Full Opinion

2026 WL 3569781 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED. Supreme Court of Alaska. DOUG BOWEN, Appellant, v. DEANA RAY, Appellee. Supreme Court No. S-19251 November 20, 2026 Superior Court No. 3PA-22-01521 CI Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, John C. Cagle, Judge. Attorneys and Law Firms Appearances: Roberta C. Erwin, Palmier ~ Erwin, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellant. Notice of nonparticipation filed by Jon-Marc Peterson, Denali Law Group, Wasilla, for Appellee. Before: Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. [Carney, Chief Justice, not participating.] OPINION BORGHESAN, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION Star page 1 *1 This appeal involves two issues: calculation of child support and division of marital property upon divorce. Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(h) prohibits the retroactive modification of child support orders. That is, when a parent files a motion asking the court to increase the other parent's monthly child support payments, the court may not increase amounts owed in the months before the motion was filed. In this case one parent moved to vacate a previous child support order because the other parent, the one paying support, had reported much lower income than he was actually earning. The superior court issued a new order increasing support and gave the new order an effective date months before the motion to vacate was filed. On appeal, the parent paying support argues that this order was unlawfully retroactive. We disagree. Civil Rule 90.3 does not prohibit the superior court from retroactively increasing a parent's monthly child support payment when the existing child support order is based on the parent's knowing misrepresentation of income. The rule is not intended as a shield to protect parents who have knowingly underreported their income. Rather, it is intended to ensure children receive the financial support they need. The property division issue concerns the superior court's ruling that the couple had an equity interest in a piece of real property that was titled in the name of the husband's parents. The court found the husband had an agreement with his parents that they would purchase the property, which was suitable for his dental practice, and that the husband would make payments to his parents so that the property would eventually become his. The court ruled that the equity in the property was marital and should be divided between the husband and wife. The husband challenges this ruling on appeal. Because the evidence supports the court's finding about the agreement, we affirm its ruling. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Doug Bowen and Deana Ray married in 2006. The parties had four children during their marriage. They separated in March 2022. Deana filed for divorce in May 2022. A. Child Support Proceedings Doug and Deana each filed a proposed child support order and supporting financial documents in December 2022. Doug, who worked as a pediatric dentist and served in the Alaska Army National Guard, calculated his income as $36,960. He submitted his W-2 for the Alaska National Guard, which showed that he made $9,825.54 for his service in 2021. The parties’ tax documents also showed a net loss of $24,830 for the rental properties they owned together. The court issued an interim custody and child support order in January 2023. The order gave Deana primary custody of all four children. Based on Doug's reported income, the court ordered him to pay $697.94 each month to support all four children, starting in April 2022, the month after Doug and Deana separated. 1 Star page 2 *2 Deana filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 2023 child support order. She claimed that Doug earned much more income than he had reported. But she did not offer any evidence. The court denied Deana's motion to reconsider the first child support order without explanation. In March 2023 Deana filed a motion to vacate the child support order, alleging that Doug had several streams of income but knowingly submitted a proposed child support order based solely on the $36,960 he made in his private practice. Deana argued that Doug's total income should be based on all of his income streams, including his private dental practice, his work for Southcentral Foundation as a pediatric dentist, his national guard service, and revenue from his rental properties. Deana submitted a tax form showing that Doug earned $183,688.47 through his private practice in 2021. Deana claimed that Doug earned a gross annual salary of at least $170,000 from Southcentral Foundation alone, pushing his income well over the income cap for child support calculations. 2 She submitted Doug's paystubs from Southcentral Foundation, showing that Doug began working for Southcentral Foundation in September 2022 and earned a salary over $170,000 per year. Doug then filed a motion for sanctions and a motion to strike Deana's motion. The motion alleged that Deana's counsel “lob[bed] baseless, defamatory, ugly accusations” by suggesting that Doug's counsel would intentionally mislead the court about Doug's income. Doug's motion demanded a public apology from Deana's counsel, an award of attorney's fees, an order striking Deana's motion, and sanctions against Deana's counsel. Deana opposed Doug's motion. The court denied Doug's motion for sanctions and motion to strike in September 2023. By that time, the first day of the divorce trial had already taken place. Doug had testified that he had begun working at Southcentral Foundation in September 2022 with a salary of $176,000. Referencing Doug's trial testimony, the court stated that Doug “has maintained that the January 3, [2023] Child Support Order is correct, yet ignores his income as stated in his sworn testimony which indicates that it should be modified.” Rejecting Doug's request for sanctions, the court stated that “[i]f any party was acting in bad faith, it was Mr. Bowen.” On the same day the court denied Doug's motions, it also issued a second interim child support order. The order determined that Doug's income exceeded the cap and increased his monthly support obligation for his four children to $3,780. 3 The order had an effective date of October 1, 2022. The court then deemed Deana's motion to vacate the previous child support order moot. Doug filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to modify, arguing that the effective date of the second child support order was an impermissible retroactive modification of his child support obligation and his adjusted income was actually a loss of $37,071 for 2022. The court denied Doug's motion to reconsider. 4 B. Property Division Proceedings Star page 3 *3 A trial was held to divide the marital property. The court heard testimony from Doug, Deana, family members, and family friends. Most relevant to the contested property issue on appeal is the parties’ testimony about a property referred to as Silver Springs. Deana testified that this property was purchased by Doug's parents so Doug could use it for his dental practice. She testified that Doug paid his parents $2,000 per month for Silver Springs. Doug testified that the payments he made to his parents were for rent and other debts unrelated to Silver Springs. The superior court found that Doug had paid his parents $2,000 per month for Silver Springs during the marriage and that the marital estate had equity in Silver Springs because of these payments. 5 The court credited Deana's testimony that Doug's parents had purchased the properties for him with the “anticipation of [Doug] building a dentistry practice during the marriage.” The court ultimately found that the evidence supported Deana's position and assigned “the valuation of the payments made (thus the equity) with marital funds to Mr. Bowen.” Doug appealed. Deana declined to participate in the appeal. III. DISCUSSION A. The September 2023 Child Support Order Is Not Erroneous. 1. The child support calculation is not clearly erroneous. Doug argues that the court mistakenly found that his income met or exceeded the $126,000 income cap for purposes of calculating his child support obligations. Doug argues that the court incorrectly double-counted his income. He suggests the court may have been confused because the paychecks he received while working as a dentist for Southcentral Foundation were paid to his private dentistry business, giving the appearance that he made more income than he actually did. “We use the clearly erroneous standard when reviewing factual findings, including findings regarding a party's income ....” 6 “Factual findings are clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the record as a whole, [we are] left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 7 Courts calculating a parent's income for purposes of an ongoing child support obligation should determine the parent's expected future income. 8 The superior court here did not explain how it calculated Doug's income for either order, but the calculations seem to be based on the parties’ testimony and Doug's financial documents. This evidence supports the finding that Doug's income from October 2022 onward would exceed the income cap of $126,000 under Civil Rule 90.3(c)(2). Star page 4 *4 First, Doug himself testified that his annual salary at Southcentral Foundation was approximately $176,000. Deana also testified at trial that she believed Doug made well over $126,000 annually. Second, Doug's paystubs from the Southcentral Foundation corroborate the testimony about his income. The paystubs show that his gross monthly pay was approximately $13,266.40. Including his September 2022 sign-on bonus of $17,247, Doug earned approximately $176,000 for his first year of work. Third, Doug's tax documents support the court's finding that his income exceeded the Rule 90.3 income cap, even though his business deductions give the impression that he did not make a profit in 2021 and 2022. The commentary for Civil Rule 90.3 states that income from self-employment includes “gross receipts minus the ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce the income. Ordinary and necessary expenses do not include amounts allowable by the IRS for the accelerated component of depreciation expenses ... or any other business expenses determined by the court to be inappropriate.” 9 In this case Doug claimed substantial deductions for business expenses in 2021 and 2022, including accelerated depreciation of business assets. But the superior court was not required to deduct these claimed business expenses when calculating Doug's income for child support purposes. And even if Doug was not making a profit from his private practice, the evidence shows he made a significant salary after beginning his job at Southcentral Foundation in September 2022. Therefore, the figures in Doug's tax returns do not convince us that the court clearly erred in calculating his income for child support purposes. 2. The September 2023 order was not unlawfully retroactive. Doug argues that the superior court erred by retroactively modifying the child support obligation imposed by the court's January 2023 interim child support order. Deana filed a motion to vacate this order in March 2023. The superior court granted the substance of Deana's request, issuing an order that increased Doug's income and support obligations and giving the new order an effective date of October 2022 — several months before Deana's motion to vacate and around the time Doug began working at Southcentral Foundation. Doug argues that the court violated Civil Rule 90.3(h)’s prohibition against retroactively modifying child support by increasing his child support obligation for months prior to the date Deana moved to vacate. 10 “We review a superior court's decision to modify child support for an abuse of discretion.” 11 “We will find an abuse of discretion when the decision on review is manifestly unreasonable.” 12 We exercise our independent judgment when interpreting court rules. 13 “Under the independent judgment standard we adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 14 Star page 5 *5 “[C]ourts may not retroactively modify support orders” absent special circumstances. 15 Retroactive modification is generally prohibited under Civil Rule 90.3(h) unless “paternity is disestablished and the modification can be implemented without violating federal law, or on the motion of the obligor when there is a clerical mistake or the support order is based on a default amount.” 16 Civil Rule 90.3(h) was enacted to comply with federal law. 17 In 1986 Congress enacted a law, known as the Bradley Amendment, 18 that requires states receiving federal funds to maintain rules ensuring that support awards are “not subject to retroactive modification.” 19 The Bradley Amendment was implemented through a federal rulemaking process, 20 which we have examined for insight into the purposes underlying the Amendment and Civil Rule 90.3. 21 The rulemaking process indicates that the Bradley Amendment was intended to prevent instances “where a child support obligor, through his or her own neglect or refusal to comply with the support order, incurred arrearages which [are] subsequently reduced or forgiven entirely by the court.” 22 For example, public comments collected during the rulemaking process expressed dissatisfaction with state laws allowing the retroactive reduction of child support “without placing any diligence requirement on the absent parent to petition in a timely manner to reduce the order.” 23 Comments also conveyed concern that “[s]uch laws further permitted arguments to be made about changed circumstances in prior periods at a time when evidence may not have been easily attained or available.” 24 The policy concerns behind the Bradley Amendment are not implicated by this case, where the court increased Doug's support obligation because Doug knowingly underreported his income. We have not treated Civil Rule 90.3 as an insurmountable bar to vacating or modifying child support judgments based on fraud. In Fernandez v. Fernandez , a married couple dissolved their marriage in 1986, and the wife was awarded monthly child support. 25 But the couple lived mostly together until 2007. 26 After their separation, the wife tried to enforce past-due child support dating back to 1986. 27 The husband moved for relief from the child support order under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). 28 The superior court granted the motion after concluding that the parties’ original dissolution was a fraudulent attempt to evade creditors. 29 It issued a new child support order effective as of the parties’ 2007 separation date, years before the father filed his motion for relief. 30 The wife appealed, arguing that this was an impermissible retroactive modification of child support. 31 Star page 6 *6 We affirmed the superior court's ruling. We noted that Civil Rule 90.3’s bar on retroactive modification contained an exception: prohibiting collection of arrears from an obligor parent if the obligor parent assumed primary custody of the child for an extended period of time. 32 This exception did not perfectly fit the parties’ circumstances. 33 But we held that Civil Rule 90.3’s bar on retroactive modification did not preclude the court's decision to vacate the child support order that was procured by fraud and to replace it with an accurate order. 34 Our decision was based on the Rule's underlying principle and the fact that modification would not result in a windfall for the obligor parent or “deprive his children of funds to which they are entitled.” 35 Other jurisdictions have approved retroactive modification in cases where a parent has misrepresented income in bad faith. For example, in Stevenson v. Stevenson the Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered whether a father's failure to completely disclose his assets justified retroactively modifying the father's child support obligation. 36 The father in Stevenson reported that he earned $38,400 per year but failed to mention in his financial disclosure statement that he began receiving distributions from four large trusts. 37 Wisconsin law prohibited retroactive modification, 38 but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the father's misrepresentation made it appropriate for “the court to reach back to the time of the divorce to make retroactive calculations based on the complete picture of [the obligor's] income from that time.” 39 The court stated that “neither the court nor [the obligee] should be hand tied to a ruling that was made while [the obligor] was continuing to get away with his violation of the disclosure statute.” 40 Similarly, Illinois law prohibits retroactive child support modification, 41 but the Illinois appellate court refused to construe that prohibition as preventing retroactive modification when fraud was involved: [W]e do not construe section 510(a) to find a legislative intention that a parent under a support obligation might escape it by means of fraud or dishonesty.... Such a construction would allow individuals to escape their obligations and run contrary to the public policy expressed in both the Parentage Act and the Dissolution Act. In addition ... the court bears the important responsibility to ensure the welfare of minors before the court, as well as the authority to uphold its own orders in the face of fraud. We do not believe that the legislature intended to constrict the court's authority in these respects. [ 42 ] Star page 7 *7 Ohio 43 and West Virginia 44 courts have also allowed retroactive modification where misrepresentation is involved, even where there is a statutory or rule-based prohibition on retroactive modification. Consistent with our decision in Fernandez and the rulings of other courts, we hold that Civil Rule 90.3 does not bar the superior court from vacating or modifying a child support award and making the new award retroactive when the obligor knowingly underreports income. We decline to interpret Civil Rule 90.3(h) in a way that protects parents acting in bad faith and harms the children who depend on parents’ support. 45 For these reasons, the superior court did not err by retroactively increasing Doug's child support obligation. The first interim child support award was based on tax documents submitted by Doug that indicated his income was around $40,000. Deana moved to vacate this child support award on the basis of fraud. The superior court found that Doug had testified that he earned $176,000 annually at Southcentral Foundation, and it stated that “[i]f any party was acting in bad faith, it was [Doug].” In light of the evidence and findings, the court's decision to impose an increased support obligation on Doug, retroactive to the time he began working at Southcentral Foundation, did not violate Civil Rule 90.3. B. It Was Not Clear Error To Find That The Marital Estate Had Equity In The Silver Springs Property That Was Available For Distribution. Doug also challenges the superior court's findings regarding the marital estate's equity in the Silver Springs property purchased by Doug's parents. Doug argues that the court erred in finding that he and Deana acquired an interest in Silver Springs through payments he made to his parents during the marriage. “Alaska follows the law of equitable distribution, which is a set of rules for dividing property upon divorce.” 46 “Division of marital property involves three steps: ‘(1) deciding what specific property is available for distribution, (2) finding the value of the property, and (3) dividing the property equitably.’ ” 47 Doug's challenge involves the first step: whether the payments he made to his parents created equity in Silver Springs that was available for distribution as marital property. “The first step — characterizing property as either marital or separate — ‘may involve both legal and factual questions.’ ” 48 “Underlying factual findings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate are factual questions.” 49 “We review factual findings for clear error, which exists ‘only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction based on the entire record that a mistake has been made.’ ” 50 Star page 8 *8 The parties disputed whether Doug had an agreement with his parents about purchasing Silver Springs. Deana testified at trial that Doug found Silver Springs and thought it would be a good place for a pediatric dental practice because it was commercially zoned and close to a middle school. She testified that Doug “didn't have the ... capital or credit to buy [Silver Springs] at the time, so he had asked his parents to purchase [the property] for him, and he [had] been making monthly payments to [his parents] for [Silver Springs].” She also testified that Doug had discussions with his parents about transferring title to Doug once he paid off the balance, although she admitted she was not part of those conversations. 51 According to Deana, Doug paid approximately $2,000 per month for the Silver Springs property, and he began making these payments while they were still married. Doug testified that he was interested in eventually purchasing Silver Springs from his parents but had to pay his parents back for other loans first. He testified that he started “paying back his debts [to his parents] as quickly as [he] could” once they started making payments on the property. Doug argued that his payments to his parents were for legal fees, rent, and other debts owed and had nothing to do with Silver Springs. The court also received documentary evidence, including: a note to Doug from his mother, informing him of his monthly “First Mortgage payment,” the mortgage balance, and the interest rate; a document hand-written by Doug that detailed his monthly payments to his parents; and an email from one of the Silver Springs real estate agents directing the other agent to “include Doug Bowen ... in all email correspondence moving forward.” The court found that the weight of the evidence and testimony supported Deana's claim that Doug was paying his parents in exchange for eventual ownership of the Silver Springs property. It determined that the value of the payments was available for distribution and assigned “the valuation of the payments made (thus the equity) with marital funds to Mr. Bowen.” The court's finding is well supported by the parties’ testimony and the documents presented, and our review of the record does not leave us with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. “We give particular deference to the trial court's factual findings when they are based primarily on oral testimony, because the trial court, not this court, performs the function of judging the credibility of witnesses.” 52 We therefore uphold the court's decision to treat the equity in Silver Springs property as marital property subject to division between the parties. 53 IV. CONCLUSION Star page 9 *9 We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court. Footnotes 1 A non-custodial parent's child support obligation is calculated by multiplying the parent's adjusted annual income by a percentage based on the number of children covered by the support order. Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)(2). A non-custodial parent's support obligation for four children is typically 36% of the parent's annual adjusted income. Id. 2 Prior to October 16, 2023, the maximum income used to calculate child support payments was $126,000; after October 16, 2023, the income cap was set at $138,000. Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(2). 3 Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(2) (prior to October 16, 2023 modification). 4 The court eventually issued a third child support order in February 2024 reducing Doug's monthly support obligation to $1,562.81 in light of a change in the parents’ custody arrangement. This third order is not at issue in this appeal. 5 See Beals v. Beals , 303 P.3d 453, 460 (Alaska 2013) (“Generally, ‘all assets acquired by the parties during their marriage are marital property.’ ” (quoting Johns v. Johns , 945 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Alaska 1997))). 6 Sharpe v. Sharpe , 366 P.3d 66, 68-69 (Alaska 2016) (quoting Wilhour v. Wilhour , 308 P.3d 884, 887 (Alaska 2013)). 7 Id. at 69 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett , 6 P.3d 724, 726 (Alaska 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 See Swaney v. Granger , 297 P.3d 132, 139 (Alaska 2013); Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. III.F (“Child support is calculated as a certain percentage of the income which will be earned when the support is to be paid.”). 9 Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. III.B; see Mitchell v. Mitchell , 370 P.3d 1070, 1079 (Alaska 2016) (“[T]he commentary to Civil Rule 90.3 has not been officially adopted, but it can provide useful guidance in applying the rule.” (quoting Miller v. Clough , 165 P.3d 594 , 599 n.10 (Alaska 2007))). 10 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(h)(2) (“Child support arrearage may not be modified retroactively .... A modification which is effective on or after the date that a motion for modification ... is served on the opposing party is not considered a retroactive modification.”). 11 Wills v. Humphries , 564 P.3d 272, 275 (Alaska 2025) (citing Mitchell , 370 P.3d at 1076 ). 12 Id. (quoting Mitchell , 370 P.3d at 1076 ). 13 Baker v. Duffus , 568 P.3d 735 , 743 (Alaska 2025) (quoting Shea v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Ret. Benefits , 204 P.3d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 2009)). 14 Id. (quoting Shea , 204 P.3d at 1026 ). 15 Teseniar v. Spicer , 74 P.3d 910, 915 (Alaska 2003) (quoting State, Child Support Enf't Div. v. Bromley , 987 P.2d 183, 188 (Alaska 1999)); Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(h)(2). 16 Hendren v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enf't Div. , 957 P.2d 1350, 1352 (Alaska 1998) (first citing AS 25.27.166(d); and then citing AS 25.27.195). 17 Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. X.B. 18 See id. (noting that law is referred to as “the Bradley Amendment”). 19 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9103 (a), 100 Stat. 1874 , 1973 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(9)(C)). 20 Prohibition of Retroactive Modification of Child Support Arrearages, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,757 (Apr. 19, 1989) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 302, 303 and 305). 21 See Karpuleon v. Karpuleon , 881 P.2d 318, 321 (Alaska 1994) (citing Prohibition of Retroactive Modification of Child Support Arrearages, 54 Fed. Reg. at 15,758). 22 Prohibition of Retroactive Modification of Child Support Arrearages, 54 Fed. Reg. at 15,762. 23 Karpuleon , 881 P.2d at 321 (citing Prohibition of Retroactive Modification of Child Support Arrearages, 54 Fed. Reg. at 15,758). 24 Prohibition of Retroactive Modification of Child Support Arrearages, 54 Fed. Reg. at 15,758. 25 358 P.3d 562, 564 (Alaska 2015). 26 Id. The parties did separate for a few years in the late nineties, during which the father paid child support. Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. ; see Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b) (authorizing court to grant relief from final judgment). 29 Fernandez , 358 P.3d at 564 . 30 Id. at 564-65 . 31 Id. at 570 . 32 Id. at 570-71 . Under the previous version of Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(h)(3), “if the child or children live[d] with the obligor parent, with the consent of the obligee parent, for a period greater than nine months, and the obligor parent d[id] not make support payments during that time, then the obligee parent [could] not collect the arrears.” Id. at 570 (alteration in original) (quoting Webb v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enf't Div. ex rel. Webb , 120 P.3d 197, 199 (Alaska 2005)). Civil Rule 90.3(h)(3) now prevents the obligee parent from collecting arrears if the obligor parent assumed primary custody for a period greater than 6 months. 33 Fernandez , 358 P.3d at 570-71 . 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 765 N.W.2d 811, 814-15 (Wis. App. 2009). The trial court in Stevenson made a finding that the father acted willfully or negligently when he excluded the vast majority of his assets from his disclosure forms. Id. at 816. 37 Id. at 814-15. 38 Wis. Stat. § 767.59 (1m) (2007). 39 Stevenson , 765 N.W.2d at 821 . 40 Id . 41 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/510(a) (2020). 42 Clark v. Lay , 213 N.E.3d 928 , 937 (Ill. App. 2022). 43 Osborne v. Osborne , 611 N.E.2d 1003, 1009 (Ohio App. 1992) (“[I]f we were to hold that the trial court could retroactively order this support figure only to the date of appellee's motion, appellant would still retain the benefits of the fraud he perpetrated .... Such an anomalous result will not be sanctioned by this court.”). 44 Hayhurst v. Shepard , 633 S.E.2d 272, 276 (W. Va. 2006) (“The authority of the circuit courts to modify alimony or child support awards is prospective only and, absent a showing of fraud or other judicially cognizable circumstance in procuring the original award, a circuit court is without authority to modify or cancel accrued alimony or child support installments.” (quoting Goff v. Goff , 356 S.E.2d 496, 498 (W. Va. 1987))). 45 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 94 (“These rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any case where it shall be manifest to the court that a strict adherence to them will work injustice.”). 46 Aubert v. Wilson , 483 P.3d 179, 186 (Alaska 2021) (quoting Kessler v. Kessler , 411 P.3d 616, 618 (Alaska 2018)). 47 Id. (quoting Thompson v. Thompson , 454 P.3d 981, 988 (Alaska 2019)). 48 Id . (quoting Pasley v. Pasley , 442 P.3d 738, 744 (Alaska 2019)). 49 Id. (quoting Grove v. Grove , 400 P.3d 109, 112 (Alaska 2017)). 50 Id. (quoting Pasley , 442 P.3d at 744 ). 51 There was no hearsay objection to this testimony. 52 Thompson , 454 P.3d at 992 (quoting Berry v. Berry , 277 P.3d 771, 778 (Alaska 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 53 The superior court's ruling that the marital estate had an equity interest in the Silver Springs property involves the rights of third parties: Doug's parents, the titled owners of this property. “[T]he court can divide property in which one or both parties own an equitable interest, even if legal title ownership is in a third party.” 1 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUIT. DISTRIB. OF PROP., § 5:18 (4th ed. 2025 update). Doug's parents were not parties to this litigation, so it is unclear whether they may be bound by this ruling. See Brett R. Turner, Division of Third-Party Property in Divorce Cases , 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 375, 422 (2003) (“When third-party claims are litigated in the divorce case, the third person is not bound by the result unless he or she is joined as a party.”). But Doug has not argued that the court's ruling cannot be binding on him or that this ruling is inequitable. Cf. Boucher v. Boucher , 553 A.2d 312 , 316-17 (N.H. 1988) (describing award of equitable interest in property titled in name of nonparty as potential “illusory asset” and remanding for trial court to determine whether property division was equitable under circumstances). And the failure to join necessary parties does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Padgett v. Theus , 484 P.2d 697, 701-02 (Alaska 1971) (declining to set aside judgment due to failure to join indispensable party). Because none of these issues were argued in this appeal, we decline to address them. End of Document