State of Arizona v. Ricky Alonzo Hippensteel

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. RICKY ALONZO HIPPENSTEEL, Appellant. No. CR-25-0203-PR Filed June 1, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County The Honorable Justin Beresky, Judge No. CR2021-123897-001 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 572 P.3d 579 (App. 2025) VACATED COUNSEL: Damon A. Rossi (argued), Deputy Public Defender, Maricopa County Office of the Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Ricky Alonzo Hippensteel Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice M. Jones (argued), Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court Kevin D. Heade, Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Florence, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER authored the Opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE, KING, and CRUZ joined. JUSTICE MONTGOMERY dissented. CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Opinion of the Court: ¶1 A jury convicted Ricky Alonzo Hippensteel of second degree murder after he stabbed Derek Joseph Odle. Without objection, the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the crime of provocation manslaughter, see A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2), and provided a flawed verdict form. The issue here is whether these errors constituted fundamental, prejudicial errors requiring a new trial. We conclude they did. BACKGROUND ¶2 In June 2021, Hippensteel and Odle were friends living in Tonopah, Arizona. In the early morning hours of June 25, Hippensteel sought out Odle in an informal compound of mobile homes and other structures. The two men fought outside a trailer where Odle was staying, and Odle was stabbed to death. The State indicted Hippensteel for first degree murder and related lesser offenses. ¶3 At trial, Hippensteel testified and did not deny stabbing Odle but asserted he acted in self-defense and to prevent a crime (assault). According to Hippensteel, he approached Odle outside Odle’s trailer to discuss a missing tractor while Odle was using a knife to scrape or cut wires. The two began arguing, and at some point, Hippensteel looked away. When he turned back, he saw Odle raise the knife toward him, prompting Hippensteel to react immediately by blocking the knife, thereby sustaining a stab wound to his hand. The confrontation then escalated into a physical fight involving “grabbing, hitting, throwing, [and] punching,” during which Odle was fatally stabbed. Hippensteel told jurors that he did not remember stabbing Odle, and that when he left the 2  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court scene, Odle was “standing alive.” The prosecutor impeached Hippensteel with evidence that he previously told a detective he had not seen Odle for two weeks or been to the compound for years. Hippensteel admitted lying to the detective but claimed he was telling the truth to the jury. ¶4 Kathleen Abrigo, Odle’s girlfriend, provided the jury with a different version of events. Abrigo testified that she and Odle were asleep in the trailer when Hippensteel stood outside yelling about taking Odle’s car. Abrigo woke Odle and told him to go talk to Hippensteel, and Odle did so, asking “what’s up?” From inside the trailer, Abrigo watched the exchange through a window and saw Hippensteel apparently punching Odle until Odle fell against the trailer, staggered, and then collapsed. According to Abrigo, Odle did not have a knife and did not take any action against Hippensteel. Abrigo called 9-1-1 and exited the trailer, where she saw Hippensteel standing over Odle, holding a small knife. According to Abrigo, Hippensteel told Odle something like “this is what you get for stealing my shit, punk.” Abrigo also testified that while she was still on the phone, Hippensteel threatened her not to provide his name to authorities and then fled. When asked whether she had previously seen Hippensteel with a knife, Abrigo answered yes, explaining “we all have them.” Hippensteel denied seeing Abrigo that day. ¶5 Other witnesses corroborated aspects of both Hippensteel’s and Abrigo’s accounts but also offered testimony that conflicted with each. Donald Parker testified that Hippensteel stopped by his trailer shortly before the stabbing and said he was going to kill Odle for “ransacking his place earlier that morning.” Parker said Hippensteel calmed somewhat after Parker explained that Odle had been in his trailer all night. He saw Hippensteel walk in the direction of Odle’s trailer, but he did not see him with a knife. Later, Parker saw Hippensteel return and said he was flipping a knife and appeared agitated. ¶6 Joseph Abriani’s testimony conflicted with Parker’s. Abriani testified that he was outside and that Parker was nearby speaking with Ruben Ruiz when Hippensteel walked up and asked if Odle was around. After Abriani said he believed Odle was in his trailer, Hippensteel walked off toward the trailer. Abriani did not see Hippensteel with a knife or hear him making threats towards Odle. Abriani did not see Hippensteel returning or flipping a knife, as Parker asserted, even though Abriani and Parker were together until paramedics arrived to treat Odle. 3  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court ¶7 Jonathan Kelly testified that Hippensteel knocked on the door of Kelly’s Winnebago, which was near Odle’s trailer, entered visibly upset, and spoke about taking Odle’s car. Kelly further testified that Hippensteel then saw Odle outside his trailer, made “a beeline” toward him, and appeared to punch him. Kelly did not see Odle fight back. ¶8 Lorena Cluck, Ruben Ruiz, and Angelica Bailon were also inside Kelly’s Winnebago during Hippensteel’s visit. Cluck testified that Hippensteel stated there “might be a murder” on the property and that he wanted to take Odle’s car. Ruiz testified that he saw Odle fall and, upon going outside, observed Hippensteel, who appeared angry, holding a knife and telling Abrigo not to call 9-1-1. Bailon testified that Hippensteel and Odle were friends, but Hippensteel was angry at Odle that morning for “ditch[ing] him somewhere.” ¶9 The jury also heard testimony that Odle and several witnesses were using drugs at the time of the incident. At the time Odle died, his blood alcohol concentration was 0.03%, and toxicology reports revealed levels of amphetamines, methamphetamine, and THC, the primary psychoactive compound found in cannabis. The toxicology report also stated that the level of methamphetamine found was “capable of causing hallucinations, aggressive behavior[,] and irrational reactions.” Ruiz and Bailon testified that they were high on drugs that morning, and Ruiz also said that he and Kelly were getting high in the Winnebago when Hippensteel stopped in. Kelly denied this. An officer testified that Abrigo originally said she had been smoking drugs with Odle that morning before Hippensteel arrived. ¶10 The jury’s fact finding was undoubtedly complicated by differing versions of events, the drug use that may have muddled observations and memories, and the fact that Hippensteel and all the above-named witnesses, except Abriani, were impeached with prior inconsistent statements. Tellingly, the jurors asked witnesses more than fifty questions. ¶11 Without objection, the trial court used Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (“RAJIs”) to instruct the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, provocation manslaughter, negligent manslaughter, aggravated assault, unlawful flight, and resisting arrest. Ultimately, the jury found Hippensteel guilty of second degree murder, unlawful flight, 4  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court and resisting arrest. It found him not guilty of committing aggravated assault against Abrigo. After the verdicts were read, defense counsel told the court that the verdict form should have required the jury to separately state whether it considered provocation manslaughter. But counsel did not ask for any relief, and the court did not take action. The court sentenced Hippensteel to concurrent prison terms, including nineteen years for second degree murder. In a divided opinion, the court of appeals affirmed. See State v. Hippensteel, 572 P.3d 579, 580 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. 2025). ¶12 We granted review of Hippensteel’s petition for review because whether the jury instructions and verdict forms given resulted in fundamental, prejudicial error is an issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. DISCUSSION ¶13 Hippensteel argues that the trial court committed reversible error by giving an incorrect jury instruction and verdict form to the jury. Because he did not raise this objection to the trial court, we review for fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140 ¶ 12 (2018). To establish such error, Hippensteel must initially demonstrate that the court committed error. See id. at 142 ¶ 21. If error exists, he must also show that under the totality of the circumstances, “(1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error took from [him] a right essential to his defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have received a fair trial.” Id. “If [Hippensteel] establishes fundamental error under prongs one or two,” he must separately show prejudice. See id. If he establishes fundamental error under the third prong, he has also shown prejudice, and we must grant him a new trial. See id. A. The Trial Court Incorrectly Instructed The Jury On Provocation Manslaughter And Provided An Erroneous Verdict Form ¶14 The parties do not dispute that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on provocation manslaughter and provided an erroneously worded verdict form. To place these errors in context, we first review the elements of second degree murder and provocation manslaughter. ¶15 A person commits second degree murder, a class one felony, if, without premeditation, the person intentionally, knowingly, or, “[u]nder 5  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life,” recklessly causes the death of another. A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(1)–(3), (C). A person commits provocation manslaughter, a class two felony, by committing second degree murder “on a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim.” § 13-1103(A)(2). Notably, because provocation manslaughter includes an additional element, it is not a lesser included offense of second degree murder. See State v. Lua, 237 Ariz. 301, 303 ¶ 7 (2015). Instead, provocation manslaughter is a less serious degree of homicide that carries a reduced punishment. See id. ¶16 In Lua, this Court clarified potential confusion stemming from our decision in State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437 (1996), when provocation manslaughter is at issue. See Lua, 237 Ariz. at 306 ¶ 19. In LeBlanc, we stated that a “jury may deliberate on a lesser offense if it either (1) finds the defendant not guilty on the greater charge, or (2) after reasonable efforts cannot agree whether to acquit or convict on that charge.” 186 Ariz. at 438. We, therefore, directed trial courts to give this “reasonable efforts” instruction “in every criminal case involving lesser-included offenses.” Id. at 440. But, because provocation manslaughter, a less serious offense, can only be committed if the defendant also committed second degree murder, a more serious offense, we explained in Lua that a LeBlanc instruction is improper in that circumstance. See Lua, 237 Ariz. at 306 ¶ 19. Instead, the court should instruct the jury as follows: If you find the elements of second-degree 1 murder proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must consider whether the homicide was committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim. If you unanimously find that the homicide was committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim, then you must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather than second-degree murder. See id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added) (quoting Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.04, at 107 (3d ed. 2008)). This instruction enables the jury to distinguish 1 Because A.R.S. § 13-1104 and § 13-1105 do not hyphenate “second degree murder” or “first degree murder,” we do not hyphenate the phrases. For any quoted material containing the hyphenated phrases, however, we retained the hyphen. 6  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court between second degree murder and provocation manslaughter and to return a verdict on the less serious offense when warranted. See id. at 307 ¶ 20. ¶17 Here, the trial court gave the Lua instruction as part of its instruction on second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Specifically, the court instructed the jury that if it found that Hippensteel committed all the elements of second degree murder, it must consider whether he killed Odle upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from an adequate provocation by Odle. If the jurors unanimously found that circumstance, the court instructed they must convict Hippensteel of manslaughter. The instruction did not define “adequate provocation.” ¶18 The court then incorrectly gave a LeBlanc instruction on provocation manslaughter, instructing the jury that it “may” consider provocation manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder and second degree murder if it found Hippensteel not guilty of both crimes or was undecided about his guilt. After describing reckless manslaughter, the court instructed on provocation manslaughter as follows: The second way to commit “manslaughter” is manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion requires proof that: 1. a. The defendant intentionally killed another person; or b. The defendant caused the death of another person by conduct which the defendant knew would cause death or serious physical injury; or c. Under circumstances which showed an extreme indifference to human life, the defendant caused the death of another person by consciously disregarding a grave risk of death. The risk must be such that disregarding it was a gross deviation from what a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have done; and 7  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court 2. The defendant acted upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; and 3. The sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulted from adequate provocation by the person who was killed. [It is no defense that the defendant was unaware of the risk solely by reason of intoxication.] “Adequate provocation” means conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a reasonable person of self-control. Words alone are not adequate provocation to justify reducing an intentional killing to manslaughter. There must not have been a “cooling off” period between the provocation and the killing. A “cooling off” period is the time it would take a reasonable person to regain self-control under the circumstances. You must unanimously agree that the State has proven “manslaughter” beyond a reasonable doubt before you may find the defendant guilty of “manslaughter.” However, all of you do not have to agree on whether it was “reckless manslaughter” or “manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either second-degree murder or manslaughter but you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. ¶19 The trial court erred by giving the LeBlanc jury instruction on provocation manslaughter. First, as we explained in Lua, provocation manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of second degree murder. 237 Ariz. at 303 ¶ 7. Second, the LeBlanc instruction incorrectly told the jury it could only consider provocation manslaughter if it failed to find that Hippensteel had committed second degree murder. But, in fact, the jury was required to consider provocation manslaughter after finding that Hippensteel had committed second degree murder. See id. at 306 ¶ 20; § 13-1103(A)(2). Third, the LeBlanc instruction told jurors they “may” consider provocation manslaughter, whereas jurors were legally required to convict Hippensteel of manslaughter if he committed second degree murder upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation. See § 13-1103(A)(2). 8  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court ¶20 The court compounded the instructional error in the verdict form, which provided, in relevant part, as follows: Lesser-Included Offense Verdict on “second degree murder”: If you find the defendant “guilty” of “first-degree murder”, do not complete this portion of the verdict form. In other words, complete this portion only if you find the defendant either “not guilty” of “first-degree murder” or you are unable to decide. We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our oaths, do find the Defendant, Ricky Hippensteel, on the charge of “second-degree murder” as the result of the death of Derek Joseph Odle as follows (check only one): __ Not guilty __ Guilty __ Unable to agree Lesser-Included Offense Verdict on “manslaughter”: If you find the defendant “guilty” of “first-degree murder” or “guilty” of “second degree murder,” do not complete this portion of the verdict form. In other words, complete this portion only if you find the defendant either “not guilty” of both “first-degree murder” and “second degree murder” or you are unable to decide. We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled action, and upon our oaths, do find the Defendant, Ricky Hippensteel, on the charge of “manslaughter” as the result of the death of Derek Joseph Odle as follows (check only one): __ Not guilty __ Guilty __ Unable to agree 9  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court Complete this portion of the verdict form only if you find the defendant “guilty” of “manslaughter.” Please indicate the number of jurors who found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense of “manslaughter” was committed as follows: __ Reckless manslaughter __ Manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion __ Both reckless manslaughter and manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion ¶21 The verdict form contains three errors. First, like the LeBlanc instruction, the verdict form incorrectly states that provocation manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first degree and second degree murder. Second, the verdict form instructs jurors not to complete the manslaughter portion if they found Hippensteel guilty of first degree or second degree murder. But under Lua, once jurors found that Hippensteel committed second degree murder, they were required to consider whether he committed provocation manslaughter. Third, because the verdict form treats provocation manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, it provides no place for jurors to indicate whether they unanimously found Hippensteel guilty or not guilty of provocation manslaughter, a distinct offense, after finding that he committed second degree murder. See State v. Garcia, 102 Ariz. 468, 471 (1967) (stating that when the court submits forms of verdict to the jury, “it should give a form of every kind of a verdict that may possibly be returned by the jury”). ¶22 For these reasons, we agree with the parties that the trial court committed error by giving the LeBlanc instruction on provocation manslaughter and then repeating the instructional error in the verdict form. 10  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court B. The Instructional Error Was Fundamental Error Because It Deprived Hippensteel Of A Right Essential To His Defense ¶23 The instructional error took an “essential right” from Hippensteel if it deprived him of “a constitutional or statutory right necessary to establish a viable defense or rebut the prosecution’s case.” Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 141 ¶ 19. Although provocation manslaughter is not a traditional defense, the right to have the jury correctly instructed on it has both statutory and constitutional dimensions. Hippensteel possessed the right under § 13-1103(A)(2) to have the jury correctly instructed so it could meaningfully consider whether the homicide constituted provocation manslaughter rather than the more serious offense, second degree murder. See Lua, 237 Ariz. at 306–07 ¶¶ 19–20. And the Due Process Clause may be implicated when a defendant is convicted of a more serious offense, despite evidence supporting a verdict on the less serious offense of provocation manslaughter. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703–04 (1975). The court’s error effectively deprived Hippensteel of his right to rebut the prosecution’s case for second degree murder by having the jury meaningfully consider whether to return a verdict on a less serious offense. See State v. Valenzuela, 194 Ariz. 404, 407–08 ¶ 16 (1999) (“By failing to give the [lesser included offense instruction], the trial court denied appellant ‘a right essential to his defense’ and affected the ‘very foundation of [his] theory of defense.’” (second alteration in original)); see also State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543, 551 ¶ 25 (2021) (“By inviting the jury to circumvent the reasonable-doubt standard and consequently undermining Defendants’ constitutional rights and safeguards, the prosecutor deprived Defendants of an ‘essential right’ necessary to rebut the State’s case.”). ¶24 Hippensteel’s primary defense theory was self-defense, which was unaffected by the instructional error. But he advanced a secondary theory in response to the murder charges by arguing that the murder was not premeditated but occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. See § 13-1103(A)(2). Specifically, during closing argument, defense counsel argued that if the jury did not believe that Hippensteel acted in self-defense, it should find either second degree murder or manslaughter “based on the sudden quarrel, based on the argument.” ¶25 The dissent faults Hippensteel for not arguing “provocation manslaughter” expressly or at length. See infra ¶¶ 49–52. But defense counsel’s argument necessarily encompassed provocation manslaughter. 11  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court Counsel referred the jury to its instructions and tracked the manslaughter instruction, citing a “sudden quarrel” and the argument between Hippensteel and Odle as the basis for a manslaughter verdict. That reference to a sudden quarrel invoked the entire offense as the court defined it, including the element of adequate provocation by the victim. Counsel was not required to recite each statutory element to the jury; that is the function of the instruction. See State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 (1984) (“The very purpose of a jury charge is to flag the jurors’ attention to concepts that must not be misunderstood . . . .” (quoting State v. Denny, 119 Ariz. 131, 134 (1984))). ¶26 The brevity of defense counsel’s argument is unsurprising. Self-defense was the stronger theory with a potentially bigger payoff—an acquittal—and consumed most of defense counsel’s argument. But a defendant does not forfeit the right to a correct instruction by emphasizing one theory over another. We, therefore, disagree with the dissent that the relative prominence of a defense theory determines whether an instructional error on that theory deprived the defendant of a right essential to his defense. ¶27 The dissent also contends that our reliance on Valenzuela is misplaced because the trial court there gave no lesser included offense instruction at all, while the jury here received an instruction on provocation manslaughter. See infra ¶¶ 54–56. The dissent’s distinction elevates form over substance. What mattered in Valenzuela, and what matters here, is whether the instructional error deprived the jury of a meaningful opportunity to give effect to the defendant’s theory by returning a verdict on a less serious offense. As in Valenzuela, Hippensteel’s mental state was the cornerstone of his defense: he disputed premeditation, claimed self-defense, and argued alternatively that his reaction to Odle’s sudden aggression warranted a manslaughter verdict rather than murder. Each theory turned on his mental state at the moment of the killing, and provocation manslaughter offered the jury the means to give that evidence legal effect. The LeBlanc instruction and the accompanying verdict form foreclosed that path just as surely as the missing instruction did in Valenzuela. That those errors took a different form does not change their consequence. In both cases, the jury was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to return a verdict on a less serious offense supported by the evidence. ¶28 The evidence at trial made Hippensteel’s sudden-quarrel argument viable. Hippensteel testified that during his confrontation with 12  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court Odle, he turned away and, upon turning back, saw Odle raising a knife toward him. Hippensteel responded by blocking the knife with his hand, which sparked a physical struggle that ultimately resulted in Odle being stabbed. Hippensteel explained that he did not consciously think or feel during the encounter, stating, “My mind, it shut down, like, quick . . . . There was no thoughts. There was nothing there. It was just an instant of reaction.” He further testified that the fight “was just survival.” ¶29 Hippensteel’s account that Odle provoked the fight was corroborated by other evidence. Abrigo testified that “all” in the compound carried knives, from which the jury could have inferred that Odle did as well. Hippensteel sustained a minor injury to his hand, consistent with having blocked a knife. Parker testified that Hippensteel had calmed down before walking toward Odle’s trailer, suggesting that Hippensteel, who was friends with Odle, was not the aggressor in the ensuing confrontation. Also, Odle’s autopsy revealed methamphetamine levels “capable of causing hallucinations, aggressive behavior, and irrational reactions.” From this evidence, the jury could have found Hippensteel’s account credible—that Odle aggressively responded to Hippensteel’s early-morning inquiry about a missing tractor by raising a knife toward him, thereby supporting an inference of adequate provocation. ¶30 The LeBlanc instruction, together with the faulty verdict form, deprived Hippensteel of the opportunity to have the jury meaningfully consider a verdict on the less serious offense of provocation manslaughter rather than second degree murder. This constitutes fundamental error. See Valenzuela, 194 Ariz. at 407–08 ¶ 16. C. The Instructional Error Was Prejudicial ¶31 “Establishing prejudice from fundamental error varies depending on the nature of the error and the unique case facts.” Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 29. The instructional error here deprived Hippensteel of the opportunity for the jury to return a verdict for provocation manslaughter after considering legally correct instructions and an error-free verdict form. He must, therefore, show that without this error, a reasonable jury could have found him guilty of provocation manslaughter. See id. This inquiry “excludes imaginative guesswork.” Id. ¶ 31. It asks whether “without the error, a reasonable jury could have 13  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court plausibly and intelligently” found Hippensteel guilty of provocation manslaughter. See id. To answer that question, we consider the entire trial record, including the evidence and the parties’ arguments. See id. ¶32 Because the jury did not find that Hippensteel premeditated the homicide or acted in self-defense, it had to determine whether his conduct constituted second degree murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide. We conclude that if the jury credited Hippensteel’s testimony and the corroborating evidence, see supra ¶¶ 28-29, it could have “plausibly and intelligently” found him guilty of provocation manslaughter. ¶33 Hippensteel’s case for provocation manslaughter is not strong. Several witnesses portrayed him as the aggressor, and his account shifted between his initial statement to the detective and his trial testimony. But the credibility of several witnesses was impeached or otherwise called into question because of their drug use at the time of the homicide and inconsistent statements. The jury could have believed Hippensteel’s account that Odle provoked him while rejecting his self-defense theory if it concluded that a reasonable person would not have believed that deadly physical force was immediately necessary to protect against Odle’s use of such force. See A.R.S. § 13-405(A)(2) (providing when deadly physical force is justified). If so, it still could have plausibly found that Hippensteel reasonably lost control and stabbed Odle upon being suddenly provoked by the raised knife, which cut Hippensteel when he blocked the knife with his bare hand. See State v. Harwood, 110 Ariz. 375, 379 (1974) (stating that “heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances”(quoting People v. Danielly, 202 P.2d 18, 27 (1949))); A.R.S. § 13-1101(4) (“‘Adequate provocation’ means conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a reasonable person of self-control.”); see also State v. Knoten, 555 S.E.2d 391, 396 (S.C. 2001) (finding evidence of adequate provocation where defendant and victim were “in a heated encounter and she had twice cut him with a knife”); State v. Craig, 33 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Mo. App. 2000) (finding evidence of adequate provocation where the victim confronted the defendant and displayed a knife). The instructional error, coupled with the faulty verdict form, therefore prejudiced Hippensteel by misinforming the jury on the law and impeding its decision whether to find him guilty of the less serious offense of provocation manslaughter. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 29. 14  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court ¶34 The State argues that because the Lua instruction required the jury to consider provocation manslaughter if it found the elements of second degree murder, and we presume the jury followed this instruction, the jury necessarily rejected provocation manslaughter before considering the incorrect LeBlanc instruction. Therefore, the State contends, Hippensteel has not shown that the LeBlanc instruction and verdict form prejudiced him. Our dissenting colleague makes a similar argument. See infra ¶¶ 59–66. We disagree. ¶35 Indeed, we generally presume that the jury follows the instructions given to it. See State v. Rushing, 573 P.3d 72, 83 ¶ 27 (Ariz. 2025). But here, the jury was explicitly told it must “consider all these instructions” and not “pick out one instruction or part of one and ignore the others.” We presume the jury followed that directive, meaning it considered both the Lua instruction and the LeBlanc instruction. It was not possible, however, to follow both because they directly conflicted. See Lua, 237 Ariz. at 306 ¶ 19 (noting that a jury following a LeBlanc instruction would logically never consider provocation manslaughter). This irreconcilable conflict overcomes any presumption that the jury followed only the correct instruction. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1985) (“A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied . . . .”). ¶36 The dissent contends that Francis is inapposite because it concerned a burden-shifting presumption rather than a sequencing conflict. See infra ¶ 60. We cite Francis not for its holding that the challenged presumption violated due process, but for a narrower point that survives the dissent’s distinction. See infra ¶ 60. The reviewing-court problem Francis identified arises whenever a jury receives two instructions that cannot both be followed. 471 U.S. at 322. That problem turns on the irreconcilability of the instructions, not on the particular legal doctrine that produced the conflict. ¶37 Returning to this record, a reasonable jury following the jury instructions and verdict form likely would not have meaningfully considered whether Hippensteel committed provocation manslaughter. The Lua instruction told the jury it must consider provocation manslaughter if it found all the elements of second degree murder, but the LeBlanc instruction told jurors they may consider provocation manslaughter only after acquitting on, or deadlocking over, second degree murder. Compounding that conflict, the definition of “adequate provocation” 15  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court appeared only in the LeBlanc instruction. It is theoretically possible that the jury found second degree murder and then independently rejected provocation manslaughter after consulting the definition of “adequate provocation” in the LeBlanc instruction while ignoring the conflicting parts of that instruction. Accepting that possibility, however, would be like the “imaginative guesswork” we eschewed in Escalante. 245 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 31. The verdict form also made this scenario less likely by directing jurors to stop once they found Hippensteel guilty of second degree murder. ¶38 The jury’s deliberations underscore the point. It noticed an unrelated error in the second degree murder and manslaughter portion of the verdict form and alerted the court. Specifically, the form referred to first degree murder in places where it should have referred to second degree murder and manslaughter. The judge corrected the form, brought the jury into the courtroom, and read the corrected language. After telling the jury that the new form would be provided to it, the judge concluded by saying, “[S]o as you go through your verdict form, you consider first-degree, second-degree, manslaughter, negligent homicide, so on and so forth as it relates to Count 1.” The court’s instruction to consider the homicide offenses in descending order compounded the prejudice. That directive, combined with the LeBlanc instruction’s requirement that the jury acquit on second degree murder before considering manslaughter, effectively foreclosed provocation manslaughter once the jury found Hippensteel guilty of second degree murder. A jury following both instructions, in good faith, had no occasion to reach provocation manslaughter at all. ¶39 The jury then returned to deliberations with a form that provided a place for it to return a verdict on second degree murder. But, assuming the jury was following the Lua instruction, it had no place to mark whether it found Hippensteel guilty, not guilty, or that it was unable to return a verdict for provocation manslaughter if the jury found the elements of second degree murder. And the form told jurors not to complete the manslaughter portion of the verdict form if they found Hippensteel guilty of second degree murder. Considering the conflict between the Lua instruction and the LeBlanc instruction, the omission of a distinct place in the verdict form for the jury to enter a verdict on provocation manslaughter if it found the elements of second degree murder, and the judge’s last instruction to consider each homicide in descending order of seriousness, it is likely that the jury never properly considered provocation manslaughter. 16  STATE v. HIPPENSTEEL Opinion of the Court ¶40 Our dissenting colleague concludes from the record that the jury necessarily followed the Lua instruction and rejected provocation manslaughter. See infra ¶¶ 65–66. He points to evidence contradicting Hippensteel’s account and highlights juror questions as showing skepticism about his credibility. See infra ¶¶ 69–79. But that evidence supports the verdict the jury returned does not answer the question Escalante asks: whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could have plausibly and intelligently returned a different verdict. See 245 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 31. ¶41 The dissent’s reliance on the aggravated assault acquittal illustrates the problem. The dissent reasons that because the acquittal could only rest on Abrigo’s testimony that she was not afraid of Hippensteel, the jury “demonstrably” credited her and therefore credited her broader testimony that Odle had no knife. See infra ¶¶ 75–76. But the acquittal does not compel that inference. Hippensteel testified that he never saw or spoke to Abrigo during or after hi