McEntyre-shurtleff v. Bernstein
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket1 CA-CV 26-0585 FC
JudgeBrian Y. Furuya
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
In re the Matter of:
DAMEON ZACHARY MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF, Petitioner/Appellee,
v.
DIANA ALISSA BERNSTEIN, Respondent/Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CV 26-0585 FC
FILED 11-17-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2026-051361
The Honorable John R. Doody, Judge, Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Diana Bernstein, Scottsdale
Respondent/Appellant
The Valley Law Group, LLC, Phoenix
By Carson R. Lester, Ryan Reppucci
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF v. BERNSTEIN
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.
F U R U Y A, Judge:
¶1 Diana Bernstein appeals the trial court’s decision to continue
the Amended Order of Protection against her. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 After a committed relationship and having a child together,
Bernstein and Dameon McEntyre-Shurtleff separated in July 2025.
McEntyre-Shurtleff sought a parenting time plan through family court.
Over the next year, he found tracking devices on his vehicle three separate
times and reported each discovery to the police. He believed Bernstein was
tracking him because she sent messages accurately describing what he was
doing at that moment and that she was there. Further, McEntyre-Shurtleff’s
workplace received communications alleging he stole from work and filed
a fraudulent workers’ compensation claim. He believed and testified that
Bernstein was the cause of these communications.
¶3 Amidst these events, Bernstein sent many messages to
McEntyre-Shurtleff asking about their relationship and claiming she posted
an intimate video of them online. He did not consent to any such video
being recorded or circulated. Bernstein also entered his residence without
permission. Though Bernstein told police she did not enter his residence,
McEntyre-Shurtleff’s security camera captured a photo of Bernstein inside
with her hand raised to push the camera aside. His concerns surged with
each incident, and he reported Bernstein to the Peoria police multiple times.
He sought an order of protection, the superior court granted the order ex
parte, and Bernstein requested a hearing to contest the order.
¶4 At the hearing, the court found Bernstein committed an act of
domestic violence within the last year by a preponderance of evidence. And
the court found good cause to continue the protective order, as amended to
include a Brady indicator. Bernstein timely appealed. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.
(“ARCAP”) 9(a). We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the
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MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF v. BERNSTEIN
Decision of the Court
Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-
2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rules of Protective Order Procedure (“Rule”)
42(a)(2) and (b)(2).
DISCUSSION
¶5 When a court continues a protective order, we review for
abuse of discretion. Vanwormer v. Lopez, 259 Ariz. 87, 89 ¶ 6 (App. 2024),
citing Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 619 ¶ 16 (App. 2012).
I. Sufficient Evidence from the Contested Hearing Supports the
Court’s Findings.
¶6 Bernstein contends the court abused its discretion by
upholding the protective order because it had no objective evidence she
harassed or stalked McEntyre-Shurtleff. We disagree.
¶7 After reviewing a petition, pleadings, and evidence offered by
a plaintiff, including evidence of harassment, the court must issue an order
of protection if the plaintiff shows reasonable cause exists to believe “[t]he
defendant has committed an act of domestic violence within the past year.”
A.R.S. § 13-3602(E)(1). But a defendant is entitled to contest the order of
protection at a hearing. A.R.S. § 13-3602(L). After holding this hearing, the
court may modify, quash, or continue the protective order. Id. The order
will be upheld if the plaintiff proves the case by a preponderance of
evidence. Kamma v. Gaun, 261 Ariz. 413, 415 ¶ 5 (App. 2025).
¶8 Because McEntyre-Shurtleff and Bernstein have a “child in
common,” harassment constitutes an act of domestic violence. See A.R.S. §§
13-3601(A)(2), -3602(A). Harassment can include when the defendant
knowingly “[c]ontacts or causes a communication,” or “[s]urveils” the
person. A.R.S. § 13-2921(A). This conduct is harassment if directed at a
specific person and “would cause a reasonable person to be seriously
alarmed, annoyed, humiliated or mentally distressed and the conduct in
fact seriously alarms, annoys, humiliates or mentally distresses the person.”
A.R.S. § 13-2921(E). The court has the discretion to weigh and assess
conflicting evidence and credibility, and we defer to those determinations.
Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 9.
¶9 Here, the court received evidence of Bernstein harassing
McEntyre-Shurtleff through text messages. Bernstein admitted her
behavior was harassing “at the time” she messaged McEntyre-Shurtleff that
she posted an intimate video of the two online. And she later sent him a
message stating other people saw or knew about the video, including his
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MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF v. BERNSTEIN
Decision of the Court
work supervisor. Bernstein sent messages about the video to McEntyre-
Shurtleff to “get under his skin.” Given this context, such messages would
cause a reasonable person mental distress, especially if the video was taken
and circulated without consent. The evidence showed Bernstein’s conduct
was not trivial and, in fact, caused McEntyre-Shurtleff serious alarm or
mental distress. Because Bernstein’s conduct supports the order of
protection, we need not address the other allegations in Bernstein’s brief.
See A.R.S. § 13-3602(E); Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 143
Ariz. 547, 548 (App. 1985) (appellate courts should not decide questions
unnecessary to resolving an appeal).
¶10 The evidence of harassment on this record is substantial. And
although Bernstein argues the court “relied entirely on a speculative
inference” about the messages, her arguments merely urge us to reweigh
the evidence. But we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess credibility,
and the court did not find Bernstein’s testimony credible. See Clark v.
Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, 276 ¶ 14 (App. 2017). Given the substantial evidence
in the record, we defer to the court’s determinations and discern no abuse
of its discretion.
II. We Award McEntyre-Shurtleff His Appellate Costs But Only a
Portion of His Attorneys’ Fees.
¶11 Bernstein requests award of her costs on appeal. We decline
because she is not the prevailing party. See Arizona Creditors Bar Ass’n, Inc.
v. State, 257 Ariz. 406, 415 ¶ 35 (App. 2024). McEntyre-Shurtleff requests
attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. Section 25-324 and Rule 39. But
Section 25-324 authorizes an award of fees in proceedings for dissolution of
marriage, legal decision-making, and parenting time. A.R.S. § 25-324(A);
Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 14. This matter is an order of protection
proceeding under Title 13.
¶12 However, parties in order of protection proceedings may be
eligible for award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees on different
grounds. See Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 15; A.R.S. § 13-3602(T); Rule 39(a)
(allowing award of costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, in order of
protection proceedings). We consider three factors when determining
whether to order costs or attorneys’ fees: “(1) the merits of the claim or the
defense asserted by the unsuccessful party; (2) whether the award will pose
an extreme hardship on the unsuccessful party; and (3) whether the award
may deter others from making valid claims.” Rule 39(b).
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MCENTYRE-SHURTLEFF v. BERNSTEIN
Decision of the Court
¶13 McEntyre-Shurtleff argues his request for fees and costs is
based on the merits of Bernstein’s unsuccessful defense and her
misrepresentation of the evidence. Bernstein’s arguments on appeal do
indeed lack merit. But though Bernstein’s appeal was baseless, McEntyre-
Shurtleff fails to discuss the impact the award will have on her or whether
it could deter others from making valid claims. See id.; Vanwormer, 259 Ariz.
at 91 ¶ 16; ARCAP 21(a)(2). In view of his failure to provide a complete Rule
39(b) analysis, and in our discretion, we award McEntyre-Shurtleff his
costs, but award only a portion of his reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal
upon compliance with ARCAP 21. Rule 39(a)–(b).
CONCLUSION
¶14 We affirm the order of protection.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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