State v. Didur
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket1 CA-CR 26-0109
JudgeMichael S. Catlett
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
NICHOLAS DIDUR, Appellant.
Nos. 1 CA-CR 26-0109
1 CA-CR 26-0110
1 CA-CR 26-0119
(Consolidated)
FILED 11-16-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Nos. CR2015-103871-001
CR2015-120116-001
CR2015-156998-001
The Honorable Kristin Culbertson, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Johnny Jacquez
Counsel for Appellee
Rising Phoenix Law Group PLLC, Phoenix
By Andrew C. Long
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. DIDUR
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
C A T L E T T, Judge:
¶1 Nicholas Didur (“Didur”) appeals the denial of his requests
to set aside his convictions in three previous cases and restore his civil
rights, including his right to possess a firearm. We reverse the court’s
refusal to restore Didur’s right to possess a firearm in his first case, but we
otherwise affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Didur committed drug offenses in July 2014, January 2015,
and May 2015, which the State charged in three separate cases. In 2016,
Didur pleaded guilty to four felonies and a misdemeanor across his three
cases. The superior court accepted Didur’s pleas on the same day,
designated each offense as non-dangerous, and sentenced him to 2.5 years
in prison and 3 years’ probation. By the end of 2021, Didur served his
sentences, including probation, and paid all restitution.
¶3 In June 2023, Didur moved to set aside his convictions, obtain
a certificate of second chance, and restore his civil rights, including his right
to possess a firearm. Didur’s application emphasized his stable career,
family life, and sobriety, stating he was “rehabilitated.” The court reviewed
Didur’s motions and determined he met the initial eligibility requirements
to obtain the relief requested. But the court denied Didur’s requests after
referencing that he had three separate cases, that he recently completed
probation in 2021, and that he needed to “maintain a crime free lifestyle for
an extended period” before the court would set aside his convictions. The
court denied Didur’s request to restore his civil rights because doing so was
“not in the public’s best interest.”
¶4 In August 2024, Didur again moved to set aside his
convictions and restore his rights. The court denied those motions for the
same reasons it gave for denying his first set of motions. The court also
noted it had been less than a year since the court denied his previous
motions.
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STATE v. DIDUR
Decision of the Court
¶5 In December 2025, Didur moved a third time to set aside his
convictions and restore his civil rights. Didur emphasized his faith and
service to others as additional reasons why the court should grant relief. In
his January 2015 case, Didur alternatively requested that the court restore
his right to possess a firearm under § 13-907(A). In his two other two cases,
Didur requested that the court restore his civil rights and right to possess a
firearm under A.R.S. § 13-908(A) and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
(“Rule”) 30.1(b).
¶6 The court denied Didur’s third request to set aside his
convictions in all three cases or restore his civil rights in two cases, finding
“[i]t is not in the public’s best interest given [Didur’s] criminal history” and
citing his other convictions. But the court granted Didur’s request to restore
his civil rights in the January 2015 case, except for the right to possess or
own a firearm. The court noted that case appeared to be the “first case in
time” and that “restoration of rights is mandatory for a first felony offense”
but “[r]estoration of firearm rights is discretionary for this date of offense.”
The court denied Didur’s request to restore his right to possess a firearm
because the court did not restore his rights in the two other cases and
denying Didur’s request was “appropriate because [of] the number of
overall offenses.”
¶7 Initially, Didur moved for reconsideration. Then, he timely
appealed. Didur later requested that we stay his appeal and revest
jurisdiction in the superior court to decide his motion for reconsideration.
We granted that request. But the superior court denied reconsideration.
¶8 Didur timely appealed the court’s orders denying his third set
of motions. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(3).
DISCUSSION
¶9 Didur argues the superior court abused its discretion by
refusing to set aside his convictions, provide certificates of second chance,
and restore his civil rights. We review the court’s denial to set aside a
conviction or restore civil rights for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bernini,
233 Ariz. 170, 173 ¶ 8 (App. 2013); State v. Nixon, 242 Ariz. 242, 245 ¶ 10
(App. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court commits a legal
error. State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 12 (2006). We interpret statutes de novo.
Nixon, 242 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 5.
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STATE v. DIDUR
Decision of the Court
I. A.R.S. § 13-905(C)
¶10 Didur argues the superior court abused its discretion by not
applying the § 13-905(C) factors to his motion to set aside and request for
certificates of second chance. As relevant here, an individual convicted of
a criminal offense “may apply to the court to have the judgment of guilt set
aside” after completing “the conditions of probation or sentence and
discharge[.]” A.R.S. § 13-905(A). Subsection 13-905(C) lists seven factors
the court “shall consider” when deciding whether to set aside a conviction.
Some of those factors include: “[t]he nature and circumstances of the
offense,” “prior or subsequent convictions,” “[t]he length of time that has
elapsed since the competition of the applicant’s sentence,” and “[a]ny other
factor that is relevant to the application.” A.R.S. § 13-905(C). If the court
grants the motion, the court must include a certificate of second chance if
the person was convicted of a misdemeanor or, if the person was convicted
of a felony, the required number of years have passed since the person
fulfilled the conditions of probation or sentence. A.R.S. § 13-905(K).
¶11 Rule 29.6(a) lists seven similar factors the court must consider
when deciding a motion to set aside a judgment. When denying a request
“the court . . . must state the reasons for the denial in writing and on the
record.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 29.6(b). If the request is denied, the individual
“may file a new application after satisfying all requirements or after
resolving any other reason for denial.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 29.6(c).
¶12 The court denied Didur’s third request to set aside his
convictions after concluding that “[i]t is not in the public’s best interest
given [Didur’s] criminal history.” Didur argues this reason was insufficient
when the court’s previous denials focused on how much time had passed
since his convictions. But nothing in § 13-905 or Rule 29.6 suggests the court
is limited to its prior reasoning when deciding a subsequent request. The
opposite is true. By including “[a]ny other factor that is relevant to the
application,” the statute requires the court to consider the totality of the
circumstances when deciding whether to set aside a conviction. See A.R.S.
§ 13-905(C). True, Rule 29.6(c) instructs that an individual may refile an
application after “resolving any other reason for denial.” Still, the court
remains the arbiter of whether the individual, all things considered, is
entitled to relief.
¶13 Contrary to Didur’s assertion, the court did not give a
materially different reason when denying his third application. Didur’s
“criminal history” can include the number of offenses committed, the
seriousness of those offenses, and the length of time since they occurred.
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STATE v. DIDUR
Decision of the Court
Thus, Didur’s assertion that “the court’s orders no longer evaluated
whether the additional time satisfied the concern it had previously
identified” is unavailing. How much time elapsed since a crime was
committed is inherent when considering a person’s “criminal history.” The
court applied a more holistic approach, rather than simply focusing on how
much time had elapsed since Didur’s convictions.
¶14 Didur asserts that the court treated his multiple convictions
as “automatically dispositive” and as creating a “categorical bar” leaving
him with no path for relief. But “[w]e assume trial courts know the law in
the absence of evidence to the contrary,” and there is no evidence that the
superior court treated any one factor as dispositive. State v. Espinoza, 229
Ariz. 421, 428 ¶ 29 (App. 2012). We also see no evidence that the court
permanently denied Didur relief or failed to consider the factors listed in
§ 13-905(C) and Rule 29.6(b). Because Didur has not demonstrated that the
court relied on incorrect facts or law, he has shown no abuse of discretion.
II. A.R.S. § 13-907
¶15 Next, Didur argues the court erred by refusing to restore his
right to possess a firearm in his January 2015 offense under § 13-907(A)
because he completed his sentence and the court found it was his first
offense. The State concedes Didur’s January 2015 offense was his first, so
the court should have automatically restored his right to possess a firearm
for that offense. We agree.
¶16 While restoring civil rights is generally discretionary, there is
an exception for a first offense. State v. Key, 128 Ariz. 419, 421 (App. 1981).
Any individual “who has not previously been convicted of a felony offense
shall automatically” have “any civil rights” restored after “completion of
probation” or “absolute discharge” and “pay[ing] all victim restitution[.]”
A.R.S. § 13-907(A). This automatic restoration includes the right to possess
a firearm unless the offense was dangerous or serious. A.R.S. § 13-907(C).
An individual need not file a request to restore their civil rights for their
first offense. A.R.S. § 13-907(A). But if they do, “the court shall grant” that
request. A.R.S. § 13-907(A).
¶17 Here, the court listed Didur’s 2015 offense as non-dangerous
and no statute designated it as serious. See A.R.S. § 13-706(F)(1) (listing
serious offenses). By the end of 2021, Didur served his sentence, including
probation, and paid all restitution. The court found the January 2015 case
was the “first case in time” and restored Didur’s civil rights, except for his
right to possess a firearm. The court reasoned that restoring Didur’s right
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STATE v. DIDUR
Decision of the Court
to possess a firearm was “discretionary for this date of offense.” But Didur
was entitled to have his right to possess a firearm restored after the
legislature amended A.R.S. § 13-907 in September 2022. See State v. Danner,
261 Ariz. 115, 117–19 ¶¶ 6–18 (App. 2025). Because Didur included a
request to restore his right to possess a firearm, § 13-907(A) required the
court to grant that request for Didur’s 2015 offense.
III. A.R.S. § 13-908
¶18 Lastly, Didur argues the court abused its discretion by
refusing to restore his civil rights in his other two cases. “[A] person who
has previously been convicted of a felony . . . may apply to the superior
court to have the person’s civil rights restored.” A.R.S. § 13-908(A). As
relevant here, “[t]he restoration of civil rights is in the discretion of the
judicial officer.” A.R.S. § 13-908(D); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 30.6(a). The burden
is on the applicant to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that they
are “not likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety” and
that the “requested relief is not contrary to the public interest.” Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 30.6(c). If the court denies the request “its order must state the
reasons for the denial in writing[.]” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 30.6(e).
¶19 Didur argues the court gave an insufficient reason for
denying his requests. But A.R.S. § 13-908 does not limit the reasons for
denial; it instead grants the court broad discretion. A.R.S. § 13-908(D); see
also Key, 128 Ariz. at 421–22 (“[T]he considerations which form the basis of
a judge’s decision to restore a person’s civil rights pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-
908, may differ substantially from the considerations which form the basis
of a determination to vacate a defendant’s conviction[.]”); Ariz. R. Crim. P.
30.6(c).
¶20 Here, the court denied Didur’s request to restore his civil
rights because “[i]t is not in the public’s best interest given [Didur’s]
criminal history.” Didur argues the court “did not identify any evidence”
that he poses a danger to public safety or why his rehabilitation evidence
was insufficient. But the superior court need not identify specific evidence
supporting its conclusion. Instead, Didur must present clear and
convincing evidence that he is no longer a danger to public safety and that
his requested relief is not contrary to the public interest. Didur has not
established that, based on the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable
person could conclude (as the superior court did) that he did not yet meet
his burden. The court did not abuse its discretion.
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STATE v. DIDUR
Decision of the Court
CONCLUSION
¶21 We affirm the denial of Didur’s motions to set aside his
convictions in all three cases and the denial of the restoration of his civil
rights in the July 2014 and May 2015 cases. We reverse the order refusing
to restore Didur’s right to possess a firearm stemming from the January
2015 case.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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