Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE In re the Marriage of: CHOC WAGONER, Petitioner/Appellee, v. BEVA WOOD (FKA: BEVA WAGONER), Respondent/Appellant. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0141 FC FILED 11-16-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County No. S0900DO202200381 The Honorable Joseph Samuel Clark, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL White Mountain Law Group PLC, Show Low By Michael R. Ellsworth Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Beva Wood, Snowflake Respondent/Appellant WAGONER v. WOOD Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined. C A T L E T T, Judge: ¶1 Beva Wood (“Wife”) appeals various orders the superior court entered after dissolving her marriage to Choc Wagoner (“Husband”). We lack jurisdiction over all but one of them. As to the one order over which we have jurisdiction, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The parties married in 2008. In 2022, Husband petitioned to dissolve their marriage. In July 2023, the court entered a Decree of Dissolution (“Decree”). The Decree ordered the parties to sell the marital residence (“the Residence”) and divide the proceeds. ¶3 In October 2023, Husband petitioned to enforce the Decree’s provisions about selling the Residence and find Wife in contempt, asserting that Wife was uncooperative. Wife countered that Husband delayed the sale by refusing to agree on a realtor. In March 2024, the court assigned a realtor and ordered the parties to “promptly contact the realtor and sign any and all documents needed to get the property listed for sale immediately.” The court also denied Husband’s contempt petition, finding the parties made a good-faith attempt to agree, but they had been “hopelessly deadlocked” about choosing a realtor until the court intervened. ¶4 Husband returned to court a year later and petitioned the Court a second time to find Wife in contempt. He claimed Wife violated the court’s March 2024 order by not cooperating with the realtor and unreasonably delaying the sale of the Residence. In response, Wife “adamantly denie[d]” that she disregarded the court order and claimed that a dispute about the price listing and an unsatisfactory offer caused the delay. The court again ordered the parties to cooperate with the real estate agent to complete the sale. ¶5 Next, Wife moved for exclusive rights to list the Residence for sale and to find Husband in contempt. She claimed Husband manipulated 2 WAGONER v. WOOD Decision of the Court the court into believing that any delays were Wife’s fault. The court denied her motion, again ordered Husband and Wife to cooperate in selling the Residence, and awarded Husband attorney fees. Wife did not appeal that award. ¶6 In December 2025, Husband again petitioned the court for contempt and attorney fees. He asserted that the real estate agent secured buyers for the Residence, but Wife refused to sign paperwork regarding costs for repairs made. Wife asked the court to stay the sale while she filed another lawsuit to obtain Husband’s share of the Residence’s proceeds. Wife did not dispute Husband’s request for attorney fees. On December 9, 2025, the court found that the buyers’ offer was appropriate, it was in the parties’ best interests to sell the Residence, Wife acted unreasonably, and Husband was entitled to attorney fees. Although the court did not find Wife in contempt, the court ordered Wife to sign the paperwork facilitating the sale of the Residence and directed Husband to file a China Doll affidavit supporting his attorney fees. On January 27, 2026, after considering Husband’s affidavit, the court awarded Husband $2,567.10 in attorney fees, to be paid from Wife’s portion of the Residence’s sale. ¶7 Mother timely appealed the attorney fee award. JURISDICTION ¶8 Wife argues the superior court erred by: (1) ordering and enforcing the Residence’s sale; (2) failing to grant Rule 85 relief; (3) creating an “unfair process” because of the “cumulative effect[] of errors[;]” and (4) awarding Husband attorney fees. ¶9 We must ensure we have jurisdiction. Camasura v. Camasura, 238 Ariz. 179, 181 ¶ 5 (App. 2015). We lack jurisdiction over orders not raised in the notice of appeal. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 480 ¶ 39 (2023); Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 118, 124 (App. 1982); ARCAP 8(c) (“The notice of appeal . . . must . . . [d]esignate the judgment or portion of the judgment from which the party is appealing[.]”). ¶10 In Wife’s notice of appeal, she identified only the superior court’s January 27 attorney fee award. And while she asked us in her opening brief to “[r]everse the orders enforcing the sale of the property,” she then conceded in her reply brief that she appealed only the attorney fee award. Wife asserts that although she “addressed issues in her Opening Brief that were not [a]ppealed,” she “presented this information as evidence” of how the court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees; 3 WAGONER v. WOOD Decision of the Court she agreed she “has not asked [this court] for an appeal on [the other orders] at this time.” ¶11 So in this appeal, we have jurisdiction only to consider the court’s attorney fee award to Husband.1 See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at ¶ 39; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶12 Wife argues the court abused its discretion by awarding Husband attorney fees. But Wife did not oppose the fee award in the superior court, and arguments not raised in the superior court are waived on appeal. See BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Espiau, 251 Ariz. 588, 594 ¶ 25 (App. 2021). Even if we overlooked waiver, Wife would not prevail. ¶13 The superior court may award attorney fees in dissolution proceedings “after considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout[.]” A.R.S. § 25-324(A). We review a fee award under § 25-324 for an abuse of discretion and reverse only when such an award is clearly erroneous. Hefner v. Hefner, 248 Ariz. 54, 57 ¶ 6 (App. 2019). “We will not disturb the trial court’s discretionary award of fees if there is any reasonable basis for it.” Orfaly v. Tucson Symphony Soc’y, 209 Ariz. 260, 265 ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (citation modified). ¶14 Wife argues the court abused its discretion by awarding Husband attorney fees despite evidence of Husband’s noncompliance with court orders, disputed facts, and “[p]rocedural irregularities affecting fairness.” The superior court found that Wife acted unreasonably by not responding to the realtor’s request to sign documents finalizing the Residence’s sale. On multiple occasions, the court ordered Wife to cooperate with the real estate agent and sign those sale documents. Reasonable evidence in the record supports that Wife failed to cooperate with the realtor and acted unreasonably. So the court did not err by awarding Husband attorney fees. See Orfaly, 209 Ariz. at 265 ¶ 18. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ¶15 Husband requests attorney fees under A.R.S. § 25-324 and both parties request costs. In our discretion, we award Husband his 1 Wife filed a second notice of appeal identifying other orders. The parties are currently briefing that appeal, which is not before us. 4 WAGONER v. WOOD Decision of the Court attorney fees and costs on appeal upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. We deny Wife’s request for costs. CONCLUSION ¶16 We dismiss any issue Wife raises other than her challenge to the superior court’s January 27 attorney fee award, which we affirm. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 5