Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE In re the Matter of: DAMEON ZACHARY MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF, Petitioner/Appellee, v. DIANA ALISSA BERNSTEIN, Respondent/Appellant. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0585 FC FILED 11-17-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2026-051361 The Honorable John R. Doody, Judge, Pro Tempore AFFIRMED COUNSEL Diana Bernstein, Scottsdale Respondent/Appellant The Valley Law Group, LLC, Phoenix By Carson R. Lester, Ryan Reppucci Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF v. BERNSTEIN Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined. F U R U Y A, Judge: ¶1 Diana Bernstein appeals the trial court’s decision to continue the Amended Order of Protection against her. For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 After a committed relationship and having a child together, Bernstein and Dameon McEntyre-Shurtleff separated in July 2025. McEntyre-Shurtleff sought a parenting time plan through family court. Over the next year, he found tracking devices on his vehicle three separate times and reported each discovery to the police. He believed Bernstein was tracking him because she sent messages accurately describing what he was doing at that moment and that she was there. Further, McEntyre-Shurtleff’s workplace received communications alleging he stole from work and filed a fraudulent workers’ compensation claim. He believed and testified that Bernstein was the cause of these communications. ¶3 Amidst these events, Bernstein sent many messages to McEntyre-Shurtleff asking about their relationship and claiming she posted an intimate video of them online. He did not consent to any such video being recorded or circulated. Bernstein also entered his residence without permission. Though Bernstein told police she did not enter his residence, McEntyre-Shurtleff’s security camera captured a photo of Bernstein inside with her hand raised to push the camera aside. His concerns surged with each incident, and he reported Bernstein to the Peoria police multiple times. He sought an order of protection, the superior court granted the order ex parte, and Bernstein requested a hearing to contest the order. ¶4 At the hearing, the court found Bernstein committed an act of domestic violence within the last year by a preponderance of evidence. And the court found good cause to continue the protective order, as amended to include a Brady indicator. Bernstein timely appealed. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. (“ARCAP”) 9(a). We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the 2 MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF v. BERNSTEIN Decision of the Court Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) Section 12- 2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rules of Protective Order Procedure (“Rule”) 42(a)(2) and (b)(2). DISCUSSION ¶5 When a court continues a protective order, we review for abuse of discretion. Vanwormer v. Lopez, 259 Ariz. 87, 89 ¶ 6 (App. 2024), citing Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 619 ¶ 16 (App. 2012). I. Sufficient Evidence from the Contested Hearing Supports the Court’s Findings. ¶6 Bernstein contends the court abused its discretion by upholding the protective order because it had no objective evidence she harassed or stalked McEntyre-Shurtleff. We disagree. ¶7 After reviewing a petition, pleadings, and evidence offered by a plaintiff, including evidence of harassment, the court must issue an order of protection if the plaintiff shows reasonable cause exists to believe “[t]he defendant has committed an act of domestic violence within the past year.” A.R.S. § 13-3602(E)(1). But a defendant is entitled to contest the order of protection at a hearing. A.R.S. § 13-3602(L). After holding this hearing, the court may modify, quash, or continue the protective order. Id. The order will be upheld if the plaintiff proves the case by a preponderance of evidence. Kamma v. Gaun, 261 Ariz. 413, 415 ¶ 5 (App. 2025). ¶8 Because McEntyre-Shurtleff and Bernstein have a “child in common,” harassment constitutes an act of domestic violence. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(A)(2), -3602(A). Harassment can include when the defendant knowingly “[c]ontacts or causes a communication,” or “[s]urveils” the person. A.R.S. § 13-2921(A). This conduct is harassment if directed at a specific person and “would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed, humiliated or mentally distressed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys, humiliates or mentally distresses the person.” A.R.S. § 13-2921(E). The court has the discretion to weigh and assess conflicting evidence and credibility, and we defer to those determinations. Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 9. ¶9 Here, the court received evidence of Bernstein harassing McEntyre-Shurtleff through text messages. Bernstein admitted her behavior was harassing “at the time” she messaged McEntyre-Shurtleff that she posted an intimate video of the two online. And she later sent him a message stating other people saw or knew about the video, including his 3 MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF v. BERNSTEIN Decision of the Court work supervisor. Bernstein sent messages about the video to McEntyre- Shurtleff to “get under his skin.” Given this context, such messages would cause a reasonable person mental distress, especially if the video was taken and circulated without consent. The evidence showed Bernstein’s conduct was not trivial and, in fact, caused McEntyre-Shurtleff serious alarm or mental distress. Because Bernstein’s conduct supports the order of protection, we need not address the other allegations in Bernstein’s brief. See A.R.S. § 13-3602(E); Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 143 Ariz. 547, 548 (App. 1985) (appellate courts should not decide questions unnecessary to resolving an appeal). ¶10 The evidence of harassment on this record is substantial. And although Bernstein argues the court “relied entirely on a speculative inference” about the messages, her arguments merely urge us to reweigh the evidence. But we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess credibility, and the court did not find Bernstein’s testimony credible. See Clark v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, 276 ¶ 14 (App. 2017). Given the substantial evidence in the record, we defer to the court’s determinations and discern no abuse of its discretion. II. We Award McEntyre-Shurtleff His Appellate Costs But Only a Portion of His Attorneys’ Fees. ¶11 Bernstein requests award of her costs on appeal. We decline because she is not the prevailing party. See Arizona Creditors Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 257 Ariz. 406, 415 ¶ 35 (App. 2024). McEntyre-Shurtleff requests attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. Section 25-324 and Rule 39. But Section 25-324 authorizes an award of fees in proceedings for dissolution of marriage, legal decision-making, and parenting time. A.R.S. § 25-324(A); Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 14. This matter is an order of protection proceeding under Title 13. ¶12 However, parties in order of protection proceedings may be eligible for award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees on different grounds. See Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 15; A.R.S. § 13-3602(T); Rule 39(a) (allowing award of costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, in order of protection proceedings). We consider three factors when determining whether to order costs or attorneys’ fees: “(1) the merits of the claim or the defense asserted by the unsuccessful party; (2) whether the award will pose an extreme hardship on the unsuccessful party; and (3) whether the award may deter others from making valid claims.” Rule 39(b). 4 MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF v. BERNSTEIN Decision of the Court ¶13 McEntyre-Shurtleff argues his request for fees and costs is based on the merits of Bernstein’s unsuccessful defense and her misrepresentation of the evidence. Bernstein’s arguments on appeal do indeed lack merit. But though Bernstein’s appeal was baseless, McEntyre- Shurtleff fails to discuss the impact the award will have on her or whether it could deter others from making valid claims. See id.; Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 91 ¶ 16; ARCAP 21(a)(2). In view of his failure to provide a complete Rule 39(b) analysis, and in our discretion, we award McEntyre-Shurtleff his costs, but award only a portion of his reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21. Rule 39(a)–(b). CONCLUSION ¶14 We affirm the order of protection. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 5