Kaltz v. Kaltz

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE In re the Matter of: ERIC M. KALTZ, Petitioner/Appellant, v. KATHERINE M. KALTZ, Respondent/Appellee. No. 1 CA-CV 25-1010 FC FILED 10-30-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2022-091821 The Honorable Laura Johnson Giaquinto, Judge Pro Tempore AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED COUNSEL Eric M. Kaltz, Gilbert Petitioner/Appellant  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined. P E R K I N S, Judge: ¶1 Eric M. Kaltz (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s orders (1) modifying legal decision-making authority; (2) changing the parenting-time schedule; (3) reducing his spousal maintenance obligations; (4) reducing his child support obligations; (5) denying his request for attorney fees; (6) granting Katherine Kaltz (“Mother”) final educational decision-making authority; and (7) declaring him a vexatious litigant. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Father and Mother married in 2015 and have two children in common. Father petitioned for dissolution in 2022. ¶3 In March 2024, the superior court entered a decree dissolving the marriage. It denied Mother’s request to relocate to Michigan. The court found Father had committed domestic violence and failed to rebut the statutory presumption that awarding him sole or joint legal decision-making authority would be contrary to the children’s best interests. It awarded Mother sole legal decision-making authority. It also granted the parties equal parenting time on a 5-2-2-5 schedule. It ordered Father to pay spousal maintenance of $3,000 per month for a three-year term and child support of $1,383 per month. ¶4 Four months after the superior court entered the decree, Father petitioned to modify child support and spousal maintenance, arguing there had been a substantial and continuing change in circumstances and he did not have the ability to pay the ordered amounts. Mother then moved with the children to Michigan and petitioned the court for relocation and modification of parenting time. She argued Father’s failure to pay child support and spousal maintenance compelled her to move in with her family in Michigan. Father cross-petitioned to modify parenting time and legal decision-making. 2  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court ¶5 In January 2025, following an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied Mother’s petition for relocation and ordered her to return the children to Arizona. It also denied Father’s cross-petition to modify parenting time and legal decision-making authority, instead affirming its award of sole legal decision-making authority to Mother and the equal parenting time order. The court also denied Father’s petitions to modify child support and spousal maintenance. Father appealed those rulings in February 2025, and we affirmed. In Re Marriage of Kaltz, No. 2 CA-CV 2025-0097-FC, 2026 WL 876719, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Mar. 30, 2026) (mem. decision). ¶6 In April 2025, while the appeal was pending, Father petitioned the superior court to grant him sole legal decision-making authority and designate him as the primary residential parent, with Mother to have only weekend parenting time. He claimed the health, safety, and welfare of the children were in serious and immediate jeopardy because Mother was unemployed, lacked a stable residence, and had not enrolled the children in school. He also alleged Mother had inappropriately shared information about the dissolution action with the children. Father asked the court to recalculate child support and award him the attorney fees he incurred in connection with the petition. ¶7 The court declined to consider Father’s request on an emergency basis but set a hearing on Father’s petition. Before that hearing, Father separately moved the court—based on the same allegations—for temporary orders granting him sole legal decision-making authority, designating him the primary residential parent, and suspending Mother’s parenting time or restricting it to supervised daytime visits. ¶8 After receiving Father’s motion for temporary orders, the superior court set a resolution management conference. At Father’s request, the court changed the conference to an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Father’s counsel agreed the court should enter final orders, instead of temporary orders. ¶9 In July 2025, the superior court denied Father’s petition because it had not been a year since the January 2025 ruling, and he did not sufficiently show the children’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health was in danger. The court also denied Father’s petition to modify child support because he had not presented sufficient evidence regarding his income. Finally, the court ruled that Mother had not been unreasonable regarding resolution of the issues in Father’s petition and denied his request for an award of attorney fees. 3  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court ¶10 Father filed a motion under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 83(a) asking the court to amend its ruling. He argued the court: (1) misapplied the one-year statutory threshold for modification of legal decision-making and parenting time orders; (2) failed to make findings regarding the children’s best interests, including addressing Father’s evidence Mother endangered them by neglecting their education; (3) should not have relied on the findings in the January 2025 order because it was on appeal; (4) did not give Father notice that it would address his petition to modify child support at the July 2025 hearings; and (5) should have awarded Father attorney fees. ¶11 In August 2025, the superior court held an evidentiary hearing on Father’s request for make-up parenting time for the time Father missed while the children were with Mother in Michigan. The court found Mother in contempt, ordered that Father would have 109 days of make-up parenting time to take place over school breaks, and directed Father to submit a China Doll affidavit to support his request for attorney fees. ¶12 Father then petitioned to modify spousal maintenance and child support in September 2025. He argued a reduction in child support was warranted based on his reduced income. He also asked the court to terminate his spousal maintenance obligation, noting (1) he had paid maintenance to Mother for three years since the initial pre-decree temporary orders, (2) his income had decreased, and (3) he had incurred significant legal costs due to Mother’s unauthorized relocation. He alternatively asked the court to reduce the amount of the payment. ¶13 Father showed that the children missed a significant amount of school in Michigan and that Mother did not enroll them in school when they returned to Arizona, instead relying on informal homeschooling. Mother disputed the accuracy of the school records concerning absences and tardies. The superior court found, based on Father’s undisputed testimony, that the children were doing well academically, with one child reading above grade level, and the parties working to address concerns about the other child being somewhat behind in reading comprehension. ¶14 In November 2025, after an evidentiary hearing, the superior court impliedly granted Father’s Rule 83(a) motion by amending its July 2025 order. The court found a material and continuing change in circumstances that affected the children’s welfare had occurred and justified a change in legal decision-making authority and parenting time. It awarded the parties joint legal decision-making authority and changed the parenting time schedule from the 5-2-2-5 schedule to a week-on/week-off 4  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court schedule. The court also reduced Father’s child support obligation to $470 per month and modified his spousal maintenance obligation to $1,502 per month. It denied Father’s request for an award of attorney fees. ¶15 Father timely appealed. ¶16 Five days later, Father filed an expedited motion stating the parties had reached an impasse regarding the selection of a school for their children. He asked the court to order that the children attend the school Father had chosen. Citing Father’s pending appeal, the superior court declined to take any action on Father’s expedited motion or any other pending matter. This Court later revested jurisdiction in the superior court and authorized it to consider all pending motions. In February 2026, the superior court awarded Mother final say about the children’s education. It also declared both Mother and Father vexatious litigants, stated both parties filed motions without legal merit to harass the other party and delay litigation, and ordered no further pleadings filed by either party would require a response unless ordered by the court. ¶17 Father timely appealed that order, and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2); Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 78(a)(1). DISCUSSION ¶18 Mother did not file an answering brief. While we may treat that failure as a confession of reversible error, Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259 ¶ 9 (App. 2014), the best interests of the parties’ children are at issue, so we decline to do so. In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, 525 ¶ 2 (App. 2002). ¶19 We accept the superior court’s factual findings unless there is clear error, Hoobler v. Hoobler, 254 Ariz. 130, 140 ¶ 22 (App. 2022), and review legal decision-making, parenting time, child support, spousal maintenance, and vexatious-litigant orders all for abuse of discretion. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471 ¶ 4 (App. 2018) (legal decision-making and parenting time); Gonzalez-Gunter v. Gunter, 249 Ariz. 489, 493 ¶ 16 (App. 2020) (child support); In re Marriage of Priessman, 228 Ariz. 336, 340 ¶ 12 (App. 2011) (spousal maintenance); Contreras v. Bourke, 258 Ariz. 223, 231 ¶ 21 (App. 2024), rev’d on other grounds, 260 Ariz. 319 (2025) (vexatious litigant order). ¶20 The court abuses its discretion when its ruling is unsupported by the facts or when the court misapplies the law or a legal principle. Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 531 ¶ 5 (App. 2019). We do not reweigh the 5  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court evidence or determine witness credibility. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347 ¶ 13 (App. 1998). But we “draw our own legal conclusions from the facts found or implied in the judgment.” Nash v. Nash, 232 Ariz. 473, 476 ¶ 5 (App. 2013). ¶21 Father challenges the superior court’s November 2025 rulings on legal decision-making, parenting time, best-interests findings, spousal maintenance, child support, and the denial of his request for attorney fees. He also challenges the February 2026 vexatious litigant designation and educational decision-making order. ¶22 Beyond that, Father questions aspects of the superior court’s best-interests findings and legal decision-making ruling in the July 2025 order. We do not consider these arguments because the superior court amended the July 2025 order in November 2025. We also do not address whether the superior court committed procedural and substantive error which deprived Father of meaningful appellate review. Father waived this issue by not developing it in his opening brief. Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491 ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007). I. Legal Decision-Making Authority ¶23 Father challenges the superior court’s best-interests findings supporting its ruling awarding the parties joint legal decision-making authority. ¶24 Legal decision-making authority is the right and responsibility to make non-emergency legal decisions for the children, including those about education, health care, religious training, and personal care. A.R.S. § 25-401(3). The superior court must decide legal decision-making authority “in accordance with the best interests of the child[ren]” and make findings on the record using the best-interests factors. A.R.S. § 25-403 (A), (B). ¶25 The superior court’s November 2025 order awarded the parties joint legal decision-making authority and equal parenting time and made the required best-interests findings in support of those rulings. Father argues these findings were unsupported by the record, internally inconsistent, and failed to reconcile past findings, including the children’s educational instability. ¶26 The superior court’s ruling addressed all the best-interests factors, made explicit findings on each, and identified the evidence supporting its conclusions. To the extent Father contends the court should 6  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court have given greater weight to his testimony and asks us to reweigh the evidence, we will not do so. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 13. ¶27 Father contends the superior court erred by incorporating findings from its January 2025 ruling into the November 2025 ruling without resolving their inconsistencies. But Father does not identify, and we do not see, any portion of the November 2025 order that the superior court incorporated from the January 2025 findings. Even if he did, the court was not required to defer to the January 2025 order or reconcile its new findings with that order because it found a material change in circumstances. Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 345–46 ¶¶ 25–27 (App. 2020). ¶28 Father argues the superior court could have relied on its August 2025 contempt findings to determine joint legal decision-making was not possible. But a party cannot prevail on appeal by relitigating the facts and arguing the superior court should have reached a different conclusion. Celaya v. Rivero Quinteros, 261 Ariz. 323, 333 ¶ 26 (App. 2025). ¶29 Father next argues the superior court did not properly account for the children’s educational instability, prolonged school absences, and developmental needs in its best-interests findings. Although the superior court did not specifically address Father’s educational concerns in its findings, we assume it considered all relevant evidence when making its findings. Id. at 333 ¶ 28. ¶30 Finally, Father argues the superior court erred by not considering the parties’ interpersonal conflict and difficulty communicating. But the court weighed these facts against other facts, including that parties completed the court-ordered parenting class, Father’s testimony that he would consult with Mother to make parenting decisions, and Mother’s testimony that she had tried to schedule parenting time with Father while she was in Michigan. ¶31 Because we do not reweigh evidence, Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 13, we reject Father’s arguments. The court’s later determination that the parties were engaging in harassing and unreasonable litigation conduct does not undermine this decision. II. Parenting Time Schedule ¶32 Father argues the modification from the 5-2-2-5 schedule to the week-on/week-off schedule was not supported by the record and is not in the children’s best interests. 7  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court ¶33 The parties, beginning with their separation in 2022, followed a 5-2-2-5 schedule. In July 2025, both Father and Mother testified that they wanted to keep the 5-2-2-5 schedule and did not want a week-on/week-off schedule. Still, the court ordered the parties to share equal parenting time on a week-on/week-off schedule. ¶34 The superior court did not state why the modified parenting time schedule was in the children’s best interests, only that it is “practical and also maximizes each parent’s parenting time to the extent it is in the children’s best interests.” But the court must make “specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(B). ¶35 Thus, we vacate that portion of the November 2025 order and remand for the court to either (1) make specific on-the-record findings about why a week-on/week-off parenting time schedule is in the children’s best interests, or (2) enter a different parenting time order with appropriate findings for why that order is in the children’s best interests. III. Spousal Maintenance A. The superior court correctly refused to terminate spousal maintenance. ¶36 Father argues the court abused its discretion by not terminating spousal maintenance because Mother did not establish a continuing need for support. He asserts Mother had the burden to demonstrate continued entitlement to spousal maintenance after his income changed. Father is incorrect. Father, as the party seeking modification, had the burden of proving all changed circumstances. McClendon v. McClendon, 243 Ariz. 399, 401 ¶ 9 (App. 2017). ¶37 Also, the record supports the court’s determination. Mother testified that Father had interfered with her attempts to find a job. Mother earned little through delivering food part-time while the children were in school or with Father, otherwise supporting herself with spousal maintenance and child support monies. Father points out that Mother admitted she is not disabled and is capable of working full time, but he offered no evidence that Mother was capable of earning more than the minimum wage the court attributed to her. ¶38 The court did not abuse its discretion by declining to terminate spousal maintenance. 8  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court B. The superior court incorrectly stated the spousal maintenance term. ¶39 Father incorrectly argues that the court should have terminated his spousal maintenance obligation because he had already paid spousal maintenance for 3 years. The decree ordered Father to pay spousal maintenance for 3 years beginning April 2024, which has not yet expired. ¶40 But the superior court incorrectly stated that Father’s spousal maintenance obligation remained 5 years “as established” in the decree. The decree established a 3-year spousal maintenance period. ¶41 Thus, we remand and direct the superior court to amend its order to reflect the correct term. IV. Child Support ¶42 Father argues the superior court erred by failing to apply its child support modification order retroactively to April 2025—the date he filed his emergency petition. We agree the court may apply the order retroactively but disagree with Father’s proposed date. ¶43 A child support modification takes effect on the first day of the month after notice of the petition, unless the court finds good cause to set a different date not earlier than the petition’s filing date. A.R.S. § 25-327(A). The court denied the emergency petition in July 2025. In September 2025, Father petitioned to modify child support based on a change in his income, which the court granted in November 2025. ¶44 Thus, the modification arose out of the September 2025 petition, not the April 2025 petition. But the court erred in setting the effective date as December 1, 2025, instead of October 1, 2025, because it did not find good cause to set a later date. ¶45 We remand and direct the superior court to either (1) amend its order to reflect the effective date of October 1, 2025, or (2) make good-cause findings to support an effective date of December 1, 2025. V. Attorney Fees ¶46 Father argues the superior court abused its discretion in its order denying Father’s application for attorney fees. ¶47 The court may award attorney fees after considering the parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness of their positions 9  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court throughout the proceedings. A.R.S. § 25-324(A). Here, the court found no financial disparity between the parties and that both acted unreasonably and denied Father’s application. ¶48 Father first contends the superior court failed to make adequate findings to support its denial. But “[t]here is no obligation for the trial court to make findings of fact” in determining attorney fees. MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 592 ¶ 39 (App. 2011). And a litigant is required “to object to inadequate findings at the trial court level so that the court will have an opportunity to correct them, and failure to do so constitutes a waiver.” Id. By failing to object at the superior court, Father waived this issue. Id. at 592 ¶¶ 39–40. ¶49 Father also argues the record does not support the superior court’s ruling because Mother’s conduct was unreasonable. But Father also acted unreasonably. Father failed to pay spousal maintenance, child support, a court-ordered equalization payment, and the attorney fees awarded to Mother, and the court found him in contempt. Father also interfered with Mother’s job opportunities. ¶50 Thus, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s request for attorney fees. VI. Educational Decision-Making ¶51 When parents with joint legal decision-making authority cannot agree on any part of a parenting plan—including education—the court must decide that issue. A.R.S. § 25-403.02(D); see also Paul E. v. Courtney F., 246 Ariz. 388, 395 ¶¶ 26–27 (2019). ¶52 This Court authorized the superior court to resolve Father’s motion to resolve an educational impasse. Instead, the superior court ordered Mother will have the final say on the children’s education, citing generally “all of the evidence and information that has been received in this matter.” Father argues the superior court erred by granting Mother final say over the children’s education because the court exceeded the scope of this Court’s remand, its ruling lacks evidentiary support, and the court did not make the required best-interests findings. ¶53 We reject Father’s argument that the superior court’s ruling exceeded the scope of its authority. This Court’s order revesting jurisdiction authorized the superior court to resolve all pending motions. 10  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court ¶54 We agree the superior court erred by modifying the parties’ legal decision-making authority. Father’s motion asked the superior court to decide which school the children should attend, not to modify legal decision-making authority. The superior court has discretion to award one parent the final say on educational decisions even if the parents otherwise have joint legal decision-making authority. Yanez v. Sanchez, 257 Ariz. 302, 308 ¶ 30 (App. 2024). But the court must first find a change of circumstances materially affecting the children’s well-being and determine that modification is in the children’s best interests by making findings on the record. A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A), -403.01(B). Here, the superior court did neither. ¶55 We vacate its order and remand for the court to exercise its authority under A.R.S. § 25-403.02(D) to decide where the children will attend school. VII. Vexatious Litigant Designation ¶56 Father asserts the superior court’s designation violated procedural due process and was not supported by the record. We agree with his due process concern. ¶57 Courts have inherent authority to curtail vexatious litigation. Madison v. Groseth, 230 Ariz. 8, 14 ¶ 17 (App. 2012). When a court makes such a designation, it must (1) give the litigant notice and an opportunity to oppose the order, (2) create an adequate record for appellate review by listing all cases and motions supporting the designation, (3) make substantive findings explaining why the litigant’s behavior is frivolous or harassing, and (4) tailor the order narrowly to address the specific misconduct. Id. at 14 ¶ 18. ¶58 The superior court improperly declared Father a vexatious litigant without giving Father notice and an opportunity to oppose the order. Id. Thus, we vacate the portion of the February 2026 order declaring Father a vexatious litigant. CONCLUSION ¶59 For the foregoing reasons, we: (1) affirm the superior court’s order awarding the parties joint legal decision-making authority; (2) vacate the court’s order directing week-on/week-off parenting time and remand for the court to either make specific findings supporting that ruling or enter a different parenting time order with appropriate findings; (3) affirm the court’s spousal maintenance ruling but direct the court on remand to enter an order correcting the term of spousal maintenance from 5 years to 3 years; 11  KALTZ v. KALTZ Decision of the Court (4) vacate the effective date of the child support modification and remand for the court to either make the modification effective October 1, 2025, or make good-cause findings to support an effective date of December 1, 2025; (5) affirm the superior court’s denial of Father’s request for an award of attorney fees; (6) vacate the court’s order granting Mother sole legal decision-making authority regarding educational decisions and remand for the court to exercise its authority under A.R.S. § 25-403.02(D) to resolve the parties’ school choice impasse; and (7) vacate the superior court’s order declaring Father a vexatious litigant. ¶60 Father requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal, citing A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 25-324. We deny his request for an award of attorney fees because Father represented himself in this matter and has not shown that he incurred any attorney fees on appeal. Munger Chadwick, P.L.C. v. Farwest Dev. & Const. of the Sw., LLC, 235 Ariz. 125, 126 ¶ 5 (App. 2014). We will award Father costs on appeal upon his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 12