Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE DEREK A. KENDALL, DANIELLE CAPARN TUTOKEY, Petitioners, v. ELOISE CAPARN, NICOLE CAPARN POA, Respondents. No. 1 CA-SA 26-0386 FILED 11-10-2026 Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. LC2026-000407-001 DT The Honorable Jillian Francis, Judge JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED COUNSEL Derek A. Kendall, Chandler Petitioner Danielle Caparn Tutokey, Chandler Petitioner Hull Holliday & Holliday PLC, Phoenix By Denise M. Holliday, Kevin W. Holliday, Matthew Schlabach Counsel for Respondents KENDALL, et al. v. CAPARN, et al. Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined. J A C O B S, Judge: ¶1 The San Marcos Justice Court entered a judgment of eviction against Derek Kendall and Danielle Caparn Tutokey (“Petitioners”) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. They appealed to the superior court on Monday, April 20, 2026. The superior court refused to hear their appeal, ruling that the five calendar day deadline in Superior Court Rule of Appellate Procedure - Civil (“SCRAP”) 4(a) meant Petitioners had to appeal by Sunday, April 19, 2026. Petitioners ask us to exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction to compel the superior court to hear their appeal, arguing SCRAP 1(g) extends all deadlines that fall on a weekend to the next day court is open. They are right, so we exercise our discretionary jurisdiction and grant relief. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(7), (8). BACKGROUND ¶2 Petitioners live in Chandler, Arizona. On Tuesday, April 14, 2026, after a hearing, the justice court entered an eviction judgment against them. They appealed on April 20, 2026, which was the Monday following the fifth day after the eviction judgment. See SCRAP 4(a), 1(g). The superior court dismissed their appeal as untimely under SCRAP 4(a), and declined to reconsider that dismissal when Petitioners cited SCRAP 1(g) to the court. The constable evicted Petitioners Kendall and Tutokey on October 7, 2026. DISCUSSION I. We Exercise Our Discretionary Special Action Jurisdiction. ¶3 Petitioners ask us to exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction to review and reverse the superior court’s orders. The landlord doesn’t oppose our exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction. We exercise our discretionary jurisdiction for two reasons: (1) they were recently evicted, so promptness in comparison to a conventional appeal matters; and (2) no rule of law supports the decision at issue. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(7), (8). 2 KENDALL, et al. v. CAPARN, et al. Decision of the Court II. The Superior Court Erred in Ruling It Lacked Jurisdiction Over the Appeal Because When the Deadline for an Act Falls on a Weekend or Holiday, the Deadline Is the Next Day Court Is Open. ¶4 We review the superior court’s orders ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over Petitioners’ appeal de novo. Sanchez-Ravuelta v. Yavapai Cnty., 259 Ariz. 517, 524 ¶ 26 (2025) (“[A] question of appellate jurisdiction is an issue of law that is subject to de novo review.”) (cleaned up). We likewise review the interpretation of court rules de novo. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Higgins, 251 Ariz. 282, 284 ¶ 7 (2021)). ¶5 Petitioners argue the superior court committed a legal error when it ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over their appeal. They argue that SCRAP 1(g) moved their deadline to appeal from April 19 (Sunday) to April 20 (Monday). Their landlord agrees that SCRAP 1(g) applies. The landlord declines to defend the superior court’s orders, stating “[t]he basis for the superior court’s initial ruling and order denying the motion for rehearing in light of [SCRAP] 1(g) is unclear. Landlord does not otherwise represent the signing judge and does not advocate on the court’s behalf.” Where one party declines to defend an appealed ruling, as here, we can take that as a confession of error. See Tiller v. Tiller, 98 Ariz. 156, 157 (1965) (“[T]his [c]ourt will assume that failure to file an answering brief is a confession of reversible error on the part of the appellee.”) Here, we take landlord’s brief as a confession of reversible error. We nonetheless write to explain the proper construction of SCRAP 4(a) and 1(g). A. In Arizona’s Court Rules, Including the SCRAP, When a Deadline Would Fall on a Weekend or Holiday, the Deadline Carries Forward to the Next Court Day. ¶6 The Superior Court Rules of Appellate Procedure - Civil, like other sets of rules issued by the Arizona Supreme Court that relate to civil matters, have provisions governing time. They all work the same: when something is due to be done over a weekend or holiday, the time period that would have concluded over the weekend or on the holiday carries forward to the next day. ¶7 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(3) and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 4(a)(3) both provide identically, in computing time periods, that the last day of a period counts within the time limit, “unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. When the last day is excluded, the period runs until the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(3); Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 4(a)(3). 3 KENDALL, et al. v. CAPARN, et al. Decision of the Court ¶8 Arizona Rule of Procedure for Eviction Actions 3(d) is indistinguishable. It provides that the last day of the period is included, “unless the last day is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday.” Ariz. R.P. Evic. A. 3(d). ¶9 This design is sufficiently common that other sets of rules borrow it. Arizona Probate Rule 4(a)(1) borrows from the civil rules to the extent they are not inconsistent, thus importing the time provision in Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a). Ariz. R. Prob. P. 4(a)(1). And Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 5(a) likewise imports the substance of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a). See ARCAP 5(a). ¶10 Rule 1(g) in the SCRAP is just like these. It provides that: In computing time limits, the “last day” or “deadline” means that when the last day of any period of time, or the deadline for completing an act prescribed herein falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or day when the court is closed, the “last day” or “deadline” shall be the next day court is open. SCRAP 1(g). We next apply the rule to this case. B. The Superior Court Erred by Deciding That the Use of “Calendar Days” in SCRAP 4 Means the Deadline for Appeal, Which Would Have Fallen on Sunday, April 19, Didn’t Carry Over to Monday, April 20. ¶11 When applying a rule, we begin with its plain language. See State v. Solano, 257 Ariz. 10, 13 ¶ 10 (App. 2024). SCRAP 1(g) indicates that it applies “when the last day of any period of time . . . falls on a . . . Sunday,” as here. SCRAP 1(g). “Any” is a modifier that indicates without limitation — it includes all possible members of the set. See U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”); see also City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Electronics, Inc., 242 Ariz. 139, 144 ¶ 17 (2017) (“[T]he word ‘any’ is broadly inclusive.”). Thus, SCRAP 1(g) applies to all cases in which a time period falls on a Sunday, including this one. And when SCRAP 1(g) applies to a deadline, that deadline is moved to “the next day court is open.” SCRAP 1(g). Thus, the plain language of the rule shows that Petitioners had a deadline that fell on Sunday, April 19 — which meant the rule moved the deadline to the next day court was open — here, Monday, April 20. For this reason, the superior court erred in deciding it lacked jurisdiction over their appeal, filed on Monday, April 20. 4 KENDALL, et al. v. CAPARN, et al. Decision of the Court ¶12 The superior court explained, while denying Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, that it believed the use of “calendar days” in SCRAP 4(a)’s appellate deadline meant that SCRAP 1(g) didn’t apply. This reflects an incorrect understanding of how counting works in court rules. A comment on a structurally identical rule, Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 6, illustrates this point. See Comment, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(c). That Comment explained how a five-day period worked in conjunction with weekend days. It explained that when adding five days to a due date for mailing, “[i]ntermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are included in counting these added five days.” Id. In other words, counting those five calendar days means you don’t skip over weekends — they are included. ¶13 But including those calendar days isn’t the end of the story. Once they are counted, the Comment directs, “If the fifth day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to act is the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” That’s how it works here, too. Following SCRAP 4(a)’s “calendar days” language tells us that Petitioners’ five calendar days would elapse on Sunday, April 19. But we have to read the SCRAP as a whole, meaning that SCRAP 4(a) is meant to work with SCRAP 1(g). See In re D.S., 262 Ariz. 91, 94 ¶ 11 (App. 2026) (explaining that we read rules “in conjunction with each other and harmonize them whenever possible.” (quoting Magee v. Olson, 260 Ariz. 370, 373 ¶ 9 (App. 2025))); see also State ex rel. Berning v. Alfred, 186 Ariz. 403, 405 (App. 1996) (“We construe rules of procedure together in such a way that they will not be contradictory, but harmonious.”). When we then consult SCRAP 1(g), as we must, the deadline moves from Sunday, April 19, 2026 to Monday, April 20, 2026. This makes the superior court’s ruling error. MOTION FOR STAY ¶14 Petitioners asked this Court to stay the operation of the superior court’s ruling that they were not entitled to an appeal. On October 16, 2026, this Court did so, and ordered the restoration of the status quo before the October 7, 2026 eviction, because the eviction relied on the superior court’s incorrect ruling. In response, the landlord made the premises available to Kendall and Tutokey. ¶15 Because our decision is effective immediately, see Paragraph 16, infra, this Court dissolves its October 16, 2026 stay of the superior court’s ruling. Petitioners may proceed with their appeal. Whatever rights the landlord had in the posture of their tenants’ appeal, the landlord has again. 5 KENDALL, et al. v. CAPARN, et al. Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶16 We exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction and grant relief, vacating the superior court’s orders declining to take jurisdiction of Petitioners’ appeal. Our decision is effective immediately. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 11(a)(1) (the ARCAP apply in special actions to the extent they are consistent with the Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions); Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 18(c) (permitting this Court to make decisions “effective immediately”). We direct the superior court to consider the appeal on its merits. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 6