Hall v. Hall

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE In re the Matter of: LAURA HALL, Petitioner/Appellee, v. BRIAN HALL, Respondent/Appellant. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0272 FC FILED 11-04-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2019-098469 The Honorable Harla M. Davison, Commissioner AFFIRMED COUNSEL Laura Hall, Avondale Petitioner/Appellee Pro Se Duenas Eden Cravatta PLC, Phoenix By Dorian L. Eden Counsel for Respondent/Appellant  HALL v. HALL Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined. H O W E, Judge: ¶1 Brian Hall (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to alter or amend parenting time. For the reasons below, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Father and Laura Hall (“Mother”) married in 2004. They had four children, born in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2014. In 2019, Mother petitioned for dissolution of marriage. In 2021, the trial court issued its decree dissolving the marriage. ¶3 The trial court decided that Father and Mother should split parenting time. It determined that Mother would be the “primary residential parent” and Father would have parenting time every other weekend from Friday to Monday and from midweek Wednesday to the following Wednesday. Holidays were also split between them. ¶4 Two years later, Mother and Father jointly agreed to modify parenting time. They agreed to a “5-2-2-5” schedule, where Mother would have the children every Monday and Tuesday, and Father would have them every Wednesday and Thursday, while weekends would be split between the parents. ¶5 Later that year, Father lost his job. He secured a new job but “unofficially relocate[d]” to Pennsylvania. Father needed to work three weeks in Pennsylvania and one week in Arizona. Given his new living situation, the “5-2-2-5” schedule became untenable. Thus, he requested another modification of parenting time. He proposed that his parenting time consist of the first nine days of the month. He also requested every third weekend of the month, every three-day weekend holiday, and the entirety of Fall, Spring, and Summer break. ¶6 The court scheduled a hearing at which Father presented exhibits and testified. Mother appeared and testified at the hearing. Mother argued that giving Father parenting time for nearly every vacation was not 2  HALL v. HALL Decision of the Court in the children’s best interests. The trial court granted Father parenting time for the first nine days of every month. However, it found Mother’s position on the best interest of the children “credible,” and “maintain[ed] the current [holiday] schedule[,]” ruling “[t]he balance of the parties parenting plan is affirmed.” It stated that “[s]hould Father secure the ability to work two weeks in Arizona” then “the parties shall meet and confer on an equal access parenting plan.” ¶7 Not long after, Mother and Father both claimed that the other parent was not honoring the new parenting-time agreement. Mother moved to enforce parenting time. The trial court held an enforcement hearing. At the hearing, Father stated that the agreement was a “50/50 schedule” because he had the first nine days of each month “plus alternating weekends.” Meanwhile, Mother argued the parenting time schedule was not equal. Instead, they agreed to “the first nine days beginning at the first weekend and the week following and then that second weekend of the month[,]” but not to “every other weekend.” ¶8 After taking the matter under advisement, the court clarified the parenting time order because neither parent understood the orders. It explained that “the balance of the parties’ parenting plan was not [explicitly] defined.” While the modification order stated, “[t]he balance of the [] parenting plan is affirmed,” the court noted that that statement referred to “holidays, breaks, and vacations.” Further, the court found that the parenting plan “taken in conjunction with” the court’s directive for Father to later meet with Mother to discuss an equal parenting plan if he could secure “work [for] two weeks in Arizona . . . meant that the Order [did] not grant equal access parenting time.” Otherwise, maintaining the balance of the parenting plan “would render” Father’s ability to later meet “redundant.” The court made clear that it “only ordered parenting time for Father during the first week of every month.” Thus, the order did not include “every other weekend” because that “would result in [] near equal parenting access.” ¶9 Father moved to alter or amend the ruling under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 83. He argued that the court “reduced” his parenting time to “only nine days” and that such a reduction violated his due process rights, Rule 83(a), and A.R.S. § 25-411(A). The trial court denied his motion. Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). 3  HALL v. HALL Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶10 Mother did not file an answering brief, but because this appeal involves the children’s best interests, we decline to apply confession of error. See In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, 525 ¶ 2 (App. 2002). ¶11 “[A] court may modify a parenting plan only if it first finds a material change of the circumstances affecting the child’s welfare since the last court order.” Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 341 ¶ 1 (App. 2020). Once a court finds a change, it then turns to the factors in A.R.S. § 25-403(A) and “determine[s] whether a change in the parenting plan will be in the child[ren]’s best interests.” Id. A trial court has “broad discretion to decide whether a change of circumstances has occurred.” Id. at 343 ¶ 14. We review a trial court modification of a parenting plan for abuse of discretion. See id. A due process challenge to a parenting plan modification is reviewed de novo. See Solorzano v. Jensen, 250 Ariz. 348, 350 ¶ 9 (App. 2020). ¶12 Father contends that the trial court dressed a “modification” in the clothing of a “clarification.” Absent notice and a hearing, Father asserts he had no opportunity to procure evidence, witnesses, and, overall, to litigate his parenting time with his children. He argues the absence of such a hearing violated due process, Rule 83(a)(1), and A.R.S. § 25-411(A). Yet, the trial court merely clarified a previous parenting time designation, implicating no statute, rule, or constitutional right. Thus, the trial court did not err. ¶13 First, Father argues that the court violated due process because it provided no notice that it was “considering a reduction of his parenting time.” Due process protects parents’ fundamental interest in their children’s “care, custody, and management.” Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 238 ¶ 4 (App. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Due process entitles a party to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Cook v. Losnegard, 228 Ariz. 202, 206 ¶ 18 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). “[B]ecause determinations of legal decision-making and parenting time rest upon the best interests of the child, it is necessary that the parties have time to prepare and present all relevant evidence to the court before such orders are modified.” Cruz v. Garcia, 240 Ariz. 233, 236 ¶ 11 (App. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). ¶14 Father had fair notice and an opportunity to be heard during the actual modification hearing. Father testified, presented exhibits, and argued before the judge. Afterward, the trial court declined to grant equal 4  HALL v. HALL Decision of the Court parenting time until he could live in Arizona for two weeks a month, instead of one. During the modification hearing, Father had ample opportunity to present his evidence and assert his arguments. See Cruz, 240 Ariz. at 237, 238 ¶¶ 15, 18 (finding a trial court violated due process by modifying legal decision making when the purpose of the hearing was for a suspension of parenting time). ¶15 The fact Father misunderstood the parenting-time order does not constitute a violation of his due process rights. Father would be entitled to an additional hearing only if the court changed parenting time. See Heidbreder v. Heidbreder, 230 Ariz. 377, 381 ¶ 14 (App. 2012) (explaining due process is implicated only when the court “modifies child support without conducting a hearing” (emphasis added)). However, after the enforcement hearing, the trial court did not modify but clarified parenting time because “neither party ha[d an] understanding of [] the current Orders.” It “only ordered parenting time for Father during the first week of every month.” The modification order had the same directive. The extent to which the modification order referred to “equal parenting time” pertained to “holidays, breaks, and vacation.” Indeed, the last line of the parenting time modification order said if “Father secure[d] . . . work two weeks in Arizona and two weeks in Pennsylvania” the parties then could meet on “an equal access parenting plan.” If an equal access parenting plan was contingent on Father’s ability to live for a longer period in Arizona than he currently does, then the order could not have granted equal parenting time. So, the clarification was not an additional modification that would have entitled Father to additional due process protections. ¶16 Second, Father argues the court erred in denying his motion to alter or amend because it did not “properly consider all of the evidence” and “ruled on an issue that neither party raised[,] . . . Father’s parenting time.” Yet, he submitted no additional evidence for the trial court to consider. Further, contrary to what Father claims, the court did not rule on a motion never raised by either party. As explained, the court made no ruling but clarified the court order. The court was well within its discretion to deny the motion. See Silence v. Betts, 258 Ariz. 84, 86–87 ¶ 7 (App. 2024) (explaining this Court only reverses a denial of a motion to alter or amend on “untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons”). ¶17 Finally, Father argues that the trial court violated A.R.S. § 25- 411(A) because the court entered a new “parenting plan less than a year” from the previous plan, and “no affidavits or verified petitions were filed requesting a modification.” Once again, the court did not enter a new parenting plan, it only clarified a previous modification order. 5  HALL v. HALL Decision of the Court ¶18 Father requests attorney’s fees under Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21(a)(2) and A.R.S. § 25-324. After considering the reasonableness of the parties’ positions, this Court denies his request. CONCLUSION ¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 6