Walmart, Inc. v. Bonnie Estell, as the personal representative of the Estate of James E. Reed

Rel: November 6, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ SC-2025-0883 _________________________ Walmart, Inc. v. Bonnie Estell, as the personal representative of the Estate of James E. Reed, deceased Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court (CV-22-900460) MENDHEIM, Justice. SC-2025-0883 Walmart, Inc. ("Walmart"), appeals from the Baldwin Circuit Court's order denying its postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law following a jury trial in which a verdict was rendered in favor of Bonnie Estell, as the personal representative of the estate of James E. Reed, deceased, that awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages. We affirm. I. Facts At the time of the incident that precipitated this lawsuit, Jackson Andrew Walters was a 20-year-old student at the University of Alabama. Walters traveled to Gulf Shores on spring break in March 2022 with two other friends. On March 15, 2022, Walters went to a Walmart store located in Orange Beach and decided to purchase alcohol despite the fact that he was underage. Walters took the items he was purchasing to a self-checkout kiosk and scanned several items, including a bottle of Cooks-brand California Champagne and a 12-pack of Truly's Hard Seltzer.1 When the champagne was scanned, it triggered an alert that alcohol was being purchased, which required a Walmart employee to 1Truly's Hard Seltzer contains a mixture of vodka and fruit juice. In this instance, Walter purchased Truly-brand "Original Lemonade." 2 SC-2025-0883 verify that the purchase was legal in order to complete the transaction. A Walmart cashier, Secret Harris, came over to the self-checkout kiosk to check Walters's ID. Walters handed Harris a purported Georgia driver's license that indicated he was 21 years old. Walters testified that it was a "fake ID" that he had obtained "through a friend at the University of Alabama" for $40. A video of the transaction shown to the jury indicates -- and Orange Beach Walmart General Manager Nelson Eric White agreed -- that Harris "had that ID in her hand for less than five seconds" before she returned it to Walters and approved the transaction. However, White also testified that Harris met the requirements of the training she had received for alcohol sales from Walmart and the Alabama Beverage Control ("ABC") Board because, he said, "[i]n the ABC training, that's all it says, is to look at the ID, make sure and verify it's that person, and that they look at the age of 21." An expert witness who testified on Estell's behalf, Ronald Tobb, stated that a visual inspection revealed three indications that Walters's Georgia driver's license was fake. First, there was a crisp edge around the picture of the person instead of a "feathered edge." Second, the color of the fake ID was "a little fuller in color." Third, the location of the 3 SC-2025-0883 signature on the fake ID was under the picture instead of bordering the picture. Tobb also testified that, if Walmart had paid for a service that scans IDs, the fake license would have been identified within three seconds. Walters testified that the next day, March 16, 2022, he went to a friend's beach house in Gulf Shores and that he took the alcohol he had purchased at Walmart with him. Walters stated that, starting around 1:00 p.m., he drank at least four of the Truly-brand beverages. He then drove to get dinner, admitting that he was "under the influence of alcohol" when he started to drive. The first restaurant Walters went to had a long wait time, so he and his friends decided to go to a different restaurant. On his way, Walters turned north onto Highway 180. Reed was 80 and Estell was 72 at the time of the incident that precipitated this lawsuit, and they had been married for nearly 18 years. Reed and Estell lived in Indiana. They were both retired from employment, and their kids were grown, so they spent much of their time together traveling around the country in a truck camper. In March 2022, one of their grandchildren, Ely, had spring break, and Reed and Estell decided to take him to "Gulf Shores so he [could] 4 SC-2025-0883 experience the beach." Ely was 11 years old at that time. For the excursion, the trio traveled in the truck camper to Gulf State Park. On March 16, 2022, the three explored the area -- Estell and Ely on bicycles and Reed on a mobility scooter that allowed him to stand up or sit down, depending on his preference. They went into town using side streets: they ate dinner at a small restaurant and then stopped for some ice cream. On their way back to Gulf State Park, they traveled along a bike path on East 16th Street heading east. Estell and Ely were ahead of Reed on their bicycles when they came to a stop sign at the intersection of 16th Street and Highway 180. They crossed Highway 180 and then stopped at the other side to wait for Reed. Estell and Ely watched as Reed crossed Highway 180 on his scooter. However, as Reed crossed, his scooter appeared to waver a bit, and then Reed was hit by a car traveling north on Highway 180. Estell testified: "A. [Estell:] I play[ed] mama bear at that point. I [saw] something happening. I'm thinking, I've got to help. "I turn around and get off my bike, throw it to the ground. "I turn around, and [Reed's] gone; he's underneath the car. " 'Oh, my God.' 5 SC-2025-0883 "So I ran up to the car and I mean, you've already heard the evidence, so the scooter is in the street, he's under the car. His legs are literally sticking out under the car and facing towards where it came out of. I just see his legs. It's like Dorothy and the house falling on the witch. All I see is the legs. "And I literally went under the car and started talking to him. "He was laying like this with his hands up here, and he couldn't talk; he tried to talk. "He had blood coming out of here. "He tried to talk, but he couldn't; you could see it in his eyes; you could see it in his mouth. He was trying, but he couldn't. "And finally, the gentleman, the policeman that was here [Detective Timothy Lester], he told me I had to leave; that they were going to administer CPR on him. "And at that point, I realized I didn't even know where Ely was. "And I talked to the policeman and told him what he needed, what he wanted. "And I ran to find out where Ely was, and he was still on the side of the road in the grass. A man was sitting with him. That was my day." An eyewitness, Dustin Lee Spencer, testified: 6 SC-2025-0883 "Q. [Estell's counsel:] Okay. And again, you saw -- I don't want to put words in your mouth. Okay? Tell me what Mr. Walters's vehicle did? "A. He was slowed down, and then the next thing you know, he guns it. "He hits that gentleman and rolled over him, backs up again, hits him and then goes forward and starts dragging him until everybody starts yelling. 'Stop. Stop.' "Q. Okay. Were you able to -- let me ask you this. What happened after he stopped? "A. He sat in his truck for a second. "Q. And then when the gentleman gets out, you could tell there was something wrong with him. "A. He was just stumbling, couldn't talk to nobody. He was just hollering and screaming. He just didn't care. ".... "Q. Were you able to observe Mr. Reed? "A. I was in the parking lot. I was helping them trying to get help at first. "So the Fire Department got there and the gentleman was underneath the tires, stuck. "And he's hollering and screaming. There's nothing you could really do until they got there, so I did not go over there and talk to him personally. "Q. Did he appear to be in pain? 7 SC-2025-0883 "A. Yes, sir. Very badly." Reed was flown to a hospital, but he died of his injuries upon arrival. Walters admitted that, at the time he struck Reed, it was bright and sunny and nothing was obstructing his view and that he had noticed a bright-yellow pedestrian-crossing sign off to the side of the street. He also acknowledged that Reed would have had to cross two full lanes of traffic before he came to the lane in which Walters was driving. Walters testified that he never saw Reed before hitting him. Walters further stated: "Q. [Estelle's counsel:] Did your intoxication play a role in this accident? "A. Yes, sir, it did. "Q. And do you acknowledge that you were, in fact, intoxicated on March 16, 2022? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. And was all of the alcohol you consumed that day alcohol you purchased from Walmart the day before? "A. Yes, sir." Detective Timothy Lester testified that Walters submitted to a breathalyzer test after he had been taken into custody following the accident and that "the results were a .11," which was above the legal limit 8 SC-2025-0883 for blood-alcohol content. Detective Lester further stated that, following an investigation, manslaughter charges were brought against Walters in connection with Reed's death. On April 12, 2022, Estell, through counsel, filed a "Petition to Appoint Special Administrator for the Sole Purpose of Collecting Damages for Wrongful Death" in the Morgan Superior Court in Morgan County, Indiana. In that petition, Estell stated that Reed had "died intestate on March 16, 2022"; that Reed's death was caused "by injuries resulting from an alleged wrongful tort committed ... by certain individuals, organizations, and/or entities, in the state of Alabama"; and that, as far as Estell was aware, Reed was "domiciled in Morgan County" at the time of his death and "left an automobile and a small checking account, both valued at under $50,000[ ] and no administration upon James E. Reed's estate is pending in the state of Indiana." Estell further stated that she was Reed's surviving spouse and requested "[t]hat a Special Administrator should be appointed for the estate of [Reed] for the sole purpose of bringing an action to recover damages for the wrongful 9 SC-2025-0883 death of [Reed] pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-23-1-1[2] and pursuant to Indiana Code § 29-1-10-17.[3]" On April 13, 2022, the Morgan Superior 2Section 34-23-1-1, Ind. Code Ann., is Indiana's wrongful-death statute, which, in pertinent part, provides: "Sec. 1. When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be, lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission. When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the action shall be commenced by the personal representative of the decedent within two (2) years, and the damages shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, including, but not limited to, reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses, and lost earnings of such deceased person resulting from said wrongful act or omission. That part of the damages which is recovered for reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense shall inure to the exclusive benefit of the decedent's estate for the payment thereof. The remainder of the damages, if any, shall, subject to the provisions of this article, inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower, as the case may be, and to the dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin, to be distributed in the same manner as the personal property of the deceased. ..." 3Section 29-1-10-17, Ind. Code Ann., concerns the appointment of a special administrator of an estate and provides: "Sec. 17. An administrator collecting damages for personal injury resulting in the death of any decedent, may, at any time, file in the court where he was appointed his final report with respect to such proceeds, and the same may be approved by the court, and it shall not be necessary to publish 10 SC-2025-0883 Court ordered that "Petitioner, Bonnie J. Estell, should be appointed as special administrator of the Estate of James E. Reed for the sole purpose of bringing an action concerning [Reed's] alleged wrongful death." Pursuant to that order, the Clerk of the Morgan Superior Court issued "Letters of Administration" to Estell on April 13, 2022. On May 10, 2022, Estell commenced in the Baldwin Circuit Court an action "as the Personal Representative of the Estate of James E. Reed" against Walters and Walmart. The complaint appeared to assert claims under the Wrongful Death Act, § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975; the Dram Shop Act, § 6-5-71, Ala. Code 1975; and the Civil Damages Act, § 6-5-70, Ala. Code 1975. On June 10, 2022, Walmart filed an answer to the complaint. On June 17, 2022, Estell and Walters requested a joint stipulation of dismissal of the claims against Walters.4 On June 23, 2022, the trial any notice of the final settlement of such estate unless the same is ordered by the court. In the event that said administrator was appointed for the sole purpose of collecting such damages it shall not be necessary to publish any notice of the issuance of letters of administration." 4The record on appeal indicates that Walters reached a settlement with Estell because, before and after the trial, Walmart argued that it was entitled to a setoff of the settlement amount against the judgment awarded to Estell. 11 SC-2025-0883 court granted the requested dismissal of claims against Walters, leaving Walmart as the sole defendant in the action. On January 12, 2024, Estell filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint in which she expressed a desire to add herself as a plaintiff "in her personal capacity ... on the Dram Shop cause of action because the statute specifically allows the wife to recover." Estell also stated that originally she had also asserted claims under the Wrongful Death Act and the Civil Damages Act but that the "Dram Shop [Act] is the sole and exclusive remedy available to [Estell] pursuant to Alabama law for the death of James Reed." Estell also noted that "very little has been done to this point [in this case] because of the pending criminal case against Jackson Walters." On January 25, 2024, Estell filed an amended complaint "personally, and as next friend of James Reed," against Walmart. Estell asserted claims of negligent and wanton wrongful death "as next friend of James Reed," and claims under the Dram Shop Act "personally and as next friend of James Reed." On January 30, 2024, the trial court granted Estell's motion for leave to file the amended complaint. 12 SC-2025-0883 On May 31, 2024, Estell and Walmart filed a "Joint Status Report" that informed the trial court that Walters's criminal case had concluded, which would enable the parties to take his deposition. However, the parties stated that they were not ready for trial. On June 16, 2025, Walmart filed its summary-judgment motion. In that motion, Walmart argued that it could not be held liable because its cashier, Harris, "did everything she was trained to do and everything she was required legally to do under the ABC Administrative Code to ensure that Mr. Walters was of legal age to purchase alcohol." Walmart also contended that Estell's damages under the Dram Shop Act were limited to "loss of means of support" according to the language of the statute. On July 9, 2025, Estell filed a response in opposition to Walmart's summary-judgment motion. Estell argued that, under Alabama's Administrative Code, Walters had not provided a "valid" driver's license to Walmart and, thus, that Walmart had violated the law by selling alcohol to Walters. Estell also contended that her damages were not limited to loss of support from Reed because she was asserting a claim for wrongful death under the Dram Shop Act. Estell stated that her amended complaint had mistakenly stated that she was filing her action 13 SC-2025-0883 personally and as next friend of James Reed even though "[t]he proper plaintiff is Bonnie Estell as personal representative of the Estate of James E. Reed." On July 15, 2025, the trial court denied Walmart's summary- judgment motion. On the same date, the trial court entered an order that stated: "By agreement, all pending counts in the complaint, or amended complaint, are hereby DISMISSED, with the exception of the Dram Shop action on behalf of the Estate, which is the sole count to be tried before the jury." (Capitalization in original.) On August 8, 2025, Walmart filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's denial of Walmart's summary-judgment motion. In that motion, Walmart contended that Estell's "claims are an impermissible amalgamation of distinct causes of action under Alabama law. Despite repeated amendments and shifting representations, [Estell] has failed to assert a viable claim under either the Alabama Wrongful Death Act or the Dram Shop Act. The law is clear: these are separate and exclusive claims, with differing remedies, each with its own requirements and limitations. [Estell] is not the proper party to assert a wrongful death claim, and no wrongful death claim exists here. Further, the Dram Shop Act does not provide a remedy for death to the estate. Moreover, and finally, any personal claim under the Dram Shop Act has been abandoned." 14 SC-2025-0883 The following day, August 9, 2025, Estell filed a motion to strike Walmart's motion to reconsider, noting that it had been filed three days before the scheduled trial and in derogation of the trial court's scheduling order that required dispositive motions to be filed by June 16, 2025. On August 11, 2025, the trial court denied Walmart's motion to reconsider and Estell's motion to strike. The case was tried before a jury from August 11 to August 13, 2025. At the close of Estell's case, Walmart filed motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Walmart reiterated the arguments it had presented in its previous motions as well as several other arguments related to the evidence presented at the trial. The trial court denied Walmart's motion the same day. Walmart presented no witnesses or evidence after Estell rested her case. Following closing arguments, the trial court charged the jury. Those charges began by making it clear to the jury the capacity in which Estell brought her action and the claim asserted against Walmart. "THE COURT: ... How did we come here in court today? Well, a Complaint was filed by Ms. Bonnie Estell as the personal representative of the Estate of Mr. James Reed against Walmart for a Dram Shop Violation. Walmart denies the allegation. 15 SC-2025-0883 ".... "Ladies and gentlemen, this is a -- as you already have heard -- a one-count Complaint for violation of the Dram Shop Act. "Bonnie Estell, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of James Reed, filed this lawsuit against Walmart under what is called the Alabama Dram Shop Act. "The Dram Shop Act allows a lawsuit by a person who is injured by an intoxicated person. "The lawsuit is filed against an entity that provided the other person with the alcoholic beverages and caused the person to become intoxicated or contributed to that intoxication." The trial court's instructions also made it clear that the focus of the case was Reed's death. "To recover, [the personal representative of Reed's Estate] must prove through reasonable satisfaction from the evidence all of [the] following: "Number one, that Walmart sold alcoholic beverages to Jackson Walters. "Number two, that the alcoholic beverages caused or contributed to Jackson Walters becoming intoxicated. "Number three, that furnishing of the alcoholic beverages to Jackson Walters was contrary to the Code of Alabama, as I just read, and/or the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board Administrative Code, to which I just read to you. 16 SC-2025-0883 "And Number four, that as a consequence of Jackson Walters's intoxicated conduct, James Reed died. "Ladies and gentlemen, if you find that [the personal representative of Reed's estate] proved each and every one of these elements of a violation of the Dram Shop Act, then you should find in favor of [the personal representative of Reed's estate]. ".... "Ladies and gentlemen, if you decide that Jackson Walters's intoxication caused in any way James Reed's death, then you must find for [the personal representative of Reed's estate] and apportion damages accordingly." On August 13, 2022, the jury rendered its verdict, which stated: "We, the Jury, find in favor of Bonnie Estell, as personal representative of the estate of James Reed and against Walmart Inc. and award compensatory damages in the amount of Nine-hundred thousand Dollars ($900,000) and award punitive damages in the amount of: Zero Dollars ($0)." The trial court entered a judgment reflecting the verdict the same day. On September 18, 2025, Walmart filed a "Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate the Judgment." Walmart's postjudgment motion echoed the arguments it had repeatedly made before and during the trial. 17 SC-2025-0883 "Walmart is entitled to judgment because there is no cognizable claim for death under the Dram Shop Act and because Estell lacks standing to assert any claim on behalf of her deceased husband's estate. Additionally, Estell abandoned any personal claim she had under the Dram Shop Act and, in any event, the evidence is insufficient to prove the elements of a viable dram shop claim for her personally. "Additionally, Walmart renews its motion for a judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Walmart completely fulfilled its obligations to examine the fake ID presented to it, and therefore, under binding precedent from the Supreme Court of Alabama, Walmart may not be held liable for any violation of the Dram Shop Act, even if one assumed that there were a plaintiff with a viable claim (which there isn't)." On October 6, 2025, the trial court denied Walmart's postjudgment motion. On November 17, 2025, Walmart appealed. II. Standard of Review "The standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law ('JML') is as follows: " ' "When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. Carter v. 18 SC-2025-0883 Henderson, 598 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992). The nonmovant must have presented substantial evidence in order to withstand a motion for a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). A reviewing court must determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Id. Regarding a question of law, however, this Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 1992)." " 'Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003).' "CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 46 So. 3d 434, 450-51 (Ala. 2010)." DISA Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 272 So. 3d 142, 148 (Ala. 2018). III. Analysis Walmart makes three arguments for why it believes the trial court erred in refusing to enter a judgment as a matter of law in its favor. First, 19 SC-2025-0883 Walmart contends that it was error to allow Estell to assert a claim for the wrongful death of Reed under the Dram Shop Act. Second, Walmart argues that, even if there was a viable claim for Reed's death under the Dram Shop Act, Estell did not possess the proper legal capacity under Alabama law to assert such a claim. Third, Walmart argues that, under a legal test enunciated in McLeod v. Cannon Oil Corp., 603 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1992), the trial court should have concluded that Walmart was "immune" from liability for Reed's death that resulted from the sale of alcohol to Walters. We examine each of the foregoing arguments in turn. A. Wrongful Death and the Dram Shop Act As we have already mentioned, Walmart contends that no cognizable claim for wrongful death exists under the Dram Shop Act and, therefore, that Estell's claim never should have been submitted to the jury. We start our examination of that contention by looking at the statute at issue. The version of the Dram Shop Act applicable in this case provided: "(a) Every wife, child, parent, or other person who shall be injured in person, property, or means of support by any intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person shall have a right of action against any person who shall, by selling, giving, or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages, 20 SC-2025-0883 cause the intoxication of such person for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages. "(b) Upon the death of any party, the action or right of action will survive to or against his executor or administrator. "(c) The party injured, or his legal representative, may commence a joint or separate action against the person intoxicated or the person who furnished the liquor, and all such claims shall be by civil action in any court having jurisdiction thereof." Former § 6-5-71, Ala. Code 1975.5 Concerning § 6-5-71, this Court has explained: "We conclude, based on these prior interpretations, that § 6-5-71 is penal in nature and that its purpose is to punish the owners of taverns who continue to serve customers after they have become intoxicated. The legislature intended to stop or to deter drunken driving facilitated by bar owners, in order to protect the public at large from tortious conduct committed by any intoxicated person who was served liquor by a bar owner while in an intoxicated condition. A right of action under § 6-5-71 runs in favor of two classes of persons[:] '(1) The person injured in person or property, [and] (2) [the] wife, child, parent, or other person ... who has been injured through loss of means of support because of personal injury to the person furnishing the means of support.' Ward[ v. Rhodes, Hammonds & Beck, Inc.], 511 So. 2d [159,] 161 [(Ala. 1987)]. The phrase 'other person' constitutes a second class of claimants that encompasses 'anyone who is proximately 5Section 6-5-71, Ala. Code 1975, was substantively amended in 2023, but the amendment became effective on April 19, 2023. See Act No. 2023-25, Ala. Acts 2023. Therefore, the amended version is not applicable in this case. 21 SC-2025-0883 "injured in person, property or means of support by any intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person." And ... this category of plaintiffs is as broad as proof of proximate cause will permit.' James[ v. Brewton Motel Mgmt., Inc.], 570 So. 2d [1225,] 1229 [(Ala. 1990)] (quoting Ward, 511 So. 2d at 164). This Court has interpreted § 6-5-71 to encompass a broad spectrum of plaintiffs and will not now start limiting them to 'innocent' parties alone." McIsaac v. Monte Carlo Club, Inc., 587 So. 2d 320, 324 (Ala. 1991).6 Thus, there is no question that the person "injured" by the intoxicated person has a right of action against the entity that sold alcohol to the intoxicated person in violation of the law. However, Walmart contends that "[t]he plain meaning of the Dram Shop Act is that no remedy is available for death, but only for various harms suffered by the living." Walmart's brief, p. 35. For support of that position, Walmart relies heavily upon this Court's holding and reasoning in Webb v. French, 228 Ala. 43, 152 So. 215 (1934). 6The McIsaac Court concluded that the phrase "other person" in § 6-5-71 included the intoxicated person. That specific conclusion is altered by subsection (e) in amended § 6-5-71, which states: "Nothing contained in this section shall authorize the consumer of any alcoholic beverage to recover from the provider of the alcoholic beverage for injuries or damages suffered by the consumer caused by the consumer's ingestion of alcohol." 22 SC-2025-0883 In Webb, it was alleged that Hawkins Westmoreland, while intoxicated, drove his car into another car in which Nellie Webb Stewart was a passenger. Both Westmoreland and Stewart were killed. The administrator of Stewart's estate, Odie Webb, sued Eunice French, the executrix of Westmoreland's estate, "claiming damages for death by wrongful act. [French argued] that no cause of action survives in such a case." 228 Ala. at 44, 152 So. at 216. Webb contended that a cause of action existed under the Dram Shop Act. The trial court agreed with French, concluding that there was no cause of action. On appeal, this Court agreed, explaining: "Count A seeks to present a case under Code, §§ 5674, 5675, which read: " '5674. Wife, etc., shall have right of action for injury in consequence of sale or disposition of prohibited liquors or beverages. -- Every wife, child, parent, or other person who shall be injured in person, or property, or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, shall have a right of action against any person who shall by selling, giving or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages. [1909, p. 63, § 8.] 23 SC-2025-0883 " '5675. Survival and revival of actions. -- Upon the death of any party, the action, or right of action will survive to or against his executor or administrator. The party injured, or his legal representative, may bring a joint or separate action against the person intoxicated, or who furnished the liquor; and all such suits shall be by civil action in any court having jurisdiction thereof.' "These statutes have not been heretofore construed. They are a codification of section 8 of the Act of August 25, 1909, Acts 1909, p. 63. "This act, one of the companion prohibition bills of that special session, covers more than thirty pages, and, broadly speaking, may be deemed a prohibition enforcement measure. "The construction of section 8, divided into two sections in the Code, is not free from difficulty. The first portion, now section 5674 of the Code, creates a cause of action against the bootlegger (to use a modern term) for personal injuries to third persons at the hands of one to whom the bootlegger has furnished prohibited liquor and the injury is the proximate consequence of intoxication from such liquor. "It would seem the right of action runs in favor of two classes of persons: "(1) The person injured in person or property. "(2) Wife, child, parent, or other person (a dependent maybe) who has been injured through loss of means of support because of personal injury to the person furnishing the means of support. 24 SC-2025-0883 "The damages recoverable are expressly declared to be the 'damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages.' "The basis of the action is actual damages, nominal at least, with exemplary damages added at the discretion of the jury, because of willfulness, wantonness, aggravation, etc., under general law. 4 Michie's Digest, p. 649, § 70. In this, such action differs from suits under the Homicide Act [the predecessor of the Wrongful Death Act]. "[Webb] relies upon section 5675, as giving a right of action for death by wrongful act against the person inflicting the injury in consequence of his intoxication, and, in case of his death before suit, a cause of action against his personal representative. "This statute speaks only of injuries to person or property. Throughout our legal system actions for personal injuries and actions for death from wrongfully inflicted injury are distinct. "All death actions are statutory. At common law no such action was known. It never came into being, and no question of survival could arise. Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 So. 104, [(1911)] Ann. Cas. 1913B, 225; White v. Ward, 157 Ala. 345, 47 So. 166 [(1908)], 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 568; 17 C. J. p. 1181. "It is obvious the statute in question gives a direct right of action to the wife, child, etc., for whatever statutory damages have been sustained. "The question of survivor of the cause of action in such case would arise, it seems, upon the death of such plaintiff, the wife, etc., and the cause would survive to her personal representative, not the representative of the victim of personal injury causing death. 25 SC-2025-0883 "But, if a new cause of action is here created for wrongful act causing death, to be instituted by the personal representative, to whom does the recovery inure? "All our statutes creating a cause of action for death by wrongful act are for the benefit of the living. "Both under the Homicide Act and Lord Campbell's Act, the action is for the benefit of the distributees or next of kin, not a part of the estate as such, but recovered by the personal representative as a statutory appointee for named beneficiaries. "Under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Code 1923, § 7534 et seq.), the death benefit goes to named dependents. "If a death action is contemplated under Code, § 5675, it is entirely silent on this point. For want of such provision, the recovery would become assets of the estate to be administered as other assets. "One estate suing another for tort committed by one decedent against the other in their lifetimes is an anomaly in our law. No such intent is to be given a statute unless declared in plain and unambiguous terms. No such terms are used. The statute deals with personal injuries only. "At common law the torts committed by a man went to the grave with him. Wynn v. Tallapoosa County Bank, [168 Ala. 469, 53 So. 228 (1910)]. "Code, § 5675, providing for a survival of the action and cause of action in favor of and against the personal representative of the parties may be given full effect, by confining it to causes of action accruing for personal injury not causing death, wherein the living has a just demand against the living for actual damages sustained by tortious act. In such case this statute seems to keep alive such demand in 26 SC-2025-0883 favor of the estate of the one against the estate of the other. Whether, in that case, suit must be brought while the tort- feasor lives, there is no occasion to decide." Webb, 228 Ala. at 44-45, 152 So. at 216-17 (emphasis added). In short, the Webb Court reasoned that no cause of action for the event of death was provided in the Dram Shop Act for two reasons. First, Webb concluded that what was subsection (a) of the applicable version of the Dram Shop Act in this case speaks only in terms of "injur[ies] in person or property" and not to death, while other statutes, such as the Wrongful Deat