Dickerson v. Dickerson

2026 WL 2881649 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED. Supreme Court of Alaska. Scott Riley DICKERSON, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Stephanie Lynne DICKERSON, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Supreme Court Nos. S-19164/19223 (Consolidated) September 25, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer, Bride Siefert, Judge. Superior Court No. 3HO-21-00246 CI Attorneys and Law Firms Scott Riley Dickerson, pro se, Homer, Appellant and Cross-Appellee. Heather Gardner, Heather Gardner Attorney at Law LLC, Anchorage, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant. Before: Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. [Carney, Chief Justice, not participating.] OPINION BORGHESAN, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION Star page 1 *1 This appeal concerns the equitable division of marital property in divorce. Much of the dispute arises out of the classification and distribution of the sale proceeds from the marital home. The wife contributed a large sum from her inheritance toward the down payment on the home, and the home increased in value during the marriage. The superior court ruled that the wife's inheritance funds remained her separate property, but that the increase in the value of this contribution proportionate to the home's increase in value was marital. The court did not accept the husband's claims that equity in a neighboring property the couple sold to the wife's mother was part of the marital estate. It divided the estate 50/50, rejecting the parties’ competing claims for equitable adjustments and ordering the parties to bear their own attorney's fees and costs. And it separately entered a child support award after the husband failed to provide information documenting his income. On appeal we reverse the ruling that the wife's inheritance funds remained her separate property despite being mixed with marital funds in the purchase of the marital home. When a spouse mixes separate funds with marital funds, it is presumed that the spouse intended the funds to become marital property. The spouse claiming the funds remained separate has the burden of proving otherwise. In this case, the spouse's trial testimony about her intent for the funds was the only evidence that she intended to keep the commingled funds separate. We have cautioned courts against giving too much weight to parties’ self-serving testimony about their prior intent, and in this case there was no evidence corroborating the wife's testimony. Therefore, she failed to overcome the presumption that her inheritance funds became marital. And because the inheritance funds became marital, the wife's argument that these funds’ increase in value remained separate fails as well. We uphold the rest of the superior court's rulings. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Stephanie and Scott Dickerson married in 2010 and have three minor children. They separated in 2021, and Stephanie filed for divorce shortly after. The divorce proceedings were bifurcated to address property and custody issues separately. In February 2022 the court issued an interim custody order and granted Stephanie exclusive use of the family home, which the parties refer to as Paradise Place. The order allowed Scott access to a shop, sawmill, conex trailer, and parking area near the home so long as he notified Stephanie of his presence in advance. The court eventually ordered the sale of Paradise Place. Sometime around June 2023 Stephanie and Scott received an offer to buy the property for $1.45 million. This offer included a $50,000 credit for the buyer to replace the septic tank. To induce Scott to accept this offer, which was lower than he wanted, Stephanie agreed to credit Scott $30,000, which was the difference between the asking price and the buyer's offer. The offer was accepted, and Paradise Place was sold. Star page 2 *2 A property division trial was held in September 2023. The parties’ dispute focused primarily on the sale proceeds from Paradise Place. Most significantly, Stephanie claimed that a portion of the home sale proceeds were her separate property and should not be included in the marital estate. She testified that she used part of her inheritance from her grandfather toward the down payment on Paradise Place. She testified that she intended to use these funds for an investment and had a verbal agreement with Scott that she could pull the inherited funds out of the home within a few years. Accordingly, Stephanie argued that the share of funds she contributed, plus a proportionate share of the amount by which the home increased in value during the marriage, should be treated as her separate property. Scott denied that such an agreement existed. Scott testified that he and Stephanie bought Paradise Place instead of investing in other properties together, and Stephanie had not actually planned to keep her inheritance funds separate. The parties disputed several other issues at trial and in closing arguments, including whether equity in a neighboring property (the “Mary Allen property”) that the parties sold to Stephanie's mother prior to the parties’ separation at a substantial discount was part of the marital estate. The parties also disputed whether the amounts Stephanie agreed to pay Scott to gain his approval for the sale of Paradise Place should be enforced, with Stephanie claiming her agreement was obtained through duress and coercion. And they disputed whether Stephanie should be credited (i.e. reimbursed by the marital estate) for paying for the mortgage, utilities, and repairs on Paradise Place after separation until it sold. They also disputed whether Stephanie's share of the marital estate should be reduced by the imputed rental value of living at Paradise Place during the separation period. The parties also disputed the equitable division of the estate as a whole. The superior court issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found that Stephanie contributed $212,537 to the down payment on the marital home by cashing out inherited stocks and bonds and that this contribution remained her separate property, crediting her testimony about this agreement. But despite finding that some of the home's original equity was Stephanie's separate property, the court found that the entire increase in the home's equity since the down payment was marital property. It reasoned that there was no evidence of any agreement about the funds’ appreciation and that the home's increase in value was due in part to marital efforts. The court made no findings about a marital interest in the Mary Allen property, which Scott had claimed. In dividing the marital estate, the court determined that a 50/50 split was equitable, rejecting Scott's argument for a 65/35 split in his favor based on Stephanie's inheritance and allegedly superior economic status. The court enforced the $30,000 payment Stephanie had promised to obtain Scott's agreement to sell the home. It denied Scott's claim to impute rental value to Stephanie and also denied Stephanie's claim for credits for maintaining the home before the sale. The court ordered that each party would be responsible for their own attorney's fees. Star page 3 *3 The superior court issued a final child support order in June 2024. Before making its ruling, the court had asked Scott to submit a proposed child support order and calculation, but Scott did not do so. The court noted Scott's failure to provide this information when setting the child support amounts in its June 2024 order. Scott appeals aspects of the superior court's property division order, as well as its rulings on child support and costs and attorney's fees. Stephanie cross-appeals aspects of the property division order. III. DISCUSSION A. We Reverse And Remand The Property Division Order. “Equitable property distribution after divorce involves a three-step process: first, the superior court must characterize property as marital or separate; second, the court must value the property; and third, the court must determine the equitable allocation of the property.” 1 Scott's arguments primarily challenge the first and third steps of the process. As to classification, he asserts that the superior court erred in classifying the funds that Stephanie contributed to the purchase of Paradise Place as her separate property, and he faults the superior court for failing to make findings about whether the Mary Allen property was part of the estate. As to distribution, he argues the court abused its discretion by dividing the marital estate evenly and declining to add, to Stephanie's side of the ledger, imputed rental value based on her exclusive access to the marital home. Stephanie also challenges elements of the first and third steps of the distribution process. As to classification, she argues that the court erred by rejecting her claim to the appreciation in the value of her contribution to the marital home. As to distribution, she argues that the court erred by denying her credits for her post-separation payments and by enforcing the payments she agreed to make to Scott. 1. It was error to treat the funds Stephanie contributed to the purchase of the marital home as her separate property. Scott argues that the superior court erred by finding that $212,537, a sum that Stephanie inherited from her grandfather and then contributed to the down payment for Paradise Place, remained her separate funds. 2 We agree with Scott. The only evidence supporting Stephanie's assertion that she intended to keep this money separate was her trial testimony about an oral agreement with Scott that the down payment on Paradise Place would remain her separate property. But this testimony, by itself, was not enough to rebut the legal presumption that when separate property is mixed with marital property, it becomes marital. Generally, “[w]hether a spouse intended to donate his or her separate property to the marital estate is a factual finding that we review for clear error.” 3 “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the entire record, we are ‘left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court has made a mistake.’ ” 4 But when separate property is commingled with marital property, a legal presumption arises that the separate property was transmuted into marital 5 — in effect, that the separate property was gifted to the marital estate. 6 The spouse claiming the property remained separate, the “owning spouse,” has the burden to overcome the presumption that it transmuted. 7 To overcome this burden, the owning spouse must introduce evidence “sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the presumed fact does not exist.” 8 That means that Stephanie had to present enough evidence to allow a reasonable mind to conclude that she intended to keep the down payment money separate despite mixing it with marital funds when she and Scott bought their home. Whether evidence is sufficient to rebut a legal presumption is a question of law that we review de novo. 9 Star page 4 *4 The key question is whether Stephanie's trial testimony about the oral agreement was enough, standing alone, to rebut the presumption that the down payment money was gifted to the marriage. We hold that a party's uncorroborated testimony about the party's prior subjective intent or an asserted oral agreement is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. This rule reflects the fact that such testimony is inherently suspect. We have cautioned trial courts of the need for “careful skepticism” when assessing parties’ trial testimony about their prior intent. 10 When assessing such testimony, courts should consider three factors: (1) the “degree of specificity” with which the party would ordinarily be expected to remember the transaction; (2) the “documentation of such a transaction” that “would ordinarily be available to the party attempting to prove its existence”; and (3) whether “the testimony [is] neutral or self-serving.” 11 Courts may consider other factors as well, including “the credibility of the testimony, whether it is controverted by other evidence, ... [or] corroborated by admissions by the opposing party; the degree of documentation available and which party would control any such records; and other circumstances surrounding the transaction, including its remoteness in time.” 12 Although our prior decisions have not described this rule as such, they are consistent with it. In Leis v. Hustad we reversed a trial court's finding that an owning spouse intended to keep the proceeds of his home sale separate despite placing the funds in a jointly-owned escrow account. 13 The owning spouse argued that the funds were placed in a joint escrow account “merely for administrative convenience” and pointed to the fact that he had depleted the account after the parties separated. 14 We held that “[t]his evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of intent created by placing [the other spouse's] name on the account.” 15 We reasoned that the owning spouse's “self-serving testimony at trial is entitled to little weight because the parties’ actions during the marriage are better indicators of the parties’ intent during the marriage.” 16 Because there was no other evidence supporting the owning spouse's testimony that he intended to keep his property separate, this testimony did not overcome the presumption of donative intent. 17 Similarly, in Miller v. Miller we upheld the trial court's finding that separate funds placed in a joint account became marital when there was no evidence, other than the owning spouse's testimony, of intent to keep the funds separate. 18 The owning spouse had received $230,000 from his mother as a gift, placed the money in an individual investment account, and then transferred the money into a joint account in the names of both spouses. 19 The owning spouse argued that he had moved the funds to a joint account strictly for probate purposes and suggested that the account was not marital because the other spouse had never tried to access the funds. 20 But this testimony was undermined by his treatment of other assets, which he took efforts to keep separate. 21 And there was no other evidence demonstrating that the owning spouse intended to keep this property separate. 22 Thus, we upheld the trial court's ruling that the owning spouse failed to overcome the presumption of donative intent. 23 Star page 5 *5 By contrast, in cases in which we have affirmed a finding of intent to keep commingled property separate, there has been at least some additional evidence corroborating the owning spouse's testimony about their own intent. 24 In Kilkenny v. Kilkenny , for example, the owning spouse had placed $250,000 of his separate funds into the parties’ joint safe deposit box during the 2008 financial crisis. 25 The owning spouse not only testified that he intended his property to remain separate, but that he had quickly returned the bulk of the cash back into his separate investing account once he believed the financial crisis had stabilized. 26 In Schmitz v. Schmitz , we upheld the trial court's finding that a spouse's separate funds from a legal settlement remained separate, despite being briefly placed into a joint account, when they were transferred to a separate account shortly after. 27 And in Julsen v. Julsen , we upheld the trial court's ruling that a spouse's inheritance of stocks remained separate despite being placed in a joint investment account because the record reflected that the stocks were placed in the account for administrative purposes, and the other spouse never exercised any control over the account. 28 This case is more like Leis and Miller than Kilkenny , Schmitz , or Julsen . The only evidence supporting the finding that Stephanie intended to keep her inheritance funds separate was her own testimony. She testified that she had been looking to buy a condominium in Girdwood with her inheritance, but when Scott found Paradise Place she put her inheritance toward the down payment instead because she “thought it would be a good investment” and “felt very desperate” to have a primary home. She also testified that she had a verbal agreement with Scott that once the parties refinanced the home, she would be able to withdraw inherited funds from the home so that she could put the funds toward a Girdwood condominium. The superior court found Stephanie's testimony credible. But the testimony was self-serving, and there was no corroborating evidence. No documents were presented as evidence of the agreement. While we have noted that placing too much weight on the absence of contemporaneous documentation may unfairly penalize individuals of “lesser business skills,” Stephanie is a business owner who could reasonably be expected to document an agreement involving an investment of over $200,000. 29 Nor was the parties’ conduct consistent with Stephanie's testimony about their agreement. The court acknowledged that when the parties refinanced the home, they did not withdraw Stephanie's inheritance funds, contrary to Stephanie's testimony that they had agreed to do so. Nor was there evidence that the assets were commingled for only a brief period of time or subject to Stephanie's sole control. This case is unlike Kilkenny and Schmitz , where separate assets were only briefly placed in joint title. Rather, the funds Stephanie contributed to the down payment remained part of the home's equity until the home was sold years later. This case is also unlike Julsen , where the spouse claiming separate property maintained exclusive control of an asset that was jointly titled. Stephanie's inheritance funds were converted into real property over which both parties exercised control and to which they made significant improvements. Because there was no evidence corroborating Stephanie's testimony that she and Scott made an oral agreement to keep funds she contributed to the down payment separate, her testimony was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that these funds were transmuted into marital property. Therefore, we reverse the finding that the $212,537 sum was Stephanie's separate property and remand for recalculation of the marital estate. 30 Star page 6 *6 2. The lack of findings regarding a potential marital interest in the Mary Allen Drive property is not plain error. Scott argues that the superior court erred by not making any findings about the Mary Allen property, the lot next to Paradise Place that the couple sold to Stephanie's mother at a reduced price. Scott claims that he had an agreement with Stephanie's mother that he and Stephanie would retain an interest in the Mary Allen property so that Scott and Stephanie would receive some of the equity if Stephanie's mother sold it or died. But Scott did not adequately preserve this issue for appeal. Although Scott mentioned the Mary Allen property in his written closing argument, he did not include it in the post-trial property division table submitted to the court. His closing argument does not assert a specific amount or estimate for the equity interest that allegedly belongs to the marriage. Although Scott brought evidence of the Mary Allen property's value to the court's attention, he did not explain what portion of this value should be considered marital equity. Essentially, Scott argues that the superior court should have made findings about the couple's equity in the Mary Allen property, but he neither proposed nor demonstrated what the value of that equity might be. For this reason, Scott failed to preserve this argument for appeal. 31 We review for plain error, 32 and will reverse only when “an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted.” 33 Stephanie's mother testified at trial that Scott asked her to sign a contract granting Scott and Stephanie half of the profits from the Mary Allen home should she ever sell the property or pass away. But she testified that when Scott presented her with a contract, she did not sign it because she “did not feel like it was an honest and fair agreement.” Stephanie's mother also testified that she offered to pay some of the difference between the price she paid and the market value of the lot if she sold the property so that the parties could recoup some of the lot's value, but they never came to a specific agreement. Star page 7 *7 The superior court could reasonably have credited this testimony. And Scott did not provide any contract signed by the parties to prove the agreement he claims. 34 Scott claims that a signed document existed but that he was unable to access it because of restrictions on access to Paradise Place, where he claims it was stored. But without proof of such an agreement, and in light of the trial testimony of Stephanie's mother, we cannot say that failing to add some portion of the Mary Allen property's equity when calculating the marital estate was an obvious mistake. 3. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate equally. Scott argues that the superior court abused its discretion in ordering a 50/50 division of the marital estate. He argues that the court should have split the proceeds 65/35 in his favor. “The equitable allocation of marital assets is left to the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” 35 We “will not disturb the allocation unless it is clearly unjust.” 36 And “[t]he law presumes that an equal division of property is equitable.” 37 The superior court “must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce” based on several factors, including the parties’ “station in life” during the marriage and the parties’ financial needs and earning capacities. 38 And while trial courts may consider the effect of prospective inheritance on a party's financial condition when dividing property, courts must exercise caution in doing so because property divisions cannot be reopened. 39 Trial courts may consider prospective inheritance from immediate family members only; prospective inheritance must be not only possible but “virtually certain”; and trial courts “must treat the prospect as simply one factor and not give it inordinate weight.” 40 “The likelihood of inheritance should not lead to a greatly disproportionate division of assets; but if inheritance is virtually certain, the court may give it some weight in considering how to divide the property.” 41 Scott claims he is entitled to a greater share of the marital estate in part because Stephanie is in a better financial position than him, has historically received inheritance money, and will continue to receive inheritance. In dividing the marital estate, the court explicitly addressed each statutory factor from AS 25.24.160(a)(4), noting that division “starts at 50/50” and may be adjusted after considering the relevant factors. And the court specifically determined that it could not “find that [Scott] is entitled to a greater percentage of the marital estate because Stephanie might inherit more funds in the future.” This conclusion reflects reasonable caution when considering Stephanie's prospective inheritance, especially given the testimony of Stephanie's paternal uncle that Stephanie is not in her father's will and “is definitely not inheriting anything from her father.” The court's decision not to give great weight to Stephanie's prospective inheritance is consistent with our precedent and is not an abuse of discretion. Scott also seems to argue that he should receive a greater portion of the marital estate because he put a great deal of work into renovating Paradise Place. But there was conflicting testimony as to how much work Scott put into the property. And it is not clear in any case that the trial court would be required to give weight to Scott's work on the home: Scott does not point to any statutory factor that expressly requires such consideration. Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in the superior court's decision to equally split the marital estate. 4. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying claims for Ramsey credits and imputed rental value. Star page 8 *8 When attempting to divide marital property equitably, the superior court may account for both expenses and benefits incurred by the spouses during the separation period. 42 For example, the court may award a credit to one spouse who spends separate funds to preserve the value of marital property, such as by paying the mortgage and utilities on the marital home. In Ramsey v. Ramsey we held that “the fact that one party has made payments from non-marital income to preserve marital property should be considered as one of the circumstances to be weighed by the trial court in dividing the marital property.” 43 The superior court has wide discretion in deciding whether to award such credits, but it must explain its decision to deny them. 44 In this case Stephanie argues that the superior court abused its discretion by denying her request for the $53,231.72 she spent paying the mortgage, utilities, and other expenses related to maintaining the marital home. Another kind of equitable adjustment courts may make is to “impute the rental value of one party's exclusive use of the marital residence after separation to that party.” 45 Scott argues that the superior court should have compensated the marital estate for the rental value of the marital home because the court granted Stephanie exclusive use (apart from some outbuildings) from March 2022 until its sale in June 2023. We review the equitable allocation of property, including the decision “whether to grant credit for rental value [or] expenses to preserve the marital property” under the abuse of discretion standard. 46 “[W]e will not reverse an allocation ‘unless it is clearly unjust.’ ” 47 When spouses make competing requests for Ramsey credits and imputation of rental value, the superior court may consider these claims together in exercising its discretion to equitably divide the estate. 48 In Beals v. Beals we vacated an award of Ramsey credits, instructing the superior court to consider on remand whether the spouse who paid the mortgage while technically living “rent-free” in the marital home “should be given credit for [the] post-separation mortgage payments he made from separate property and whether any such credits should be offset by the value of the benefit of his post-separation occupancy of the marital home.” 49 The superior court in this case appears to have considered Stephanie's claim for a Ramsey credit in conjunction with Scott's claim to impute rental value to her, even though it did not expressly mention the latter. The court noted that the “home was vacant because Stephanie wanted to avoid Scott,” and Stephanie “did not want Scott to live in the home because she had been advised that it would sell for more if it were empty.” It also noted that Scott requested use of the home but was denied access. But it found that while Stephanie had exclusive access to the home, she also “paid considerably more to maintain the home” compared to Scott. The court also noted that neither party had to pay rent for their lodgings while the home was staged to be sold. The court therefore rejected Stephanie's request for a Ramsey credit based on the expense of maintaining the home, while declining Scott's request to impute the rental value of staying at the home to Stephanie. This implicit offset is consistent with our direction in Beals , and we see no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to reject these competing adjustments. Star page 9 *9 Stephanie also argues that the superior court's analysis of Ramsey credits should have given more weight to Scott's conduct, which she claims delayed the sale of the home. Stephanie testified and provided evidence about instances in which offers fell through because Scott would not agree to certain terms. But the court found that while “Scott's actions did cause multiple delays in the sale of the home,” the court “[did] not find that Scott was acting inappropriately or purposely undermining the sale of the home.” Thus, the court did consider Scott's conduct and how he affected the sale of the home. Given this finding we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying Stephanie Ramsey credits. 5. The superior court did not err by enforcing payments that the parties had agreed upon when finalizing the home sale. Stephanie argues that the court erred by awarding Scott sums Stephanie had agreed to pay him in an effort to persuade him to accept the buyer's offer for Paradise Place. Stephanie had agreed to pay Scott $30,000 if he accepted an offer on Paradise Place for $1.45 million with a $50,000 credit for the buyers to replace the septic system. Scott was unwilling to accept an offer below asking price and would only agree to give the buyers a $40,000 septic system credit. Stephanie agreed to pay Scott the difference between what he wanted and what the buyers were willing to pay in order to obtain his agreement to sell the house. At trial Stephanie argued that the court should not enforce these payments because she agreed to them under coercion and duress. The superior court's property division order did not expressly address this argument. “When we are asked to consider factual determinations not made by the superior court, we are limited to reviewing the record to see if the factual issues were nonetheless established as a matter of law.” 50 In In re Adoption of S.K.L.H. we reviewed a party's duress claim after the superior court briefly referenced duress in its verbal order and made no other findings about the claim. 51 We examined the record and held that “even if the superior court did not implicitly address ... duress, as a matter of law [the] record [could not] support such claims.” 52 The record contained no evidence that the party claiming duress had experienced “such fear ... that she could no longer exercise her free will to refuse her consent to the [agreement].” 53 Here, as in In re Adoption of S.K.L.H. , the record cannot support a finding of duress or coercion. “Duress generally requires a threat that arouses such fear as to preclude a party from exercising free will and judgment ....” 54 “Coercion, though not synonymous with duress, is similar and implies compulsion or constraint.” 55 In Crane v. Crane we held that “the fear of losing custody of one's children in a custody dispute,” by itself, did not establish duress or coercion that would invalidate a custody settlement agreement that a parent negotiated with the help of counsel and agreed to in open court. 56 Stephanie's fear that the realtor would not continue to list Paradise Place for sale if Scott rejected the offer is no more compelling than the parent's fear in Crane . And like that parent, Stephanie negotiated the agreement through counsel and endorsed it in open court. The evidence cannot support a finding that Stephanie was precluded from “exercising free will and judgment.” 57 Therefore, we see no error in the superior court's decision to award Scott the payment Stephanie promised him notwithstanding her claims of duress and coercion. B. We Affirm The June 2024 Child Support Award. Star page 10 *10 Scott challenges the child support award entered in June 2024. Although the superior court had invited Scott to provide documentation of income and a proposed child support calculation, Scott failed to do so. The court's calculations in the June 2024 order were therefore based on information provided by Stephanie. Three months later Scott filed a motion to modify child support. He argued that the court incorrectly calculated child support by relying on the information Stephanie had provided, which outlined the varying custody arrangements and the parties’ income. The court had not ruled on this motion by the time this appeal was filed, so the merits of this motion are not before us in this appeal. Scott's appellate briefs repeat the arguments made in his motion to modify the June 2024 support order. But because Scott did not provide the court with information about his income prior to the court's June 2024 order, despite the court requesting it, he failed to preserve any arguments that the order's calculations are incorrect. “Ordinarily, a party seeking to raise an issue on appeal must have raised it and offered evidence on it in the trial court.” 58 “[P]ermitting a party to claim error regarding a claim not raised and litigated below ‘is both unfair to the trial court and unjust to the opposing litigant.’ ” 59 Because Scott's arguments were not preserved, we review the court's support calculations for plain error. 60 We see no obvious mistakes in the superior court's calculations. Scott's 2022 tax return indicates that his total income for the year was $34,343, and the court found Scott's annual income for the purpose of calculating child support to be $29,089. Therefore, we affirm the court's June 2024 child support order. C. We Affirm The Attorney's Fees And Costs Order. Scott challenges the superior court's ruling that each party was responsible for their own fees and costs. Scott argues that he should be awarded attorney's fees based on his inferior economic position and because Stephanie's “unreasonable legal position” regarding the inheritance she invested in the marital home was baseless. “The award of attorney's fees in a divorce action ... rests within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable.’ ” 61 The purpose of awarding fees is to level the playing field between the parties. The default rule in divorce is that each party bears their own fees. 62 “[W]hen the parties’ economic status is generally equal, it is ordinarily error to make any award of costs or fees.” 63 “[E]ven if one spouse earns less than the other, if that spouse has resources sufficient ‘for the superior court to reasonably expect [him or her] to pay [his or her] own fees, it is not an abuse of discretion to require [the lower wage earning spouse] to do so.’ ” 64 Star page 11 *11 In this case the superior court compared Scott and Stephanie's professional skills and earning potential when determining the appropriate distribution of the marital estate. The court noted that the parties “enjoyed a flexible wage-earning existence” and found that “both parties could easily make the same amount of money should they choose to do so.” The court also noted that each party would receive over $500,000 from the sale of the marital home. Scott made no showing that his fees would substantially deplete his portion of the marital estate. And while a court may depart from the default rule and grant enhanced fees if it finds that a party acted vexatiously, the court found that Stephanie's legal position regarding the inheritance she invested in the home had merit, implicitly rejecting Scott's argument that Stephanie had litigated vexatiously. 65 Although we reverse the finding that the inheritance funds remained Stephanie's separate property, her argument was not frivolous. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by requiring the parties to bear their own attorney's fees and costs. IV. CONCLUSION We REVERSE the part of the property division order classifying a portion of the home sale proceeds as Stephanie's separate property and AFFIRM the remainder of the superior court's rulings on property division, attorney's fees, and child support. We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Footnotes 1 Hudson v. Hudson , 532 P.3d 272, 279 (Alaska 2023). 2 Property received through inheritance is separate property. Pasley v. Pasley , 442 P.3d 738, 745 (Alaska 2019). 3 Kessler v. Kessler , 411 P.3d 616, 621 (Alaska 2018) (citing Beals v. Beals , 303 P.3d 453, 459 (Alaska 2013)). 4 Id. (quoting Abood v. Abood , 119 P.3d 980, 984 (Alaska 2005)). 5 See Schmitz v. Schmitz , 88 P.3d 1116, 1128 (Alaska 2004) (citing Brown v. Brown , 947 P.2d 307, 311 (Alaska 1997); Chotiner v. Chotiner , 829 P.2d 829, 833 (Alaska 1992)). 6 See Kessler , 411 P.3d at 618-19 (explaining that separate property can transmute into marital property “by an implied interspousal gift”). 7 Id. at 620 . 8 Alaska R. Evid. 301 (describing operation of evidentiary presumptions). See, e.g. , In re Est. of McCoy , 844 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1993) (applying presumption of undue influence when primary beneficiary of will had confidential relationship with testator). 9 Dault v. Shaw , 322 P.3d 84, 91 (Alaska 2013) (“The question in this case is whether an evidentiary presumption was correctly applied. This is a question of law. We review such questions de novo.”); see also In re McCoy , 844 P.2d at 1135 (holding that will beneficiary met burden to present sufficient evidence of possibility that there was no undue influence). 10 Pasley v. Pasley , 442 P.3d 738, 746-47 (Alaska 2019). 11 Id. at 747 . 12 Id. at 747 n.41. 13 22 P.3d 885, 887-88 (Alaska 2001). 14 Id. at 888 . 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 105 P.3d 1136, 1142-43 (Alaska 2005). 19 Id. at 1142 . 20 Id. 21 Id. at 1142-43 (rejecting owning spouse's claim that he placed funds in joint account for “probate purposes” when he had also maintained sole title to marital home so that non-owning spouse could not “try to take the whole thing” if “something did go wrong later with the marriage”). 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 See Kilkenny v. Kilkenny , 576 P.3d 45 , 60-61 (Alaska 2025). 25 Id 26 Id. 27 88 P.3d 1116, 1129 (Alaska 2004). 28 741 P.2d 642, 646-47 (Alaska 1987) (noting that husband “admitted at trial that he did not give the stock broker any instructions concerning the account, nor could he identify a single transaction in which he had been involved”). 29 Pasley v. Pasley , 442 P.3d 738, 747 (Alaska 2019) (quoting 1 Brett R . Turner , Equitable Distrib . of Prop . § 5:59 (3d ed. Nov. 2017 update)). 30 In light of this ruling, Stephanie's cross-appeal argument that the appreciation in value of the $212,537 should have been classified as separate property necessarily fails. And Scott's argument that the superior court clearly erred by finding that Stephanie's contribution from her inheritance was worth $212,537 is moot. 31 See McLaren v. McLaren , 268 P.3d 323, 339 (Alaska 2012) (holding that spouse waived argument regarding inaccurate valuation of property by failing to make argument before trial court or present evidence of conflicting valuation). 32 Johnson v. Johnson , 239 P.3d 393, 408 (Alaska 2010) (citing Miller v. Sears , 636 P.2d 1183, 1189 (Alaska 1981) (declining to review claims not raised below except for plain error)). 33 Numann v. Gallant , 555 P.3d 527, 532 (Alaska 2024) (quoting State v. Nw. Constr., Inc. , 741 P.2d 235, 239 (Alaska 1987)). 34 Although the record indicates that an unsigned copy of an agreement was presented during trial, the document was not entered into evidence. 35 Miles v. Miles , 816 P.2d 129, 131 (Alaska 1991). 36 Hansen v. Hansen , 119 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Alaska 2005). 37 Miller v. Miller , 105 P.3d 1136, 1140 (Alaska 2005). 38 AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 39 Krize v. Krize , 145 P.3d 481, 490 (Alaska 2006). 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 See Ramsey v. Ramsey , 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992); Hall v. Hall , 446 P.3d 781, 784 (Alaska 2019); Beals v. Beals , 303 P.3d 453, 463-64 (Alaska 2013). 43 834 P.2d at 809 . We refer to credits compensating a party for their use of non-marital income to preserve marital property as “ Ramsey ” credits. 44 Hall , 446 P.3d at 784 (holding that regardless of whether superior court awards credits, “the court must make written findings explaining its decision”). 45 Carr v.