Full Opinion

2026 WL 3569668 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED. Supreme Court of Alaska. JONAH O., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY COMMUNITY SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, ARCHIE N., OSA N., AND THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM, Appellees. Supreme Court No. S-19610 November 20, 2026 Superior Court No. 3AN-22-00107 CN Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Yvonne Lamoureux, Judge. Attorneys and Law Firms Appearances: Emily Belic, Assistant Public Advocate, Paul F. McDermott, Assistant Public Advocate, and James Stinson, Public Advocate, Anchorage, for Appellant and for Appellee Guardian Ad Litem. Jennifer Teitell, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Cori Mills, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee State of Alaska, Department of Family and Community Services, Office of Children's Services. Chris Peloso, Law Offices of Chris Peloso, Juneau, for Appellee Archie N. Jay A. Hochberg, Anchorage, for Appellee Osa N. Before: Carney, Chief Justice, and Borghesan, Henderson, and Oravec, Justices. [Pate, Justice, not participating.] OPINION ORAVEC, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION Star page 1 *1 This case concerns a parent's right to revoke an Indian custodianship created by temporary transfer of custody. Under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a parent may transfer temporary physical care, custody, and control of an Indian child to an Indian person, creating an Indian custodianship. Here, the mother asked her family member to take care of her infant son, an Indian child. After the child spent several years with the relative, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) received reports of mistreatment and neglect. OCS removed the child from the relative, an Indian person, and then returned him to the mother. Eventually, OCS filed an emergency petition that the child was in need of aid. Although the relative was informed of the emergency hearing, and at one point OCS considered whether he would be a suitable placement, OCS did not involve the relative in the proceedings. As the case progressed, the mother indicated she preferred that the relative have custody of the child. After this request for placement was denied, the relative appealed to this court, arguing that he was an Indian custodian and the court should allow him to participate in the case. OCS agreed that the relative was an Indian custodian during the probable cause phase, and moved to remand the case so the relative could participate. The child's father, however, filed a partial opposition to OCS's motion, arguing that it was an open question whether the relative was an Indian custodian. We granted OCS's motion. On remand, the superior court allowed the relative to intervene in the case. The father then moved to formally revoke the Indian custodianship. The relative claimed that the mandate on remand established his status as Indian custodian and required his participation throughout the termination trial. The relative also argued that the father could not terminate the custodianship because the father had not held physical custody and because the father could not terminate a custodianship formed by the mother. The superior court found that the father's withdrawal of consent extinguished the Indian custodianship. The relative appeals. We conclude that the superior court complied with our order when it allowed the relative to participate in the proceedings after remand. We previously held that a parent of an Indian child may revoke an Indian custodianship established under 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (6). We now extend that holding and conclude that a parent with residual rights may revoke an Indian custodianship over the other parent's objection. We affirm the superior court in all remaining respects. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS A. Background Facts Luke was born in 2015 to Osa and Archie. 1 Archie was not involved in Luke's care or upbringing, was incarcerated for a significant portion of Luke's life, and did not have a relationship with Luke. Luke is an Indian child through Osa, who is a member of a Tribe. 2 Star page 2 *2 In October 2015, when Luke was approximately three months old, Osa placed Luke with Jonah and Jonah's partner. Jonah is Osa's former stepfather and she considers him Luke's grandfather. Jonah is a member of a different tribe than Osa and lives in another village (“the Village”). 3 Jonah served as Luke's primary caregiver for several years. In October 2020, OCS received a report of harm alleging that Jonah was neglecting Luke by failing to provide hearing aids, ongoing medical care, or adequate supervision. The report further alleged that Jonah was using inappropriate physical discipline. OCS substantiated the neglect allegations but did not immediately assume custody because the Village indicated that it was working with the family. In May 2021, the Village and OCS received further reports alleging that Jonah was physically abusing the child. An ICWA worker for the Village removed Luke from Jonah's care. The Village passed a resolution supporting Luke's removal from Jonah and requesting that the State take jurisdiction. Before filing a petition, OCS explored whether it should return Luke to Osa but determined that was not appropriate because Osa lacked stable housing and was about to enter substance abuse treatment. OCS then filed an emergency child in need of aid (CINA) petition and assumed emergency custody of Luke. The Tribe intervened in the case. The court held a hearing on the emergency petition in May and June 2021. Although Jonah appeared at the first day of this hearing, there is no evidence Jonah was sent notice of later proceedings, including the probable cause and removal hearings. During these proceedings, the court did not recognize him as an Indian custodian, inform him of his rights as an Indian custodian, or appoint him a lawyer. 4 In early June, the superior court found probable cause to believe Luke was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011, but declined to make removal findings as to Osa, explaining that the only evidence of physical harm involved Jonah. The court then ordered Luke placed in Osa's care under OCS's supervision until the disposition hearing, subject to conditions including that Osa “not pass on care or custody of the child to a third party without OCS approval.” The court adjudicated Luke a child in need of aid in September 2021. Luke remained in Osa's physical custody for nearly a year. In May 2022, at Osa's request, OCS reassumed physical custody and placed Luke in a foster home. In August 2023, OCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both Osa and Archie. Jonah twice requested placement, but OCS denied these requests. 5 In February 2024, shortly before the scheduled termination trial, 6 Osa moved to appoint counsel for Jonah, arguing that he was Luke's Indian custodian and that OCS was therefore required to make active efforts to reunify Luke with Jonah. OCS and the guardian ad litem (GAL) opposed, arguing that any Indian custodianship ended after the court returned Luke to Osa. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court ruled that even if an Indian custodianship existed at the time of Luke's removal, it dissolved as a matter of law when the court returned Luke to Osa's care in June 2021. Star page 3 *3 Jonah appealed the order denying him Indian custodian status. While the appeal was pending, OCS moved for a remand, waiving its objection to Jonah's status as an Indian custodian and supporting his participation in the proceedings. In its motion, OCS acknowledged that Jonah was Luke's Indian custodian when OCS removed the child from his care, and that Jonah had been denied his rights to participate during the probable cause phase of the termination case. 7 OCS asked that we remand so that Jonah could intervene. OCS also indicated that it was prepared to make active efforts to reunify Luke and Jonah, provided those efforts were still required by ICWA given any factual developments beyond the appellate record. OCS noted that it took “no position on the other Indian custodian issues raised by this case.” Archie partially opposed the motion, arguing that whether Jonah had been or could remain an Indian custodian without Archie's consent were open questions. On February 26, 2025, we granted the motion “for the purpose of allowing the Custodian, Jonah O., to intervene.” B. Proceedings Following remand, at a March 2025 status hearing where count-appointed counsel appeared on Jonah's behalf, OCS indicated it intended to proceed in the termination case with Jonah as Luke's Indian custodian and to shift reunification efforts from Osa to him — for so long, it said, as Jonah wished to serve and Osa did not seek to dissolve the arrangement. But, because the hearing revealed Archie's concern about Jonah's status as an Indian custodian, the superior court ordered the parties to state their positions on whether Jonah should be recognized as Luke's Indian custodian and as to how the case should proceed. Jonah's position was that he was the Indian custodian and was entitled to the full rights of a party. Osa agreed with Jonah and added that ICWA obliged OCS to make active efforts to reunify Luke with Jonah. Archie disagreed that Jonah could participate as Indian custodian. He contended that Jonah could not be an Indian custodian without his consent, restated that he did not consent, and asked the court to recognize his revocation. Jonah argued that because Archie never had physical custody of Luke, Archie could not create an Indian custodianship and therefore could not revoke one, either. Jonah also argued that the custodianship was an extension of Osa's parental rights and Archie could not unilaterally revoke her rights. OCS and the GAL then took the position that Archie's objection to the custodianship was sufficient to dissolve the custodianship over Osa's objection, and OCS requested a removal hearing in order to clarify its obligations regarding its ongoing reunification efforts. In May, the superior court granted Jonah's intervention. Then, addressing the parties’ arguments about the validity of the custodianship, the court stated its intent to allow Archie to revoke the custodianship. The superior court conducted a colloquy to ensure that Archie's revocation decision was knowing and voluntary. Archie confirmed that he did not want Jonah to care for Luke, citing safety concerns and Luke's progress in his foster home, and reiterated that position despite his stated goal of relinquishing his own parental rights. The superior court issued a written order recognizing Archie's revocation. The court held that a parent retains the residual right to revoke an Indian custodianship, that revocation may occur informally, and that neither incarceration nor lack of prior physical custody strips a parent of the right to revoke consent. Thereafter, the court terminated Jonah's party status and his court-appointed counsel, noting that he remained welcome to attend future hearings. Jonah appeals. III. DISCUSSION Under ICWA, an “Indian custodian” is “any Indian person who has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such child[.]” 8 Here, Osa transferred temporary physical care, custody, and control of her child to Jonah, an Indian person. The question presented is whether the parent who did not create or consent to an Indian custodianship can revoke it. Star page 4 *4 Jonah makes three arguments in support of his contention that Archie lacked the ability to terminate the Indian custodianship and his participation in the case. 9 First, he argues that when this court remanded the appeal to allow his participation, we required the superior court to allow participation for the remainder of the case. He asserts that the superior court's determination that Jonah was not an Indian custodian violated our mandate and the court erred when it declined to allow Jonah to participate in the case as a party. Second, Jonah asserts that the parent who created the Indian custodianship is the only parent that can terminate it. Finally, Jonah argues that his right to participate in the proceedings survived any attempt to revoke the custodianship. We address each of these contentions. A. The Superior Court Complied With Our Order On Remand. Jonah first contends that our order granting the motion to remand his appeal created a “mandate” that the court allow him to participate as Indian custodian throughout the case. He then argues that when the superior court later recognized a revocation of the custodianship, the superior court violated the mandate. Whether a trial court complied with a mandate on remand, and the proper interpretation of a court order, are both questions of law which we review de novo. 10 To evaluate Jonah's arguments, we look to the language of the order. The remand order instructed the superior court to undertake one action: to allow Jonah to intervene. 11 There is no indication in the record that more was requested, or expected, from our order on remand. OCS's motion conceded that Jonah was the Indian custodian “at least until the probable cause proceedings.” Yet OCS also took no position on “other Indian custodian issues raised by this case,” and limited its concession in the event factual issues develop “beyond the appellate record.” And Archie's partial opposition to the motion described some of the custodianship issues the case raised, including whether Jonah could serve as Indian custodian over Archie's objection. Although the motion practice may have indicated that there were issues with regard to the custodianship, the only action requested of this court was to remand for the purpose of allowing Jonah's intervention in the case. Our order granting the motion did not resolve any issues with regard to Jonah's status as the Indian custodian. Although Jonah was referred to as the “custodian” in the ordering language, we did not make any findings on the merits, we did not address his rights during intervention, and we did not limit or expand the scope of the proceeding on remand. We remanded to the superior court to allow Jonah to intervene, and the superior court allowed intervention. 12 Accordingly, the superior court did not violate our mandate on remand. B. A Parent With Residual Rights To An Indian Child May Revoke An Indian Custodianship Even When The Other Parent Both Created The Custodianship And Objects To Its Revocation. Star page 5 *5 The presence of an Indian custodian in a proceeding seeking a foster care placement or termination of parental rights is an important one, because Indian custodians are entitled to procedural rights along with the parents. Among these procedural protections is the obligation of the State to provide “active efforts ... designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family[.]” 13 Jonah argues that ICWA permits only the parent who creates the Indian custodianship to revoke it. Jonah also argues that Archie cannot revoke consent to his status as an Indian custodian because Archie never had physical custody of the child. Whether a parent who never had custody of the child and did not create an Indian custodianship can revoke that status is a question of law that we review de novo, 14 adopting “the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 15 We previously held that a parent may revoke an Indian custodianship. In Ted W. v. State, Department of Health Social Services, Office of Children's Services , we held a parent may revoke an Indian custodianship during a CINA proceeding, because the transfer that created it was temporary and the custodianship lasted only as long as that parent's consent. 16 There, the mother had informally placed the child with the father, whose own parental rights had been terminated; when she and OCS moved to end the arrangement, we held that “the condition under which [he] met ICWA's definition of Indian custodian no longer existed.” 17 In Molly O. v. State, Department of Health Social Services, Office of Children's Services , we held revocation of a custodianship required no formalities, just a clear expression of parental intent. 18 There, the parents simply stated to a social worker that they opposed placing their child with the Indian custodian. 19 Although we have affirmed the right to revoke a custodianship when the parents agree, we have not before addressed whether one parent may revoke a custodianship over the other parent's objection. In other contexts, one parent's objection may suffice to invalidate another parent's consent to transfer of authority. For instance, a father who retains his parental rights may object to consent to adoption by a mother. 20 And “[a] parent of a minor child may revoke a power of attorney that another parent of the minor child has made ....” 21 The question remains what the law provides in the context of a CINA proceeding under ICWA. Although ICWA recognizes a cultural practice of creating Indian custodianships, it is silent as to the process of revocation of a custodianship created by temporary transfer. 22 In a CINA proceeding, where custody has been transferred but parental rights have not been terminated, parents retain residual rights with respect to their children. 23 Alaska Statute 47.10.084 recognizes certain residual rights which “include[ ] but are not limited to” reasonable visitation, consent to adoption, consent to marriage, consent to military enlistment, and consent to major medical treatment. 24 These residual rights afford parents the “responsibility for making major decisions affecting the child's welfare.” 25 These rights do not depend on physical custody, which is often absent in a CINA case. 26 And we have held that these residual rights include the power to end a custodianship, because “the ability to withdraw a temporary transfer of physical custody of a child is of the same order of importance” as those enumerated in AS 47.10.084. 27 Star page 6 *6 ICWA does not contemplate that an Indian custodian may “usurp the parent's right to raise the child or prevent the parent from rescinding the Indian caretaker's designation as the child's Indian custodian.” 28 Similarly, no provision in ICWA provides that one parent shall have a greater right to create or maintain an Indian custodianship. Given that ICWA recognizes that a parent with residual rights may object to transfer of a state court proceeding to tribal court, 29 it would not follow that ICWA prohibits a parent with residual rights to object to an Indian custodianship by temporary transfer. Transferring jurisdiction is a more permanent change in the proceedings. Revoking a custodianship, which is temporary by nature, is a less drastic step. There is no reason why the ability to take this lesser action would not be available to a parent with residual rights. Since we have not previously addressed the issue, we may consider the reasoning of other courts to the extent it applies. 30 In In re GL, the California court of appeals considered revocation of a custodianship created by both parents. 31 There , a mother later revoked her consent to an Indian custodianship over the objection of the father. 32 The court held that the mother retained legal rights to the child during the proceeding, so to hold that the mother could not revoke the custodianship would “usurp” her rights in favor of the other parent. 33 The court also held that the revocation was valid because the transfer of custody to the custodian was “by definition, ‘temporary,’ and thus, revocable.” 34 We agree that a temporary transfer of custody is just that – temporary – and is subject to revocation by a party with rights to the child. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that any parent with residual rights may revoke the temporary transfer of custody of an Indian child to an Indian custodian, even where the other parent objects. Archie revoked Jonah's custodianship when he confirmed during the superior court's colloquy that he did not want Jonah to care for Luke. We affirm the superior court. C. The Superior Court Did Not Plainly Err By Denying Jonah Standing To Intervene In The Ongoing Proceedings. Jonah's remaining argument is that 25 U.S.C. § 1914 independently preserves his standing to challenge termination proceedings even after the court revoked his Indian custodianship. Because Jonah did not raise this argument before the superior court, we will review it for plain error. 35 Plain error exists “where an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted.” 36 Section 1914 of ICWA permits “any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed” to “petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title.” 37 Section 1914 plainly requires both that the person presently serve as the Indian custodian at the time of removal and that the child be removed from that person's custody. 38 Once that threshold is met, the Indian custodian has standing to pursue violations of the enumerated provisions of ICWA, including the right to transfer jurisdiction of a case and intervene in a state proceeding; 39 the right to counsel, notice, and participation; 40 and the process to consent or withdraw consent to placements, terminations, or adoptions. 41 Under Section 1914, then, an Indian custodian whose rights as a custodian were impaired by foster care placements or termination proceedings may petition for relief. 42 Star page 7 *7 Jonah suggests that once a custodianship is created, the custodian would retain custodian status for the life of the case notwithstanding the preference of parents. There is no support for this contention in ICWA or our case law. 43 Section 1914 of ICWA does not guarantee that an Indian custodian will remain a custodian throughout the case. In this case, the parent with residual rights revoked the custodianship, so whatever rights Jonah retained at the initial removal of Luke from his care, those rights were abrogated at revocation. 44 The superior court did not plainly err when it denied Jonah ongoing status as Indian custodian after Archie revoked consent. IV. CONCLUSION The superior court is AFFIRMED. Footnotes 1 We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the family. 2 We do not identify the Tribe to protect the privacy of the family. We refer to Luke's Tribe, which intervened in the child in need of aid proceedings, as “the Tribe.” A second, distinct tribal government, in whose community Luke lived with Jonah, and whose ICWA worker removed him from Jonah, plays a role in the events we describe; we refer to it as “the Village.” The two are separate sovereigns, and only the Tribe intervened. 3 See 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (3). 4 See 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (Indian custodian right to notice of pending proceedings and right to intervene; right to appointment of counsel; and right to examine materials). 5 OCS did tell Jonah he could renew his request if his housing situation changed, invited him to schedule family contact, and advised him of his right to seek review of the placement denials. 6 The court later vacated the termination when the placement chose guardianship over adoption. 7 See 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (Indian custodian right to notice of pending proceedings and right to intervene; right to appointment of counsel; and right to examine materials). 8 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (6); see also CINA Rule 2(i). 9 Because Osa did not file a separate appeal or a cross appeal, we confine our decision to the issues raised by the Appellant, Jonah. Alaska R. App. P. 204(a)(2); see Peterson v. Ek , 93 P.3d 458, 467 (Alaska 2004) (“We have consistently held that failure to file a cross-appeal waives the right to contest rulings below.”). Similarly, because we affirm the superior court based on the reasoning in the court's orders, we need not reach alternate grounds for affirmance raised in the briefing. 10 See Williams v. Crawford ex rel. Estate of McVey , 47 P.3d 1077, 1079 (Alaska 2002) (citing Bennett v. Bennett , 6 P.3d 724, 726 (Alaska 2000) (holding proper interpretation of court order is question of law)). 11 When the state removes a child from the custody of an Indian custodian, that Indian custodian may intervene to challenge the state's removal. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 . 12 See Ivy v. Calais Company, Inc. , 397 P.3d 267, 272-73 (Alaska 2017) (holding no violation of mandate on remand where remand was for purpose of correcting belief that “fair value” and “fair market value” were same, and superior court “did exactly that on remand.”). 13 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (a)-(d). 14 Pam R. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Child.’s Servs. , 185 P.3d 67, 71 (Alaska 2008). 15 Kalmakoff v. State , 257 P.3d 108, 118 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Guin v. Ha , 591 P.2d 1281 , 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979)). 16 204 P.3d 333, 338-39 (Alaska 2009). 17 Id 18 320 P.3d 303, 309 (Alaska 2014). 19 Id. at 305-06, 308-09 . Jonah suggests a custodianship may become irrevocable if it has not been revoked within several years of its creation. But he identifies no authority imposing a durational limit on revocation, and our case law suggests it is the temporary nature of the custodianship that matters, not its duration. Ted W., 204 P.3d at 335-37 (upholding revocation several months after removal). 20 See AS 25.23.040 (requiring consent of mother, and of father where he was married to mother at or after conception, has adopted the minor, or has otherwise legitimated minor); see Debbie G. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs, Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 132 P.3d 1168, 1171-72 (Alaska 2006). 21 AS 13.26.066(b). 22 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (6). 23 Ted W. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs, Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 204 P.3d 333, 338-39 (Alaska 2009); see AS 47.10.084(c). 24 AS 47.10.084(c). 25 Ted W., 204 P.3d at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 See Duke S. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 433 P.3d 1127, 1136-37 (Alaska 2018); Winston J. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 134 P.3d 343, 344-47 (Alaska 2006). 27 Ted W. , 204 P.3d at 339 ; see AS 47.10.084(c) (“When there has been transfer of legal custody or appointment of a guardian and parental rights have not been terminated by court decree, the parents shall have residual rights and responsibilities. These residual rights and responsibilities of the parent include, but are not limited to, the right and responsibility of reasonable visitation, consent to adoption, consent to marriage, consent to military enlistment, consent to major medical treatment except in cases of emergency or cases falling under AS 25.20.025 ....”). 28 Ted W. , 204 P.3d at 338 (citing H.R.Rep.No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978)). 29 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b). 30 Ito v. Copper River Native Ass'n , 547 P.3d 1003 , 1022 n.129 (Alaska 2024) (stating that decisions from other jurisdictions are viewed as persuasive for their reasoning when applicable) (citing Native Vill. Of Tununak v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs, Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 334 P.3d 165, 175 (Alaska 2014)). 31 177 Cal. App. 4th 683 , 689, 695 (2009). 32 Id. at 695. 33 Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (6)). 34 Id 35 D.J. v. P.C. , 36 P.3d 663, 667-68 (Alaska 2001); see also Kyle S. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Child.’s Servs. , 309 P.3d 1262, 1267 (Alaska 2013). 36 D.J. , 36 P.3d at 668 (quoting Sosa v. State , 4 P.3d 951, 953 (Alaska 2000). 37 25 U.S.C. § 1914 . 38 See 25 U.S.C. § 1914 . 39 See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 . 40 See 25 U.S.C. § 1912 . 41 See 25 U.S.C. § 1913 . 42 25 U.S.C. § 1914 . 43 We acknowledge ICWA does allow a prior Indian custodian to petition for custody if an adoption decree is set aside or if adoptive parents consent to termination of their parental rights. 25 U.S.C. § 1916 . 44 We note, however, that although he was dismissed as a party, the superior court did allow Jonah to continue to participate in the case as a grandparent as permitted by CINA Rule 3(c). End of Document