44 Third, Rule 48(a) cannot be read in isolation, but instead must be read in context with the remainder of Rule 48, as context is a primary determinant of meaning. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 259 Ariz. 105, 108 ¶ 11 (2025) (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (explaining that courts must interpret a statute’s plain language in context, because “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of meaning”)); S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, 286 ¶ 31 (2023) (explaining that we determine the meaning of a statute “according to the plain meaning of the words in their broader statutory context”); State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 47 ¶ 23 (2004) (“We interpret court rules according to the principles of statutory construction.”). The following provisions appear immediately after Rule 48(a): (1) Rule 48(b) adopts specific Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure that apply to proceedings before the presiding disciplinary judge, (2) Rule 48(c) provides that the Arizona Rules of Evidence, with certain exceptions, “shall be followed as far as practicable,” and (3) Rule 48(d) and (e) set forth the standard of proof and burden of proof that apply. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 48. We do not read Rule 48(a) in isolation, or invoke “a narrow, crabbed reading of [the] text.” State v. Serrato, 259 Ariz. 493, 497 ¶¶ 15–16 (2025). Instead, we analyze Rule 48 as a cohesive whole so that we do not overlook contextual clues that inform the meaning of subsection (a). See id. Read in context, Rule 48(a) means that discipline proceedings are also unique as they relate to the applicability of certain court rules and the relevant standard of proof and burden of proof. ¶45 The dissent traces the history of Rule 48(a) and contends that its text was originally sourced from American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rule for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (“Model Rule”) 17(A), which, in turn, was addressed by ABA Standard 1.2, and we should therefore use the commentary to ABA Standard 1.2 to inform our understanding of Rule 48(a). Infra ¶¶ 104–05. Even assuming we should look to the commentary of ABA Standard 1.2 to interpret the meaning of Rule 48(a), that commentary supports our position. The commentary observes that (1) the question of what rules “should be applied . . . must be determined upon the facts presented in a particular case,” and (2) “[t]he general consensus is that disciplinary proceedings are unique and thus may properly be characterized as sui generis.” Joint Committee on Professional Discipline of the Appellate Judges’ Conference and the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, Standards for Lawyer Disciplinary and 16  ACCURSIO v. TREE HOUSE LABS, LLC Opinion of the Court Disability Proceedings 1.2 cmt. (A.B.A., Tentative Draft 1978) (cleaned up). We agree that discipline proceedings are unique. As discussed, the filing of a bar charge initiates a proceeding, and whether it ever becomes a civil proceeding depends on the facts presented in each particular case (i.e., whether the process reaches a point where the respondent is required to respond subject to significant penalties). Supra ¶ 34; infra ¶ 77. Accordingly, we agree with the dissent’s observation that “the sui generis nature of disciplinary proceedings concerns the need to engage in a case- by-case determination.” Infra ¶ 105. Discipl