In re: Suzanne M. Willmon v. First State Bank of DeKalb County, Casey S. Handrich, and Louis Crowder
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketSC-2026-0424
JudgeCook, J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: November 20, 2026
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
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Ex parte Suzanne M. Willmon
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Suzanne M. Willmon
v.
First State Bank of DeKalb County, Casey S. Handrich, and
Louis Crowder)
(Marshall Circuit Court: CV-25-900059)
COOK, Justice.
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This petition for a writ of mandamus raises the question of how to
conduct discovery in a civil case when a witness invokes their Fifth
Amendment right not to incriminate themselves.
The petitioner, Suzanne M. Willmon, claims that certain bank
documents were forged, leading to a foreclosure on her property. The
focus of this mandamus petition is discovery directed to the bank
employee who allegedly forged those documents. In April 2022, Willmon
executed a promissory note ("the 2022 note") in favor of First State Bank
of DeKalb County ("the Bank"), secured by a second mortgage on property
she owned in Grant ("the Grant property"). Afterward, in October 2023,
she allegedly contacted the Bank's vice president to request a $60,000
advance on the 2022 note. According to the Bank, Willmon requested that
Casey S. Handrich, a notary who was employed at the Bank, execute
various loan documents related to her request, including a renewed
promissory note for $211,883.10 and mortgage documents adding two
properties located in Woodville as collateral. Once the documents were
executed, Handrich was to notarize them. Willmon now disputes all of
this and claims that those documents were forged by Handrich.
Later, Willmon defaulted on the note secured by the first mortgage
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on the Grant property, which had been serviced by Selene Finance LP.
The Bank then notified Willmon that her default also triggered a default
under the 2022 note and the second mortgage. Thus, despite her claim
that the documents were forged, the Bank notified Willmon that it
intended to sell the Grant property in a foreclosure sale on February 13,
2025.
In response, Willmon filed this action against the Bank in the
Marshall Circuit Court, requesting that the court declare the rights of
the parties in regard to the 2022 note and order the foreclosure sale to be
stopped. Willmon also moved for a temporary restraining order ("TRO")
preventing the foreclosure sale, but the sale occurred before any TRO
could be entered. The Bank then filed its answer to Willmon's complaint,
denying her claims and asserting a counterclaim to recover the deficient
funds that it alleged Willmon still owed it under the 2022 note following
the foreclosure sale of the Grant property.
Willmon amended her complaint to, among other things, add
additional claims against the Bank and to add Handrich as a defendant
to her action, and Willmon alleged claims of forgery and notary
misconduct against Handrich.
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Willmon eventually took the deposition of Handrich. At that time,
Handrich refused to answer any questions and invoked her Fifth
Amendment right under the United States Constitution. Willmon filed
a motion to compel, and the trial court initially ordered Handrich to sit
for a deposition.
Handrich then moved the trial court vacate its order compelling her
to testify. She also asked the trial court to stay the proceedings against
her and to prohibit further deposition questions, interrogatories, and
other matters in the case that implicated her Fifth Amendment right.
In response, Willmon moved for sanctions against Handrich for
failing to comply with the trial court's previous order compelling her
testimony. Willmon also opposed Handrich's motion to stay, arguing that
Handrich had failed to demonstrate a concrete, nonspeculative basis for
a stay and that a blanket stay would substantially prejudice her.
Following additional filings and proceedings, the trial court granted
Handrich's motion to indefinitely stay the proceedings against her after
it determined that Willmon's amended complaint included allegations
that Handrich had engaged in criminal conduct, thus implicating
Handrich's Fifth Amendment right.
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Willmon has now petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to, among other things, (1) vacate its order
granting Handrich's motion to indefinitely stay the proceedings against
her based on her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right and (2) vacate
its order denying her request to compel Handrich to provide responses to
her discovery and to sit for a deposition in this case. For the reasons
stated below, we grant the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
I. Willmon's Executed Promissory Note with the Bank in August
2022
As stated previously, Willmon owned property, the Grant property,
which had a note secured by a mortgage that was serviced by Selene
Finance LP. On April 30, 2022, Willmon executed the 2022 note in the
amount of $208,390.60 in favor of the Bank. That loan was secured by a
second mortgage on the Grant property. The note was due and payable
in full on February 26, 2023.
When Willmon was unable to pay the 2022 note in full by the
maturity date, she executed in March 2023, a "Modification, Extension,
and Change In Terms Agreement" in the amount of $40,969 ("the March
2023 notice of additional advances"). That loan was secured by the second
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mortgage on the Grant property, extended the loan's maturity date, and
allegedly increased the interest rate from 7% to 9%. According to
Willmon, she paid that loan back in full on August 15, 2023.
II. The October 2023 Documents
On October 1, 2023, Willmon contacted the Bank's vice president,
Jacob Stubblefield, to request a $60,000 advance on the existing 2022
note in order to purchase a tractor for her land in Kentucky and to get
her property in Kentucky surveyed. The Bank claims that it was
unwilling to extend the additional $60,000 to be secured by the tractor,
which would have been located in a different state, and, instead, offered
to extend the additional $60,000 loan if it was secured by an additional
advance notice under the second mortgage on the Grant property.
According to the Bank, in her text exchange with Stubblefield,
Willmon agreed to the terms of the proposed loan and also agreed to
execute an additional mortgage advance notice to be recorded in the
Probate Office of Marshall County to secure the additional $60,000 loan.
The Bank then arranged to have the loan documents prepared on October
23, 2023, so that they would be ready for Willmon to execute them in
Grant on October 24, 2023.
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The Bank contends that, on October 24, 2023, Willmon allegedly
contacted Handrich, a notary who was employed by the Bank, and asked
her to execute various loan documents related to her request, including a
renewed promissory note for $211,883.10, a notice of additional advance
for $60,000, and mortgage documents adding two properties located in
Woodville as collateral ("the October 2023 loan documents").
Once the documents were executed, Handrich notarized them. The
additional mortgage advance notice was thereafter recorded on October
27, 2023, with the Marshal County Probate Office.
Willmon, however, vigorously disputes this account of events and
maintains that she never asked Handrich to execute the October 2023
loan documents. According to her, Handrich forged her signature on
those documents without her knowledge, consent, or power of attorney
and without discussion of the terms.
Despite Willmon's claims, however, the Bank notes that the
$60,000 loan proceeds were deposited into Willmon's checking account on
October 24, 2023. Willmon then executed and delivered two checks -- one
in the amount of $45,327.81 for the tractor and a second in the amount
of $15,000 for the survey of her property in Kentucky.
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Willmon acknowledges that the $60,000 loan proceeds were
deposited into her account and that she executed and delivered the two
checks described above. However, she claims that she believed that those
funds were an advance on the 2022 note that was secured by the second
mortgage on the Grant property.
III. Willmon Defaults on the First Mortgage on the Grant Property
and the Bank Begins Foreclosure Proceedings
In December 2024, Willmon advised the Bank that she had ceased
making the payments on the note secured by the first mortgage on the
Grant property and that that loan was in default. The Bank then received
a payoff statement from Selene Finance LP that indicated that no
payments had been made on the note secured by the first mortgage on
the Grant property since March 2024 and that the outstanding amount
due as of the date of the payoff statement was $123,927.02.
On January 29, 2025, the Bank, as a protective advance under the
second mortgage, paid Selene Finance LP $126,121.38 to release the first
mortgage on the Grant property. According to the Bank, Willmon's
failure to maintain payment of the note secured by the first mortgage
constituted a default under the second mortgage on the Grant property
used to secure the 2022 note and under the October 2023 loan documents.
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As a result, the Bank commenced foreclosure procedures on the Grant
property.
Willmon claims that she was unaware of any of this until January
30, 2025, and maintained that the October 2023 loan documents were
forged. Despite her claim that the documents were forged, the Bank
notified Willmon that it intended to sell the Grant property securing the
loans at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on February 13, 2025.
On February 12, 2025, Willmon's counsel sent a dispute letter to
the Bank's foreclosure counsel, asserting that the October 2023 loan
documents were forged, disputing the debt, and demanding cancellation
of the February 13, 2025, foreclosure sale. Over Willmon's objections,
that foreclosure sale went ahead as scheduled. According to the Bank,
the Grant property was sold to the highest bidder -- Louis Crowder -- for
$175,000, which, Willmon alleges, is less than the $200,000 appraised
value of the property.1
After applying the gross sale proceeds toward the expenses of the
1According to Willmon, Crowder was on notice of the dispute
between her and the Bank through the existence of her underlying
lawsuit against the Bank and, thus, she says, cannot claim to be a bona
fide purchaser of the Grant property.
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sale in the amount of $7,637.86, as provided under the second mortgage,
there remained net foreclosure proceeds of $167,362.14, which were
applied first to reimburse the Bank for the protective advance to pay off
the defaulted first mortgage, plus interest, and second to the original
unpaid balance of the 2022 note, leaving an unpaid deficiency balance
owed by Willmon of $179,107.83. As explained below, this amount would
later become the basis of the Bank's deficiency counterclaim against
Willmon.
IV. Willmon's Underlying Action Against the Bank
On February 12, 2025, Willmon filed a declaratory-judgment action
against the Bank in the Marshall Circuit Court, requesting that the court
declare the rights of the parties in regard to the loans and order the
nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the Grant residence to be stopped. Willmon
attached three exhibits to her complaint, including (1) a copy of the notice
of the foreclosure sale, (2) a copy of the March 13, 2023, notice of
additional advances, and (3) a letter from her attorney to the Bank asking
it to cancel the foreclosure sale.
The next day, on February 13, 2025, Willmon moved for a TRO
preventing the foreclosure sale. She also moved for a preliminary
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injunction restraining the filing of a foreclosure deed if the sale occurred
before the entry of the TRO.
Although the trial court granted her request and entered the TRO
on February 14, 2025, the foreclosure sale had already proceeded as
planned on February 13, 2025. As a result, on February 19, 2025, the
Bank moved to dissolve the TRO as moot. That same day, Willmon filed
her consent to have the TRO dissolved and also moved to withdraw her
request for a preliminary injunction.
On March 12, 2025, the Bank answered Willmon's complaint and
filed a counterclaim seeking to recover a deficiency judgment against
Willmon in the amount of the principal sum of $179,107.83, interest at
13.5% per annum, attorney's fees in the amount of $20,000, and costs.
The trial court issued a scheduling order on March 19, 2025, which
set Willmon's last day to amend her pleadings as June 1, 2025, the Bank's
last day to amend its pleading as July 1, 2025, and trial on October 14,
2025.
On April 21, 2025, Willmon answered the Bank's counterclaim and
asserted numerous affirmative defenses. In her answer, Willmon
vigorously denied the Bank's account of events and maintained that the
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October 2023 loan documents were forged.
On June 11, 2025, Willmon amended her complaint, adding
additional claims against the Bank, including claims of fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty and good faith, wrongful foreclosure, and conversion, as
well as two counts of breach of contract related to the Bank's inclusion of
the Woodville properties in the October 2023 loan documents. She also
named Crowder and Handrich as defendants. She alleged claims of fraud,
fraud in the execution, and notary misconduct against Handrich and a
declaratory-judgment claim against Crowder.
Willmon also filed an amended answer and served interrogatories,
requests for production, and requests for admissions on Handrich.
On June 26, 2025, the Bank moved to strike the amended complaint
as untimely filed. On July 3, 2025, the trial court granted the Bank's
motion and struck Willmon's amended complaint and amended answer.
V. The Bank's Motion for a Summary Judgment
On July 17, 2025, the Bank moved for a summary judgment on its
counterclaim against Willmon. In its motion, the Bank argued that
Willmon had defaulted under the terms of the written agreements with
it by failing to make payments on the note secured by the first mortgage
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on the Grant property to Selene Finance LP, which, it said, was a breach
of the Bank's second mortgage under the 2022 note. That breach, it said,
led to the foreclosure of the Bank's second mortgage, thus resulting in the
deficiency balance that it is claiming as damages against Willmon.
According to the Bank, its request for relief was separate from the
$60,000 loan advance contemplated by the October 2023 loan documents
that Willmon alleges were forged. Rather, it said, the focus of its request
for relief was on the additional $60,000 that were deposited into her bank
account because Willmon admittedly spent those funds in accordance
with the purpose for which she originally sought them -- to purchase a
tractor and to have land surveyed in Kentucky. The Bank argued that it
was "immaterial" whether the October 2023 loan documents were signed
on her behalf because she accepted the benefit of that loan by using the
money for those purposes.
On July 31, 2025, Willmon opposed that motion, stating that her
discovery requests to the Bank remained incomplete and requesting that
the scheduled summary-judgment hearing be continued pursuant to Rule
56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Willmon later filed her opposition to the Bank's summary-judgment
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motion. In her opposition, Willmon first argued that the Bank had failed
to meet its initial prima facie burden of establishing that no genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the October 2023 loan
documents were forged. According to Willmon, the Bank pointed to
unreliable affidavits that, she said, were contradicted by Stubblefield in
an "attempt to obscure its misconduct and unfairly burden [her] with
fabricated debts." She then argued, among other things, that genuine
issues of material fact existed concerning the authenticity of the October
2023 loan documents, as evidenced by the affidavits and exhibits she
attached to her opposition. Willmon also filed a motion for leave to amend
her complaint and answer in order to reinstate her previously struck
amended complaint, which included claims against Handrich.
The trial court reset the summary-judgment hearing for October 3,
2025, allowing Willmon time to complete the discovery she alleged she
needed to oppose the motion.
VI. Handrich's Invocation of Her Fifth Amendment Right and
Willmon's Motion to Compel
On September 30, 2025, Willmon deposed Handrich. After
Handrich confirmed her name, she invoked her right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
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Constitution. She then did so in response to every subsequent question.
That same day, Willmon moved to compel Handrich to provide
testimony in response to nonincriminating questions.
On October 1, 2025, the Bank opposed Willmon's motion to compel
Handrich's testimony, citing Willmon's filing of a complaint against the
Bank with its federal regulator, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("the FDIC"). That complaint had included a copy of
Handrich's affidavit in support of Willmon's claim that the October 2023
loan documents were "forged" and requested that the FDIC refer the
evidence to a law-enforcement agency for criminal investigation.
On October 2, 2025, Willmon supplemented her motion to compel
and requested that the trial court continue the scheduled hearing on the
Bank's summary-judgment motion until she was able to properly depose
Handrich. Relying on Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., Willmon asserted that
"discovery from Handrich is absolutely critical to [her] claims and
defenses" and that the Bank's counterclaim against her seeking a
deficiency judgment in excess of $179,000, plus accruing defaulting
interest and attorney's fees, is based on the loan transactions involving
Handrich's actions. She argued that denying her the opportunity to
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obtain this discovery would severely prejudice her ability to mount a full
defense and would leave her unable to counter the Bank's narrative or
substantiate her own claims of fraud and regulatory violations.
That same day, the Bank filed an omnibus response, opposing all of
Willmon's pending motions. In particular, the Bank challenged Willmon's
request to extend the discovery deadline on the basis that "there is no
reason to allow additional discovery to obtain testimony from Casey
Handrich as [she] has invoked her rights under the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution against self-incrimination due to Willmon's own
actions in requesting investigation of Handrich's actions by federal
authorities."
On October 29, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying the
Bank's motion for a summary judgment. It also issued an order granting,
in part, Willmon's motion to compel testimony from Handrich and to
impose sanctions and granting Willmon's motion for leave to amend her
answer and complaint. Regarding the motion to compel Handrich's
testimony, the trial court ordered Handrich to sit for her deposition and
provide responses to any and all questions asked of her that were not
incriminating in nature.
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On November 5, 2025, Willmon filed her amended complaint, once
again naming the Bank, Handrich, and Crowder (the buyer of the Grant
property at the foreclosure sale) as defendants. That same day, Willmon
filed her amended answer and affirmative defenses.
On December 16, 2025, Handrich opposed Willmon's motion for
sanctions and requested a protective order to stay the proceedings
against her and thereby prevent further deposition questions, discovery,
and trial testimony. It is unclear from the materials before us whether
the trial court took any action on Handrich's request.
VII. The Bank's Motion for a Partial Summary Judgment on
Willmon's Claims Against It
Following additional filings and proceedings, on February 5, 2026,
the Bank once again moved for partial summary judgment, and the trial
court set the motion for a hearing. In its motion, the Bank argued that it
was entitled to a summary judgment in its favor on all of Willmon's
claims against it.2
2We note that, in its motion, the Bank asserted, apparently for the
first time, that its counterclaim against Willmon arose out of Willmon's
failure to repay the 2022 note as agreed. Specifically, the Bank alleged
that Willmon
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On March 4, 2026, Willmon filed her opposition to the Bank's
motion for a partial summary judgment. In her opposition, Willmon
argued that genuine issues of material fact existed "regarding document
authenticity, loan authorization, consumer loan classification,
compliance with federal lending regulations, the validity of the waiver
clause, foreclosure propriety, and the Bank's pattern of deceptive
conduct" and that those "disputed facts preclude summary judgment and
require resolution by trial."
On March 13, 2026, the trial court granted the Bank's motion for a
partial summary judgment on all of Willmon's claims against the Bank.
However, Willmon's fraud and notary-misconduct claims against
Handrich and her declaratory-judgment claim against Crowder, along
with the Bank's counterclaim against Willmon, remained pending.
"owes to Bank the deficiency balance of the 2022 Note
remaining after foreclosure of the 2022 Mortgage, the
protective advance made by Bank to pay off a delinquent first
mortgage held by Selene Finance in order to preserve the
second lien position of the 2022 mortgage, an additional
$60,000.00 loan which she has admitted to requesting and
admittedly received (and spent) the loan proceeds on a
$40,000.00 farm tractor and $15,000.00 land survey on
property in Kentucky, plus associated attorney's fees and
costs as provided under the terms of the 2022 Note and
Mortgage."
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VIII. Handrich's Motion to Stay the Proceedings Against Her
On March 26, 2026, Handrich moved the trial court vacate its order
compelling her to testify and to stay the proceedings against her. She also
requested that the trial court prohibit further deposition questions,
interrogatories, and other matters in the case that implicated her Fifth
Amendment right. According to Handrich, Willmon's continued
questioning of her in the case "could incriminate or reasonably expose
Handrich to criminal liability" that would "create[] an undue burden and
risk of constitutional harm" for her. She later filed a brief in support of
her motion to stay in which she argued that the proceedings should be
stayed against her should be stayed until the criminal statutes of
limitations have run.
Five days later, Willmon moved for sanctions against Handrich for
failing to comply with the trial court's previous order compelling her
testimony. According to Willmon, after multiple attempts to get
Handrich's counsel to provide dates for the deposition, she was told that
Handrich would "not be testifying in this matter." She moved to compel
Handrich's responses to her interrogatories and requests for production
and to deem admitted her requests for admission that had been served
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on Handrich. Willmon also opposed Handrich's motion to stay, arguing
that Handrich had failed to demonstrate a concrete, nonspeculative basis
for a stay and that a blanket stay would substantially prejudice her.
IX. The Bank's Motion for a Summary Judgment on Its
Counterclaim Against Willmon and Willmon's Request for a
Continuance under Rul 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.
On April 15, 2026, the Bank moved for a summary judgment on its
counterclaim concerning the deficiency balance resulting from the
foreclosure on the Grant property. The Bank argued that it was entitled
to a summary judgment on its counterclaim because that counterclaim
was based on Willmon's failure to pay the mortgage payments on the
Grant property that had been used to secure the 2022 note. Because the
facts and documentation underlying that claim had nothing to do with
any alleged illegal conduct by Handrich, the Bank argued, it was entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law in its favor on that counterclaim.
The trial court apparently scheduled a hearing on the Bank's
motion for May 18, 2026.
On May 9, 2026, Willmon moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule
56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., to continue the May 18, 2026, hearing on the Bank's
motion for a summary judgment until Willmon was able to obtain
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complete discovery from Handrich. Willmon maintained that Handrich's
testimony was crucial to her ability to defend against the Bank's
counterclaim for a deficiency balance following the foreclosure on the
Grant property.
The Bank opposed the requested continuance. It argued that
Handrich's testimony was irrelevant to the amount of indebtedness that
Willmon owed to it. According to the Bank, that indebtedness was based
on the second mortgage on the Grant property that was used to secure
the 2022 note; it further asserted that "the subsequent foreclosure of said
mortgage as a result of Willmon's default thereunder, and the resulting
deficiency balance are fully presented and proven in [the] Bank's motion
without reference to any documents for which 'the circumstances
surrounding the execution, notarization, and handling' could create a
genuine issue of material fact."
X. The Trial Court's Orders
On May 14, 2026, the trial court issued three orders: (1) one
resetting the summary-judgment hearing for June 2, 2026, and denying
Willmon's Rule 56(f) motion to postpone the hearing; (2) one denying both
Willmon's request for sanctions against Handrich and her motion to
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compel discovery responses from Handrich; and (3) one granting
Handrich's motion to indefinitely stay the proceedings against her based
on her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right.
Willmon thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.
We ordered answers and briefs.
Standard of Review
"A petition for writ of mandamus is the proper method by which to
challenge a trial court's decision on a motion to stay a civil proceeding
when a party is the subject of a criminal investigation." Ex parte
Steinberg, 330 So. 3d 813, 816 (Ala. 2021) (quoting Ex parte McDaniel,
291 So. 3d 847, 851 (Ala. 2019)). Further, this Court has stated:
" ' "The utilization of a writ of mandamus to compel or prohibit
discovery is restricted because of the discretionary nature of
a discovery order. The right sought to be enforced by
mandamus must be clear and certain with no reasonable basis
for controversy about the right to relief. The writ will not issue
where the right in question is doubtful." ' "
Ex parte Finerty, 611 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Ex parte
Bozeman, 420 So. 2d 89, 91 (Ala. 1982), quoting in turn Ex parte Dorsey
Trailers, Inc., 397 So. 2d 98, 102 (Ala. 1981)).
It is well settled that " ' " ' [t]he writ of mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be "issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right
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in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court." ' " ' " Ex parte Alamo Title Co., 128 So. 3d 700, 708 (Ala. 2013)
(citations omitted).
Discussion
As stated previously, Willmon has petitioned this Court for a writ
of mandamus directing the trial court to (1) vacate its order granting
Handrich a stay of the civil proceedings against her based on her
invocation of her Fifth Amendment right and (2) vacate its order denying
Willmon's request to compel Handrich to respond to her discovery and
submit to a deposition. We will address each request for mandamus relief
in turn.
I. The Trial Court's Blanket Stay of the Civil Proceedings Against
Handrich Based on the Invocation of Her Fifth Amendment Right
Willmon contends that, when a party seeks to stay civil proceedings
based on Fifth Amendment concerns, Alabama law requires the trial
court to engage in a careful, fact-specific balancing analysis. Relying on
our Court's prior mandamus decisions in Ex parte Baugh, 530 So. 2d 238
(Ala. 1988), Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte
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Rawls, 953 So. 2d 374 (Ala. 2006), she contends that that analysis must
consider (1) whether the civil and criminal matters are parallel, (2)
whether the privilege is genuinely threatened, and (3) whether the
movant's interests outweigh the prejudice to the opposing party and the
interests of justice. Willmon contends that the trial court was not
presented with any evidence of those factors.
Because our caselaw makes clear that a party in a civil case may
invoke the Fifth Amendment before indictment only if the threat of self-
incrimination is real and reasonable, not merely speculative, and because
Handrich's own sworn discovery responses indicate that she knows of no
criminal charges, that she knows of no pending investigation, and that
there has been no contact from law enforcement or regulators, Willmon
contends that the trial court's blanket stay based on Handrich's
invocation of her Fifth Amendment right was clear error and that she is,
thus, entitled to mandamus relief.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." That
right applies to both criminal cases and civil cases. The Fifth Amendment
" 'not only protects the individual against being involuntarily
called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution
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but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to
him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings.' "
Ex parte Rawls, 953 So. 2d at 379-80 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).
"A court has the discretion to stay civil proceedings, to postpone
civil discovery, or to impose protective orders and conditions in the face
of parallel criminal proceedings against one of the parties when the
interests of justice seem to require." Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 787-
88. Regarding a trial court's decision on a motion to stay civil proceedings
based on Fifth Amendment concerns, our Court has previously stated
that
"Alabama caselaw is staunchly committed to the proposition
that actual criminal charges are not necessary to justify the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, so long as the party moving for the stay clearly
demonstrates to the trial judge that that party is the subject
of an ongoing, and overlapping, criminal investigation."
Id. at 785 (some emphasis added). In Ex parte Rawls, 953 So. 2d at 378,
this Court stated that, in order to determine if a stay is warranted under
such circumstances, three factors must be addressed:
"(1) whether the civil proceeding and the criminal proceeding
are parallel, see Ex parte Weems, 711 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (Ala.
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1998); (2) whether the moving party's Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination will be threatened if the
civil proceeding is not stayed, see Ex parte Windom, 763 So.
2d 946, 950 (Ala. 2000); and (3) whether the requirements of
the balancing tests set out in Ex parte Baugh, 530 So. 2d [238,
244 (Ala. 1988)], and Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776, 789
(Ala. 2003), are met."
As stated previously, Willmon argues that the order staying the
case as to Handrich based on her invocation of her Fifth Amendment
right should be vacated because, she says, the trial court was not
presented with any evidence that satisfied the legal principles discussed
above. We agree.
In her motion seeking a stay, Handrich asserted over and over
again that she has a "reasonable apprehension of a risk of self-
incrimination" given the "significant overlap between [her] alleged
conduct and the elements necessary to support a criminal charge." She
further asserted that the conduct alleged against her by Willmon "is the
same conduct [Willmon] alleged in her submission to the FDIC" and that
that conduct may be the basis for criminal charges, including charges for
fraud and forgery." In short, Handrich said, "the civil case and any
potential criminal investigation/case will turn on the same questions
concerning the alleged conduct that [Willmon] claims occurred during a
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period when Handrich was employed by [the Bank]."
There is nothing in the materials before us that indicates that the
FDIC (or any other governmental agency) has begun an investigation
into the allegations in Willmon's complaint, much less an investigation
in Handrich herself. In fact, in her discovery responses, Handrich
admitted that she has never been contacted by either the FDIC or the
Alabama State Banking Department regarding any complaints about
loans involving Willmon or the Bank. Handrich further admitted that she
had no information about any other criminal charges or open
investigations related to notary acts or forgery. Thus, Handrich failed to
present any evidence showing that she is the "subject of an ongoing, and
overlapping, criminal investigation," as our caselaw requires for a stay of
civil proceedings based on the invocation of the Fifth Amendment to be
upheld. Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 785.
At best, Handrich's statements are simply general assertions that
a criminal investigation might take place. Such assertions do not
" 'clearly demonstrate[],' " Ex parte McDaniel, 291 So. 3d at 853 (emphasis
and citation omitted), the existence of a criminal proceeding parallel to
this civil proceeding. See Ex parte Merrill, 264 So. 3d 855, 860 n.4 (Ala.
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2018) ("Motions, statements in motions, and arguments of counsel are
not evidence."); and American Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Mobile v. Long, 281
Ala. 654, 656, 207 So. 2d 129, 132 (1968) (stating that an "unsworn
statement of counsel was not evidence"). " ' "[A] motion to stay civil
discovery during the pendency of a parallel criminal proceeding is not
properly granted upon speculative or conclusory grounds." ' " Ex parte
McDaniel, 291 So. 3d at 854 (quoting Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 788,
quoting in turn Ex parte Hill, 674 So. 2d 530, 533 (Ala. 1996)).
Based on the lack of evidence in this case, Handrich has not
established that she is the subject of an overlapping, parallel criminal
investigation, as the legal principles discussed above clearly require.
Thus, we agree with Willmon that that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in ordering the stay.3
3Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, the second factor
discussed in Ex parte Rawls, supra -- whether Handrich's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination is threatened by the civil
proceeding -- was not demonstrated in the present case. Further, a
discussion of the third factor set forth in Ex parte Rawls, supra -- whether
the requirements of the balancing test set out in Ex parte Baugh, 530 So.
2d 238, 244 (Ala. 1988), and Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 789, are met
-- is also pretermitted. See Ex parte Butts, 183 So.3d 931 (Ala. 2015)
(stating that the conclusion that a party's right against self-incrimination
was not threatened by a civil proceeding obviated the need to discuss the
third issue in Ex parte Rawls).
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II. The Trial Court's Denial of Willmon's Request to Compel
Handrich to Respond to Discovery and Submit to a Deposition
Next, in the same vein, Willmon insists that the trial court erred
when it denied her renewed request to compel Handrich to respond to her
discovery requests and to sit for a deposition based on Handrich's
invocation of her Fifth Amendment right. According to Willmon, a party
may not frustrate discovery by withholding responsive information after
a court order and then seek shelter behind a "blanket privilege"
unsupported by concrete criminal exposure. Petition at 26.
As our Court has previously stated:
"The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure permit very broad
discovery and the rules must be broadly and liberally
construed. Cole v. Cole Tomato Sales, Inc., 293 Ala. 731, 310
So. 2d 210 (1975). However, [Ala. R. Civ. P.] 26(c) recognizes
that the right of discovery is not unlimited, and gives the court
broad power to control the use of the process and to prevent
its abuse by any party. The rule does not allow an arbitrary
limit on discovery, but instead vests the trial court with
discretion in the discovery process."
Campbell v. Regal Typewriter Co., 341 So. 2d 120, 123 (Ala. 1976).
Accordingly, "[t]he particular details of the discovery process must
necessarily be left to the sound discretion of the trial court," and the trial
court "may enter appropriate orders under [Ala. R. Civ. P.] 26(c) and if
necessary, on a showing of undue burden, it may order alternative means
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of discovery." Id. at 124 (citing Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d
300 (5th Cir. 1973)).
Because we have now determined tha