Full Opinion

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE LEILAH LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel., RACHEL MITCHELL, the Maricopa County Attorney, Respondents. No. 1 CA-SA 26-0214 FILED 11-19-2026 Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2023-008427-001 The Honorable Kristin Culbertson, Judge JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED COUNSEL Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix By Nikolas D. Forner, Alicia M. Dominguez Counsel for Petitioner Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix By Josh Maxwell, Richard Dusterhoft, Julie A. Done Counsel for Respondents LOPEZ v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court OPINION Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined. C A T L E T T, Judge: ¶1 Can county attorneys unilaterally issue third-party subpoenas for documents during criminal proceedings? Yes. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The State charged Leilah Lopez (“Lopez”) with first-degree murder after her son died from blunt-force trauma. If convicted, Lopez faces the death penalty. ¶3 Pretrial, the Maricopa County Attorney (“County Attorney”) served two document subpoenas on third parties. She obtained court approval for neither. In 2023, the County Attorney served a subpoena on the Sheriff’s Office for copies of “physical mail going to or coming from” Lopez. ¶4 And in 2025, the County Attorney served a subpoena on NMS Labs. That subpoena “ordered” NMS Labs “to relinquish” laboratory reports and documentation regarding the minor victim. On May 13, 2025, a deputy county attorney signed the subpoena. It required NMS Labs to appear at a pre-scheduled conference in Lopez’s case “at 9:00 AM on October 10, 2025 . . . to give testimony on behalf of the State of Arizona.” Alternatively, the subpoena said NMS Labs could mail responsive documents to the County Attorney. ¶5 In January 2026, the County Attorney gave Lopez the NMS Labs subpoena and the records received in response. Lopez then asked the superior court to stop the State from unilaterally using subpoenas to obtain documents. After briefing, the court refused. It concluded A.R.S. § 13-4071 allows “the State to issue subpoenas to third parties without seeking prior leave of court and/or notice to the opposing party.” In the court’s view, using § 13-4071(B)(2) “to obtain records from third parties” is legal. Lopez now seeks special action relief. 2 LOPEZ v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court JURISDICTION ¶6 Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions (“RPSA”) 4 outlines the grounds for bringing a special action. To bring a special action, a petition must seek relief formerly obtained through the writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition. RPSA 2(c), 4. Lopez argues the County Attorney lacks authority to issue document subpoenas to third parties, and the superior court erred by concluding otherwise. Both are viable arguments for special action jurisdiction. See RPSA 4(b), (c). ¶7 But even when a special action petition raises viable grounds, jurisdiction “may be accepted only if the remedy by appeal is not equally plain, speedy, and adequate.” RPSA 2(b)(2); see also RPSA 12(a). Lopez did not seek to preclude the County Attorney from using the NMS Labs documents. Had Lopez done so and had the court denied that request, she could challenge that decision on appeal. But Lopez has no appellate vehicle for challenging the court’s decision allowing the County Attorney to issue document subpoenas. Once the County Attorney does so and third parties respond, neither the subpoena nor the response can be undone. “At that point, the value of any subsequent appeal becomes nil.” Kelly v. Blanchard, 255 Ariz. 197, 200 ¶ 9 (App. 2023). ¶8 Even when a petitioner asserts viable grounds and lacks an appellate remedy, accepting special action jurisdiction is discretionary. Id. at 199 ¶ 7. But resolving Lopez’s petition requires us to interpret statutes and court rules. No appellate opinion addresses the question Lopez raises. That question could impact all county attorneys and every criminal prosecution. And the State identifies nine instances when criminal defendants have pressed the same challenge. So the issue presented is legal, likely to recur, and of first impression and statewide importance. See State ex rel. Romley v. Martin, 203 Ariz. 46, 47 ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We accept jurisdiction. See RPSA 12. DISCUSSION ¶9 Lopez argues county attorneys lack authority “to force third parties to relinquish records outside of court through a subpoena.” The State responds that county attorneys can “issue [document] subpoenas . . . to third parties and” nothing requires them to “require return of the subpoenaed documents to the court or” a witness to appear with the documents. To solve this conundrum, we analyze county attorneys’ statutory authority. 3 LOPEZ v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court ¶10 The Arizona Constitution “created the Office of County Attorney and” statutes “prescribe[] the duties attached thereto.” Bd. of Supervisors of Maricopa Cnty. v. Woodall, 120 Ariz. 379, 382 (1978). County officers, like county attorneys, have only those powers the people (through the Constitution) or the legislature (through statutes) have “expressly, or by necessary implication, delegated to them.” Vangilder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 252 Ariz. 481, 488 ¶ 24 (2022). I. ¶11 We therefore ask whether any statute grants county attorneys authority to issue a third-party subpoena for documents. The County Attorney sources such power in § 13-4071(B)(2). To determine whether that is correct, we engage in statutory interpretation, which we conduct de novo. State v. Serrato, 259 Ariz. 493, 496 ¶ 9 (2025). ¶12 When interpreting statutes, we focus on text. See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142 ¶ 15 (2024). We interpret statutory terms using their “commonly accepted meaning[],” unless they have a special meaning. Id. ¶ 16. But focusing on text does not mean interpreting it hyperliterally—context matters. Id. ¶ 15; Serrato, 259 Ariz. at 497 ¶¶ 15–16. Context stems from the statute’s “entire text” and “related statutes on the same subject.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 15. Context matters because statutes must blend with the broader statutory scheme. See id. Considering context achieves another aim—not making any part of a statute void, trivial, or absurd. Id.; Serrato, 259 Ariz. at 499 ¶ 28. If a term or phrase, in context, has an accepted meaning, we apply it. See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., 257 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 16. Opposing parties seldom agree on statutory meaning. Still, party disagreement does not create ambiguity. Id. at 143 ¶ 17. Rather, ambiguity exists when, after reviewing a statute’s text and that in other statutes on the same subject, we cannot tell which of two (or more) reasonable meanings applies. Id. When that occurs, we analyze the statute’s “historical background, its spirit and purpose, and the effects and consequences of competing interpretations.” Id. at 142 ¶ 17. A. ¶13 The subsection at issue—§ 13-4071(B)—identifies who may issue a subpoena during criminal proceedings, and under what circumstances. A.R.S. § 13-4071(B). Subsection (B)(2) identifies when a “county attorney” may do so. A.R.S. § 13-4071(B)(2). It lists three circumstances. One, county attorneys may issue a subpoena “for witnesses 4 LOPEZ v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court to appear before the grand jury.” Id. Two, county attorneys may issue a subpoena “for witnesses requested by a grand jury.” Id. And three, county attorneys may issue a subpoena “for witnesses on a complaint, indictment or information to appear before the court in which the complaint, indictment or information is to be heard or tried[.]” Id. ¶14 We analyze this third circumstance. Applying the statute’s text, county attorneys may issue a subpoena when (1) the State obtains an indictment; (2) the State identifies one or more “witnesses” it wants to appear; and (3) that appearance will occur in the court in which the indictment will be tried. ¶15 The State obtained an indictment against Lopez for first- degree murder and other crimes. Plus, the County Attorney’s subpoena required NMS Labs to appear in the court in which Lopez’s indictment will be tried. The sole remaining question, then, is whether “witnesses” includes a third party who has documents the State believes are relevant. B. ¶16 Binding precedent answers that question. In Marston’s, Inc. v. Strand, the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted A.R.S. § 13-1821(B)(2), the predecessor to § 13-4071(B)(2). 114 Ariz. 260, 263 (1977). Much like § 13- 4071(B)(2) (the statute we interpret), § 13-1821(B)(2) said county attorneys can issue a subpoena “for witnesses on an indictment or information to appear before the court in which the indictment or information is to be tried.” See id. ¶17 The petitioners in Marston’s argued that the term “for witnesses” limits the “subpoena power to a subpoena [for testimony] and does not allow for the issuance of a subpoena [for documents].” Id. Our supreme court disagreed. See id. The court, while recognizing “the differences between a subpoena [for testimony] and a subpoena [for documents],” said it “believe[d] that the term ‘for witnesses’ as used in the criminal code . . . includes both.” Id. The court reasoned “that petitioners’ interpretation . . . would contravene a long-standing history of issuing subpoenas seeking documentary evidence in criminal matters[.]” Id. So “[t]he language used embraces both a subpoena [for testimony] and a subpoena [for documents].” Id. ¶18 In 1977, the legislature renumbered § 13-1821 as § 13-4071. See 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 142 § 166 (1st Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2054). And in the ensuing decades, the legislature amended § 13-4071 at least three times. 1982 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 323, § 1 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2178); (1998 Ariz. 5 LOPEZ v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court Sess. Laws ch. 53 § 1 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2082); 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 79 § 1 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1093). Yet the legislature did not deviate from the phrase “for witnesses.” So what was true in Marston’s remains true today—“for witnesses” includes both subpoenas for testimony and for documents. See 114 Ariz. at 263; State ex rel. Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127, 132 (2020) (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] is most salient when we interpret statutes, because it is easier for the legislature to correct any misinterpretations it perceives we have made in that context.”); Jackson v. Northland Constr. Co., 111 Ariz. 387, 388 (1975) (when our supreme court interprets a statute that is then “re-enacted in substantially the same terms, the legislature is presumed to have placed its approval on the judicial interpretation given[.]”). C. ¶19 Lopez resists this conclusion, but none of her arguments undercut Marston’s. State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, 318 ¶ 15 n.4 (2004) (our supreme court’s opinions bind us; we cannot disregard or modify them). ¶20 Lopez relies on two statutes enacted after Marston’s. Both let county attorneys “issue a subpoena duces tecum” (i.e., a document subpoena) when investigating or prosecuting certain offenses. See A.R.S. § 13-1812(A); A.R.S. § 13-3018(B). Lopez claims both “would be . . . meaningless if the [l]egislature had already provided that power in A.R.S. § 13-4071.” ¶21 Lopez is mistaken. In two ways, the statutes she musters are narrower than § 13-4071. They apply only when a county attorney investigates or prosecutes certain offenses. See A.R.S. § 13-1812(A) (covering document subpoenas to “a financial institution”); A.R.S. § 13- 3018(B) (covering document subpoenas to “a communication service provider”). They also do not permit county attorneys to serve third-party subpoenas for testimony. They permit only document subpoenas. See id. ¶22 Those statutes also are broader than § 13-4071. Unlike that statute, they permit a county attorney to serve a third-party subpoena during an investigation or prosecution, while § 13-4071(B)(2) triggers only after “a complaint, indictment[,] or information” materializes. See id. So Lopez is wrong that how we interpret § 13-4071(B)(2)—including by applying Marston’s—will render the two statutes she identifies meaningless. Both still have force. ¶23 Lopez also maintains that the County Attorney’s interpretation would mean county attorneys can demand “the production 6 LOPEZ v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court of discovery outside of court, without notice to opposing counsel, and without having to make any showing to a court[.]” In Lopez’s view, that would render Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 15.2(g) “insignificant.” Rule 15.2, titled, “The Defendant’s Disclosures,” lists the documents a defendant must give the State. Rule 15.2(g) states that “[o]n the State’s motion, a court may order any person to make available to the State material or information not included in this rule if the court” makes three findings. Lopez argues our interpretation will make Rule 15.2(g) meaningless because county attorneys will always opt for a subpoena. ¶24 Our supreme court rejected a similar argument in State v. Smith. 250 Ariz. 69 (2020). There, the defendant argued the State “illegally obtained his [cell site location information] by “ignoring the protections of [Rule 15.2(g)(1)]” rather than using a “procedure set forth in [A.R.S.] § 13- 3016.” Id. at 83 ¶ 37. The court disagreed, explaining that Rule 15.2(g) is only one way to get records a third party holds. Id. ¶ 38. ¶25 We conclude § 13-4071(B)(2) provides another route for obtaining third-party records. Concluding as much does not make Rule 15.2(g) superfluous. That Rule still applies in various contexts, including when the State seeks information a party possesses. See Wells v. Fell, 231 Ariz. 525, 526–27 ¶¶ 7, 10 (App. 2013) (under Rule 15.2(g), a court may order that defense counsel disclose witness interviews in his possession to the State); cf. Carpenter v. Super. Ct., 176 Ariz. 486, 487, 489–90 (App. 1993) (requiring a defendant to request police reports under Rule 15.1 when the State controlled those records). D. ¶26 Lopez also argues that a witness on whom a county attorney serves a subpoena must appear in court to produce the requested documents. Lopez says so because § 13-4071(B)(2) provides that county attorneys may issue a subpoena “for witnesses to appear before the court.” ¶27 We agree that county attorneys’ subpoenas must provide a date and time for a third-party witness to appear before the court in which an indictment will be tried. But we disagree that county attorneys cannot discharge a third-party witness if it complies before the date and time in the subpoena. Nothing in § 13-4071(B)(2) prohibits county attorneys from doing so. And nothing in that subsection requires that county attorneys force a witness to appear if it has already complied. Counsel in criminal and civil proceedings routinely discharge third-party witnesses from subpoenas, including because they have complied with the subpoena. 7 LOPEZ v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court County attorneys have the same ability when it comes to subpoenas issued under § 13-4071, including because a witness already produced responsive documents. II. ¶28 Lopez also thinks that allowing county attorneys to subpoena documents from third parties without notifying a criminal defendant violates due process. “We review constitutional questions, including compliance with due process, de novo.” Ariz. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ariz. Motor Vehicle, LLC, 255 Ariz. 139, 142 ¶ 14 (App. 2023). “Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time.” Id. (citation modified). ¶29 We need not decide whether allowing county attorneys to issue third-party subpoenas without notice to a criminal defendant always comports with due process. The subpoena here did not seek privileged, confidential, or protected information about Lopez. Had it done so, our analysis might be different. Instead, the subpoena here sought treatment records about the minor victim. When the County Attorney received those documents from NMS Labs, she disclosed them to Lopez. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(b)(5). And Lopez does not claim she cannot move to suppress those records if she has substantive grounds for doing so. Under these circumstances, the County Attorney did not violate Lopez’s due process rights. See Smith, 250 Ariz. at 83 ¶ 36 (rejecting a due process argument when the State disclosed the information to the defendant and he “was given a full and fair opportunity to suppress this evidence”). III. ¶30 The County Attorney acted consistently with § 13-4071(B)(2) and due process. Petitioner concedes she did not object in the superior court to the County Attorney’s subpoena for her jail mail. So only the County Attorney’s subpoena to NMS Labs is at issue. ¶31 As for that subpoena, it required NMS Labs to appear before the court in which Lopez’s indictment will be tried. It provided NMS Labs with a date and time to appear to produce documents, and that date and time corresponded with scheduled proceedings in Lopez’s case. But before the date and time listed in the subpoena, NMS Labs produced responsive documents. So NMS Labs did not appear at the court proceedings listed in the subpoena. The County Attorney then produced the NMS Labs documents, and Lopez does not claim she cannot later move to suppress those documents on substantive grounds. We deny relief. 8 LOPEZ v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court CONCLUSION ¶32 Subsection 13-4071(B)(2) authorizes county attorneys to issue a subpoena for a witness to appear in criminal proceedings, including to produce documents. See Marston’s, 114 Ariz. at 263. And if a witness produces those documents before the date and time in the subpoena, county attorneys can excuse a witness from appearing. The County Attorney’s document subpoena complied with § 13-4071(B)(2) and due process. We accept jurisdiction but deny relief. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 9