Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOSEPH ROBLEDO, Appellant. No. 1 CA-CR 25-0558 FILED 11-17-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2024-127652-001 The Honorable Suzanne Scheiner Marwil, Judge VACATED AND REMANDED COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Michael O’Toole Counsel for Appellee Michael J. Dew Attorney at Law, Phoenix Counsel for Appellant STATE v. ROBLEDO Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined. G A O N A, Judge: ¶1 Twelve days before his trial on drug and weapons charges, Anthony Robledo asked to represent himself. The superior court denied Robledo’s request after finding he didn’t have sufficient “knowledge and ability.” The jury then convicted Robledo on three counts. On appeal, Robledo argues—and the State agrees—the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to waive counsel and represent himself. ¶2 We appreciate the State’s concession and also agree. Because the record doesn’t support the superior court’s denial of Robledo’s request to represent himself, we vacate Robledo’s convictions and sentences and remand for a new trial. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 In June 2024, Phoenix police officers observed Anthony Robledo riding his bicycle in the street. The officers decided to stop Robledo because the front of his bike didn’t have a white light as required by A.R.S. § 28-817(A). Rather than stop, Robledo dropped his bicycle and ran. The officers pursued, detained, and searched Robledo. That search uncovered two firearms, methamphetamine, fentanyl, small baggies, and a digital scale. ¶4 At a pretrial conference twelve days before trial, the superior court denied Robledo’s request for a continuance to retain private counsel. The court also denied Robledo’s request for new court-appointed counsel. Robledo told the court he’d been “uncomfortable for months” with his attorney. The court reminded Robledo that he already received one continuance to get new counsel and denied the request because it was “too late.” ¶5 Robledo then asked to represent himself. The court said it wouldn’t continue the trial and it didn’t think self-representation was in Robledo’s best interest. Robledo said he still wanted to represent himself. 2 STATE v. ROBLEDO Decision of the Court ¶6 The court recessed so Robledo could read and fill out a waiver of counsel form. The court then asked Robledo if he fully read the waiver; he said yes. After Robledo signed the waiver, the court told him: “An attorney can be of great value in a criminal case, and there are serious dangers and disadvantages to representing yourself. Why do you want to do this?” Robledo responded: “I believe it’s my best . . . opportunity.” ¶7 The superior court engaged in a colloquy with Robledo to determine whether he could knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. When asked why he hadn’t raised his dissatisfaction with his attorney to the case-management judge earlier, Robledo said he wasn’t “exactly sure” which judges “handle what part of the case.” The court stated: “[I]t does concern me that you’re saying that you didn’t file a single motion to change counsel because you couldn’t keep track of who was your case management judge. So that would give me pause about giving you the ultimate responsibility to represent yourself and taking on a lot of other responsibilities relative to the case.” ¶8 The court cautioned Robledo about “the gravity of what [he] would be taking on” by representing himself, stated again that trial wouldn’t be continued, and explained to Robledo the possible sentences if he was convicted. ¶9 The court asked Robledo if he understood that he would have the sole responsibility for: asserting legal defenses, interviewing witnesses, doing his investigation, doing legal research, filing and arguing motions, examining and cross-examining witnesses, giving his opening statement at trial, and giving his final statement to the jury. Robledo asked: “And I’m expected to do that in 11 days, prepare that in 11 days?” The court said yes and asked if Robledo understood that; Robledo said he did. ¶10 Robledo also said he understood all of the following: he would be held to the same standard as an attorney in representing himself; he wouldn’t obtain a continuance; he wouldn’t be able to litigate any issues previously litigated by his counsel; his current attorney would be his advisory counsel; he wouldn’t be able to testify in narrative form and would have to write out questions for his advisory counsel to ask him; he could change his mind and request counsel again but he wouldn’t be allowed to proceed pro se again if he did so; he would be expected to appear at every court hearing and trial date; and the court would consider any non- appearance as a withdrawal of his right to represent himself. 3 STATE v. ROBLEDO Decision of the Court ¶11 After the colloquy, the court asked Robledo if he had any questions; Robledo said he didn’t. The court then asked Robledo: “And do you still wish, based on everything we’ve discussed, to give up your right to counsel and to represent yourself?” Robledo said yes. ¶12 The superior court denied Robledo’s request, expressing “significant concerns” about whether Robledo “actually has the knowledge and the ability to represent himself.” Specifically, the court emphasized Robledo’s statement that he didn’t know who his case management judge was and that he “failed to follow through on even the very simple tasks of engaging a private attorney.” Because Robledo didn’t do “those very basic things,” the court found he couldn’t make a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.” ¶13 The jury then convicted Robledo of one count of possession of dangerous drugs for sale, one count of possession of narcotic drugs for sale, and one count of misconduct involving weapons. The court sentenced Robledo to concurrent terms of 15.75 years on the drug counts and 10 years on the weapons charge. ¶14 Robledo timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, - 4033(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶15 On appeal, Robledo argues that the superior court erred in denying his request to represent himself. The State agrees the error was structural and Robledo is entitled to a new trial. Because we aren’t bound by the State’s concession, we must independently decide whether the superior court erred. State v. Lucas, 260 Ariz. 567, 578 ¶ 21 (App. 2025), as amended (Oct. 1, 2025). ¶16 We review the denial of a request for self-representation for abuse of discretion. State v. McLemore, 230 Ariz. 571, 575 ¶ 15 (App. 2012). “[A]n erroneous failure to accord a defendant his properly asserted right to represent himself when he is competent to waive counsel in a criminal case is structural error requiring reversal without a showing of prejudice.” Id. Structural error is error that affects “the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). ¶17 The United States and Arizona Constitutions guarantee the “fundamental right to waive counsel and represent oneself in a criminal 4 STATE v. ROBLEDO Decision of the Court trial.” LaCount v. Mroz in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 253 Ariz. 49, 52 ¶ 5 (App. 2022); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. These provisions reflect “a nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975). ¶18 To proceed pro se, a competent defendant must unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation. McLemore, 230 Ariz. at 576 ¶ 17. The invocation must be voluntary and knowing. State v. De Nistor, 143 Ariz. 407, 412 (1985). When a defendant’s request is untimely, the court has the discretion to grant or deny the request. Id. at 413. But when a defendant’s request is timely, the court’s discretion is more narrowly circumscribed; the court may deny a competent defendant’s motion only if it determines he made the request to delay or disrupt trial. McLemore, 230 Ariz. at 576 ¶ 17. ¶19 The record shows that Robledo unequivocally, voluntarily, and knowingly invoked his right to self-representation. Robledo restated his request several times during the pretrial hearing. He read and signed the waiver of counsel form. He acknowledged the “serious dangers and disadvantages to representing yourself.” And he articulated to the court his reasons for wanting to represent himself, responding affirmatively every time the court asked if he understood something. ¶20 Robledo’s request, made 12 days before the start of trial, was also timely. See State v. Weaver, 244 Ariz. 101, 105 ¶ 10 (App. 2018) (a motion for self-representation made before a jury is empaneled is timely). And the record doesn’t show Robledo was trying to disrupt or delay trial. Robledo said he would like more time to prepare, but he said he still wanted to represent himself even after the court made clear that it wouldn’t grant a continuance. ¶21 There’s also no reason to think that Robledo lacked the competence to represent himself. See McLemore, 230 Ariz. at 571 ¶ 17 (“[C]ompetence to waive the constitutional right to counsel is the primary restriction on the free-exercise of self-representation.”). “Self- representation at trial requires the mental capacity to minimally participate in the process as an advocate. An advocate must have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the dispute; formulate a defense strategy; and engage with the court, counsel, witnesses and, in some cases, the jury.” State v. Ibeabuchi, 248 Ariz. 412, 416 ¶ 16 (App. 2020). 5 STATE v. ROBLEDO Decision of the Court ¶22 The superior court asked Robledo if he has or ever had “any mental problems”; he said he didn’t. The court asked Robledo’s attorney if he had “ever gone through Rule 11,” and she responded: “Not that I’m aware of.” Nothing in the record suggests that Robledo lacked the competence to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. ¶23 Ultimately, the superior court didn’t base its denial on Robledo’s competence, the timeliness of the request, or a belief that he was trying to delay or disrupt the proceedings. Rather, the superior court denied Robledo’s request because he wasn’t able to do “very basic things” like request a continuance from the case management judge or engage a private attorney. Because of Robledo’s “failure to follow through” with these aspects of his proceedings, the court found that he didn’t have the “knowledge and the ability” to represent himself. But “a defendant’s technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to an assessment of whether there is an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel.” State v. Binder, 170 Ariz. 519, 520 (App. 1992). ¶24 The superior court made clear that it believed Robledo’s request was unwise: “[Y]ou have a right to represent yourself . . . we can go over all the colloquy, but I would tell you that just to cut to the chase, I do not think that’s a good idea for you . . . I don’t think that that would ultimately be in your best interest.” Whether the court thought the request unwise is irrelevant; once Robledo invoked his right to self-representation, the “fundamental question” is whether his “waiver of counsel was made in an intelligent, understanding and competent manner.” State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 146 (1967); see State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160 (1977) (court’s “protecting duty” pertains to “whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.”). ¶25 “At its core, the right to self-representation is grounded in the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty.” State v. Dunbar, 257 Ariz. 421, 427 ¶ 19 (2024) (cleaned up). The superior court erred in taking this choice away from Robledo without identifying a sufficient basis, and that error was structural. See id. at 427–28 ¶ 22 (the erroneous denial of a defendant’s right to self-representation is structural error). And when “structural error occurs . . . we automatically reverse the guilty verdict.” State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 552 ¶ 45 (2003). We thus vacate Robledo’s convictions and sentences and remand for a new trial. 6 STATE v. ROBLEDO Decision of the Court ¶26 Given our disposition of the case, we need not reach Robledo’s alternative argument that the superior court erred by rejecting his request for new counsel. CONCLUSION ¶27 We vacate Robledo’s convictions and resulting sentences and remand to the superior court for a new trial. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 7