Full Opinion

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. No. 1 CA-JV 26-0063 FILED 11-17-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County No. S8015SV202500042 The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge REVERSED COUNSEL Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff By Chad Joshua Winger Counsel for Appellant Crescent Law Firm, Lake Havasu City By Russell E. Woemmel Counsel for Appellee Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman By Bobbie Shin Counsel for Appellee Child IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court OPINION Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined. G A O N A, Judge: ¶1 “[T]he law does not compel useless things.”1 In this appeal, we consider how this maxim applies to a mother’s challenge to an order terminating her parental rights to her 17-year-old child (“Child”) based on the statutory ground of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-853(1). ¶2 All agree that: (1) Child had a court-ordered right to refuse visitation with Mother; (2) Mother requested visitation with Child multiple times; (3) Child refused to see Mother when she made those requests; and (4) Child had no interest in seeing Mother. Yet the superior court found that Child’s guardian (“Guardian”) proved abandonment because Mother “failed to make a good-faith effort to establish or maintain regular contact with [Child] through the supervised visitation procedures.” The court also found “no just cause” for Mother’s “fail[ure] to maintain a normal parental relationship . . . for a period substantially exceeding six months” without detail or elaboration. ¶3 Invoking her fundamental parental rights, see, e.g., In re M.N., 259 Ariz. 120, 126 ¶ 29 (2025), Mother says the superior court abused its discretion by disregarding Child’s repeated refusal to see Mother in finding that she’d abandoned Child. And Mother is right—she didn’t “abandon” Child when Child consistently invoked his right to refuse visitation, refused to see or communicate with her, and the evidence showed that additional requests would have been futile. Because these facts defeat Guardian’s abandonment claim, we reverse. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶4 Child was born in October 2009 to Mother; Child’s father is unknown. Guardian became part of Child’s life when Child was less than a 1 McNeill v. CP Boulders LLC, No. CV-23-02481-PHX-SMM, 2025 WL 2161578, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2025) (translating the Latin term “lex non cogit ad inutilia”). 2 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court month old, and “step[ped] into the role as [Child’s] father figure” almost immediately. Mother and Guardian married in 2011, share two biological children (“Siblings”), and divorced in 2016. After the divorce, Mother and Guardian had a “week on, week off” 50/50 parenting scheduling with Child. Mother and Child maintained a close relationship despite this split parenting arrangement and “were very heavily involved with one another and very bonded” until 2022. ¶5 In 2022, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) filed a dependency action as to Child after it learned of allegations that Child sexually abused some of his half siblings2 (“Dependency Case”). Mother had regular visitation with Child during the proceeding, and those visits were “smooth as they could go.” The superior court dismissed the Dependency Case in February 2023 at DCS’s request. ¶6 Both Mother and Guardian were also parties to a family court proceeding pending before the same superior court division (“Family Case”). As part of the Family Case, the superior court awarded Guardian third-party custody of Child. It also ordered (“Supervision Order”) that: • “[A]ny contact between Mother and [Child] shall be supervised”; • “Mother shall have up to 4 hours of supervised visitation each week with [Child] at Mother’s expense,” and that “[i]f there is no agreement, then . . . the supervised visitation shall occur” at Milemarkers, a third-party provider; and • “[I]f [Child] does not choose to participate in parenting time with his Mother, then he shall not be forced to do so.” ¶7 Mother never tried to schedule supervised visitation with Child directly through Milemarkers. She did, however, ask if Child could join at least some supervised parenting sessions she had with Siblings at Milemarkers when those sessions first started; Guardian denied her requests. Though the parties dispute whether Mother asked Guardian in- person to visit Child, Mother and Guardian exchanged messages throughout the years about Child. Those included the following: • May 13, 2023. Mother messaged Guardian that she’d “hoped to see [Child and Siblings] at [another child’s] birthday party today. I have 2 Along with Child and Siblings, Mother has at least nine other children who live with her. 3 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court taken photos for [Child and Siblings] to have since they missed it. Please let me know if you will be willing to share photos with the boys if I send them.” Guardian responded the next day that Child was “not interested.” • August 17, 2023. Mother wrote to Guardian after learning of the dismissal of Child’s delinquency case: “Please tell [Child] I love him and am so happy to hear this chapter is coming to a close. I would love for my phone calls Monday evening like the Court order allows and I want him to know I think about him every passing day and miss him dearly.” • April 16, 2024. Mother wrote to Guardian: “hello, please update me on [Child]. I want to be involved with him as much as possible. Is he open to doing his Monday phone calls yet? Or is there a way maybe I can set up a Fortnite account maybe to play online with him? I just want to be involved and have some type of relationship with him moving in a positive direction.” • April 18, 2024. Guardian responded to Mother: “[Child] still does not want to engage in contact. When he is ready and interested it will need to be under supervision and fortnite is not an appropriate platform for that. I will let him know your idea but he is very unhappy about your newest child and does not wish to have any contact.” • October 4, 2024. Guardian messaged Mother after she came by Guardian’s house unannounced: “I appreciate the delivery of packages for [Child].” • August 14, 2025. Mother asked about buying Child a car because his “birthday is coming up this October and he[’]s probably eager to get on the road,” adding that she “wanted to buy [] him his first car.” • September 15, 2025. Mother followed up with a “killer deal” on a car and offering to let Guardian pick it up and take it home for Child as long as “title [is] placed in [Child’s] name.” • October 4, 2025. Mother messaged Guardian to “wish [Child] a happy birthday,” wondered “if he[’]s open to a call,” and asked how to get him a birthday card; Guardian responded the same day that “[Child] doesn’t want to talk and does not want a gift” but “says thank you for the happy birthday.” 4 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court • February 8, 2026. Mother asked if Child wanted to meet her and Siblings at a fair; Guardian said, “I asked him and he told me no. Thank you for the invite, but he is not interested.” ¶8 Child also hasn’t asked Guardian to help arrange visitation with Mother since the Supervision Order “because he’s wished not to do visits.” ¶9 In September 2025, Guardian filed this action seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights over Child. Guardian alleged that Mother abandoned Child and “has been absent from [Child’s] life since 2022” and hadn’t had “contact with him for over six months.” Ashley Mahone of Hope Study LLC conducted a termination social study in February recommending termination. The superior court then held a termination hearing during which Guardian and Mother were the only witnesses. ¶10 The superior court ordered termination after evidence closed. It held that Guardian proved the statutory ground of abandonment “by the lack of [Mother’s] effort in just trying to rebuild or maintain a relationship with [Child] through the supervised visitation that was set forth in the Court orders.” This was the sole basis for the court’s termination finding, as it continued by finding that Mother (1) “made some attempts” to “send cards, gifts, or letters,” and (2) had no child support obligations, and thus there wasn’t “sufficient evidence” on that issue to support abandonment. ¶11 The court then acknowledged that Child “is not interested” in having contact with Mother and found that termination was in Child’s best interests because it would “have a therapeutic benefit to [Child] by reducing uncertainty, anxiety, in a sense giving permanence to [Child].” ¶12 The court’s written order—entered several months later— explained that “Mother failed to make a good-faith effort to establish or maintain regular contact with [Child] through the supervised visitation procedures established by the [Supervision Order].” It continued: “Although Mother occasionally communicated birthday wishes, discussed gifts, or attempted indirect contact, those efforts did not constitute reasonable efforts to maintain a normal parental relationship with [Child].” The court thus found that “Mother failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with [Child] without just cause for a period substantially exceeding six months.” The court’s written findings about Child’s best interests largely track its oral findings—including that termination “will 5 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court provide [Child] permanency, stability, and legal security” and that termination would allow Guardian to adopt Child. ¶13 Mother appealed and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8- 235(A). DISCUSSION ¶14 A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of their child is among “the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Arizona law also protects that fundamental right. See Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579 ¶ 8 (2021), holding modified by Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471 (2023); A.R.S. §§ 1-601, -602; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 4. In deciding whether to terminate this fundamental right, the superior court must (1) “find by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists under § 8-533(B),” and if so, then (2) “determine by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the child’s best interests.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 476 ¶ 20 (cleaned up). ¶15 We then review a termination order as follows: • First, we accept the superior court’s factual findings on all issues if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, id. ¶ 30, and view those facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s ruling, Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 6 ¶ 22 (2016); • Second, we analyze the superior court’s legal conclusion about whether the petitioner proved a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and will affirm that finding unless it’s “clearly erroneous”—meaning “that no one could reasonably find the evidence [] clear and convincing.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479 ¶ 31 (emphasis added) (cleaned up); • Third, we also review for clear error the superior court’s findings about whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151 ¶¶ 17–18 (2018). ¶16 Mother contends the superior court erred in terminating her fundamental parental rights by discounting Child’s repeated exercise of his right to refuse visitation when finding that Guardian proved abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. She also argues the superior court’s best interests finding can’t stand because the record doesn’t show that “it would 6 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court presently be detrimental to the Child if Mother’s rights were not terminated.” ¶17 Because we hold that Guardian didn’t establish abandonment by clear and convincing evidence and reverse on that ground, we need not address the superior court’s best interests finding. Our analysis follows. I. Mother Didn’t Abandon Child. ¶18 The termination order before us turns on the superior court’s finding that Guardian proved the statutory ground of “abandonment,” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), by clear and convincing evidence. “Abandonment” means the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment. A.R.S. § 8-531(1). “[A]bandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective intent, but by the parent’s conduct.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 18 (2000). ¶19 The superior court’s abandonment finding rests on the statute’s final sentence, which our Supreme Court recently held creates a presumption of abandonment if the party seeking termination “alleges facts sufficient to support each of these elements: (1) failure to maintain a normal parental relationship; (2) for six months; and (3) without just cause.” In re B.W., 260 Ariz. 123, 130 ¶ 18 (2025). But “[t]he other parent may rebut this presumption by showing just cause or by presenting other evidence that disproves the alleged failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, at which point the presumption vanishes.” Id. (cleaned up). Once that happens, “the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact must be determined as if the presumption had never operated in the case.” Id. (cleaned up). ¶20 A petitioner can still prove abandonment if the other party destroys the presumption. In that scenario, the petitioner carries the burdens of production and persuasion. Id. at 130–31 ¶¶ 19–20. And even then, “just cause” remains “an exception to abandonment.” Id. at 130 ¶ 19. 7 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court A. We review evidence—not allegations—related to abandonment and will resolve this case on whether Mother had “just cause” not to maintain a normal parental relationship. ¶21 Before addressing Mother’s arguments, and like our Supreme Court before us, “[w]e pause here to clarify the procedure the juvenile court should apply when determining the applicability of § 8-531(1)’s presumption.” Id. ¶ 20. We do so because the rules and procedures B.W. outlines contradict at points. ¶22 To start, and as noted above, our Supreme Court said a petitioner establishes the presumption if they “allege[] facts sufficient to support each of these elements: (1) failure to maintain a normal parental relationship; (2) for six months; and (3) without just cause.” Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added). But the Court later held that “sufficient evidence created a presumption under [A.R.S.] § 8-531(1).” Id. at 132 ¶ 27 (emphasis added). The former suggests a pleading standard we’d apply to a termination petition; the latter suggests we must examine the actual evidence adduced during a termination hearing. Because B.W. otherwise invokes the burdens of production and persuasion, id. at 130–31 ¶¶ 18, 20, and our Supreme Court analyzed “evidence” rather than allegations, we do not interpret B.W. as prescribing a rule governing the sufficiency of a termination petition. We view the word “alleges” in B.W. as a misnomer rather than a requirement. ¶23 That leads us to the second issue: must a petitioner adduce affirmative evidence showing a lack of “just cause” before the presumption applies? Later in B.W., our Supreme Court held that “just cause” under A.R.S. § 8-831(1) means a parent “had a reasonable and fair justification for not maintaining a normal parental relationship with the child and relied on that justification in good faith.” Id. at 131 ¶ 24. But in determining whether the abandonment presumption applied to the non-petitioning parent in B.W., our Supreme Court said it was deciding whether the “termination should be reversed because [the father] rebutted the abandonment presumption by showing ‘just cause’ under the statute.” Id. at 132 ¶ 27. Jumping straight to the non-petitioning parent’s burden of production skips a critical step: the petitioning parent’s initial burden of production to establish the presumption’s application. Because our Supreme Court held that “without just cause” is necessary for the presumption to apply, there’s nothing to rebut if the petitioning parent fails to present sufficient evidence to prove that negative. 8 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court ¶24 This issue is more difficult to resolve, and we need not do so here. No matter who carried the burden or whether the abandonment presumption applies, we decide this case on “just cause” alone. See id. at 130 ¶ 19 (“just cause” is “an exception to abandonment” even if the presumption is destroyed or doesn’t apply); In re Z.R., __ Ariz. __, 2026 WL 2932106, *6 ¶ 45 (App. 2026) (“Even if Mother proved either [the presumption or abandonment under the statute], her abandonment claim fails if Father had ‘just cause.’”). But either the legislature or our Supreme Court may wish to clarify B.W. or the statute and how the abandonment presumption applies going forward, particularly because its application alone decides many termination cases. See, e.g., In re V.M., 261 Ariz. 198, 201–02 ¶¶ 13–14 (App. 2025); In re Termination of Parental Rights as to A.M., 2026 WL 2494141 *1, *3 ¶¶ 16–19 (App. Aug. 24, 2026) (mem. dec.); In re L.C., 2026 WL 2111756 *1, *2–*3 ¶¶ 14, 16–17 (App. July 22, 2026) (mem. dec.); Termination of Parental Rights as to S.D., 2026 WL 1948852 *1, *2 ¶¶ 7, 12–15 (App. July 6, 2026) (mem. dec.). B. Mother had “just cause” for not maintaining a normal parental relationship with Child. ¶25 As a reminder, the superior court found that Guardian established and proved abandonment because “Mother failed to make a good-faith effort to establish or maintain regular contact with [Child] through the supervised visitation procedures established by the [Supervision Order].” It found that Mother “made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the [C]hild.” The court noted, however, that it did not predicate this finding on a failure on Mother’s part to send cards, gifts, or letters. Nor did the court ground its finding on a failure to provide financial support, stating that it “[didn’t] think there’s sufficient evidence in that respect to support a ground of abandonment.” But, focusing on Mother’s failure to attempt to arrange supervised visitation, it nevertheless found that her “occasionally communicat[ing] birthday wishes, discuss[ing] gifts, or attempt[ing] indirect contact” was unreasonable. On these facts, the superior court found Mother’s failure to maintain a normal parental relationship for “a period substantially exceeding six months” was “without just cause.” Mother challenges this finding, and Mother is correct. ¶26 “Just cause” exists when a parent “had a reasonable and fair justification for not maintaining a normal parental relationship with the child and relied on that justification in good faith.” B.W., 260 Ariz. at 131 ¶ 24. The “just cause” inquiry requires the superior court to “examine what a parent has done to facilitate a normal parental relationship.” Id. at 132 ¶ 26. 9 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court But the inquiry doesn’t end there; the court “must also consider that the parent’s conduct—or ability to ‘do something’—may be affected by a parent’s reasonable, good faith belief that circumstances exist that preclude the parent from exercising traditional methods of maintaining a normal parental relationship.” Id. ¶27 In B.W., the respondent father acknowledged that he didn’t have a normal parental relationship with his child for years, but argued there was “just cause” for that reality “because his criminal defense attorney advised him that these acts would likely jeopardize his chance of prevailing at his criminal trial.” Id. ¶ 27. Because there was no record about father’s criminal proceedings and the advice he’d received, our Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to determine “whether a reasonable person in Father’s place, acting in good faith reliance on his criminal defense attorney’s advice, would have decided not to maintain a normal parental relationship with his child.” Id. ¶ 29. Our Supreme Court found this broader analysis necessary because “[t]he circumstances and resulting conduct surrounding a fractured parent-child relationship— occurring either by choice or through neglect—should be thoroughly examined by the [superior] court before it terminates a parent’s rights because ‘[f]ew forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.’” Id. at 133 ¶ 33 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982)). ¶28 Under B.W., the superior court should have analyzed whether a reasonable person in Mother’s place, acting in good faith reliance on Child’s repeated refusal to see or speak with her, would have decided not to maintain a normal parental relationship with Child. But that’s not what the superior court did. Instead, it focused on Mother’s decision not to request supervised visitation through Milemarkers, while ignoring: (1) that Mother requested visitation and contact through other means, (2) Child’s court-granted right under the Supervision Order to refuse visitation, (3) Child’s repeated refusal of visitation, and (4) Guardian’s undisputed testimony that Child didn’t want to see or speak with her. A parent facing circumstances precluding them from “exercising traditional methods of bonding” with their child must still “vigorously assert [their] legal rights to the extent necessary.” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296 ¶ 20 (App. 2013). But that standard cannot mean that a parent must engage in a repeated series of futile acts like the superior court apparently would have required of Mother here. ¶29 As detailed above, the record shows that Mother reached out to Guardian multiple times over the years trying to see and speak with Child, only to be told each time that Child wasn’t interested. Mother left 10 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F. Opinion of the Court Child gifts and even offered to buy Child his first car as his sixteenth birthday approached to no avail. Even the superior court acknowledged that Child “is not interested” in seeing Mother, yet faulted Mother for not requesting supervised visitation through Milemarkers that all the evidence suggests Child would have refused. We do not interpret statutes to reach absurd results, State v. Estrada, 201 Ariz. 247, 251 ¶¶ 16–17 (2001), and thus do not read A.R.S. § 8-531(1) to compel a parent to take some unidentified number of useless acts—here, futile visitation requests—before they can establish “just cause.” ¶30 Because the record establishes that Mother had “just cause” to not maintain a normal parental relationship with Child, the superior court’s abandonment finding was error. C. Termination is improper on this record. ¶31 Because Mother established “just cause” and the superior court already found that Mother’s attempts to send “cards[,] gifts[,] and letters” and failure to provide financial support weren’t “factor[s] to consider,” Guardian failed to prove abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. ¶32 That said, we acknowledge Guardian’s wish to adopt Child (and Child’s reciprocal wish for that adoption to occur), and that they can achieve this goal without Mother’s consent after Child turns 18. See A.R.S. § 14-8101(C) (“Neither the consent of the natural parent or parents of the person to be adopted, of the division nor of any other person is required.”). CONCLUSION ¶33 We end where we began—“the law does not compel useless things.” Because that’s what the superior court’s order required of Mother here and the record doesn’t support termination, we reverse. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 11