bonitas/best v. Olsen
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket1 CA-CV 25-0894
JudgeD. Andrew Gaona
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
BONITAS CASITAS, LLC, Plaintiff/CounteDefendant/Appellant,
v.
ROBERT OLSEN, et al., Defendants/CounterClaimants/Appellees.
GREGORY BEST, CounterDefendant/Appellant
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0894
FILED 11-19-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2020-002556
The Honorable John L. Blanchard, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Ernst Brown & Draper, PLLC, Phoenix
By Joshua M. Ernst
Counsel for Plaintiff/CounterDefendant/Appellant
Gregory Best, Phoenix
CounterDefendant/Appellant
Law Offices of David S. Mayes, Sherman Oaks, CA
By David S. Mayes
Counsel for Defendants/CounterClaimants/Appellees
BONITAS/BEST v. OLSEN
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
G A O N A, Judge:
¶1 Bonitas Casitas, LLC and Gregory Best appeal the superior
court’s judgment voiding a warranty deed and a correction deed and
clearing those deeds from the records of the Maricopa County Recorder’s
Office. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 This case involves competing deeds to property in Phoenix
(“Phoenix Property”). Robert Olsen claims title to the Phoenix Property
through a quitclaim deed from his father that he recorded with the
Maricopa County Recorder’s Office in 2015 (“2015 Quitclaim Deed”).
Bonitas claims title to the Phoenix Property based on a warranty deed
executed by Olsen’s father to Bonitas in 2019 (“2019 Bonitas Warranty
Deed”).
¶3 Bonitas sued Olsen in 2020 for violating A.R.S. § 33-420(A) by
falsely recording two documents: (1) a special warranty deed (“2019 Olsen
Special Warranty Deed”) that conveyed the Phoenix Property from Olsen
to the Robert Olsen Property Trust (“Trust”) and (2) a deed of trust
encumbering the Phoenix Property. Bonitas alleged that the 2015 Quitclaim
Deed listed the address of a property in Seligman (“Seligman Property”)
and thus didn’t convey title of the Phoenix Property to Olsen despite
attaching a warranty deed to Olsen’s father with the Phoenix Property’s
legal description. Bonitas sought monetary damages under A.R.S. § 33-
420(A), and also requested judgment to clear title in its prayer for relief.
¶4 Olsen and the Trust counterclaimed against Bonitas and
Gregory Best, a business associate of Bonitas’ sole principal. The
counterclaim alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-420(A) for the false recording
of two documents: (1) the 2019 Bonitas Warranty Deed and (2) a correction
deed Best filed on behalf of Bonitas (“2020 Correction Deed”) that
purported to correct the 2015 Quitclaim Deed by replacing the legal
description of the Phoenix Property with the legal description of the
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BONITAS/BEST v. OLSEN
Decision of the Court
Seligman Property. Olsen acknowledged that the 2015 Quitclaim Deed
misstated the common address of the Phoenix Property to be the address
for the Seligman Property but alleged it contained the correct legal
description of the Phoenix Property. Olsen also requested the superior court
clear title under A.R.S. § 33-420(B) by invalidating the 2019 Bonitas
Warranty Deed and the 2020 Correction Deed. Olsen also alleged abuse of
process and requested attorneys’ fees.
¶5 Olsen and the Trust moved for summary judgment on
Bonitas’ complaint and for partial summary judgment on their own A.R.S.
§ 33-420(B) counterclaim to clear title. In March 2023, the superior court
granted Olsen’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Bonitas’ claim
under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). As the court concluded, Bonitas wasn’t an owner
or beneficial title holder at the time Olsen recorded the 2015 Quitclaim Deed
and thus couldn’t seek relief under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). The court noted that
Bonitas didn’t allege a violation of A.R.S. § 33-420(B) to clear title and didn’t
make a claim under A.R.S. § 12-1102 to determine and quiet title. The court
then granted Olsen’s motion for partial summary judgment to clear title
under A.R.S. § 33-420(B) by invalidating the 2019 Bonitas Warranty Deed
and the 2020 Correction Deed.
¶6 The lawsuit continued as to the remaining claims. In 2023, the
Trust sold the Phoenix Property to Tamarindo Investments, LLC. In June
2024, Olsen moved for entry of judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 54(b) and applied for attorneys’ fees. The superior court
denied entry of Rule 54(b) judgment and declined to order a piecemeal
award of attorneys’ fees given the remaining unadjudicated claims.
¶7 Tamarindo’s counsel then filed a notice of limited scope
representation. Tamarindo moved to substitute as a party for the Trust and
requested a final order of adjudicated claims.
¶8 The superior court granted the motion to substitute and
dismissed all unadjudicated claims. Bonitas moved for reconsideration and
to amend the complaint to implead Tamarindo; the court denied both
motions. The superior court entered final judgment under Rule 54(c), which
(1) formally substituted Tamarindo as the transferee of the Trust, (2)
dismissed Bonitas’ complaint against Olsen with prejudice, (3) ordered the
2019 Bonitas Warranty Deed and the 2020 Correction Deed invalid and
void, and (4) ordered those deeds cleared from the records of the Maricopa
County Recorder’s Office.
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BONITAS/BEST v. OLSEN
Decision of the Court
¶9 Bonitas moved for a new trial, which the superior court
denied. Bonitas and Best both filed notices of appeal.
¶10 We have jurisdiction over Bonitas’ and Best’s timely appeals
under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) and (A)(5).
DISCUSSION
I. The Superior Court Didn’t Err in its Summary Judgment Rulings
Related to A.R.S. § 33-420.
¶11 Bonitas and Best challenge the superior court’s summary
judgment rulings under A.R.S. § 33-420. We review de novo the superior
court’s grant of summary judgment and review the facts in the light most
favorable to Bonitas and Best, against whom the superior court granted
judgment. See Gallery Cmty. Ass’n v. K. Hovnanian at Gallery, LLC, 262 Ariz.
543, 546 ¶ 8 (2026).
¶12 Section 33-420(A) provides for monetary damages for the
wrongful recording of a document asserting an interest in, lien, or
encumbrance against real property. Section 33-420(B) provides a
mechanism to clear title to the real property for a wrongful recording of a
false or fraudulent document. Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 233 Ariz. 22,
27 ¶ 19 (App. 2013). Both subsection A and subsection B of A.R.S. § 33-420
permit causes of action brought only by the “owner or beneficial title
holder” of the real property. An owner or beneficial title holder includes
“all persons or entities holding legal or beneficial title to property.” In re
Estate of Olson, 223 Ariz. 441, 446 ¶ 23 (App. 2010); Hatch Co. Contracting,
Inc. v. Ariz. Bank, 170 Ariz. 553, 556 (App. 1991) (a beneficial title holder can
include a beneficiary under a deed of trust).
¶13 Bonitas sought damages under A.R.S. § 33-420(A) for
wrongful recording, arguing that after Olsen’s father deeded Bonitas the
Phoenix Property, Olsen and the Trust wrongfully recorded the 2019 Olsen
Special Warranty Deed and the 2019 deed of trust. Bonitas also sought to
“clear title.” To prevail on its A.R.S. § 33-420(A) damages claim, and its
presumed clear-title claim under A.R.S. § 33-420(B),1 Bonitas needed to
1 The superior court found that Bonitas didn’t allege a violation of A.R.S. §
33-420(B). Bonitas contends this finding was error because it properly
brought a cause of action under A.R.S. § 33-420(B) to clear title to the
Phoenix Property. Though the body of Bonitas’ complaint doesn’t state a
claim under A.R.S. § 33-420(B), the prayer for relief does request a judgment
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BONITAS/BEST v. OLSEN
Decision of the Court
prove that it was the “owner” or “beneficial title holder” of the Phoenix
Property at the time those two deeds were recorded in 2019. A.R.S. § 33-
420(A)–(B). But Bonitas failed to show a disputed issue of material fact on
that issue.
¶14 The 2015 Quitclaim Deed’s recording gave notice to all
persons, including Bonitas, of that deed’s existence. See A.R.S. § 33-416. And
regardless of the apparent mistake in the 2015 Quitclaim Deed (which
stated a common address for the Seligman Property but attached a deed
with the legal description for the Phoenix Property), a recorded quitclaim
deed is presumptively valid. See A.R.S. § 33-412(A); Merrifield v. Merrifield,
95 Ariz. 152, 153–55 (1963) (a quitclaim deed that is signed by the grantor,
delivered to the grantee, and duly recorded shows prima facie title in the
grantee).
¶15 In its complaint, Bonitas didn’t seek to invalidate or void the
2015 Quitclaim Deed. It also couldn’t clear title under A.R.S. § 33-420(B)
because Bonitas wasn’t the owner of the Phoenix Property when Olsen
recorded the 2015 Quitclaim Deed. SWC Baseline & Crismon Investors, L.L.C.
v. Augusta Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 228 Ariz. 271, 280 ¶ 25 (App. 2011). And
although the parties vigorously debated the Phoenix Property’s ownership,
Bonitas didn’t file a quiet title action under A.R.S. §§ 12-1101 to -1104.
Bonitas told the superior court that it wasn’t seeking relief under those
statutes. But actions to determine and quiet title must be adjudicated in a
formal quiet title action. See Hulsebus v. McConnell, 46 Ariz. 371, 375 (1935).
The function of a cause of action under A.R.S. § 33-420(B) is fundamentally
different than that under A.R.S. § 12-1101. A.R.S. § 33-420(B) permits the
superior court to clear title to property of a wrongfully recorded document.
See Sitton v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 233 Ariz. 215, 218 ¶ 13 (App. 2013);
Stauffer, 233 Ariz. at 27 ¶ 19. Section 12-1101, by contrast, permits a court to
“determine and quiet title to real property.” A.R.S. § 12-1101(A) (emphasis
added); see Cook v. Town of Pinetop-Lakeside, 232 Ariz. 173, 176 ¶ 13 (App.
2013). Without determining and quieting title to the Phoenix Property in a
formal quiet title action, Bonitas couldn’t prove it was an owner or
beneficial title holder of the Phoenix Property in 2019 to prevail on its A.R.S.
§ 33-420(A) or (B) claims.
¶16 What’s more, other public agencies have acknowledged the
validity of the 2015 Quitclaim Deed as transferring title of the Phoenix
to “clear title.” To decide this appeal, we presume Bonitas properly pled
and pursued a cause of action under A.R.S. § 33-420(B).
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BONITAS/BEST v. OLSEN
Decision of the Court
Property to Olsen. The record shows that the Maricopa County Recorder’s
Office identified the 2015 Quitclaim Deed in the title history of the Phoenix
Property as transferring the property from father to son. The Maricopa
County Assessor also recognized the 2019 Olsen Special Warranty Deed as
superior to the 2019 Bonitas Deed. And the City of Phoenix cited Olsen, as
the title holder, several times in 2018.
¶17 With Olsen’s 2015 Quitclaim Deed remaining unchallenged,
Olsen, and then the Trust, were the record owners of the Phoenix Property
in 2019 when Bonitas and Best recorded their deeds. Olsen and the Trust
could therefore proceed on their A.R.S. § 33-420(B) claim. Because Olsen
and the Trust provided evidence that Bonitas wrongfully recorded the 2019
Bonitas Warranty Deed and that Best wrongfully recorded the 2020
Correction Deed, the superior court properly granted summary judgment
to Olsen and the Trust under A.R.S. § 33-420(B) and properly cleared the
land records of the two wrongfully recorded deeds.
¶18 Bonitas also argues the superior court erred in finding that its
action would still be barred by the statute of limitations even if it properly
amended its complaint to add claims under A.R.S. § 33-420(B) or A.R.S. §
12-1102. Given our resolution of this case, we need not address Bonitas’
argument about the statute of limitations.
II. The Superior Court Didn’t Err in Permitting Tamarindo’s
Substitution.
¶19 Bonitas and Best argue the superior court erred in permitting
Tamarindo to substitute as transferee of the Trust to finalize the Rule 54(c)
judgment. We review the court’s decision to grant a substitution motion
under Rule 25(c) for abuse of discretion. See Luxliner P.L. Export, Co. v.
RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 71–72 (3d Cir. 1993) (a decision under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), which is substantially similar to our Rule
25(c), is “generally within the district court’s discretion.”).
¶20 Rule 25(c) permits the superior court to order the transferee
of a party’s interest to be substituted in the action. Tamarindo bought the
Phoenix Property from the Trust and then sought a signed order clearing
the title after the superior court granted summary judgment to Olsen and
the Trust and voided the 2019 Bonitas Warranty Deed and the 2020
Correction Deed. The superior court didn’t err in substituting Tamarindo
because the record shows that the Trust transferred its interest in the
property to Tamarindo.
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BONITAS/BEST v. OLSEN
Decision of the Court
CONCLUSION
¶21 We affirm and grant Tamarindo’s request for reasonable
attorney fees and costs under A.R.S. § 33-420(B) upon its compliance with
Arizona Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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