Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE In re the Matter of: JAVIER MARANON, JR., Petitioner/Appellant, v. AYERIM GARCIA, Respondent/Appellee. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0024 FC FILED 11-20-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County No. S1400DO202000904 The Honorable Mark W. Reeves, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Javier Maranon, Jr., Yuma Petitioner/Appellant Mary Katherine Boyte, PC, Yuma By Mary K. Boyte Henderson Counsel for Respondent/Appellee MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Veronika Fabian joined. J A C O B S, Judge: ¶1 Javier Maranon, Jr. (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s October 2025 Order modifying Father’s parenting time and child support obligations and awarding Ayerim Garcia (“Mother”) attorneys’ fees. For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Father Petitions to Establish Paternity, Legal Decision- Making, Parenting Time, and Child Support. ¶2 Child was born to Mother and Father in March 2019. Father petitioned in September 2020 to establish paternity, legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support. After six days of trial between April 2022 and August 2023, the superior court entered final orders in October 2023 (the “October 2023 Order”). The court granted both parents joint legal decision-making over their son, with Mother having final authority, and adopting an equal 5-2-2-5 parenting schedule. The court found both parents mentally and physically healthy and capable of parenting; neither had acted “mendacious[ly]”; and neither committed domestic violence. It ordered Father to pay $149 per month in child support, with each party to bear their own attorneys’ fees. B. Mother Challenges the October 2023 Order, and Both Parties Seek Post-Decree Modifications. ¶3 In November 2023, Mother timely moved to alter or amend the October 2023 Order under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 83. She argued the court had adopted findings from Father’s proposed form of order that were unsupported by the evidence, including findings as to the parties’ parenting history, co-parenting relationship, child support, and attorneys’ fees. Mother also claimed that, after the close of the evidence, the child exhibited behaviors that made her concerned he had been exposed to or was the victim of sexual abuse. She argued those developments affected the child’s best interests and warranted reopening the evidence and reconsidering the parenting time orders. 2 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court ¶4 Father opposed the motion, arguing Rule 83 did not permit the court to consider post-trial events because they were not “newly discovered material evidence” within the rule’s meaning. He also argued Mother sought to modify parenting time within one year of the October 2023 Order without satisfying Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 25- 411(A). Father further argued medical evaluations of the child didn’t substantiate sexual abuse and maintained findings in the October 2023 Order concerning parenting time, child support, and attorneys’ fees should remain unchanged. ¶5 More than one year later, while Mother’s Rule 83 motion was still pending, Father petitioned to modify child support. Father argued the Arizona Child Support Guidelines produced a presumptive obligation of $376 per month payable by Mother, rather than the $149 per month he had been ordered to pay. He also requested that Mother pay seventy-five percent of uncovered medical, dental, and vision expenses and sought attorneys’ fees if the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. ¶6 In March 2025, the superior court heard argument on Mother’s Rule 83 motion and Father’s child support petition. The court explained it would receive evidence concerning events after the close of the 2023 trial and Father’s request to modify child support, while separately determining whether the original trial record warranted amended findings under Rule 83. ¶7 In April 2025, Mother filed a post-decree petition to modify parenting time. She argued the child’s concerning behaviors continued and required mental health treatment. Mother alleged Father didn’t meaningfully participate in counseling, sometimes failed to transport the child to appointments or arrived late, and did not meaningfully participate in periodic meetings with the therapist. She further alleged the child had attendance and behavioral problems at school during Father’s parenting time, became upset at parenting time exchanges, and sometimes attempted to run away rather than leave with Father. Mother also argued Father refused to assist during difficult exchanges, exposed their son to inappropriate entertainment, and failed to cooperate concerning school matters. She requested that the court modify the parenting plan to reflect the child’s current best interests. 3 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court C. The Superior Court Holds an Evidentiary Hearing Over Two Days and Excludes Father’s Untimely Supplemental Disclosures. ¶8 The superior court began an evidentiary hearing on the pending motions and petitions on May 2, 2025. After the parties didn’t finish their presentation of evidence on May 2, the court gave the parties three months’ notice the proceeding would conclude on August 7. ¶9 On August 6, 2025, the day before the hearing continued, Father filed a supplemental exhibit disclosure and supplemental disclosure statement identifying numerous exhibits, approximately 30 of which were USB drives containing lengthy audio and video recordings. The court struck the untimely supplemental disclosures but allowed Father to use exhibits and recordings he had previously disclosed. D. The Superior Court Grants Mother’s Petition to Modify Parenting Time, and Father Appeals. ¶10 On October 6, 2025, the superior court entered the October 2025 Order. The court amended several findings from the October 2023 Order and granted Mother’s petition to modify parenting time. The court found the child “is not well adjusted to parenting time with Father, particularly the schedule established in 2023.” It also found Father kept recording interactions rather than facilitating them, “did not appear supportive of therapy,” and “unreasonably denie[d]” that the child’s behaviors were a cause for concern. After reviewing records and recordings of Father’s communications and conduct, the court expressed “significant concern about Father’s mental health.” The court also found Father failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 49 and related discovery requests requiring him to identify his mental health care providers and produce relevant records. The court found Father’s refusal kept it from getting “accurate information regarding Father’s diagnoses and condition” and suggested he believed the undisclosed information would “reflect negatively upon the issues before the court.” ¶11 Addressing Father’s petition to modify child support, the court found Father received $4,011 per month in Veterans Administration (“VA”) disability benefits and attributed additional employment income based on Arizona’s then-current minimum wage. It found Father’s VA disability rating did not establish an inability to work and that he had not otherwise rebutted the statutory presumption of full-time minimum-wage employment. The court also found Father had repeatedly misrepresented 4 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court his employment circumstances and income in 2023, delaying and increasing the cost of the litigation which took until 2025 to conclude. ¶12 The court continued in effect the prior award of joint legal decision-making authority, with Mother retaining final decision-making authority, reduced Father’s parenting time to alternate weekends, increased his child support obligation to $622 per month, and awarded Mother $57,298.80 in attorneys’ fees. ¶13 Father filed a Rule 83 motion after the October 2025 Order, which the superior court denied as an impermissible successive motion under Rule 83(d). Father timely appealed the October 2025 Order. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION I. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Modifying Parenting Time. ¶14 Father argues the court lacked authority to modify parenting time because Mother sought relief within one year of the October 2023 Order without establishing serious endangerment under A.R.S. § 25- 411(A). He also argues the court failed to make a threshold finding of changed circumstances. ¶15 We review parenting time orders for an abuse of discretion but review questions of law de novo. DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423 ¶ 9 (App. 2019). Before modifying parenting time, the superior court must determine whether changed circumstances materially affecting the child’s welfare justify reconsidering the existing order. Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 343 ¶ 14 (App. 2020) (citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977)). If that threshold is met, the court determines whether modification serves the child’s best interests. Id.; see A.R.S. §§ 25-403, -411(J). The court need not make an express finding of changed circumstances when the record reasonably supports an implied finding. Celaya v. Rivero Quinteros, 261 Ariz. 323, 334 ¶ 31 (App. 2025). A. Mother’s Petition to Modify Parenting Time Was Filed More Than One Year After the October 2023 Order. ¶16 Father contends the court erred by modifying his parenting time based on Mother’s motion, brought less than one month after entry of the October 2023 Order, without evidence establishing that their son’s environment seriously endangered his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. Mother’s November 2023 Rule 83 motion alleged errors 5 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court in the court’s October 2023 Order’s findings, but it also relied on developments occurring after the close of evidence and asked the court to reconsider its parenting time orders. The court did not modify parenting time on that request while it remained pending. Mother later filed a separate post-decree petition to modify parenting time on April 1, 2025, and the court received evidence and ruled on that petition together with the other pending matters. ¶17 Regardless of whether the November 2023 request independently satisfied A.R.S. § 25-411(A), the petition on which the court granted relief was filed approximately eighteen months after the October 2023 Order. Because Mother filed that petition more than one year after the prior order, A.R.S. § 25-411(A)’s heightened endangerment requirement did not apply to the court’s consideration of the petition. The court therefore was not required to find that the child’s environment seriously endangered his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health before modifying parenting time. B. The Record Supports an Implied Finding of Changed Circumstances. ¶18 Father argues the superior court bypassed the threshold changed-circumstances inquiry and proceeded directly to a new best- interests analysis. Mother responds that the record supports an implied finding of substantial and continuing changed circumstances. Mother also argues Father did not preserve an objection to the absence of an express finding in the superior court. We agree with Mother. Even if Father had properly preserved his claim, it fails on the merits. Although the court did not label its findings as a determination of changed circumstances, an express finding is not required if the record reasonably supports the finding implied by its ruling. Celaya, 261 Ariz. at 334, 335 ¶¶ 31, 37. ¶19 Mother presented evidence that, after the October 2023 Order, the child began counseling, experienced school and behavioral problems, increasingly resisted exchanges, and sometimes attempted to run away rather than leave with Father. After hearing the evidence, the court found the child was not well adjusted to the existing schedule, continued resisting exchanges, and sometimes attempted to run away. It also found Father did not appear supportive of therapy, and unreasonably denied the seriousness of the child’s behaviors. Those findings support an implied determination that circumstances materially affecting the child’s welfare had changed and that modification served his best interests. 6 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court II. The Superior Court Did Not Violate Father’s Due Process Rights or Abuse Its Discretion in Managing the Evidentiary Hearings. ¶20 Father argues the superior court denied him due process by excluding his supplemental audio and video exhibits considering their late disclosure, limiting additional evidence, and intervening during his examination of Mother. Mother counters that the court did not violate Father’s due process rights since it gave notice of the date for concluding the evidentiary hearing, excluded only untimely or duplicative materials, and assisted Father in presenting admissible evidence. ¶21 We review claims of violations of rights to due process de novo. Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 260 ¶ 16 (App. 2014). Trial courts have broad discretion to manage proceedings and impose reasonable time limits, but they must give each party a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and confront adverse evidence. See Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 466, 470 ¶¶ 14, 26 (App. 2014); Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346 (1992). Reversal requires a showing of prejudice. Volk, 235 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 26. A. Father Had a Meaningful Opportunity to Present His Case. ¶22 Viewed as a whole, the proceedings gave Father a meaningful opportunity to present his case. The court continued the May hearing to an additional full day in August and gave the parties more than three months’ notice that the proceedings would conclude that day. Father then continued his examination of Mother, presented evidence, examined witnesses, and addressed the parenting time and child support issues. The court also accepted Mother’s offer to give Father thirty minutes of her allotted hearing time. When the court intervened, it generally did so to address objections, explain evidentiary procedures, clarify questions, or redirect repetitive lines of examination. All in all, between the hearing on the morning of May 2, 2025, and the full-day hearing on August 7, 2025, the court conducted on-the-record proceedings for 8 hours and 35 minutes, a majority of which was used by Father. ¶23 The court acted within its discretion by excluding Father’s supplemental materials. One day before the hearing resumed, Father disclosed a five-inch binder and approximately thirty USB drives containing lengthy recordings, renumbered exhibits, excerpts, and summaries to opposing counsel. Courts may exclude untimely-disclosed materials. Fadlon v. Cleverly, 262 Ariz. 127, 138 ¶¶ 42-43 (App. 2026) (excluding exhibits disclosed one week before trial as not “reasonably in 7 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court advance of the hearing” under Rule 49(b)(2)(B)). The court did not deny Father his rights to due process by using this discretion. ¶24 Father was able to use his properly disclosed exhibits and recordings after identifying them and laying appropriate foundation. The court admitted Father’s evidence when he did so, and repeatedly assisted Father with evidentiary procedures and the presentation of exhibits. ¶25 None of this abridged Father’s rights to due process: applying rules of procedure and evidence is the essence of process. State v. Lopez, 3 Ariz. App. 200, 205 (App. 1966) (“The constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial and due process also requires that the trial proceed according to the established procedures or rules of practice . . . ”). B. The Court Did Not Penalize Father for Maintaining the Privacy of His Medical Information. ¶26 Father also argues the court forced upon him an improper choice between disclosing confidential medical information and preserving his parenting rights. Mother responds that Rule 49 required Father to disclose the identities of his mental-health treatment providers, but not his privileged communications or his medical records without limitation. She also argues her discovery requests sought information specifically relevant to Father’s own assertion that his conditions rendered him unable to work. Father did rely on his post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety, VA disability rating, and asserted inability to work in litigating the parenting time and child support issues. ¶27 We agree with Mother that Father put his diagnoses and functional limitations at issue by citing health issues as support for his claimed inability to work. Thus, when Father declined to identify his treatment providers or produce supporting records, citing privacy, that shaped the record the court had to work with. The court considered the evidence Father chose to provide and found his failure to comply with Rule 49 disclosure requirements and Mother’s discovery requests kept the court from getting accurate information about his diagnoses and condition. Again, the process played out under the rules, and the court did not create a “procedural trap.” It thus did not deny Father due process. Lopez, 3 Ariz. App. at 205. 8 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court C. The Manner of the Court’s Participation in Cross- Examination Was Not Error. ¶28 Father further contends the court abandoned its neutrality by giving Mother a “judicial out” from statements attributed to her in a police report. Mother responds that the court merely addressed an evidentiary objection concerning whether the report accurately reflected Mother’s own words. The circumstances were this: during cross-examination, Father read language from the report stating that Mother believed the child was being exposed to sexual conduct by Father and asked Mother what she meant by “sexual conduct.” Mother’s counsel objected because Mother had not written the report, and the court asked whether Mother had used that phrase or whether it reflected the officer’s conclusion. ¶29 What happened next didn’t prejudice Father. Father continued to read directly from the police report, asking Mother whether it was “correct.” Ostensibly, Father was interested in knowing if Mother had in fact said what the police report attributed to her. In attempting to help Father understand the importance of the phrasing of his question, the court explained how police reports may not always be a perfect transcription of what was said: “So I think you better ask specifically, did [Mother] say that because there — I mean, [opposing counsel] and I have worked with [police officers] all of our lives, and they take poetic license on things and they say different things that — that may not be specifically what the person said, so.” The court did not terminate or limit Father’s examination. Father continued questioning Mother about what she told police, whether her report implied sexual abuse, why she contacted law enforcement, and the results of the police and Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) investigations. The court also admitted the DCS report that was the subject of Father’s examination. Father has not established either bias or resulting prejudice from these facts. See Volk, 235 Ariz. at 470 ¶ 26. III. The Superior Court’s Findings Concerning Parenting Time and Earning Capacity Are Not Internally Inconsistent. ¶30 Father argues the October 2025 Order is internally inconsistent because the superior court expressed “significant concern” about his mental health while also finding him capable of full -time employment. Mother responds that parenting capacity and employment capacity present distinct factual and legal questions and that a concern relevant to parenting does not necessarily establish an inability to work. She also argues the court did not base its parenting time decision 9 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court exclusively, primarily, or necessarily on its concern about Father’s mental health. We agree with Mother. ¶31 The parenting time findings addressed the child’s best interests, including his adjustment to the existing schedule and Father’s conduct within the parent-child and co-parenting relationships. The court found Father continued to record interactions and exchanges, did not adequately assist during difficult exchanges, did not appear supportive of therapy, and unreasonably denied the seriousness of the child’s behaviors. Based on records and recordings of Father’s communications and conduct, the court also expressed “significant concern about Father’s mental health.” That concern was one component of the court’s broader best-interests analysis; the court did not diagnose Father, find him unfit, or conclude he was wholly incapable of parenting. Instead, it continued joint legal decision-making authority and awarded Father parenting time on alternating weekends. ¶32 The child support findings addressed a different question: whether Father rebutted the statutory presumption that he was capable of full-time employment at no less than the applicable minimum wage. The court found Father received $4,011 per month in VA disability benefits, that his disability rating did not itself establish an inability to work, and that he had not otherwise proved he was unable to work. A concern about a parent’s conduct or mental health as it relates to a child’s best interests does not necessarily establish that the parent is incapable of performing any full- time employment. The court therefore could reasonably modify the parenting schedule while also finding that Father had not rebutted the statutory presumption of earning capacity. ¶33 Father also argues expert testimony was required before the court could make findings about his mental health. Mother disagrees, and responds that, in deciding whether modification served their son’s best interests, the court was simply required to consider the applicable statutory factors, including “[t]he mental and physical health of all individuals involved.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(5). ¶34 We agree with Mother. Section 25-403 required the court to consider Father’s mental health as part of its best-interests analysis, but it did not require the court to diagnose Father or find that a particular disorder rendered him unfit. The court could therefore consider Father’s testimony, recorded conduct, and communications without first receiving expert testimony. Additionally, the court’s parenting time decision did not rest solely on its concern about Father’s mental health; it also relied on the 10 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court child’s adjustment to the existing schedule; the continuing exchange difficulties; Father’s recorded conduct, communications, and lack of support for therapy; and the parties’ co-parenting difficulties. We defer to the superior court’s assessment of that evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who testified. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284 ¶ 20 (App. 2019) (citing Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347 ¶ 13 (App. 1998)). Because the findings concerning parenting time and earning capacity addressed distinct legal and factual questions, they are not internally inconsistent. IV. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining Father’s Income for Child Support. ¶35 Father argues the superior court erred by attributing employment income to him because of his disability. He separately contends the child support worksheet uses a total monthly income that cannot be reconciled with the income identified in the court’s order. Mother responds that Father’s VA schedular disability rating did not establish unemployability, that he failed to rebut the statutory presumption that he could earn at least full-time minimum-wage income, and that he did not preserve his challenge to the worksheet calculation. We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion. Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 112 ¶ 9 (App. 2016) (citing Engel v. Landman, 221 Ariz. 504, 510 ¶ 21 (App. 2009)). A. The Court Properly Attributed Minimum-Wage Earnings. ¶36 Under A.R.S. § 25-320(N), the court presumes, absent contrary testimony, that a parent is capable of full-time employment at least at the applicable state or federal minimum wage. The parent asserting an inability to work bears the burden of rebutting it. See State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. McEvoy, 191 Ariz. 350, 353 ¶ 13 (App. 1998). ¶37 The superior court applied that presumption and found Father had not rebutted it. Father testified that his 100% VA disability rating was based in substantial part on migraines, PTSD, and lower-back and sciatic pain, but he was uncertain how the individual ratings combined to produce his overall disability rating. Mother argues Father received benefits under the VA’s schedular-rating system rather than a determination based on individual unemployability, and that a schedular rating, even at 100%, does not itself preclude employment. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (schedular rating system for disability is based upon a “reduction in earning capacity” not a determination that the veteran cannot 11 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court procure gainful employment), with 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (alternative rating system, Total Disability Based on Individual Unemployability (“TDIU”), assigns 100% disability “when the disabled person is, in the judgment of the rating agency, unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation”) (emphasis added). Father declined to identify his treatment providers or produce his disability application and supporting medical records. Father also presented no medical testimony or other evidence establishing that his conditions prevented him from maintaining full-time employment. The court thus acted within its discretion by finding that Father’s VA disability did not establish unemployability and attributing full-time minimum-wage earnings to him. B. Father Did Not Preserve His Challenge to the Income Figure Used in the Child Support Worksheet. ¶38 Father argues the child support worksheet’s monthly income figure of $7,096 exceeds the combined amount of his $4,011 in VA benefits and the minimum-wage earnings described in the order. Mother responds that Father did not preserve the issue for appellate review because he failed to raise the asserted discrepancy in the superior court. ¶39 Mother is correct. Father did not identify the asserted discrepancy in his untimely post-judgment motion or otherwise ask the superior court to clarify which figure reflected its intended determination of his income. The court thus had no chance to determine whether the difference resulted from a clerical mistake, an error in its reasoning, or its reliance on evidence of Father’s prior earnings. “Because a trial court and opposing counsel should be afforded the opportunity to correct any asserted defects before error may be raised on appeal, absent extraordinary circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.” Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994). Father does not suggest that extraordinary circumstances excuse his failure to preserve the issue. We therefore do not consider it. V. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Mother Attorneys’ Fees. ¶40 Father challenges the award of $57,298.80 in attorneys’ fees, arguing the award imposes an impossible financial burden and resulted from proceedings in which he was not afforded a fair opportunity to challenge Mother’s positions. Mother responds that the court considered both statutory factors under A.R.S. § 25-324 and found that Father’s conduct unreasonably delayed the proceedings and increased her litigation 12 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court expenses. We agree with Mother that the superior court’s findings provide a sufficient basis for the award. ¶41 We review an award of attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 25-324 for abuse of discretion. Lehn, 246 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 29 (citing Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 494 ¶ 6 (App. 2014)). Section 25-324 requires the superior court to consider both the parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness of the positions they took throughout the proceedings. A court may award fees based on unreasonable conduct in litigation even when the party receiving the award has greater financial resources at the time of the award. See MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 592 ¶¶ 37-38 (App. 2011). ¶42 The court considered both factors. It found that, for most of the litigation, “there was a substantial disparity in the financial resources available to the parties,” with Father having “considerably greater resources than Mother.” Although Mother’s financial circumstances improved after she completed her education and began working as a registered nurse, the court found that the disparity existed during much of the litigation for which she incurred fees. The court also found Father repeatedly misrepresented his employment circumstances and income and that those misrepresentations “delayed and significantly increased the costs of this litigation.” In addition, the court found Father took unreasonable positions and engaged in conduct that unnecessarily prolonged the parties’ disputes. While the record does not support the suggestion that Father was entirely responsible for the nearly two-year delay from the filing of Mother’s Rule 83 Motion to the court’s resolution of it, we defer to the court’s finding that Father contributed to this unreasonable delay. Those findings provide a reasonable basis for the award, and Father has not shown an abuse of discretion. ATTORNEYS’ FEES ¶43 Father requests attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324 and ARCAP 21. Mother also requests fees and costs on appeal. In our discretion, after considering the parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness of their positions, we deny both parties’ requests and award Mother her taxable costs on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21. 13 MARANON v. GARCIA Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶44 We affirm. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 14