Macdonald v. Macdonald

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA IN RE THE MATTER OF: CORIEANNE MACDONALD, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. SCOTT MACDONALD, Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee. No. CV-25-0309-PR Filed October 28, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County S8015DO202400193 The Honorable Megan A. McCoy, Judge Order of the Court of Appeals, Division One 1 CA-CV 25-0475 FC Filed Aug. 20, 2025 AFFIRMED COUNSEL: Keith Berkshire (argued), Alexandra Sandlin, Elizabeth Nańez, Alicia Derr, Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Tempe, Attorneys for Scott MacDonald Michael J. Wozniak, Isabel Humphrey (argued), Aspey Watkins & Diesel, PLLC, Flagstaff, Attorneys for Corieanne MacDonald  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court JUSTICE KING authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, and JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE, MONTGOMERY, and CRUZ joined. JUSTICE KING, Opinion of the Court: ¶1 The superior court entered a Decree of Dissolution (“Decree”) in this family court proceeding involving Scott MacDonald (“Husband”) and Corieanne MacDonald (“Wife”). Thereafter, Husband filed a motion to alter or amend the Decree under Rule 83 of the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure (“Rules”). The court denied Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend. ¶2 This case requires us to determine whether the court’s entry of the order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend commenced the 30-day period for Husband to file a notice of appeal. See Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 9(a), (e)(1)(C). We conclude that it did. Because Husband did not file his notice of appeal within 30 days of the order denying his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend, the court of appeals correctly determined that his notice of appeal was untimely and that the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. See id.; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A). Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ order dismissing Husband’s appeal. BACKGROUND ¶3 The superior court entered the Decree on January 21, 2025. The Decree dissolved the marriage of Husband and Wife, addressed the division of their property and debts, denied Wife’s request for an award of spousal maintenance, and denied the parties’ requests for attorney fees and costs. The Decree stated: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED signing this minute entry as a final judgment under Rule 78(c), Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure, as there are no further matters pending before this Court.” ¶4 On February 14, Husband timely filed a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend the Decree. Husband requested that the Decree be amended 2  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court with respect to the value and division of certain property addressed in the Decree—specifically, (1) the Re/Max Business, and (2) CalPERS retirement account. On February 27, Husband filed a motion to stay the execution of the Decree as to the disputed property, which the court granted. ¶5 On May 5, the court entered an order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend. The order included a brief discussion of the court’s reasons for not amending the Decree as to the Re/Max Business and CalPERS retirement account. The order also stated: “This Court has no further matter before it based on the . . . Petition, and therefore signs this as a final order pursuant to Rule 78(b), as other matters remain pending. The case shall remain open to resolve the post decree filings.” ¶6 On June 16, the court entered an order lifting the stay of execution and directing the parties to comply with the Decree. The order also stated: “The Court has reviewed the docket and finds no further matters are pending herein and finds the Decree dated 1/21/25 is a final and appealable order under ARFLP Rule 78(c). As there are no remaining issue[s] in this matter, the Court finds that this is a final order pursuant to Rule 78(c) of the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure.” ¶7 On June 17, Husband filed a notice of appeal from (1) the Decree entered on January 21, (2) the May 5 order denying his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend, (3) the June 16 order lifting the stay, and (4) “all prior orders.” Wife moved to dismiss Husband’s appeal as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend. Wife argued that the court of appeals, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over Husband’s appeal. ¶8 The court of appeals dismissed Husband’s appeal as untimely. MacDonald v. MacDonald, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0475, at 3 (Ariz. App. Aug. 20, 2025) (dec. order). The court explained that a dissolution decree is a judgment under Rule 78(a). Id. at 2–3. When a judgment is being appealed, the notice of appeal must be filed no later than 30 days after entry of the judgment, see ARCAP 9(a), unless a party files a timely motion that extends the time to appeal, see ARCAP 9(e)(1). MacDonald, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0475, at 2. The court observed that a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend a judgment is one such time-extending motion. Id. Therefore, when a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is filed, the time to 3  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court file a notice of appeal begins to run from entry of the signed order ruling on that motion. Id. (citing ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C)). ¶9 Husband argued that the order denying his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend did not include proper Rule 78(b) or (c) finality language, which is required to make a judgment appealable. Id. at 2–3. Therefore, Husband claimed that the order was not appealable and his time to appeal did not begin until the entry of the June 16 order, which lifted the stay of execution and included Rule 78(c) finality language. Id. The court disagreed with Husband, explaining that an order ruling on a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is not a judgment under Rule 78(a), and thus Rule 78(b) or (c) finality language is not required in that order. Id. The court determined that the May 5 order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend commenced his time to appeal. Id. at 1–3 (citing ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C)). Because Husband did not file a notice of appeal until June 17—more than 30 days after entry of the May 5 order—his notice of appeal was untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at 2–3. The court, therefore, dismissed Husband’s appeal. Id. at 3. Husband filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. MacDonald, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0475, at 3 (Ariz. App. Nov. 6, 2025) (dec. order). ¶10 We granted review because the interpretation of court rules governing the appealability of judgments and orders in family court proceedings is a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. DISCUSSION ¶11 We review the interpretation of court rules de novo, Contreras v. Bourke, 260 Ariz. 319, 322 ¶ 12 (2025), using principles of statutory interpretation, State v. Greene, 255 Ariz. 37, 57 ¶ 76 (2023). When a court rule “is unambiguous in context, it is dispositive.” Contreras, 260 Ariz. at 322 ¶ 12 (quoting In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024)). A. Appellate Jurisdiction ¶12 The “court of appeals ‘derives . . . appellate jurisdiction wholly from statutory provisions.’” Garza v. Swift Transp. Co., 222 Ariz. 281, 283–84 ¶ 12 (2009) (quoting Eaton v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 122 Ariz. 391, 4  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court 392 (App. 1979)). Whether the court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction turns on compliance with the statute on which appellate jurisdiction is based and any applicable procedural rules. Choy Lan Yee v. Yee, 251 Ariz. 71, 74–75 ¶ 8 (App. 2021). ¶13 Section 12-120.21(A)(1) provides that “[t]he court of appeals shall have . . . [a]ppellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings originating in or permitted by law to be appealed from the superior court,” with one exception not relevant here. Separately, the Legislature defined the subject matter of the court of appeals’ jurisdiction by specifically enumerating the categories of superior court judgments and orders from which an appeal may be taken to the court of appeals. See § 12-2101(A). As relevant here, “[a]n appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the superior court” in several instances, including (1) “[f]rom a final judgment entered in an action or special proceeding commenced in a superior court,” and (2) “[f]rom any special order made after final judgment.” § 12-2101(A)(1)–(2). ¶14 Arizona court rules set the time for a party to file a notice of appeal. When a party files an untimely notice of appeal, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. See Edwards v. Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 284 (1971) (“It is settled in Arizona that the perfecting of an appeal within the time prescribed is jurisdictional; and, hence, where the appeal is not timely filed, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction other than to dismiss the attempted appeal.”). B. The Deadline To File A Notice Of Appeal In A Family Court Proceeding ¶15 We now turn to the court rules that address whether a ruling in a family court proceeding is a judgment that may be appealed and the deadline to file a notice of appeal. ¶16 Rule 78(a)(1) defines a judgment in a family court proceeding as follows: “Judgment” as used in these rules is a decree of dissolution of marriage, a decree of legal separation, a decree of dissolution of a covenant marriage, a decree of legal separation of a covenant marriage, a decree of annulment, judgments of 5  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court paternity and maternity, and a decision defining or modifying legal decision-making, parenting time, or child support. A decision resolving any petition listed in Rule 23(a) or any post-judgment petition filed under Rule 91(b) is a judgment. A temporary order is not a judgment. ¶17 Under Rule 78(b), the entry of a judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or parties is only an appealable judgment if it contains specific finality language. Rule 78(b) provides the following: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, . . . the court may direct the entry of an appealable judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay and recites that the judgment is entered under Rule 78(b). If there is no such express determination and recital, any decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties, and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities. ¶18 Also, the entry of a judgment that adjudicates all claims, issues, and parties is only an appealable judgment if it recites specific finality language. Rule 78(c). Rule 78(c) provides: “A judgment as to all claims, issues, and parties is not appealable unless the judgment recites that no further matters remain pending and that the judgment is entered under Rule 78(c).” ¶19 Parties who wish to appeal a judgment must file a timely notice of appeal: “To appeal a judgment, a party must file a notice of appeal under [ARCAP] 8 no later than 30 days after entry of the judgment from which the appeal is taken, except as otherwise provided in this Rule or unless the law provides a different time.” ARCAP 9(a). Certain motions timely and properly filed with the superior court extend the time to file a notice of appeal, one of which is a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 83. ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C). 6  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court ¶20 A Rule 83 motion to alter or amend a judgment “must be filed not later than 25 days after the entry of judgment under Rule 78(b) or (c).” Rule 83(c)(1). If a party timely and properly files a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend and no other time-extending motions are filed, the time to file a notice of appeal “begins to run from the entry by the superior court clerk of a signed written order disposing of the” Rule 83 motion. ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C). Thus, a timely and properly filed Rule 83 motion to alter or amend suspends the time to appeal while the court considers whether to alter or amend the judgment. See id.; see also ARCAP 9(e)(3). C. The Timeliness Of Husband’s Notice Of Appeal 1. The Parties’ Positions ¶21 Husband and Wife agree that the Decree is an appealable judgment that contained proper Rule 78(c) finality language. They also agree that Husband timely filed a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend, which extended Husband’s time to appeal under ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C). The point of dispute is when Husband’s 30-day notice of appeal period commenced. ¶22 Wife contends that Husband’s 30-day notice of appeal period commenced when the court entered its May 5 order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend. Therefore, according to Wife, Husband’s June 17 notice of appeal was not timely filed and the court of appeals correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal. ¶23 In contrast, Husband asserts that the court’s May 5 order denying his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is a judgment under Rule 78(a)(1). But because the May 5 order did not contain proper finality language under Rule 78(b) or (c), Husband contends it was not an appealable final judgment that commenced the 30-day notice of appeal period. See § 12-2101(A)(1) (providing that “[a]n appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the superior court . . . [f]rom a final judgment entered in an action or special proceeding commenced in a superior court”). Husband claims that his 30-day notice of appeal period did not commence until June 16, when the court entered its order lifting the stay of execution along with proper Rule 78(c) finality language; therefore, his June 17 notice of appeal was timely filed and the court of appeals had jurisdiction over his appeal. 7  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court 2. The Notice Of Appeal Period Under ARCAP 9(e) ¶24 ARCAP 9(e) expressly and unambiguously provides that the 30-day notice of appeal period begins when the court enters an order disposing of a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend. “If a party timely and properly files with the superior court clerk any of the following motions”—one of which is a motion “[t]o alter or amend the judgment under . . . Rule 83(a) of the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure”—then “the time to file a notice of appeal or cross-appeal for all parties begins to run from the entry by the superior court clerk of a signed written order disposing of the last such remaining motion.” ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C). The plain language identifies the commencement of the 30-day notice of appeal period as the clerk’s entry “of a signed written order disposing of the last such remaining motion”—which here is the May 5 order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend. Id.; see also ARCAP 9(e)(3) (stating that a party intending to appeal an order “disposing of one or more of the motions listed in Rule 9(e)(1) must file a notice of appeal, a notice of cross-appeal, or an amended notice of appeal under Rule 8 within the time prescribed by Rule 9,” and “[t]he time is measured from entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion”). 3. Husband’s Position That The Order Denying His Rule 83 Motion Is A “Judgment” That Required Rule 78(b) Or (c) Finality Language ¶25 We now address Husband’s contention that the order denying his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend was itself a judgment that required proper finality language under Rule 78(b) or (c) to commence the 30-day notice of appeal period. ¶26 Rule 78(a)(1) provides the definition of judgment in the context of family court proceedings. As relevant here, a judgment under Rule 78(a)(1) includes “a decree of dissolution of marriage” and several other types of court rulings. Significantly, it does not include a ruling on a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend a judgment. See Rule 78(a)(1). Nothing in Rule 78(a)(1) suggests that the denial of a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend an existing judgment creates a second judgment. 8  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court ¶27 Rules 78 and 83 address different types of superior court rulings. Rule 78(a)(1) defines a “judgment” to include “a decree of dissolution of marriage.” In contrast, Rule 83 authorizes a motion directed at a judgment that has already been entered. An order denying a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend leaves the existing judgment in place and does not itself become a second judgment. Under Husband’s interpretation, a decree of dissolution would constitute one judgment, and an order denying a motion to alter or amend that decree would constitute a second judgment, even though the latter did not change the decree. Each judgment would require separate finality language and generate duplicative appeals on the same set of issues with different appellate deadlines. ¶28 Husband argues that the order denying his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is itself a judgment because (1) Rule 78(a)(1) defines a judgment to include “[a] decision resolving any petition listed in Rule 23(a),” and (2) one petition listed in Rule 23(a) is a “dissolution of a marriage” under A.R.S. § 25-312. Husband contends that the order denying his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is “[a] decision resolving” the petition for dissolution of marriage under Rule 23(a)(2). We disagree. ¶29 Husband’s position conflates the decree of dissolution, which is the judgment that resolves the petition for dissolution of a marriage, with an order denying a motion to alter or amend the decree that was already entered. The two are not the same. Construing a Rule 83 order into the definition of judgment under Rule 78(a)(1)—as a “decision resolving any petition listed in Rule 23(a)”—is inconsistent with the text and structure of Rule 78(a), which does not refer to a Rule 83 order. ¶30 Certainly, an order denying a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is a “decision.” But it is not a “decision resolving” a petition for dissolution when viewed in context. See State v. Howard, 595 P.3d 630, 636 ¶ 15 (Ariz. 2026) (stating that when interpreting court rules, we “begin with the text, reading the rule as a whole, in context, and giving effect to each of its provisions”). There are several types of orders that may be issued after a judgment is entered in a case, including orders ruling on a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend, a motion for reconsideration, or a motion for clarification. If an order denying a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is a “decision resolving” a petition for dissolution, this would mean that several other types of post-judgment orders would also be deemed a “decision 9  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court resolving” the petition, thereby resulting in multiple judgments on the same issues. ¶31 This approach would also conflict with § 12-2101(A), which differentiates between a “special order” and a “final judgment.” See Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 428–29 ¶¶ 14–15 & n.6 (App. 2016) (“Although the ‘special order’ must have been made after entry of a ‘final judgment,’ the statute does not require that the ‘special order’ being appealed from must itself be a ‘final judgment.’”). If such post-judgment orders are also deemed judgments, this would effectively merge two distinct statutory sections—§ 12-2101(A)(1) (allowing appeal “[f]rom a final judgment”) and § 12-2101(A)(2) (allowing appeal “[f]rom any special order made after final judgment”). ¶32 Here, the Decree was the decision that resolved the petition for dissolution of marriage, and it contained proper Rule 78(c) language because no further matters remained pending. The order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend did not resolve the petition for dissolution under Rule 78(a)(1). It was a separate order that did not disturb the Decree’s finality. Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend served as a time-extending motion under ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C), which specifically provides that the time to file a notice of appeal begins “to run from the entry by the superior court clerk of a signed written order disposing of the” Rule 83 motion. ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C) does not identify a Rule 83 order as a judgment, nor does it reference Rule 78. Thus, Rule 78(a)(1)’s reference to “[a] decision resolving any petition listed in Rule 23(a)” does not upset the specific command in ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C) and its designation of a Rule 83 motion as a time-extending motion. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012) (“If there is a conflict between a general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails . . . .”). ¶33 Husband argues that if rulings disposing of a motion to alter or amend are not judgments under Rule 78(a)(1) requiring Rule 78(b) or (c) finality language, they will never be appealable under § 12-2101(A). Not so. When a party timely appeals a decree of dissolution after the denial of a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend, that party’s notice of appeal may challenge both (1) the underlying dissolution decree, and (2) the court’s denial of the Rule 83 motion. Thus, the order denying the Rule 83 motion 10  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court is reviewable on appeal from the dissolution decree. The court of appeals will have jurisdiction over the dissolution decree and the order denying the Rule 83 motion to alter or amend the decree. See § 12-2101(A)(1); see also ARCAP 9(e). This avoids duplicative appeals concerning the same issues. ¶34 This approach is also consistent with ARCAP 9(e)(2)–(3). Under ARCAP 9(e)(2), if a party files a notice of appeal before a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is filed or while a Rule 83 motion is pending, “the appeal will be suspended” until the Rule 83 motion is decided and “the appeal will be reinstated as of the entry of the order disposing of the” Rule 83 motion. 1 Also, under ARCAP 9(e)(3), a party intending to appeal an order disposing of a Rule 83 motion “must file a notice of appeal, a notice of cross-appeal, or an amended notice of appeal” within the time prescribed by ARCAP 9, which is “measured from entry of the order disposing of the” Rule 83 motion. This process necessarily allows a party to challenge both the dissolution decree and the order disposing of the Rule 83 motion. ¶35 As Husband notes, the order denying his motion to alter or amend indicated that it was being signed “as a final order pursuant to Rule 78(b), as other matters remain pending.” The order did not include the “no just reason for delay” language required by Rule 78(b). This incomplete Rule 78(b) language, however, had no legal effect on Husband’s deadline to appeal under ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C). The language did not alter the fact that the order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend was “a signed written order disposing of the” Rule 83 motion, which commenced the 30-day notice of appeal period under ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C). And because the order was not a judgment under Rule 78(a)(1), it did not require any Rule 78(b) language. The incomplete Rule 78(b) language, therefore, was of no legal consequence. ¶36 Accordingly, Husband’s 30-day period to file a notice of appeal commenced upon the entry of the May 5 “signed written order disposing of the” Rule 83 motion to alter or amend. See ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C); § 12-2101(A)(1). Because the 30-day notice of appeal period began to run from the May 5 order, the subsequent June 16 order did not restart or extend the time to appeal. We note that this timing was not prejudicial to Husband. His time to file a notice of appeal would have been the same under other possible circumstances, such as if the court had (1) denied his 1 ARCAP 9(e)(2) imposes certain notice obligations on the appellant. 11  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court Rule 83 motion to alter or amend with no additional discussion of the Re/Max Business or CalPERS retirement account, or (2) granted his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend, vacated the Decree previously entered, and entered a new decree with Rule 78(b) or (c) finality language. See Rule 83(b) (stating that “[t]he court may vacate the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new ones, and direct the entry of a new judgment”). ¶37 Husband raises concerns about the general appealability of orders denying Rule 83 motions, indicating that our interpretation should provide parties an appropriate method to appeal such orders. In this case, Husband acknowledges that his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend raised issues that are the same as those addressed in the Decree. Also, the superior court did not find grounds to alter or amend the Decree under Rule 83(a)(1), nor did it vacate the Decree and direct entry of a new decree under Rule 83(b). Nonetheless, Husband argues that when the superior court denied his Rule 83 motion, its order explaining the reasons for the denial included new findings that were not in the Decree about the profits and value of the Re/Max Business and the division of the CalPERS retirement benefits. But even if the order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion contained new findings, he had 30 days from the entry of that order to file a notice of appeal challenging both the Decree and the Rule 83 order that addressed the same issues in the Decree. See supra ¶¶ 33-34; ARCAP 9(e)(1)-(3). ¶38 We also note that § 12-2101(A)(2) permits an appeal of a “special order made after final judgment.” An order constitutes a “special order made after final judgment” under § 12-2101(A)(2) “if two requirements are met.” Vincent v. Shanovich, 243 Ariz. 269, 271 ¶ 9 (2017). “First, the issues raised on appeal from the order must be different from those that could have been raised on appeal from the underlying judgment.” Id. “This requirement prevents a delayed appeal from the judgment, and also prevents multiple appeals raising the same issues.” Id. (quoting Arvizu v. Fernandez, 183 Ariz. 224, 227 (App. 1995)). “Second, to avoid ‘innumerable appeals of anything denominated an order,’ the order must either affect the judgment or relate to its enforcement.” Id. (quoting Arvizu, 183 Ariz. at 227) (citation modified). ¶39 We agree with Husband that the order denying his Rule 83 motion to alter or amend is not appealable under § 12-2101(A)(2), as that 12  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court order addressed issues that are the same as those in the Decree regarding the Re/Max Business and CalPERS retirement benefits. Nonetheless, we do not eliminate the possibility that, in another case, an order denying a motion to alter or amend may be a “special order made after final judgment” that is appealable under § 12-2101(A)(2), so long as the order meets the two requirements described in Vincent. See 243 Ariz. at 271 ¶ 9. And because a “special order made after final judgment” is statutorily distinct from a “final judgment,” it need not include a certification of finality under Rule 78(b) or (c) to be appealable under § 12-2101(A)(2). See Brumett, 240 Ariz. at 428–29 ¶ 15. ¶40 Also, if a court grants a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend, vacates the decree that was previously entered, and enters an amended decree with proper Rule 78(b) or (c) finality language, a party has 30 days after entry of the amended decree to file a notice of appeal. See ARCAP 9(a). In that case, the amended decree is appealable as a final judgment under § 12-2101(A)(1). 2 See Rule 78(a)(1). But where, as here, the court denies a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend and leaves the previously entered judgment unchanged, the 30-day notice of appeal period commences upon “entry by the superior court clerk of a signed written order disposing of the” Rule 83 motion. See ARCAP 9(a), (e)(1)(C). ¶41 We make these points to address Husband’s concerns about the appealability of orders disposing of Rule 83 motions to alter or amend. There are avenues to appeal such orders, and thus appellate review is preserved. It is not necessary or permissible for us to treat the order denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion as a separate judgment under Rule 2 Husband also raises concerns about the enforceability of certain orders. For example, Husband raises the possibility that a court issues an order that both (1) denies a Rule 83 motion, and (2) purports to alter the underlying judgment in some manner or make an award of attorney fees—but the court does not enter an amended judgment. In that instance, a party may ask the court to vacate the underlying judgment and direct entry of an amended judgment. If the court enters an amended judgment with Rule 78(b) or (c) finality language, a party has 30 days after entry of the amended judgment to file a notice of appeal. See ARCAP 9(a). If the court does not enter an amended judgment, the judgment and Rule 83 order may be appealed as discussed, see supra ¶¶ 33-34, 37–40. 13  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court 78(a)(1), particularly where Rule 78(a)(1) does not identify such a ruling in its extensive list of rulings that constitute a “judgment.” 4. 2022 Amendments to Rule 78 ¶42 On a final note, our conclusion today is consistent with a rule petition filed in 2022 that sought to amend Rules 78, 85, and 91. See “Revised Petition To Amend Arizona Rules of Family Court Procedure 78, 85 and 91” (“Petition”) (March 25, 2022); see also Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-22-0005 (Aug. 29, 2022) (amending Rules 78, 85, and 91). The Petition was filed after Yee, in which the court of appeals suggested that a rule change should be considered to ensure that parties are on notice of the time to file an appeal from post-decree orders. 251 Ariz. at 76 ¶ 14 n.5. The Petition noted that several alternatives were available, but the proposed amendments were offered in an effort “to avoid concerns about uncertainty and confusion expressed in Yee and to provide clarity and certainty about when a ruling on a post-judgment petition is appealable.” Petition at 7. ¶43 This Court adopted the Petition that now reflects the current version of Rule 78. See Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-22-0005. The amendments revised Rule 78(a)(1)’s definition of “judgment” and clarified when a ruling qualifying as a judgment becomes appealable. See id. But the amendments did not include an order resolving a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend in the definition of “judgment.” See id. Nor did the amendments open the definition of “judgment” to include all types of post-judgment orders. See id. (adopting new language in Rule 78(a)(1), which states that “[a] decision resolving any petition listed in Rule 23(a) or any post-judgment petition filed under Rule 91(b) is a judgment”). Nothing in the Petition indicated that an order denying a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend a judgment would itself constitute a judgment requiring Rule 78(b) or (c) language. The Petition noted the need for clarity in the Rules given the large number of self-represented parties in family court proceedings. Petition at 4–5. Our interpretation of the applicable court rules assists parties by (1) reducing the possibility of multiple simultaneous appeals addressing the same issues, (2) providing clarity about the appeal of an order denying a Rule 83 motion to alter or amend, and (3) preserving appellate review. ¶44 In conclusion, the Rule 78(a)(1) judgment in this case was the Decree that contained proper Rule 78(c) finality language. The order 14  MACDONALD v. MACDONALD Opinion of the Court denying Husband’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend a judgment was not itself a second judgment that required finality language under Rule 78(b) or (c). Husband’s Rule 83 motion extended his time to file a notice of appeal. See ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C). And ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C) provides the clear event from which Husband’s 30-day notice of appeal period began to run: “entry by the superior court clerk of a signed written order disposing of” his Rule 83 motion. That order was entered on May 5, but Husband did not file a notice of appeal until June 17. Husband, therefore, filed an untimely notice of appeal and the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. CONCLUSION ¶45 We affirm the court of appeals’ order dismissing Husband’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We deny Husband’s request for attorney fees. 15