In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.V.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket1 CA-JV 26-0078
JudgeAngela K. Paton
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
No. 1 CA-JV 26-0078
FILED 11-19-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS520982
The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Matthew L., Buckeye
Appellant
Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Advisory Counsel for Appellant
Martinez Law Offices, Scottsdale
By Elizabeth J. Martinez
Counsel for Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
Decision of the Court
P A T O N, Judge:
¶1 Matthew L. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
juvenile court’s termination order. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20 (2000).
¶3 J.V., born in December 2019, is the child of Father and Desiree
J. (“Mother”), all of whom are members of the Navajo Nation. While Father
and Mother were living together in January 2020, Father was arrested for
stabbing Mother and her sister, a minor, while her sister was holding J.V.
Father pled guilty to attempted second degree murder of Mother,
aggravated assault of Mother’s sister, child abuse of J.V., and possession of
marijuana. In April 2021, Father was sentenced to seventeen years in
prison. His expected release date will be after J.V.’s eighteenth birthday.
¶4 A few years later, Father filed a family court action to
establish legal decision-making and parenting time as to J.V. and Mother
subsequently petitioned to terminate his parental rights on abandonment,
neglect/abuse, chronic substance abuse, and length of felony sentence
grounds. The juvenile court held a hearing on Mother’s petition over two
days in the summer of 2025. Mother testified about the details of Father’s
January 2020 crimes against her, her sister, and J.V. She also testified that,
before his arrest, Father had a prior alcohol-related incident with police,
abused marijuana and cough medicine, and once intentionally cut himself.
¶5 Mother further testified that Father had no relationship with
J.V. during the first month of J.V.’s life, and no contact with J.V. after his
arrest, in part due to a temporary protective order. Mother said she had no
contact with Father after his arrest, no knowledge of Father’s current
circumstances, no knowledge of his rehabilitative efforts, and no evidence
of his current use of illicit substances. Mother testified she sought
termination because she feared for J.V.’s safety.
¶6 Father also testified at the hearing. He discussed parenting
J.V. in the first month of J.V.’s life before his arrest. He admitted he had no
contact with J.V. since his arrest in January 2020 but had attempted contact.
He described his mental health, rehabilitative efforts, and spiritual
endeavors while incarcerated, offering as evidence his educational
promotion and literacy improvement certificates, and a Conquer Series
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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
Decision of the Court
Episodes IV, V, & VI certificate. He said he saw a mental health therapist
approximately six times in 2021 and 2022, and approximately four times in
2023 and 2024, and noted his general participation in “treatment services”
but not substance abuse-related ones. He acknowledged he did not provide
any records regarding his mental health treatment in prison to the court.
¶7 The Navajo Nation intervened in the case and called
Cassandra Gorman as an Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) expert
witness. Gorman testified that termination would be in J.V.’s best interests
because any relationship between J.V. and Father would result in emotional
or physical harm to J.V. She testified that Mother takes care of J.V., J.V. has
a significant bond with Mother’s new partner, and that Father never sent
J.V. gifts, cards, or letters. She also testified that Father’s incarceration
limited his access to rehabilitative services, so there were no rehabilitative
services she believed he could have participated in but failed to. The
Navajo Nation’s attorney asked the court to find the ICWA requirements
were met.
¶8 Father called his mother as a witness, who testified about
Father’s efforts to become a better person while in prison, stating J.V.
should have a relationship with Father and Father’s family. She said that
before his incarceration, Father had gone to mental health counseling for
behavioral issues and that he “was using” and “had an addiction going on.”
This included sniffing shoe glue chemicals, smoking marijuana, and taking
pills. She said Father was unable to maintain his sobriety before January
2020 and was likely under the influence of substances at the time of his
arrest.
¶9 After the hearing, the juvenile court terminated Father’s
parental rights as to J.V. on the grounds of abandonment, abuse and
neglect, substance abuse, and length of felony incarceration under Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 8-533(B). The court found termination
to be in J.V.’s best interests without providing any specific findings.
¶10 Father appealed, challenging the court’s termination ground
and best interests findings and conclusions. This Court affirmed the abuse
statutory ground because Father failed to challenge it on appeal. In re J.V.,
No. 1 CA-JV 25-0126, 2026 WL 413430, at *5, ¶ 27 (Ariz. App. Feb. 13, 2026)
(mem. decision). But this Court vacated the best-interests ruling for lack of
analysis and findings and remanded the case to the juvenile court to
analyze whether termination is in J.V.’s best interests. Id. at *5-6, ¶¶ 28-31
(citations omitted).
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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
Decision of the Court
¶11 On remand, the juvenile court found termination was in J.V.’s
best interests because “[e]stablishing and maintaining a parent-child
relationship between Father and [J.V.] would be detrimental to [J.V.]” given
that Father was convicted of several violent offenses both against and
involving J.V. It also found that J.V. is attached to Mother and J.V. and
Father have no relationship. The court further found J.V. “would benefit
from termination of the parental child-relationship because he needs a safe,
stable home, free of substance abuse, physical violence and someone who
is able to ensure his needs are met,” which Mother provides. The juvenile
court also analyzed the ICWA factors and found that the evidentiary
burden for each of them had been met. The court thus terminated Father’s
parental rights.
¶12 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Sections
8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶13 Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, the
juvenile court must find that (1) at least one statutory ground for
termination exists by clear and convincing evidence and (2) termination is
in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Alma S. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018) (citing A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)). As the trier of fact, the superior court “is in the best position to
weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses,
and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz.
332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Accordingly, we will affirm the superior court’s
factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 93–94, ¶ 4 (App. 2009).
¶14 On appeal, Father argues insufficient evidence supports the
juvenile court’s findings that Mother proved a statutory ground for
termination and that termination was in J.V.’s best interests. He also
challenges the superior court’s ICWA findings and argues his trial attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
I. The law of the case doctrine supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Mother proved a statutory ground for terminating Father’s
parental rights.
¶15 Father argues the juvenile court erred in finding that Mother
proved the ground of “[a]buse of abandonment [sic], neglect, substance
abuse and his felony conviction grounds for termination” under Section 8-
533(B). But this court affirmed the superior court’s abuse statutory
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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
Decision of the Court
termination ground finding in Father’s first appeal. In re J.V., 2026 WL
413430 at *5, ¶ 27. That decision is the law of this case and we will not
reconsider it. See Lennar Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 227 Ariz. 238, 242–43,
¶ 12 (App. 2011) (“[O]nce an appellate court has decided a legal issue, that
decision is the law of that case in subsequent . . . proceedings and the
decision will not be reconsidered in a second appeal . . . .”) (citation
omitted).
II. Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
termination is in J.V.’s best interests.
¶16 Father challenges the juvenile court’s finding that termination
is in J.V.’s best interests under Section 8-533(B). He also contends the court
erred by considering his criminal convictions in its analysis because his
appeal in that case is pending. We find his latter argument unavailing
because Section 8-533(B) does not require “the parent convicted of a crime
to exhaust all avenues of appeal before the court may proceed with a
severance hearing.” Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-2462, 162 Ariz.
536, 539 (App. 1989). And, in any event, Mother testified regarding his
crimes and nothing prevented the juvenile court from considering that
evidence in rendering its decision. See id.
¶17 As to best interests, termination is in a child’s best interests if
the child would either benefit from terminating the parental relationship or
be harmed by its continuation. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13. Either
showing can independently support a best-interests finding. Demetrius L.
v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016). The court must consider the totality
of circumstances in its best-interests analysis. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148, ¶ 1.
¶18 A bond between the parent and child is a factor to consider
but “is not dispositive in addressing best interests.” Dominique M. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). The court must also
consider the parent’s rehabilitative efforts but should not subordinate the
interests of the child to those of the parent. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 15.
A “child’s interest in stability and security” is the court’s primary concern.
Id. at 150, ¶ 12 (quoting Demetrius L., 238 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15).
¶19 Here, the juvenile court found that maintaining Father’s
parental rights would harm J.V. because Father has no relationship with
J.V., was convicted of several violent crimes involving J.V.—including child
abuse of J.V.—and “minimize[d] the crimes” and “attempt[ed] to deflect
responsibility for his actions” at trial. Specifically, when asked at trial if he
committed child abuse against J.V., the charge he pled guilty to, he
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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
Decision of the Court
responded, “No.” When asked what he is serving time for, he responded it
was for attempted homicide “supposedly” of Mother, despite having pled
guilty to that crime. The court further found that Father pled guilty to
aggravated assault of Mother’s sister, whom Father stabbed while she held
J.V. This evidence supports the court’s finding that J.V. would be harmed
by a relationship with Father and the court’s detriment finding alone is
sufficient to support its conclusion that termination is in J.V.’s best interests.
See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 16. Even so, the court further found J.V.
would benefit from termination because “he needs a safe, stable home, free
of substance abuse, physical violence and someone who is able to ensure
his needs are met[,]” which Mother provides.
III. Father waived his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
¶20 Father argues his trial attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel (“IAC”) before his first appeal. But Father was
represented by appointed appellate counsel in his first appeal and did not
raise any ineffective assistance of counsel claims in that proceeding. And
in his first appeal, this court limited its remand instruction to the superior
court to make best interests findings. On remand, the juvenile court did not
hear any new trial testimony or take new evidence. Because Father failed
to raise his IAC claims in his first appeal, he has waived this argument in
his appeal before us. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536,
¶ 9 (App. 2018); Carrillo v. State, 169 Ariz. 126, 132 (App. 1991); Ariz. State
Univ. Bd. of Regents v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 242 Ariz. 387, 390, ¶ 16 (App.
2017).
IV. The juvenile court’s ICWA findings are supported by reasonable
evidence.
¶21 Father challenges the juvenile court’s findings required under
ICWA. Specifically, Father argues insufficient evidence supported the
court’s finding that establishing Father’s parental rights as to J.V. would
result in serious emotional or physical damage to J.V., and the court
improperly relied on Cassandra Gorman as an ICWA expert witness
because “she never [interviewed Father] concerning the petition for
termination,” nor his relatives or J.V.’s attorney, and she presented no
evidence of rehabilitative programs available to inmates from ICWA or the
Arizona Department of Corrections.
¶22 Under ICWA, the juvenile court must make two additional
findings before it terminates parental rights. The court must be persuaded
(1) beyond a reasonable doubt, with evidence that must include testimony
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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
Decision of the Court
from a qualified expert witness, that continued custody of the child by the
parent is likely to result in “serious emotional or physical damage to the
child” and (2) by clear and convincing evidence that “active efforts have
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts
have proven unsuccessful.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d), (f); accord Valerie M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 331, 334-35, ¶ 14 (2009); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.2, 23.121;
Ariz. R. Proc. Juv. Ct. 353(d). We accept the juvenile court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous, meaning not supported by reasonable
evidence. Yvonne L. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 415, 422, ¶ 27 (App.
2011).
¶23 At the outset, although Father challenges the juvenile court’s
reliance on Gorman’s expert testimony, Father expressly noted “[n]o
objection” when asked by the court if he objected to Gorman being
designated a qualified expert witness at trial. In any event, the ICWA
expert testified that during her 17-year career with ICWA, she had testified
in around 5,000 ICWA cases. She had reviewed the file and case
documents—including Father’s prison class completion certificates—and
met with Mother and J.V. Although she tried to interview Father before the
first day of trial and was unable to, she conducted a phone call interview
with him before the second trial day and observed his trial testimony. She
then testified that continued custody would result in serious harm to J.V.
and that active but unsuccessful efforts were made to prevent the breakup
of the family.
¶24 The court found the “well-qualified” ICWA expert’s
testimony that returning J.V. to Father would result in serious emotional or
physical damage to J.V. to be credible. The court further found that the
nature of Father’s crime against J.V., as well as Father’s failure to accept
responsibility for the harm he caused to J.V., and the trauma that would be
inflicted upon J.V. by trying to establish a relationship with his abuser,
provided “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” that continued custody by
Father would cause serious emotional or physical damage to J.V.
Reasonable evidence supports the court’s determination.
¶25 As to whether clear and convincing evidence that active but
unsuccessful efforts were made to promote remediation and rehabilitative
efforts, the court found that Father’s counseling, educational programs, and
classes taken during his incarceration have not shown that he has accepted
responsibility for his abuse of J.V. The court further found that additional
efforts would be futile as a result of Father’s “inability to comprehend,
accept and/or remedy the ramifications of [his crimes].” This finding is
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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.V.
Decision of the Court
supported by Father’s testimony at trial denying that he committed child
abuse against J.V., and that he “supposedly” tried to kill Mother, despite
having pled guilty to both crimes. Reasonable evidence supports the
court’s determination.
¶26 Mother requests her attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal. But
she failed to include a statutory basis for her request for attorneys’ fees and
costs, so we deny it. See Grubb v. Do It Best Corp., 230 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 17 (App.
2012).
CONCLUSION
¶27 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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