Jonah B. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children's Services

2026 WL 2039774 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED. Supreme Court of Alaska. JONAH B., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY COMMUNITY SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Appellee. Supreme Court No. S-19568 July 15, 2026 Superior Court No. 3AN-19-00355 CN Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Christina A. Rankin, Judge. Attorneys and Law Firms Appearances: Olena Kalytiak Davis, Anchorage, for Appellant. Kimberly D. Rodgers, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee. Before: Borghesan, Pate, and Oravec, Justices. [Carney, Chief Justice and Henderson, Justice, not participating.] OPINION BORGHESAN, Justice. I. INTRODUCTION Star page 1 *1 Alaska law sets a one-year deadline to challenge an adoption decree, subject only to narrow exceptions. In this case a father's child was adopted after his parental rights were terminated in a separate child in need of aid (CINA) proceeding. A few months after the adoption was finalized, the termination of the father's parental rights was reversed. The superior court reopened the CINA case. The father did not challenge the child's adoption decree. Several months later, the one-year deadline to challenge the adoption decree passed. The court dismissed the CINA case as moot because the adoption could no longer be challenged. Because the adoption could not be undone, the father could no longer regain custody of the adopted child even if he could defeat the termination petition. The father now appeals and challenges the court's dismissal of the CINA case. The father argues that an exception to the one-year time bar applied because the child's adoptive parents had not taken custody of her. We disagree. The child was released to the custody of her adoptive parents after her adoption was finalized. Any challenges to the adoption were therefore prohibited after one year. The father also argues that the dismissal of the CINA case denied him due process by effectively terminating his parental rights to the adopted child. He was not denied due process. He had notice and an opportunity to be heard and was appointed counsel to represent his interests in both the CINA case and the adoption case. Finally, the father argues that his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. But given the record before us in this appeal, he has not demonstrated any constitutional deficiencies in his attorney's performance. Seeing no reversible error, we affirm the superior court's order dismissing the CINA case as moot. II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Jonah is the father of three children including Serena. 1 Jonah's three children were taken into emergency custody by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) in 2019. 2 At that time the children were in their mother's care and Jonah was incarcerated in another state. 3 OCS began efforts to reunify the family, focusing its efforts on the children's mother. 4 OCS had little contact with Jonah while he was incarcerated. 5 In March 2022 OCS petitioned to terminate Jonah's and the mother's parental rights. 6 Jonah was released from prison three months later. 7 OCS became more involved with Jonah after his release and revised his case plan to complement his parole requirements. 8 OCS continued working with Jonah but proceeded with the petition to terminate his parental rights in light of the length of time the children had been in foster care and concerns about Jonah's progress toward reunification. 9 Star page 2 *2 In January 2023 the court terminated Jonah's and the mother's parental rights to their three children. Jonah appealed the termination order. 10 In July 2023 Serena was adopted by her foster family. 11 The superior court then closed Serena's CINA case and issued an order that “released” her “into the custody of” her adoptive parents. In December 2023, several months after Serena's adoption, we reversed the termination of Jonah's parental rights. 12 We held that OCS had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with Jonah. 13 On remand in the CINA case the parties and court discussed Serena's adoption and Jonah's need for separate counsel in the adoption case. The Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) attorney representing Jonah during the CINA hearing informed the court that while OPA lacked statutory authority to represent Jonah in Serena's adoption case, “appointment of appropriate counsel to address the probate matter ... is going to need to occur.” She noted that Serena's adoption could have significant implications for Jonah's rights. The OPA attorney suggested that there was “a substantial possibility” that Jonah would need to “seek judicial remedies related to the adoption.” The OPA attorney also stated that it would be appropriate to handle Serena's CINA case separately from the cases involving Jonah's other two children “because her case is procedurally in a different circumstance given the adoption which occurred.” The children's guardian ad litem (GAL) noted that it was a very emotional time for the children because they “thought that this was not a possibility” and “were adopted or about to be adopted, and now it's completely changed.” The GAL requested a therapeutic recommendation before visitation resumed. In January 2024 the parties discussed reopening Serena's CINA case and including her in the order extending OCS custody over her siblings. Counsel for Serena's adoptive parents clarified that “the plan for [Serena] is to have a supervisory order, which is not actually a custody order.” Jonah's counsel did not object to this distinction. The superior court issued an order reopening Serena's CINA case. The order noted that the adoption decree “remain[ed] in effect” and provided that Serena “remain[ed] in the custody of [her] adoptive parents” with supervision by OCS pursuant to AS 47.10.080(c)(2). Jonah was appointed counsel in the adoption case in February 2024. In a March 2025 CINA hearing OCS represented that Jonah had not made substantial progress on his case plan and announced its intent to file a new termination petition. In April 2025 OCS filed a petition to terminate Jonah's parental rights to all three children. Two weeks after the new termination petition was filed, the GAL assigned to Jonah's children filed a motion asking the court to declare Serena's CINA case moot. The GAL argued that because Serena's adoption had been in place for over one year, it could no longer be undone, citing AS 25.23.140(b). 14 Jonah argued that declaring the case moot based on the adoption effectively nullified our decision reversing termination of his parental rights. Star page 3 *3 In a brief order, the superior court granted the GAL's motion to declare the CINA case moot. The court terminated OCS's supervision of Serena. It then ordered her CINA case closed. Jonah appeals. III. DISCUSSION A. The Superior Court Did Not Err By Dismissing The CINA Case On Mootness Grounds. Jonah argues that the court erred by dismissing Serena's CINA case on mootness grounds. “A claim is moot ... if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if it prevails.” 15 Whether a claim is moot is a question of law that we review de novo using our independent judgment. 16 Serena's CINA case is moot because Serena's adoption can no longer be undone. So even if Jonah prevailed in the CINA case, he could no longer be Serena's legal parent. 17 Alaska Statute 25.23.140(b) imposes a strict time bar for challenging an adoption: Subject to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of one year after an adoption decree is issued, the decree may not be questioned by any person including the petitioner, in any manner upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, unless, in the case of the adoption of a minor the petitioner has not taken custody of the minor .... This statute reflects a legislative policy that “at some point adoptions must become final.” 18 “To allow collateral attacks on final adoption decrees at any time threatens to unreasonably disrupt the upbringing of the adopted child.” 19 Applying this statute in a case similar to Jonah's, we held that a CINA case became moot once the one-year period to challenge the child's adoption had expired. 20 In that case, In re Adoption of C.R. , the children who were the subject of a CINA case were adopted after their parents’ rights had been terminated. 21 After we reversed the termination of their parental rights, the parents filed a motion for relief from judgment in the adoption case. 22 The parents argued that their motion was timely because their appeals of the termination orders had tolled AS 25.23.140(b)’s one-year bar. 23 We rejected that argument, reasoning that “only an appeal of an adoption decree tolls the one-year period.” 24 Having held that the parents did not timely challenge the adoption decree, we agreed with the superior court's ruling that the CINA case was moot. 25 “The children remain[ed] under the care of the adoptive parents and [we]re no longer in need of aid.” 26 Star page 4 *4 The same rule applies to Jonah. Serena was adopted in 2023. More than one year had passed when the superior court declared Serena's CINA case moot in August 2025. It was uncontested that Jonah had not challenged the adoption decree, and the time to challenge it had passed. Because the adoption decree could no longer be challenged, Serena's CINA case was moot. Jonah challenges the superior court's mootness ruling on two grounds. Neither of these is persuasive. First, Jonah argues that AS 25.23.140(b)’s one-year bar does not apply here because Serena's adoptive parents had not “taken custody” of her. 27 He did not make this argument to the superior court, so we review the court's application of the one-year bar for plain error. 28 “[P]lain error exists in a CINA case where an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted.” 29 There is no obvious mistake because the record indicates that Serena's adoptive parents had taken custody of Serena. Although the adoption decree is not part of the record in this case, the superior court issued an order in the CINA case releasing Serena “into the custody of” her adoptive parents in September 2023. The record indicates that Serena was living with her adoptive parents when we reversed the termination order in December 2023. When the superior court issued the order reopening the CINA case, it provided that Serena “remain[ed] in the custody of h[er] adoptive parents,” under OCS's supervision. Therefore, the court did not make an obvious mistake by failing to apply the “not-taken-custody” exception to AS 25.23.140(b)’s one-year limit to challenge an adoption decree. Second, Jonah argues that the superior court made legal errors in its order reopening the CINA case after we reversed the order terminating his parental rights. He argues that the superior court should have committed Serena to OCS's custody under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) rather than ordering supervision under AS 47.10.080(c)(2). He argues that the CINA statutes did not authorize OCS to release Serena to her adoptive parents and that it was contradictory to restore OCS's authority in the CINA case while leaving custody with Serena's adoptive parents. Although portions of the superior court's order might have been confusing, we are not convinced that it was plainly contradictory or inconsistent with statute. Under AS 47.10.080(c)(2), when a child is in need of aid, the court is authorized to “order the child released to a parent, adult family member, or guardian of the child or to another suitable person” while “direct[ing] [OCS] to supervise the care and treatment given to the child.” “[A]nother suitable person” is not defined, but it is certainly broad enough to include Serena's adoptive parents. Jonah is likely right that this statutory term was not designed with this precise situation in mind. But the statutory text does not preclude the superior court from “releasing” the child — i.e. exercising its authority to leave the child with — her adoptive parents, under OCS supervision, in these unique circumstances. And Jonah has not proffered any legislative history suggesting an intent to preclude this approach. Star page 5 *5 Nor has Jonah convinced us that the superior court's order was fatally contradictory. The court's order had four components: 1. It vacated the September 2023 CINA order, which had “released” Serena “into the custody of” her adoptive parents and released OCS from its obligations to Serena. This portion effectuated our mandate reversing the termination of Jonah's parental rights and remanding the case for additional reunification efforts. 2. It recognized that the adoption decree in the separate adoption case “remains in effect.” By statute, the court must “hear” a petition to adopt a child in OCS custody “as part of the [CINA] proceedings related to the child.” 30 But the statute also makes clear that the adoption and CINA cases are separate cases: The adoptive parents are not parties to the CINA case, and the parent whose rights are terminated is not party to the adoption case. 31 The superior court could not issue an order in the CINA case vacating the adoption decree, and the decree had not been challenged in the adoption case. Therefore, the court properly recognized the continuing validity of the adoption decree. 3. The court recognized that Serena “remain[ed] in the custody of [her] adoptive parents” and directed OCS to supervise her care and treatment under AS 47.10.080(c)(2). As explained above, this was authorized by statute. The CINA statutes do not require OCS to maintain legal custody of a child in order to keep a CINA case open or to supervise the child's care. 32 4. The court ordered OCS to “engage with the father and make reasonable efforts pursuant to AS 47.10.086.” This provision properly enforced our mandate in the prior appeal. There is slight tension between the first provision vacating the September 2023 order releasing Serena into the custody of her adoptive parents and the third provision recognizing that she remained in the custody of her adoptive parents. But if the first provision is understood as simply vacating the portion of the September order releasing OCS from responsibility for Serena and closing the case, the tension disappears. This minor imprecision does not make the order inherently contradictory. Rather, the order appropriately recognized the continuing validity of the adoption decree — which had not been challenged — while invoking OCS's statutory authority to provide supervision to Serena and make reasonable efforts toward Jonah. Star page 6 *6 Finally, even if the superior court was required to commit Serena to OCS custody under AS 47.10.080(c)(1), as Jonah argues, he fails to clearly explain why this would have prevented the CINA case from becoming moot. He seems to suggest that if the court had granted OCS custody of Serena upon reopening the CINA case, then the adoptive parents would not have “taken custody” under AS 25.23.140(b). We disagree. “The evident reason for the not-taken-custody exception to the strict one-year period is that undoing an adoption where the exception applies involves either no risk or a reduced risk of destabilizing a newly formed family or severing powerful psychological ties to the adoptive parents.” 33 Serena's parents had already taken custody of her, and those ties had been created. The mere act of returning legal custody to OCS upon reopening the case would not undo what had already occurred. We decline to interpret the “not-taken-custody” exception to AS 25.23.140(b)’s strict time-bar in the way Jonah seems to suggest. The superior court's order reopening the CINA case did not prevent the one-year deadline from applying to Serena's adoption. Once that deadline to challenge the adoption had passed, the CINA case was moot because even if Jonah prevailed, he could no longer gain custody of Serena. Therefore, it was not error to dismiss the CINA case. B. The Superior Court Did Not Violate Jonah's Right To Due Process. Jonah argues that he was denied due process by the trial court's determination that Serena's CINA case was moot because “the court deprived Jonah[ ] [of] his fundamental right to parent Serena through what can only be characterized as an unclear and unfair process during which it appeared that neither the court itself nor Jonah contemplated the process or possibility of such an outcome.” According to Jonah, “the court failed to properly and coherently usher the matter forward,” depriving him of the opportunity to contest termination of his parental rights. Jonah's due process argument is not entirely clear, but he seems to suggest that reopening Serena's CINA case and including Serena's case alongside her siblings’ cases in subsequent proceedings lulled him into inaction. He argues that the court's dismissal of Serena's CINA case as moot deprived him of his parental rights without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. “A valid constitutional challenge based on due process requires state action and the deprivation of an individual interest of sufficient importance to warrant constitutional protection.” 34 “The crux of due process is [having the] opportunity to be heard and the right to adequately represent one's interests.” 35 Whether a parent's right to due process has been violated in CINA proceedings is a question of constitutional law that we review de novo, adopting “the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 36 Precisely what process is due in a particular instance is determined by the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. 37 This test requires consideration of (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, which includes the fiscal and administrative burdens associated with an additional or alternative procedure. 38 The private interest affected here is “of the highest order.” 39 But the risk of erroneously depriving this interest was low. Jonah had notice of our decision reversing the termination of his parental rights. The attorney who appeared for Jonah at the first post-remand hearing indicated that Jonah needed an attorney to represent his interests in the adoption case and that he might need to “seek judicial remedies related to the adoption” in light of the reversal. Star page 7 *7 Jonah also had an opportunity to be heard. He was appointed counsel in the adoption case under Alaska Administrative Rule 12(e). And Alaska Adoption Rule 17 outlines the process through which an adoption decree may be challenged. 40 Jonah fails to describe any additional procedural safeguards that were necessary to protect his parental rights. He attempts to distinguish his case from In re Adoption of C.R. by noting that the termination of his parental rights was reversed before the one-year period for adoption challenges had expired. But this difference does not help his case. The fact remains that Jonah did not challenge the adoption within the statutory period even though he had almost six months to do so (unlike the parents in Adoption of C.R. 41 ). And OCS's interest in providing stability for children and promoting predictability in adoption administration weighs against Jonah's due process argument. To the extent Jonah suggests the court should have advised him on how to protect his parental rights with regard to the adoption, it would have been improper for the court to do so. The court “must be careful to maintain [its] impartiality” and “may not act as [an] advocate[ ] ... on substantive legal issues.” 42 It was not the court's responsibility to advise Jonah how to protect his rights. We see no denial of due process in the proceedings on remand. C. Jonah Was Not Denied His Constitutional Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel In The CINA Case. A parent in a CINA case, “[l]ike an individual being prosecuted for a crime, ... has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in a proceeding to terminate parental rights.” 43 Jonah argues that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. He argues that his counsel was ineffective because his attorney did not challenge the court's order reopening Serena's CINA case and did not directly challenge the adoption. As a result, Jonah claims, he lost his parental rights “through an unopposed de facto termination.” To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a parent must prove that “counsel's conduct either generally throughout the trial or in one or more specific instances did not conform to the standard of competence” that is constitutionally required, and “there must be a showing that the lack of competency contributed” to the loss of parental rights. 44 It is the parent's burden to prove both prongs of this test. 45 A parent in a CINA case may bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal even when the issue was not first raised and decided in the trial court. 46 “Whether a parent's due process right to receive effective assistance of counsel was violated is a question of law” that we review de novo. 47 Star page 8 *8 The record of the adoption proceeding for which Jonah was appointed separate counsel is not part of this case. Nor is there any record of the probate counsel's performance in this case that would allow us to decide a claim of ineffective assistance. Therefore, our decision in this case concerns only the attorney appointed to represent Jonah in this CINA case. Jonah fails to show that his CINA counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. An attorney's performance receives “a strong presumption of competence.” 48 “[R]easonable tactical decisions are virtually immune from subsequent challenge even if, in hindsight, better approaches could have been taken.” 49 Jonah argues that his counsel should have objected to the court's order reopening the case because it maintained the adoptive parents’ legal custody under AS 47.10.080(c)(2) rather than placing legal custody in OCS under AS 47.10.080(c)(1). But as we explained earlier, this distinction has no bearing on the fact that Serena's adoptive parents had already taken custody of her, triggering the one-year period for challenging the adoption decree. 50 And although Jonah also faults counsel for failing to argue that the adoptive parents never took custody, the record strongly suggests they did so. We are not convinced that the failure to make these arguments means that counsel was incompetent. Counsel's lack of objection to the superior court's order does not establish either prong of the test for ineffective assistance. Jonah also argues that his CINA counsel was ineffective because he did not directly challenge Serena's adoption. Jonah argues that because the remand occurred “well inside the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree,” his attorney should have challenged the adoption by filing a motion to vacate or stay the adoption. But his CINA counsel, an OPA attorney appointed to represent Jonah specifically in the CINA case, was not appointed to represent Jonah in the adoption case. 51 Jonah's CINA counsel did ask the court to appoint separate counsel for Jonah under Administrative Rule 12(e), and the court appointed Jonah counsel for the adoption case several months before the one-year deadline to challenge Serena's adoption. It seems reasonable for Jonah's CINA counsel to expect that if the adoption needed to be challenged directly, Jonah's counsel in the adoption case would do so. None of the alleged deficiencies in his CINA counsel's performance suggest that his counsel failed to perform at the level of a reasonably competent attorney. Jonah has failed to prove that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. IV. CONCLUSION Star page 9 *9 We AFFIRM the order dismissing Serena's CINA case as moot. Footnotes 1 We use pseudonyms to protect the parties’ privacy. 2 Because this is the second time Jonah's case has come before us, we describe relevant facts from our decision in the first appeal. Jonah B. v. State, Dep't of Fam. Cmty. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , No. S-18646, 2023 WL 8452398 , at *1 (Alaska Dec. 6, 2023). 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. at *1-2. 6 Id. at *2. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 See id. (discussing continued efforts). 10 Id. at *3. 11 The adoption decree is not part of the record in this case. The parties all agree that the adoption occurred in July 2023. 12 Jonah B. , 2023 WL 8452398 , at *4. 13 Id. at *4-6. 14 See AS 25.23.140(b) (prohibiting questioning adoption decree “upon the expiration of one year after an adoption decree is issued ... by any person ... in any manner upon any ground”). 15 In re Adoption of C.R. , 572 P.3d 568 , 578 (Alaska 2025) (quoting Mullins v. Loc. Boundary Comm'n , 226 P.3d 1012, 1017 (Alaska 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Id. at 574 (quoting Peter A. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 146 P.3d 991, 993-94 (Alaska 2006)). 17 See AS 25.23.130(a) (providing that final decree of adoption has effect of “reliev[ing] the natural parents ... of all parental rights and responsibilities ... so that the adopted person thereafter is a stranger to the former relatives for all purposes”). 18 In re Adoption of T.N.F. , 781 P.2d 973, 980 (Alaska 1989). 19 Id. 20 In re Adoption of C.R. , 572 P.3d at 578. 21 Id. at 571. 22 Id. at 571-72. 23 Id. at 572-73. 24 Id. at 577. 25 Id. at 578. 26 Id. 27 See AS 25.23.140(b) (providing that adoption decree may not be questioned after one year “unless, in the case of the adoption of a minor the petitioner has not taken custody of the minor”). 28 See Kyle S. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 309 P.3d 1262, 1267 (Alaska 2013) (citing Lucy J. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 244 P.3d 1099, 1111 (Alaska 2010)) (reviewing issue not raised at trial for plain error). 29 Remy M. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 356 P.3d 285, 288 (Alaska 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Kyle S. , 309 P.3d at 1267 ). 30 AS 47.10.011(a). 31 AS 47.10.011(a)-(e). 32 See AS 47.10.084(a) (providing that when child is found in need of aid and released to parent, guardian, or another suitable person under AS 47.10.080(c)(2), “a relationship of legal custody exists” imposing on “the parents, guardian, or other suitable person the responsibility of physical care and control of the child, the determination of where and with whom the child shall live,” and authority to make decisions about child's life); State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. v. Michelle P. , 411 P.3d 576, 579 (Alaska 2018) (holding that superior court's “jurisdiction over a CINA case is distinct from the grant of custody or supervision to OCS in a disposition order and that it derives from the child's status as a child in need of aid”). 33 Goliver v. McAllister , 34 P.3d 324, 326 (Alaska 2001). 34 Sarah A. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs ., 427 P.3d 771, 778 (Alaska 2018) (quoting Dennis O. v. Stephanie O. , 393 P.3d 401, 406 (Alaska 2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 35 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dennis O. , 393 P.3d at 406 ). 36 Id. at 777-78 (quoting Dennis O. , 393 P.3d at 405-06 ). 37 Id. at 778; see Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 38 Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335 . 39 D.M. v. State, Div. of Fam. Youth Servs. , 995 P.2d 205, 212 (Alaska 2000) (quoting In re J.L.F. K.W.F. , 828 P.2d 166, 170 (Alaska 1992), overruled on other grounds by In re S.A. , 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996)). 40 Alaska Adpt. R. 17(a) (providing that validity of adoption decree may be challenged through motion to set aside decree subject to statutory time limitations). 41 See In re Adoption of C.R. , 572 P.3d 568 , 571 (Alaska 2025) (stating that parents’ rights were terminated in June 2019, adoption was finalized in November 2019, and termination order was reversed in December 2020). 42 Leahy v. Conant , 436 P.3d 1039, 1049 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Rae v. State, Dep't of Corr. , 407 P.3d 474, 479 (Alaska 2017)). 43 Penn P. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 522 P.3d 659, 666 (Alaska 2023) (alterations in original) (citing V.F. v. State , 666 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Alaska 1983)). 44 Id. (quoting V.F. , 666 P.2d at 46 ). This two-prong test was adapted from the right to counsel in the criminal context. Risher v. State , 523 P.2d 421, 425 (Alaska 1974). 45 Id. (citing Chloe W. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 336 P.3d 1258, 1265 (Alaska 2014)). 46 Id. at 668 (“Our cases allow — and will continue to allow — parents the flexibility to decide whether to bring a claim of ineffective assistance to us on direct appeal or to the superior court through a Rule 60(b)(6) motion.”); see Chloe W. , 336 P.3d at 1267 (noting that parent had “new counsel on appeal who had an opportunity to evaluate the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and how it might best be presented”). 47 Id. at 664 (quoting Chloe O. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 309 P.3d 850, 856 (Alaska 2013)). 48 Id. at 666 (quoting David S. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. , 270 P.3d 767, 784 (Alaska 2012)). 49 Id. (quoting Chloe O. , 309 P.3d at 858-59 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). 50 See AS 25.23.140(b) (prohibiting questioning adoption decree “upon the expiration of one year after an adoption decree is issued ... by any person ... in any manner upon any ground”). 51 There is also some uncertainty over OPA's authority to represent Jonah in the adoption matter. See AS 44.21.410(a)(4) (allowing OPA to represent indigent persons entitled to representation under AS 18.85.100 who cannot be represented by public defender due to a conflict of interest); AS 18.85.100(a), (e) (authorizing public defender to represent indigent parents in CINA cases, but not expressly authorizing representation in adoption cases). End of Document