In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.F.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket1 CA-JV 26-0063
JudgeD. Andrew Gaona
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F.
No. 1 CA-JV 26-0063
FILED 11-17-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015SV202500042
The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge
REVERSED
COUNSEL
Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff
By Chad Joshua Winger
Counsel for Appellant
Crescent Law Firm, Lake Havasu City
By Russell E. Woemmel
Counsel for Appellee
Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman
By Bobbie Shin
Counsel for Appellee Child
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION
Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
G A O N A, Judge:
¶1 “[T]he law does not compel useless things.”1 In this appeal,
we consider how this maxim applies to a mother’s challenge to an order
terminating her parental rights to her 17-year-old child (“Child”) based on
the statutory ground of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-853(1).
¶2 All agree that: (1) Child had a court-ordered right to refuse
visitation with Mother; (2) Mother requested visitation with Child multiple
times; (3) Child refused to see Mother when she made those requests; and
(4) Child had no interest in seeing Mother. Yet the superior court found that
Child’s guardian (“Guardian”) proved abandonment because Mother
“failed to make a good-faith effort to establish or maintain regular contact
with [Child] through the supervised visitation procedures.” The court also
found “no just cause” for Mother’s “fail[ure] to maintain a normal parental
relationship . . . for a period substantially exceeding six months” without
detail or elaboration.
¶3 Invoking her fundamental parental rights, see, e.g., In re M.N.,
259 Ariz. 120, 126 ¶ 29 (2025), Mother says the superior court abused its
discretion by disregarding Child’s repeated refusal to see Mother in finding
that she’d abandoned Child. And Mother is right—she didn’t “abandon”
Child when Child consistently invoked his right to refuse visitation, refused
to see or communicate with her, and the evidence showed that additional
requests would have been futile. Because these facts defeat Guardian’s
abandonment claim, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 Child was born in October 2009 to Mother; Child’s father is
unknown. Guardian became part of Child’s life when Child was less than a
1 McNeill v. CP Boulders LLC, No. CV-23-02481-PHX-SMM, 2025 WL
2161578, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2025) (translating the Latin term “lex non
cogit ad inutilia”).
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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F.
Opinion of the Court
month old, and “step[ped] into the role as [Child’s] father figure” almost
immediately. Mother and Guardian married in 2011, share two biological
children (“Siblings”), and divorced in 2016. After the divorce, Mother and
Guardian had a “week on, week off” 50/50 parenting scheduling with
Child. Mother and Child maintained a close relationship despite this split
parenting arrangement and “were very heavily involved with one another
and very bonded” until 2022.
¶5 In 2022, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) filed a
dependency action as to Child after it learned of allegations that Child
sexually abused some of his half siblings2 (“Dependency Case”). Mother
had regular visitation with Child during the proceeding, and those visits
were “smooth as they could go.” The superior court dismissed the
Dependency Case in February 2023 at DCS’s request.
¶6 Both Mother and Guardian were also parties to a family court
proceeding pending before the same superior court division (“Family
Case”). As part of the Family Case, the superior court awarded Guardian
third-party custody of Child. It also ordered (“Supervision Order”) that:
• “[A]ny contact between Mother and [Child] shall be supervised”;
• “Mother shall have up to 4 hours of supervised visitation each week
with [Child] at Mother’s expense,” and that “[i]f there is no
agreement, then . . . the supervised visitation shall occur” at
Milemarkers, a third-party provider; and
• “[I]f [Child] does not choose to participate in parenting time with his
Mother, then he shall not be forced to do so.”
¶7 Mother never tried to schedule supervised visitation with
Child directly through Milemarkers. She did, however, ask if Child could
join at least some supervised parenting sessions she had with Siblings at
Milemarkers when those sessions first started; Guardian denied her
requests. Though the parties dispute whether Mother asked Guardian in-
person to visit Child, Mother and Guardian exchanged messages
throughout the years about Child. Those included the following:
• May 13, 2023. Mother messaged Guardian that she’d “hoped to see
[Child and Siblings] at [another child’s] birthday party today. I have
2 Along with Child and Siblings, Mother has at least nine other children
who live with her.
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Opinion of the Court
taken photos for [Child and Siblings] to have since they missed it.
Please let me know if you will be willing to share photos with the
boys if I send them.” Guardian responded the next day that Child
was “not interested.”
• August 17, 2023. Mother wrote to Guardian after learning of the
dismissal of Child’s delinquency case: “Please tell [Child] I love him
and am so happy to hear this chapter is coming to a close. I would
love for my phone calls Monday evening like the Court order allows
and I want him to know I think about him every passing day and
miss him dearly.”
• April 16, 2024. Mother wrote to Guardian: “hello, please update me
on [Child]. I want to be involved with him as much as possible. Is he
open to doing his Monday phone calls yet? Or is there a way maybe
I can set up a Fortnite account maybe to play online with him? I just
want to be involved and have some type of relationship with him
moving in a positive direction.”
• April 18, 2024. Guardian responded to Mother: “[Child] still does not
want to engage in contact. When he is ready and interested it will
need to be under supervision and fortnite is not an appropriate
platform for that. I will let him know your idea but he is very
unhappy about your newest child and does not wish to have any
contact.”
• October 4, 2024. Guardian messaged Mother after she came by
Guardian’s house unannounced: “I appreciate the delivery of
packages for [Child].”
• August 14, 2025. Mother asked about buying Child a car because his
“birthday is coming up this October and he[’]s probably eager to get
on the road,” adding that she “wanted to buy [] him his first car.”
• September 15, 2025. Mother followed up with a “killer deal” on a car
and offering to let Guardian pick it up and take it home for Child as
long as “title [is] placed in [Child’s] name.”
• October 4, 2025. Mother messaged Guardian to “wish [Child] a
happy birthday,” wondered “if he[’]s open to a call,” and asked how
to get him a birthday card; Guardian responded the same day that
“[Child] doesn’t want to talk and does not want a gift” but “says
thank you for the happy birthday.”
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Opinion of the Court
• February 8, 2026. Mother asked if Child wanted to meet her and
Siblings at a fair; Guardian said, “I asked him and he told me no.
Thank you for the invite, but he is not interested.”
¶8 Child also hasn’t asked Guardian to help arrange visitation
with Mother since the Supervision Order “because he’s wished not to do
visits.”
¶9 In September 2025, Guardian filed this action seeking to
terminate Mother’s parental rights over Child. Guardian alleged that
Mother abandoned Child and “has been absent from [Child’s] life since
2022” and hadn’t had “contact with him for over six months.” Ashley
Mahone of Hope Study LLC conducted a termination social study in
February recommending termination. The superior court then held a
termination hearing during which Guardian and Mother were the only
witnesses.
¶10 The superior court ordered termination after evidence closed.
It held that Guardian proved the statutory ground of abandonment “by the
lack of [Mother’s] effort in just trying to rebuild or maintain a relationship
with [Child] through the supervised visitation that was set forth in the
Court orders.” This was the sole basis for the court’s termination finding,
as it continued by finding that Mother (1) “made some attempts” to “send
cards, gifts, or letters,” and (2) had no child support obligations, and thus
there wasn’t “sufficient evidence” on that issue to support abandonment.
¶11 The court then acknowledged that Child “is not interested” in
having contact with Mother and found that termination was in Child’s best
interests because it would “have a therapeutic benefit to [Child] by
reducing uncertainty, anxiety, in a sense giving permanence to [Child].”
¶12 The court’s written order—entered several months later—
explained that “Mother failed to make a good-faith effort to establish or
maintain regular contact with [Child] through the supervised visitation
procedures established by the [Supervision Order].” It continued:
“Although Mother occasionally communicated birthday wishes, discussed
gifts, or attempted indirect contact, those efforts did not constitute
reasonable efforts to maintain a normal parental relationship with [Child].”
The court thus found that “Mother failed to maintain a normal parental
relationship with [Child] without just cause for a period substantially
exceeding six months.” The court’s written findings about Child’s best
interests largely track its oral findings—including that termination “will
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Opinion of the Court
provide [Child] permanency, stability, and legal security” and that
termination would allow Guardian to adopt Child.
¶13 Mother appealed and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-
235(A).
DISCUSSION
¶14 A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of their
child is among “the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
Arizona law also protects that fundamental right. See Jessie D. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579 ¶ 8 (2021), holding modified by Brionna J. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471 (2023); A.R.S. §§ 1-601, -602; Ariz. Const.
art. 2, § 4. In deciding whether to terminate this fundamental right, the
superior court must (1) “find by clear and convincing evidence that a
statutory ground for termination exists under § 8-533(B),” and if so, then (2)
“determine by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the
child’s best interests.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 476 ¶ 20 (cleaned up).
¶15 We then review a termination order as follows:
• First, we accept the superior court’s factual findings on all issues if
reasonable evidence and inferences support them, id. ¶ 30, and view
those facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior
court’s ruling, Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 6 ¶ 22 (2016);
• Second, we analyze the superior court’s legal conclusion about
whether the petitioner proved a statutory ground for termination by
clear and convincing evidence and will affirm that finding unless it’s
“clearly erroneous”—meaning “that no one could reasonably find the
evidence [] clear and convincing.” Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479 ¶ 31
(emphasis added) (cleaned up);
• Third, we also review for clear error the superior court’s findings
about whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Alma S. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151 ¶¶ 17–18 (2018).
¶16 Mother contends the superior court erred in terminating her
fundamental parental rights by discounting Child’s repeated exercise of his
right to refuse visitation when finding that Guardian proved abandonment
by clear and convincing evidence. She also argues the superior court’s best
interests finding can’t stand because the record doesn’t show that “it would
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Opinion of the Court
presently be detrimental to the Child if Mother’s rights were not
terminated.”
¶17 Because we hold that Guardian didn’t establish abandonment
by clear and convincing evidence and reverse on that ground, we need not
address the superior court’s best interests finding. Our analysis follows.
I. Mother Didn’t Abandon Child.
¶18 The termination order before us turns on the superior court’s
finding that Guardian proved the statutory ground of “abandonment,”
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), by clear and convincing evidence. “Abandonment”
means
the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing
normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding
that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal
parental relationship with the child without just cause for a
period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.
A.R.S. § 8-531(1). “[A]bandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective
intent, but by the parent’s conduct.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196
Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 18 (2000).
¶19 The superior court’s abandonment finding rests on the
statute’s final sentence, which our Supreme Court recently held creates a
presumption of abandonment if the party seeking termination “alleges facts
sufficient to support each of these elements: (1) failure to maintain a normal
parental relationship; (2) for six months; and (3) without just cause.” In re
B.W., 260 Ariz. 123, 130 ¶ 18 (2025). But “[t]he other parent may rebut this
presumption by showing just cause or by presenting other evidence that
disproves the alleged failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, at
which point the presumption vanishes.” Id. (cleaned up). Once that
happens, “the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact must be
determined as if the presumption had never operated in the case.” Id.
(cleaned up).
¶20 A petitioner can still prove abandonment if the other party
destroys the presumption. In that scenario, the petitioner carries the
burdens of production and persuasion. Id. at 130–31 ¶¶ 19–20. And even
then, “just cause” remains “an exception to abandonment.” Id. at 130 ¶ 19.
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Opinion of the Court
A. We review evidence—not allegations—related to
abandonment and will resolve this case on whether Mother
had “just cause” not to maintain a normal parental
relationship.
¶21 Before addressing Mother’s arguments, and like our Supreme
Court before us, “[w]e pause here to clarify the procedure the juvenile court
should apply when determining the applicability of § 8-531(1)’s
presumption.” Id. ¶ 20. We do so because the rules and procedures B.W.
outlines contradict at points.
¶22 To start, and as noted above, our Supreme Court said a
petitioner establishes the presumption if they “allege[] facts sufficient to
support each of these elements: (1) failure to maintain a normal parental
relationship; (2) for six months; and (3) without just cause.” Id. ¶ 18
(emphasis added). But the Court later held that “sufficient evidence created
a presumption under [A.R.S.] § 8-531(1).” Id. at 132 ¶ 27 (emphasis added).
The former suggests a pleading standard we’d apply to a termination
petition; the latter suggests we must examine the actual evidence adduced
during a termination hearing. Because B.W. otherwise invokes the burdens
of production and persuasion, id. at 130–31 ¶¶ 18, 20, and our Supreme
Court analyzed “evidence” rather than allegations, we do not interpret B.W.
as prescribing a rule governing the sufficiency of a termination petition. We
view the word “alleges” in B.W. as a misnomer rather than a requirement.
¶23 That leads us to the second issue: must a petitioner adduce
affirmative evidence showing a lack of “just cause” before the presumption
applies? Later in B.W., our Supreme Court held that “just cause” under
A.R.S. § 8-831(1) means a parent “had a reasonable and fair justification for
not maintaining a normal parental relationship with the child and relied on
that justification in good faith.” Id. at 131 ¶ 24. But in determining whether
the abandonment presumption applied to the non-petitioning parent in
B.W., our Supreme Court said it was deciding whether the “termination
should be reversed because [the father] rebutted the abandonment
presumption by showing ‘just cause’ under the statute.” Id. at 132 ¶ 27.
Jumping straight to the non-petitioning parent’s burden of production
skips a critical step: the petitioning parent’s initial burden of production to
establish the presumption’s application. Because our Supreme Court held
that “without just cause” is necessary for the presumption to apply, there’s
nothing to rebut if the petitioning parent fails to present sufficient evidence
to prove that negative.
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Opinion of the Court
¶24 This issue is more difficult to resolve, and we need not do so
here. No matter who carried the burden or whether the abandonment
presumption applies, we decide this case on “just cause” alone. See id. at
130 ¶ 19 (“just cause” is “an exception to abandonment” even if the
presumption is destroyed or doesn’t apply); In re Z.R., __ Ariz. __, 2026 WL
2932106, *6 ¶ 45 (App. 2026) (“Even if Mother proved either [the
presumption or abandonment under the statute], her abandonment claim
fails if Father had ‘just cause.’”). But either the legislature or our Supreme
Court may wish to clarify B.W. or the statute and how the abandonment
presumption applies going forward, particularly because its application
alone decides many termination cases. See, e.g., In re V.M., 261 Ariz. 198,
201–02 ¶¶ 13–14 (App. 2025); In re Termination of Parental Rights as to A.M.,
2026 WL 2494141 *1, *3 ¶¶ 16–19 (App. Aug. 24, 2026) (mem. dec.); In re
L.C., 2026 WL 2111756 *1, *2–*3 ¶¶ 14, 16–17 (App. July 22, 2026) (mem.
dec.); Termination of Parental Rights as to S.D., 2026 WL 1948852 *1, *2 ¶¶ 7,
12–15 (App. July 6, 2026) (mem. dec.).
B. Mother had “just cause” for not maintaining a normal
parental relationship with Child.
¶25 As a reminder, the superior court found that Guardian
established and proved abandonment because “Mother failed to make a
good-faith effort to establish or maintain regular contact with [Child]
through the supervised visitation procedures established by the
[Supervision Order].” It found that Mother “made only minimal efforts to
support and communicate with the [C]hild.” The court noted, however,
that it did not predicate this finding on a failure on Mother’s part to send
cards, gifts, or letters. Nor did the court ground its finding on a failure to
provide financial support, stating that it “[didn’t] think there’s sufficient
evidence in that respect to support a ground of abandonment.” But,
focusing on Mother’s failure to attempt to arrange supervised visitation, it
nevertheless found that her “occasionally communicat[ing] birthday
wishes, discuss[ing] gifts, or attempt[ing] indirect contact” was
unreasonable. On these facts, the superior court found Mother’s failure to
maintain a normal parental relationship for “a period substantially
exceeding six months” was “without just cause.” Mother challenges this
finding, and Mother is correct.
¶26 “Just cause” exists when a parent “had a reasonable and fair
justification for not maintaining a normal parental relationship with the
child and relied on that justification in good faith.” B.W., 260 Ariz. at 131 ¶
24. The “just cause” inquiry requires the superior court to “examine what a
parent has done to facilitate a normal parental relationship.” Id. at 132 ¶ 26.
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But the inquiry doesn’t end there; the court “must also consider that the
parent’s conduct—or ability to ‘do something’—may be affected by a
parent’s reasonable, good faith belief that circumstances exist that preclude
the parent from exercising traditional methods of maintaining a normal
parental relationship.” Id.
¶27 In B.W., the respondent father acknowledged that he didn’t
have a normal parental relationship with his child for years, but argued
there was “just cause” for that reality “because his criminal defense
attorney advised him that these acts would likely jeopardize his chance of
prevailing at his criminal trial.” Id. ¶ 27. Because there was no record about
father’s criminal proceedings and the advice he’d received, our Supreme
Court remanded the case for the superior court to determine “whether a
reasonable person in Father’s place, acting in good faith reliance on his
criminal defense attorney’s advice, would have decided not to maintain a
normal parental relationship with his child.” Id. ¶ 29. Our Supreme Court
found this broader analysis necessary because “[t]he circumstances and
resulting conduct surrounding a fractured parent-child relationship—
occurring either by choice or through neglect—should be thoroughly
examined by the [superior] court before it terminates a parent’s rights
because ‘[f]ew forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.’”
Id. at 133 ¶ 33 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982)).
¶28 Under B.W., the superior court should have analyzed whether
a reasonable person in Mother’s place, acting in good faith reliance on
Child’s repeated refusal to see or speak with her, would have decided not
to maintain a normal parental relationship with Child. But that’s not what
the superior court did. Instead, it focused on Mother’s decision not to
request supervised visitation through Milemarkers, while ignoring: (1) that
Mother requested visitation and contact through other means, (2) Child’s
court-granted right under the Supervision Order to refuse visitation, (3)
Child’s repeated refusal of visitation, and (4) Guardian’s undisputed
testimony that Child didn’t want to see or speak with her. A parent facing
circumstances precluding them from “exercising traditional methods of
bonding” with their child must still “vigorously assert [their] legal rights to
the extent necessary.” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296 ¶ 20 (App.
2013). But that standard cannot mean that a parent must engage in a
repeated series of futile acts like the superior court apparently would have
required of Mother here.
¶29 As detailed above, the record shows that Mother reached out
to Guardian multiple times over the years trying to see and speak with
Child, only to be told each time that Child wasn’t interested. Mother left
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Opinion of the Court
Child gifts and even offered to buy Child his first car as his sixteenth
birthday approached to no avail. Even the superior court acknowledged
that Child “is not interested” in seeing Mother, yet faulted Mother for not
requesting supervised visitation through Milemarkers that all the evidence
suggests Child would have refused. We do not interpret statutes to reach
absurd results, State v. Estrada, 201 Ariz. 247, 251 ¶¶ 16–17 (2001), and thus
do not read A.R.S. § 8-531(1) to compel a parent to take some unidentified
number of useless acts—here, futile visitation requests—before they can
establish “just cause.”
¶30 Because the record establishes that Mother had “just cause”
to not maintain a normal parental relationship with Child, the superior
court’s abandonment finding was error.
C. Termination is improper on this record.
¶31 Because Mother established “just cause” and the superior
court already found that Mother’s attempts to send “cards[,] gifts[,] and
letters” and failure to provide financial support weren’t “factor[s] to
consider,” Guardian failed to prove abandonment by clear and convincing
evidence.
¶32 That said, we acknowledge Guardian’s wish to adopt Child
(and Child’s reciprocal wish for that adoption to occur), and that they can
achieve this goal without Mother’s consent after Child turns 18. See A.R.S.
§ 14-8101(C) (“Neither the consent of the natural parent or parents of the
person to be adopted, of the division nor of any other person is required.”).
CONCLUSION
¶33 We end where we began—“the law does not compel useless
things.” Because that’s what the superior court’s order required of Mother
here and the record doesn’t support termination, we reverse.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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