In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G., S.R., and J.N. No. 1 CA-JV 26-0085 FILED 11-09-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. JD41435 The Honorable Keith J. Miller, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson By Toni M. Valadez, Jennifer L. Thorson, Dawn R. Williams Counsel for Appellant Department of Child Safety Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Queen Creek By Steven Czop Counsel for Appellee Father Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa By Seth Draper Counsel for Appellee Mother  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G., et al. Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined. J A C O B S, Judge: ¶1 The Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) appeals the juvenile court’s order denying its motion to terminate the parental rights of Leonard U. (“Father”) and Chantal N. (“Mother”) as to their minor children M.G., S.R., and J.N. (“the Children”) on the fifteen-month out-of-home care ground. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s order, and DCS demonstrates no error, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. DCS Receives Multiple Reports Calling into Question Mother’s and Father’s Care for the Children. ¶2 Mother and Father are originally from the Congo. They speak Kinyarwanda and Swahili, require translation services, and have no formal education. M.G. was born on May 9, 2015, in a refugee camp in Uganda. ¶3 On or about October 7, 2016, Mother, Father, and M.G. (along with four older children who have since become adults and are not at issue in this case) entered the United States as refugees. The family settled in Arizona and S.R. was born on August 30, 2017. ¶4 DCS received an unsubstantiated report in November 2018 that M.G. and S.R. were not being appropriately supervised and another unsubstantiated report in March 2019 regarding lack of supervision and Mother’s alcohol abuse. ¶5 J.N. was born on August 15, 2019. In September 2020, an unsubstantiated report to DCS stated J.N. was underweight. To the contrary, the Phoenix Police Department determined J.N. was within the normal range of weight for a child his age and concluded its examination of the report without bringing charges. ¶6 In September 2021, a substantiated report to DCS stated that M.G. had a serious untreated ear infection, the family home was “filthy,” 2  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G., et al. Decision of the Court and the children were “filthy and smelled poorly.” DCS investigators also observed Mother under the influence once. Weeks later, another substantiated report to DCS stated that J.N. and S.R. (then 2 and 4 years old) were seen playing by themselves on a second-story balcony. ¶7 On October 21, 2021, no responsible adult was present to pick M.G. (then 6 years old) up from the bus stop after school for the fifth time that school year. He was returned to school where staff reported the lack of adult supervision to the police, who in turn notified DCS. ¶8 Father “was not present at the residence for any of the reports made to the Department and works full time.” A DCS report stated Father “does not take proper action to ensure the children are safe with mother while he is working.” DCS implemented a safety plan that required a designated responsible adult or Father to be present when Mother was with the Children. ¶9 On November 5, 2021, DCS filed an in-home dependency petition for the Children as to both Mother and Father. B. The Children Are Removed from Parents’ Home Due to Mother’s Substance Use and Father’s Not Securing Appropriate Supervision for the Children While He Worked. ¶10 On November 17, 2021, the family violated the safety plan when DCS observed the children in Mother’s care without a designated responsible adult present to supervise. DCS removed the Children from their parents’ care and placed them in non-relative kinship foster care. ¶11 On April 25, 2022, the court found the Children dependent as to Mother and Father. The case plan for the Children was “Family Reunification soon to be Remain with Family.” The court ordered a change in physical custody of the Children back to their parents. C. The Children Returned to Parents’ Home in April 2022 and Remained in Their Care Until February 2024. ¶12 DCS reported they returned the Children back to their parents’ home in April 2022 “under a safety plan in which [Father] and [adult sibling D.S.] are to supervise all contact between the children and [Mother].” The Children were noted to be physically healthy, meeting developmental milestones, and doing well in daycare/school. 3  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G., et al. Decision of the Court D. DCS Removes the Children from Parents’ Home Again Due to Mother’s Continued Substance Use and a Monitor’s Failure to Appropriately Supervise the Children. ¶13 On January 27, 2024, J.N. (then 4 years old) was found alone walking barefoot on the street outside his apartment complex. Police responded and walked J.N. back to the apartment complex, running into J.N.’s older adult brother D.S. who reported he was responsible for watching his younger siblings at the time. D.S. admitted the younger children were playing outside while he was inside the apartment and not directly supervising them. Police noted that besides not wearing any shoes, J.N. was “clean, well dressed, and healthy.” ¶14 Following the incident with J.N., the Children were removed from their parents’ care on February 13, 2024. DCS reported Mother and Father were “unable to articulate how the children were being properly supervised.” The Children transitioned to non-relative kinship foster homes. ¶15 In September 2024, DCS stated in a progress report that Mother and Father were consistent in visits with the Children and “always prepared.” DCS reported that Father “maintains consistent contact with the Department.” Nevertheless, in early November 2025, DCS requested to change the case plan to “Severance and Adoption” for the Children. DCS stated Mother and Father were “unable to provide for the children’s basic needs due to [Mother]’s ongoing alcohol use.” DCS stated its concern that the Children would be placed in “unsafe situations” if returned to the family’s home and that the Children “deserve permanence in their lives.” ¶16 The juvenile court granted DCS’s motion to change the case plan for the Children to “Severance and Adoption” over Mother’s and Father’s objections. DCS promptly moved to terminate the parent-child relationship between Mother and Father and the Children. E. The Juvenile Court Denies DCS’s Motion to Terminate. ¶17 On March 2, 2026, the juvenile court held a contested hearing on DCS’s Motion for Termination of Parent-Child Relationship. DCS called one witness with testimony relevant to the Children — a caseworker who had worked with Mother, Father, and the Children for 2.5 years. She testified that while DCS previously had concerns about the cleanliness of the family home, as of the hearing date, there were no safety concerns with the home itself as it was clean and appropriate. 4  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G., et al. Decision of the Court ¶18 Since the incident with J.N.’s being unsupervised in January 2024, over two years prior, DCS did not reassess whether older adult sibling D.S. could be an appropriate safety monitor for the minor children when Father is at work. The DCS caseworker reported she had not spoken to D.S. in seven or eight months since he stated he no longer wanted to be involved in the case. The DCS caseworker also stated the Department ruled out older adult sibling R.N. as a safety monitor because she had her own child and there were concerns with substance use. ¶19 However, the DCS caseworker did testify that if another adult was designated as a safety monitor, the safety threat to the children would be successfully managed. DCS would re-visit the issue if such an adult was identified. Further, the DCS caseworker agreed with parents’ counsel that although Father is an appropriate parent, he cannot be the primary caretaker because he could not then financially support the family. DCS stated Father is willing to use daycare services for appropriate supervision of the children. ¶20 The DCS caseworker testified Father will be unable to parent in the near future because the case has been open for “a long time” and Father doesn’t understand the problem, focusing on work instead of taking care of the children. However, she also testified that Father recognizes that Mother has an alcohol abuse problem. In addition, the DCS caseworker stated that Father and the children are bonded to each other, that Father is appropriately affectionate and engaged with the children during visits, and at least the oldest child M.G. has stated a desire to return home. ¶21 During closing arguments, Father’s counsel stated, “There seem to be alternatives that DCS is choosing not to explore, such as adults in the home. . . . They also cannot show that he would not be able to parent in the future, because he can parent right now.” ¶22 On May 1, 2026, the juvenile court issued an order denying DCS’s motion to terminate the Parent-Child Relationships between Mother, Father, and the Children. In its order, the court found DCS “did not carry its burden that Father will not be able to provide proper and effective parental care and control for the . . . three children, with the implementation of an appropriate safety plan.” The order referenced Father’s counsel’s argument in its decision, “Father’s counsel, at trial, suggested that Father could rely on his adult children to enable himself to exercise proper and effective parental care in the near future.” No party made any post- judgment motion to clarify or otherwise amend the May 1 ruling. 5  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G., et al. Decision of the Court ¶23 DCS timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1); Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9. DISCUSSION ¶24 We affirm a juvenile court’s ruling on a termination petition “unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022) (citing Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579 ¶ 10 (2021)). We examine the “factual findings made by the juvenile court, and its factual findings will be accepted ‘if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.’” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023) (quoting Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 580 ¶ 10). I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Conclusion That DCS Failed to Show Father Would Not Be Able to Provide Effective Care and Control of the Children with the Implementation of an Appropriate Safety Plan. ¶25 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court’s order denying the petition to terminate parental rights. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549 ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (citing Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207 ¶ 2 (App. 2007)). And “[w]hen considering the trial court’s express findings, we affirm the trial court’s order if the facts at trial support the trial court’s findings whether or not each supportive fact is specifically called out by the trial court in its findings.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451–52 ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (cleaned up). ¶26 DCS argues that the juvenile court erred “in finding that DCS had failed to prove the fifteen-month ground’s near-future element based solely on Father’s counsel’s argument suggesting that an appropriate safety plan could be established with the parents’ adult children.” Mother argues that this finding was not solely based on Father’s counsel’s closing argument, which is not evidence, but comes from the DCS caseworker’s testimony. The record includes testimony that if an adult other than older sibling D.S. were designated as a safety monitor, the safety threat to the children would be successfully managed. The DCS caseworker also testified Father was appropriate as a parent but needed another responsible adult to supervise the children other than Mother, and if another responsible adult were identified, DCS would re-visit the issue. Mother argues this quantum of evidence is sufficient as reasonable evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding, mandating affirmance. 6  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G., et al. Decision of the Court ¶27 We agree with Mother. The testimony of the DCS caseworker was entered as evidence. It included information that supports the juvenile court’s finding that DCS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father could not effectively and properly care for the children in the near future with the implementation of a safety plan. The court did not give any particular construction to the phrase “safety plan.” Because the record contained different alternatives that could constitute a “safety plan,” we construe the juvenile court’s order to implicitly find that any of the alternatives Mother suggested could constitute an appropriate “safety plan” justifying the order. We are required to give these facts the reading most favorable to affirming the juvenile court’s order. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. at 549 ¶ 7. When we do so, we see reasonable evidence, which requires us to affirm. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30. ¶28 We reject DCS’s criticism of the juvenile court’s order based on the court’s reference to Father’s counsel’s closing argument. Had the juvenile court based its entire ruling on a statement of counsel, and said so, that would have been error. But as Father points out, the juvenile court isn’t required to make any findings of fact in an order denying termination. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. at 549–50 ¶ 10. And as we have explained, there is reasonable evidence here supporting the juvenile court’s order. Its stray reference to Father’s counsel’s closing argument doesn’t make it otherwise. II. DCS Omitted to Raise Below That a “Safety Plan” Could Only Mean Its Continued Involvement and Didn’t Ask the Juvenile Court to Correct or Clarify What It Meant by “Safety Plan.” ¶29 DCS argues the juvenile court erred as a matter of law when interpreting A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) by contemplating DCS’s ongoing involvement in determining Father’s ability to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. DCS points to the court’s ruling as contemplating ongoing DCS involvement due to the reference made to “implementation of an appropriate safety plan.” DCS argues that “the very concept of a ‘safety plan’ is a DCS-originated policy commonly understood by both the juvenile court and this Court to refer to a plan established and supervised by DCS.” ¶30 The parents disagree. Mother argues “[t]he safety plan . . . is just an agreement on how to provide childcare between Father and another adult. DCS’s involvement is immaterial to the implementation.” Father argues that the juvenile court’s ruling “does not state ‘DCS safety plan’ or ‘indefinite DCS oversight.’” Father argues that “[a]dult siblings residing 7  IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.G., et al. Decision of the Court with the [p]arents, daycare assistance, and possibly other adults could be part of a safety plan that did not include DCS involvement.” ¶31 We prefer that the parties give the juvenile court the chance to correct potential errors before bringing matters forward on appeal. DCS for the first time on appeal argues that the ruling’s inclusion of “implementation of an appropriate safety plan” language requires ongoing DCS involvement, which would violate A.R.S. § 8-533(8)(c), because it considers the parent’s competencies separate from DCS support. While DCS argues that “it is clear that the court’s findings refer to a DCS-created safety plan,” the alternative interpretations provided by Mother and Father are viable as well. Again, we view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court’s order denying the petition to terminate a parent’s rights. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. at 549 ¶ 7. Thus considered, the reference to a “safety plan” in the juvenile court’s order need not be construed, as DCS argues, as contemplating further DCS involvement. CONCLUSION ¶32 We affirm. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 8