Kelly R. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family and Community Services, Office of Children's Services and Stacy S
CourtAlaska Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketS-19665, S-19745
JudgeCarney, Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, Oravec
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
2026 WL 3569920 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED. Supreme Court of Alaska. KELLY R., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES and STACY S., Appellees. Supreme Court Nos. S-19665, S-19745 November 20, 2026 Superior Court No. 3PA-23-00094 CN Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Kristen C. Stohler, Judge. Attorneys and Law Firms Appearances: Aneliese Palmer, Goriune Dudukgian, and James J. Davis, Jr., Northern Justice Project, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellant. No appearance by Appellee, State of Alaska. Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellee, Mother, Stacy S. Before: Carney, Chief Justice, and Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. OPINION PATE, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION Star page 1 *1 In child in need of aid (CINA) proceedings, there are certain statutory preferences that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) must observe when making placement decisions for a child in its custody, absent good cause to the contrary. 1 If OCS denies the preferred placement of a child with an adult family member or family friend, that person may seek judicial review of the agency's decision. A separate statute, AS 47.10.080(w), requires the superior court to apply a presumption that maintaining a sibling relationship is in the child's best interests. Here, a family friend — who had previously adopted the child's biological sister — sought placement of a child in OCS custody. OCS denied the request, and the superior court subsequently affirmed the agency's decision and denied the family friend's request for a placement review hearing. In its review of the request for placement, the superior court declined to apply the presumption under AS 47.10.080(w) that maintaining a sibling relationship was in the child's best interests. The court reasoned that there was no relationship to maintain because the biological sisters had been raised separately and had not yet established a relationship that could be maintained. This ruling was legal error. We hold that the presumption in AS 47.10.080(w) applies to siblings related by blood, even if adoption has severed their legal relationship and they have not established a social or emotional relationship. Because the superior court did not apply the required presumption to its assessment of whether there was good cause to deviate from the statutory placement preferences, we vacate the denial of the request for a placement review hearing and remand for further proceedings. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS A. Background Stacy S. 2 has eight children. This appeal concerns OCS's placement of Stacy's youngest biological child, Sunny. In July 2023 OCS initiated a child welfare investigation and discovered one-month-old Sunny in her mother's care, visibly shaking; Sunny later tested positive for methamphetamine. The following day, OCS filed an emergency petition for custody, which the superior court subsequently granted. OCS placed Sunny with local foster parents Tina and Ralph Ward, who have no familial relationship with Sunny. Stacy's second-youngest biological child is Brianna. Sunny and Brianna are therefore siblings related by blood; they also share the same father. About a year before Sunny was born, OCS took custody of Brianna and placed her with Kelly and Brian Randall in Tennessee. Kelly is a cousin of Brianna and Sunny's biological father. Brianna has lived with the Randalls since 2023. In August 2024 OCS proposed to permanently place Sunny with the Randalls. At that time, the Randalls were in the process of adopting Brianna. The Randalls finalized their adoption of Brianna in October 2024. To prepare Sunny for possible relocation to Tennessee, OCS began facilitating weekly visits by videoconference between Sunny and the Randalls. OCS also scheduled several in-person visits. Stacy and the Wards resisted efforts toward visitation with the Randalls. Despite tensions, Sunny had three separate in-person visits with the Randalls. Star page 2 *2 Stacy opposed OCS's proposed transfer of Sunny's placement to the Randalls and requested a hearing under AS 47.10.080(s). 3 Meanwhile, Kelly separately filed a “proxy for a formal petition” for Sunny's adoption under AS 47.10.112(c). The superior court held a placement review hearing in June 2025 to address both pleadings, where Stacy, Tina, and Kelly all testified. An OCS caseworker also testified that everything was ready for Sunny's transfer to the Randalls. B. Superior Court Denied Proposed Transfer In November 2025 the superior court issued a transfer order denying OCS's proposed change of placement to the Randalls, as well as Kelly's proxy petition for adoption. The court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence under AS 47.10.080(s) that moving Sunny to the Randall's home in Tennessee would be contrary to her best interests. The superior court determined that the statutory presumption of maintaining a sibling relationship in AS 47.10.080(w) did not apply to its analysis of the child's best interests. The court reasoned that Sunny and Brianna had not established a sibling relationship and, thus, there was no relationship to maintain. It acknowledged that placing Sunny and Brianna in separate homes would “likely interfere in their ability to form a sibling relationship.” However, it ruled that this consideration did “not overcome the other factors leading to the court's determination that transferring placement of [Sunny was] not in her best interests.” Kelly appealed the transfer order. C. Superior Court Denied New Placement Hearing Less than two weeks after the superior court issued the transfer order, Kelly requested that OCS place Sunny with her family in Tennessee. OCS denied the request, stating that a “[p]lacement review hearing was held ... and the judge has made a ruling, denying the change of placement.” In its notice of denial, the agency explained that if Kelly was an adult family member and/or family friend, she had the right to contest the decision and ask the court to overrule the decision under AS 47.14.100(e) and (m). The denial notice also stated that upon Kelly's request, the court would “schedule a hearing at which [she could] appear and explain to the Judge why the children should be placed with [her].” In response to OCS's denial, Kelly requested a review hearing under AS 47.14.100(m) 4 and asked the superior court to “either grant her a new hearing in which she can seek placement of [Sunny] or deny her immediate request based on this Court's [transfer order].” The court subsequently issued a placement order explaining that it was denying Kelly's request “for all the reasons set forth in this Court's [transfer order].” Kelly appealed the placement order. Kelly's appeals of the transfer and placement orders were then consolidated. 5 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Star page 3 *3 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, “adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 6 IV. DISCUSSION Although Kelly appeals both the superior court's transfer and placement orders, our resolution of the placement order also resolves her appeal of the transfer order. 7 The placement order adopts the court's exact reasoning in the transfer order, and a successful appeal of the placement order provides Kelly with the same relief she seeks in her appeal of the transfer order — an opportunity to have Sunny placed with her in Tennessee. We therefore do not address the validity of the transfer order. Kelly argues on appeal that the superior court erred in its placement order by failing to apply the “sibling presumption” under AS 47.10.080(w) and by denying her the placement review hearing required under AS 47.14.100(m). Stacy argues that Kelly waived her challenge to the placement order, suggesting that Kelly did not expressly challenge the findings underlying the placement order. Stacy also argues that that the sibling presumption does not apply to the circumstances here. We first determine that the sibling presumption applies to placement review hearings under AS 47.14.100(m). 8 Next, we turn to Stacy's waiver argument and hold that Kelly adequately preserved her challenge to the placement order. We then explain our interpretation of the term “sibling” as it is used in AS 47.10.080(w). We determine that the term “sibling” includes those siblings related by blood, even if their legal relationship has been severed by adoption and they have no emotional or social relationship. Accordingly, we conclude that that it was error not to recognize the presumption in AS 47.10.080(w) when considering Kelly's request for placement. Based on these holdings, we vacate the superior court's placement order and remand for further proceedings. 9 A. The Presumption In AS 47.10.080(w) Applies To Placement Review Hearings Under AS 47.14.100(m). Star page 4 *4 When OCS has custody of a child, it must “arrange for the care of [that] child ... by placing the child in a foster home or in the care of an agency or institution.” 10 Alaska Statute 47.14.100 constrains the agency's discretion when making placement decisions. For example, AS 47.14.100(e) requires OCS to “place the child, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of good cause to the contrary, ... (3) with, in the following order of preference, (A) an adult family member; (B) a family friend who meets the foster care licensing requirements ... ; (C) a licensed foster home.” Alaska law allows certain individuals to challenge OCS's placement decisions. 11 If OCS deviates from the statutory preferences in AS 47.14.100(e), an “adult family member” or “family friend” may challenge the agency's decision by requesting a hearing under AS 47.14.100(m): “If the department denies a request for placement with an adult family member or a family friend, the department shall inform the adult family member or family friend of the basis for the denial and the right to request a hearing to review the decision.” 12 Alaska Statute 47.10.080 provides a court with directions for evaluating OCS's placement decisions. In the instant matter, our particular focus is on AS 47.10.080(w), which states that “[t]he court shall recognize a presumption that maintenance of a sibling relationship, including with a sibling who is related by blood, marriage, or adoption through one parent, is in a child's best interest.” To be clear, the presumption under subsection .080(w) does not, in and of itself, establish a priority or preference to place siblings together. 13 Instead, .080(w) requires the court to presume that the benefits of maintaining a sibling relationship are in the child's best interests; this involves a broad consideration of relationships that includes, but extends beyond, placement in a home with a sibling. 14 The statutory construction of AS 47.10.080(w) suggests that it applies generally to CINA proceedings, which would include placement review hearings under AS 47.14.100(m). The legislature codified the statute in the section entitled “Judgments and orders,” under the “Children's Proceedings” article of the “Children in Need of Aid” chapter. Moreover, subsection .080 (w), a standalone provision, does not contain any language restricting its application to a particular subset of CINA proceedings. The statute's legislative history provides further confirmation of .080(w)’s general applicability. 15 The Senate Health and Social Services Committee broadly described the statute's enabling legislation, Senate Bill 82, as “relating to court jurisdiction and findings pertaining to children who are in state custody.” 16 Star page 5 *5 Given the general applicability of AS 47.10.080(w) to CINA proceedings, we hold that the superior court is required to recognize the statutory presumption in placement review hearings under AS 47.14.100(m). B. Kelly Did Not Waive Her Challenge To The Placement Order. Stacy argues that because Kelly did not challenge the best interest findings that underpinned the superior court's placement order, Kelly waived her argument that the order is invalid. Stacy asserts that Kelly “had an obligation to present those challenges to the superior court and explain why there was not good cause to deviate from the statutory placement preferences.” But we conclude that Kelly satisfied her obligation. She challenged the court's findings and raised this issue with the superior court. And, contrary to Stacy's belief, Kelly did not have a duty to explain in her motion the reasons why OCS lacked good cause to deviate from the statutory placement preferences. A party generally waives an argument for appellate review if the party does not first raise or “preserve” the argument in the trial court. 17 We require parties to preserve an argument “to ensure that the trial court has the opportunity to respond to the argument, and to ensure that there is a sufficient legal ruling and factual record to allow meaningful review by the appellate court[s].” 18 When OCS denied Kelly's request for placement, the agency relied exclusively on the superior court's transfer order as the basis for its denial. As a “family friend” under AS 47.14.100(e), Kelly challenged OCS's denial by requesting a hearing under AS 47.14.100(m). 19 Because the Wards do not qualify as an “adult family member” or “family friend,” Kelly has a higher priority placement under AS 47.14.100(e). 20 When denying Kelly's request, the court relied on the same reasoning as OCS: “[Kelly] is denied placement... for all the reasons set forth in this Court's [transfer order].” Kelly challenged that decision and filed the instant appeal. Stacy contends that Kelly waived her challenge because she did not explain “why there was not good cause” for OCS to deny her placement request. But AS 47.14.100(m) does not require Kelly to articulate an argument in her request for a hearing; it is at the hearing — if granted — where Kelly would presumably flesh out her arguments. Furthermore, Kelly was entitled to a hearing and was not required to prove that OCS lacked “good cause” to deviate from the statutory placement preferences under AS 47.14.100(e). 21 Rather, OCS carries the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the agency had good cause to deny Kelly's request as a preferred placement. 22 Star page 6 *6 For these reasons, we hold that Kelly did not waive her challenge to the placement order. C. It Was Error Not To Apply The Presumption That Maintaining A Sibling Relationship Was In Sunny's Best Interests. The superior court chose not to apply the presumption in AS 47.10.080(w) that maintaining a sibling relationship with Brianna was in Sunny's best interests. The court inferred that this statutory presumption did not apply based on its finding that Sunny and Brianna did not have an existing sibling relationship to maintain. Kelly challenges the court's reasoning, arguing that Sunny and Brianna do have an existing sibling relationship and that the court erred by failing to recognize the presumption. Stacy responds that because the use of the word “sibling” in subsection .080(w) is non-specific, the presumption does not clearly apply to Sunny and Brianna. We disagree with Stacy's argument and conclude that the presumption in .080(w) applies here. 1. The presumption applies to biological siblings, even if their legal relationship has been severed by adoption. When addressing a request for placement review, the superior court must recognize the statutory presumption that “maintenance of a sibling relationship, including a sibling who is related by blood, marriage, or adoption through one parent, is in a child's best interest.” 23 We now clarify the meaning of “sibling” in AS 47.10.080(w) through our standard methods of statutory interpretation. When interpreting a statute, we “consider its language, its purpose, and its legislative history.” 24 And “the plainer the language, the more convincing contrary legislative history must be” in order to justify an interpretation that deviates from the language of the statute. 25 We first note that the term “sibling” in AS 47.10.080(w) includes siblings who are related by blood, as well as those who are not related by blood (i.e., siblings by marriage or adoption). Though we have not yet determined whether the sibling presumption applies to blood siblings whose legal relationship has been severed, the scope of subsection .080(w) — and its broad provisions — suggests that it does. In Laura M.-J. v. State, Department of Health Social Services, Office of Children's Services , we assumed, without deciding, that the presumption applied. 26 Now, on second look, we conclude that the plain language of .080(w) necessitates a reading that “sibling” includes all biological siblings, regardless of whether the legal relationship between siblings has been severed by adoption. We agree with Kelly's assertion that the modifier “related by blood” unambiguously specifies which siblings count for the purposes of the sibling presumption. Nothing in the legislative history suggests a contrary interpretation. 27 Star page 7 *7 Stacy argues that “sibling” in AS 47.10.080(w) does not clearly apply to Sunny and Brianna's relationship because the legislature did not define “sibling” in the same way that it did in AS 47.10.093(b)(16). Alaska Statute 47.10.093(b)(16), which pertains to the disclosure of OCS records, states “in this paragraph, ‘sibling’ means an adult or minor who is related to the child who is the subject of the case by blood, adoption, or marriage” and further specifies that “a sibling who is adopted by a person other than the parent of the child who is the subject of the case remains a sibling of the child.” Because subsection .080(w) does not include this same specification — that an adopted sibling remains a sibling of the child — Stacy argues that .080(w) does not clearly apply to Sunny and Brianna's relationship. This argument is unpersuasive. The definition of “sibling” in AS 47.10.093(b)(16) does not control our interpretation of “sibling” for the purposes of AS 47.10.080(w). The legislature explicitly cabined the definition of “sibling” in subsection .093(b)(16) to that specific subsection, prefacing the definition with “in this paragraph, ‘sibling’ means.” Thus, the fact that the legislature defined the term “sibling” with greater specificity in .093(b)(16) than in AS 47.10.080(w) does not convince us that we must interpret subsection .080(w) any differently than its plain meaning. Furthermore, we interpret statutes that deal with the same or related subject matter “as harmoniously as possible.” 28 “Such statutes ‘should be read together as a whole in order that a total scheme evolves which maintains the integrity of each act.’ ” 29 The legislature enacted AS 47.10.080(w) and AS 47.10.093(b)(16) under the same statutory scheme, 30 and when read together, neither statute contradicts or confuses the meaning of the other. There is no lack of harmony between our interpretation of sibling under subsection .080(w) and the definition of sibling in subsection .093(b)(16). Thus, Stacy's reliance on .093(b)(16) is misplaced. We hold that the presumption in AS 47.10.080(w) applies to siblings who are related by blood, even if their relationship has been severed by adoption. 2. The application of AS 47.10.080(w) does not require biological siblings to have an established emotional or social relationship. Despite acknowledging that Brianna and Sunny are siblings related by blood, the superior court chose not to apply the presumption in AS 47.10.080(w); it determined that Sunny and Brianna had not yet formed a sibling relationship, and thus the court reasoned that there was no relationship for Sunny to maintain with Brianna. Kelly argues that the presumption applies because Sunny and Brianna have “formed a meaningful relationship.” Kelly points to weekly videoconference visits, and several in-person visits between the children. Broadly speaking, a presumption “is a legal inference drawn from certain facts,” which “may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence.” 31 An inference of this sort may be subsequently overcome by contrary evidence, but the inference must first be made. 32 For the purposes of AS 47.10.080(w), the inference is that maintaining a sibling relationship is in the best interests of a child in OCS custody. The superior court did not make this inference in its placement order; rather, by expressly incorporating the reasoning of the transfer order, the court assessed the relative depth and quality of Sunny and Brianna's relationship before concluding that Sunny's “potential future sibling relationship” with Brianna did “not trump [her] existing familial bonds” with the Wards. The court reasoned that the presumption did not apply because Sunny and Brianna had not yet formed a relationship, inferring that their blood relationship alone was insufficient to trigger application of the presumption. The court appeared to decide that the statutory presumption only applies to siblings related by blood who, at a minimum, have developed an emotional or social connection. Star page 8 *8 As explained above, a court must recognize the presumption in AS 47.10.080(w) if siblings are related by blood, even if their legal relationship has been severed by adoption. While an emotional or social relationship certainly may deepen a child's bond with a sibling, the emotional and social relationship is not relevant for purposes of determining whether a court must recognize the statutory presumption. If it were otherwise, the application of the sibling presumption would be much narrower. The presumption would only apply to children who have the cognitive or emotional capacity to form an attachment with their sibling, functionally excluding infants who may not have the capacity to form relationships outside of their immediate caregivers. It could also discriminate against older siblings whose capacity to form relationships might be impaired by developmental disabilities. For the reasons explained above, we hold that as a part of its review of Kelly's placement request under AS 47.14.100(m), the superior court was required to recognize the presumption that maintaining a sibling relationship with Brianna was in Sunny's best interests. Kelly argues that this error necessitates reversal. But we decline to decide as a matter of law that there was not good cause to deviate from the placement preferences under AS 47.14.100(e) that would favor Kelly. The superior court should make this determination in the first instance, especially given that circumstances may have changed during the intervening period of this appeal. Thus, we vacate and remand the court's denial of Kelly's request for a placement review under AS 47.14.100(m). V. CONCLUSION We VACATE the superior court's placement order and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Footnotes 1 See AS 47.14.100(e). 2 We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the parties and the children. 3 “A party opposed to the proposed transfer may request a hearing and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer would be contrary to the best interests of the child for the court to deny the transfer.” AS 47.10.080(s). 4 This provision states: “If the department denies a request for placement with an adult family member or a family friend, the department shall inform the adult family member or family friend of the basis for the denial and the right to request a hearing to review the decision.” 5 Sunny's mother, Stacy, is the only appellee participating in this appeal. 6 Angelica C. v. Jonathan C. , 459 P.3d 1148, 1155 (Alaska 2020) (quoting Schacht v. Kunimune , 440 P.3d 149, 153 (Alaska 2019)). 7 Stacy agrees that Kelly has standing to challenge the placement order. 8 Throughout this opinion, we use the terms “apply” and “recognize” interchangeably. We interpret the requirement to “recognize” a presumption under AS 47.10.080(w) as necessarily requiring the court to “apply” the presumption. 9 Kelly raises additional arguments on appeal that relate to the court's best interest findings. She argues that the court “failed to consider other substantial evidence” as part of its findings, and that the court clearly erred when it found that it would be “nearly impossible” to structure a transition plan that would adequately support Sunny. Kelly also argues that the court erred by finding that the goal of reunification with Stacy “trumped Sunny's need for a permanent placement.” We decline to address these arguments because we resolve the appeal in Kelly's favor on other grounds. Also, given that circumstances may have changed during the intervening period of this appeal, our review of the child's best interests would probably be of little utility on remand. 10 AS 47.14.100(a). 11 See, e.g. , AS 47.14.100(m); AS 47.10.080(s). 12 “Adult family member” is defined in AS 47.10.990(1) as “a person who is 18 years of age or older and who is related to the child as the child's grandparent, aunt, uncle or sibling; the child's sibling's legal guardian or parent.” The legislature has not defined “family friend,” except in the narrower context of CINA proceedings involving Indian children. See AS 47.14.100(t)(3). We have previously affirmed a superior court decision that a person must have some prior relationship with the child and/or the child's parents to be considered a “family friend” under AS 47.14.100(e). See Blythe P. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 524 P.3d 238, 252-53 (Alaska 2023). If a person's status as a “family friend” is contested, the superior court will ultimately resolve the matter by making a fact-specific determination. See id. 13 See Blythe P. , 524 P.3d at 253 (“This presumption focuses on the sibling relationships ; it is not a presumption that siblings be placed in the same household.” (emphasis in original)). 14 It is helpful to contrast AS 47.10.080(w) with the provisions of AS 47.14.100(r), which requires OCS to “make reasonable efforts to place siblings in the same placement if the siblings are residing in the same home when taken into the custody of the department.” Alaska Statute 47.14.100(r) does not apply to Sunny because, when OCS assumed custody, she lived in a different household than Brianna. 15 See, e.g. , S. Health Soc. Servs. Comm. Bill File for S.B. 82, Leg. 27, 12th Sess. (2012). 16 Id. at i. 17 Wiersum v. Harder , 316 P.3d 557, 567 (Alaska 2013). 18 R.C. v. State , 435 P.3d 1022, 1025-26 (Alaska App. 2018) (citing Moreno v. State , 341 P.3d 1134, 1139 (Alaska 2015)). 19 The superior court found that Kelly was a “family friend” within the meaning of the statue based on her distant familial relationship and her friendship with Sunny's father. 20 Stacy does not challenge the superior court's finding that Kelly is a “family friend” or its determination that Kelly has a higher priority for placement under AS 47.14.100(e). 21 Irma E. v. State, Dep't. of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs ., 312 P.3d 850, 853-54 (Alaska 2013) (holding that superior court erred when it denied hearing under AS 47.14.100(m) because appellant failed to show good cause). 22 Id. 23 AS 47.10.080(w). 24 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. State, Dep't of Env't Conservation , 145 P.3d 561, 566 (Alaska 2006) (quoting In re Estate of Maldonado , 117 P.3d 720, 725 (Alaska 2005)). 25 Id. (citing State v. Pub. Safety Emps. Ass'n , 93 P.3d 409, 415 (Alaska 2004)). 26 See Laura M.-J. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , No. S-18094, 2022 WL 2825676 , at *8 n.42 (Alaska July 20, 2022) (“We assume without deciding that [AS 47.10.080(w)] applies to blood siblings whose legal relationship has been severed by adoption.”). 27 See H. Judiciary Comm. Bill File for S.B. 82, Leg. 27, 12th Sess. (2012); S. Health Soc. Servs. Comm. Bill File for S.B. 82, Leg. 27, 12th Sess. (2012); S. Judiciary Comm. Bill File for S.B. 82, Leg. 27, 12th Sess. (2012); H. Health Soc. Servs. Comm. Bill File for S.B. 82, Leg. 27, 12th Sess. (2012). 28 Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp. (Lycoming Div.) , 850 P.2d 628, 633-34 (Alaska 1993). 29 Peters v. State , 943 P.2d 418, 420 (Alaska App. 1997) (quoting Conner v. State , 696 P.2d 680 , 682 n.3 (Alaska App. 1985)). 30 Both statutes are located under Title 47, Chapter 10, Article 1. 31 Angelica C. v. Jonathan C. , 459 P.3d 1148, 1161 (Alaska 2020). 32 See id. End of Document