Williamson v. Williamson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE In Re the Marriage of: SARA KATHERINE WILLIAMSON, Petitioner/Appellee, v. LEONARD AARON WILLIAMSON, Respondent/Appellant. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0104 FC FILED 10-30-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FN2023-005072 The Honorable Amanda M. Parker, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL DM Cantor Family Law Practice, Phoenix By Nicholas Walters, Amanda Rae Szpakowski Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Leonard Aaron Williamson, Phoenix Respondent/Appellant Pro Se  WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig joined. F O S T E R, Judge: ¶1 Leonard Williamson (“Husband”) appeals the superior court’s decree dissolving his marriage to Sara Williamson (“Wife”). Husband argues the court erred by accepting the business valuation of the expert appointed by the court for one marital business, dividing a second marital business, declining to assign Wife the debt from three loans, and finding no waste related to a third marital business. This Court affirms. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Husband and Wife married on September 24, 2016. During the marriage, the parties established three businesses1: (1) Williamson, LLC (“First LLC”); (2) a Turo rental car business and (3) Sara Williamson, LLC (“Second LLC”). Wife filed for dissolution on December 6, 2023, and she served Husband on December 13. The superior court held a one-day trial to determine how to split the community’s debts and assets, including the businesses and loans. ¶3 The superior court appointed an expert jointly retained by Husband and Wife to value the First LLC. The expert requested documents from Husband to assist in determining the value of the business, including payroll information and 1099 documentation. But Husband refused to turn them over. Despite Husband’s refusal to participate in the evaluation process, the expert valued the First LLC at $305,800. The superior court adopted this value. ¶4 Husband and Wife also jointly owned the Turo business. Husband managed and operated this business, including purchasing several cars through loans. The amounts owed on the loans exceeded the 1 While the parties shared additional businesses, Husband only raises issues with these three in his appeal. 2  WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court fair market value of the cars, creating negative equity. Husband depreciated the cars on his tax returns, receiving financial benefit. He also kept the profits of the rental business. And during discovery, Husband failed to disclose these profits or his tax benefit. Because Husband did not disclose the Turo profits or tax benefits, the superior court calculated the difference between the debt of the cars and their fair market value, the negative equity, and divided it between Husband and Wife. In addition, the court awarded Husband physical possession of the cars, all profits he took and the tax benefits he realized. ¶5 The parties also owned Second LLC. Husband and Wife took out a second mortgage to start the business but at the time of the parties’ dissolution there was no dispute that the business had no value. Though Husband claimed the mortgage constituted waste, Wife testified that Husband consented to taking out the loan. And Huband ultimately agreed to award the Second LLC to Wife as her sole and separate property without an equalization payment, after taking the opposite position throughout the litigation. Thus, the court awarded the Second LLC to Wife. ¶6 Finally, Husband sought to have the superior court allocate the balances of three personal loans he acquired during the marriage equally between the parties. Husband claimed he took on an $80,000 loan from his parents, a $10,000 loan from one friend and a $5,000 loan from another friend. Husband asserted that these loans were community debt. Husband provided documentation for these loans one month before trial, which showed he obtained them all before Wife filed for dissolution. During trial, Wife challenged the validity of the documents, noting that they lacked notarization, that she was unaware these loans were obtained during the marriage and that she believed Husband created the documents the month before trial. The superior court declined to allocate the loan amounts equally between Husband and Wife, finding Husband’s documentation lacked credibility. ¶7 Husband timely appealed the court’s decree. This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶8 Husband appeals on four grounds. First, Husband argues the superior court erred by accepting the expert’s valuation of the First LLC. Second, Husband disputes the court allocating the Turo business’s negative equity. Third, he asserts Wife committed waste by taking out a loan for Second LLC. Finally, Husband argues the court erroneously determined his 3  WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court loan documentation lacked credibility. This Court “defer[s] to the trial court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence.” Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). To the extent Husband asks this Court to reweigh evidence and reevaluate the credibility of testimony, this Court declines to do so. See Id. I. Evidence supports the valuation of the First LLC. ¶9 Husband contends the expert failed to consider that “the First LLC was] a pass-through entity with no hard assets” and that the expert erroneously “zero[ed] in on . . . [a] single year of abnormally high income.” Husband also argues the valuation was biased because the expert did not believe Husband was his client. Husband shows no error. ¶10 This Court reviews business valuations for abuse of discretion. Schickner v. Schickner, 237 Ariz. 194, 197, ¶ 13 (App. 2015). A trial court abuses its discretion when it “reaches a conclusion without considering the evidence . . . or the record fails to provide substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court “defer[s] to the trial court’s findings unless clearly erroneous.” Id. Only when a factual finding lacks substantial evidence is the finding clearly erroneous. Id. ¶11 First, while Husband points to other ways to value the First LLC, the existence of alternatives does not show an abuse of discretion when substantial evidence exists supporting the valuation. See Schickner, 237 Ariz. at 197, ¶ 13. Here, the expert explained his methodology and identified the documents he used to value the business. The superior court considered Husband’s contentions and concluded that he “did not meaningfully challenge Mr. Cantor’s valuation of [the] business.” Instead, the court noted that Husband focused on the amount of money in the First LLC’s accounts, rather than its value as a business. Though alternative paths exist to value a business, the court’s adoption of the expert’s value was reasonable. See Roden v. Roden, 190 Ariz. 407, 411 (App. 1997) (“While the evidence is conflicting, nothing in the record compels the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in accepting and rejecting evidence.”). Additionally, adopting Husband’s zero valuation counts only the hard assets and ignores intangible assets like goodwill. See Molloy v. Molloy, 158 Ariz. 64, 67 (App. 1988) (explaining “professional goodwill [is] . . . a community asset” with monetary value). ¶12 Beyond that, Husband’s contentious interactions with the expert during the litigation prevented the expert from adequately 4  WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court considering Husband’s position. Husband refused to turn over payroll and tax information necessary for the expert’s valuation. He insisted he turned over balance sheets, profit and loss statements and general ledgers numerous times, but then, as trial approached, informed the expert those documents never existed. If Husband wanted the expert to consider his position, he needed to supply evidence supporting that position, which Husband failed to do. The superior court did not err in considering all of this information when adopting the expert’s valuation. See Helland v. Helland, 236 Ariz. 197, 201, ¶ 21 (App. 2014) (explaining a family court is “free to accept or reject part or all of any expert’s opinion in determining the value of the business”). ¶13 The superior court considered and rejected Husband’s argument that the expert did not understand Husband was his client. The record includes reasonable evidence to support that conclusion. The expert provided a fair valuation of the business, which the court accepted as credible. That is not an abuse of discretion. See Celaya v. Rivero Quinteros, 261 Ariz. 323, 330 ¶ 9 (App. 2025) (declining the “invitation to reweigh the evidence and to substitute [this Court’s] own judgment in place of the [superior] court’s discretion”). II. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the negative equity of the Turo business. ¶14 Husband next argues that the superior court failed to comply with Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592 (App. 2017). Under Bobrow, a spouse who uses separate funds to pay community obligations after service of the petition is entitled to reimbursement. 241 Ariz. at 592. But the crux of Husband’s argument is not a failure to comply with Bobrow; rather, Husband disputes the way the trial court calculated his reimbursement. ¶15 Courts must “divide the community, joint tenancy and other property held in common equitably, though not necessarily in kind.” A.R.S. § 25-318(A). This Court reviews the apportionment of community property for “an abuse of discretion” and “consider[s] the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling . . . sustain[ing] that ruling if the evidence reasonably supports it.” Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 107, ¶ 2 (App. 2005). ¶16 Here, Husband did not produce the documents the court needed to value the business. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (a court divides equitably, not equally). The superior court could not determine Husband’s profits or his tax gains. Further, the court noted Husband primarily ran the 5  WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court Turo business, and Wife was not involved in it. Thus, because the outstanding car loans attached to the Turo business exceeded the value of the cars themselves, the court explained, the “cleanest approach” to divide the debt was by negative equity. The court awarded Husband the business, the cars and the business’s post-service profits. Meanwhile, Wife, who did not have any involvement in the business or access to the records, would be responsible for half the negative equity, subject to an offset for money Husband owed Wife from the division of other property. Equity always surveys the particular facts, and the facts here warranted dividing by negative equity. See Toth v. Toth, 190 Ariz. 218, 221 (1997) (explaining courts divide assets equitably according to “the facts of particular cases”). This division of the Turo business reasonably and equitably considered the particular facts of this case. The facts here warranted dividing the negative equity and the court did not abuse its discretion. See Toth, 190 Ariz. at 221. III. The evidence does not support a waste judgment. ¶17 Third, Husband contends the superior court erred in denying his waste claim because it did not consider the extent to which money “was wasted in 2023 on expenses not related to the marital home” and that Wife made “false[] . . . claims” during her testimony. ¶18 This Court reviews a waste determination for abuse of discretion. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346, ¶¶ 5–6. A court may compensate a spouse for another spouse’s waste by considering excessive or abnormal expenditures, concealment or fraudulent disposition of joint property when apportioning community property. A.R.S. § 25-318(C). A spouse “alleging abnormal or excessive expenditures . . . has the burden of making a prima facie showing of waste. It is then the burden of the spending spouse to go forward with evidence to rebut the showing of waste.” Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346–47, ¶ 7. Generally, if spouses jointly decide on disposing of property, a spouse cannot claim waste. See A.R.S. § 25-318(C). ¶19 Wife testified Husband consented to taking the second mortgage to start the Second LLC. Wife testified the parties used the mortgage to pay off credit card debt, other home improvements and to build a permanent horse structure beside the house. She claimed the parties recouped the balance of the mortgage upon the sale of the house. The Court found Wife’s testimony credible. Husband never testified in support of his waste claim and only challenged Wife’s testimony through two spreadsheets documenting Wife’s spending for the Second LLC. But that evidence does not explain how Wife committed waste and simply concluded there was “money wasted.” Husband also claimed Wife 6  WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court abandoned the business. However, Husband never supplied evidence supporting his contention, and Wife provided an alternative explanation for the loss of money. Here, the trial court found Wife more credible than Husband. When conflicting evidence exists, this Court defers to the trial court’s evidentiary findings. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13. ¶20 Husband also claims Wife lied when she testified that Husband used the funds from a second mortgage and that Husband made the decision to do so. However, Husband had the burden to show waste and failed to introduce any evidence to contradict Wife’s testimony. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 6 (spouse claiming waste has initial burden to prove it). The superior court found Wife credible, and this Court defers to such credibility findings. Cf. id. (deferring to the superior court’s factual finding that the Wife made a prima facie showing when she presented evidence her Husband withdrew funds without her knowledge). The record supports the superior court denying Husband’s waste claim. IV. Evidence supports the superior court’s credibility findings. ¶21 Finally, Husband contends that Wife should be responsible for half of the loans he took out during the marriage from his parents and his two friends. ¶22 Courts presume that debt incurred during a marriage is a community obligation. A.R.S. § 25-211; Hammett v. Hammett, 247 Ariz. 556, 562, ¶ 29 (App. 2019). Consequently, a spouse typically must take half of the debt upon dissolution of the community subject to any offset. Hammett, 247 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 29; A.R.S. § 25-318(A). ¶23 Here, substantial evidence supports the superior court’s finding that the loan documentation lacked credibility. During approximately two years of litigation, Husband failed to disclose any documentation supporting the loans, instead waiting until a month before trial to do so. The loan documents he produced lacked notarization or any other indication of verifiability. Wife testified that she believed that Husband had manufactured the loan documents for trial and Husband failed to present any other evidence in support of his claim. The superior court did not err in finding the loan documentation lacked credibility. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 14 (explaining this Court affirms the trial court’s findings if any reasonable evidence supports it); Lehn v. Al- Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284, ¶ 20 (App. 2019) (“On appeal, [this court does] not reweigh the evidence but defers to the family court’s 7  WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON Decision of the Court determinations of witness credibility and the weight given to conflicting evidence.”). V. Attorneys’ fees ¶24 Wife requests attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. §§ 12-349(A) and 25-324. After considering the record, the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken, and their financial resources, this Court denies the request. CONCLUSION ¶25 Affirmed. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 8