Full Opinion

Rel: October 23, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ SC-2022-0897 _________________________ Aaron Johnson, Nancy Williams, Derek Bateman, Jack Ficaro, Dashonda Bennett, Latisha Kali, Quinton Lee, Esta Glass, Joyce Jones, Deja Bush, Jarvis Dean, Taja Penn, Lisa Cormier, Mia Brand, Tammy Cowart, John Young, Mark Johnson, Latara Jackson, Senata Waters, Raymond Williams, Cynthia Hawkins, Crystal Harris, Rashunda Williams, and Mary Blackerby v. Greg Reed, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Department of Workforce Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-22-900134) On Return to Remand SC-2022-0897 BRYAN, Justice. In September 2022, a number of plaintiffs ("the plaintiffs") brought this action in the Montgomery Circuit Court against what was then known as the Alabama Department of Labor, now known as the Alabama Department of Workforce ("the Department"), and the Secretary of the Department ("the Secretary"), Fitzgerald Washington, who was later substituted by his successor, Greg Reed. The plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint dropping the Department as a defendant. The only remaining defendant is the Secretary, in only the Secretary's official capacity. In their operative complaint, the plaintiffs requested various forms of injunctive relief and an award of attorney fees. All the plaintiffs' claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to the plaintiffs, the Secretary's handling of their applications for unemployment benefits had violated the Social Security Act of 1935 ("the Social Security Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The predominant issue raised in the plaintiffs' complaint was the Secretary's delay in processing unemployment-benefits applications, 2 SC-2022-0897 which had increased in number with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, all but two of the claims for injunctive relief asserted by the plaintiffs related to requiring the Secretary to promptly process applications for unemployment benefits. However, two of the requested injunctions pertained to the content of notices issued by the Department regarding the unemployment-benefits application process. In particular, the plaintiffs sought "a permanent injunction directing [the Secretary] to provide 'all information about the unemployment compensation program and all notices to claimants using language and format making them easily read and understood by people with an eighth[-]grade education' [and] a preliminary injunction compelling [the Secretary] 'within two weeks to file a plan for rewriting notices and information sheets to ensure that they can be easily read and understood by people with an eighth[-]grade education ….' " See Johnson v. Washington, 387 So. 3d 138, 141 (Ala. 2023)("Johnson I"). The Secretary moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, and the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs then appealed to this Court. On June 30, 2023, this Court released an opinion affirming the circuit court's judgment. See Johnson I, 387 So. 3d at 144. In so doing, this Court concluded that the circuit court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over all of the plaintiffs' claims because the 3 SC-2022-0897 plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the administrative procedure set forth in § 25-4-90 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. We reasoned: "[E]very claim listed in the plaintiffs' amended complaint attacks some aspect of the process for making 'determinations with respect to claims for unemployment compensation benefits,' § 25-4-96[, Ala. Code 1975,] -- yet none of those claims have made their way through the mandatory administrative-review process set out in §§ 25-5-90 through - 97[, Ala. Code 1975]. Instead, the plaintiffs filed an original action in the circuit court, bypassing much of the administrative-review process entirely." Johnson I, 387 So. 3d at 143 (emphasis added). We noted the plaintiffs' argument on appeal that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), had held that "procedural administrative- exhaustion requirements, such as those contained in § 25-4-96," do not apply to § 1983 claims. Johnson I, 387 So. 3d at 143. However, this Court rejected that argument, reasoning that "Patsy held only that the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute, lacks an exhaustion requirement. It did not interpret the text of any State law, and certainly did not hold that State laws requiring administrative exhaustion as a prerequisite to State-court jurisdiction are unconstitutional." Johnson I, 387 So. 3d at 144. Ultimately, this Court concluded that 4 SC-2022-0897 "the plaintiffs failed to validly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction. All of their claims, in substance, seek relief related to 'the making of determinations with respect to [their] claims for unemployment compensation benefits,' § 25- 4-96, yet none of those claims has been administratively exhausted. As a result, the circuit court and this Court have no power to address the merits of those claims. We therefore affirm the circuit court's judgment of dismissal." Id. (emphasis added). The plaintiffs thereafter petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). As their "reasons for granting the writ," the plaintiffs asserted the following: "In dismissing [the plaintiffs]' § 1983 suit for failing to exhaust state administrative remedies, the Supreme Court of Alabama defied this Court's clear directive in Patsy … that § 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. … This case is a good vehicle to reinforce the important principle that state courts cannot delay the vindication of federal rights by forcing § 1983 plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies provided for in state law." Plaintiffs' certiorari petition at 10. In Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. 168 (2025), the United States Supreme Court reversed this Court's judgment in Johnson I. In so doing, however, the Court "emphasized" that its opinion was "narrow" in that it "resolve[d] this dispute but [wa]s careful not to go beyond th[e] Court's existing precedents." Williams, 602 U.S. at 179. In particular, the Court 5 SC-2022-0897 explicitly declined to "address th[e plaintiffs'] broader argument" that Patsy and another of the Court's decisions, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), "categorically bar both federal and state courts from applying state administrative-exhaustion requirements to § 1983 claims." Williams, 602 U.S. at 174 n.2. Instead, the Court reversed this Court's judgment in Johnson I on only a "narrow ground." Id. at 170. The Court held: "In the unusual circumstances presented here -- where a state court's application of a state exhaustion requirement in effect immunizes state officials from § 1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process -- state courts may not deny those § 1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds." Id. at 174 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Court ordered the following: "The Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the State's administrative-exhaustion requirement for unemployment benefits claims to in effect immunize the [Secretary] from § 1983 due process suits alleging that the Department has unlawfully delayed in processing benefits claims. By affording immunity from those claims, the Alabama ruling contravenes this Court's § 1983 precedents. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Id. at 179 (emphasis added). 6 SC-2022-0897 On remand to this Court, we released a second opinion. See Johnson v. Reed, [Ms. SC-2022-0897, Sep. 12, 2025] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2025)("Johnson II"). We explained: "Upon remand to this Court, the Secretary filed an unopposed request for supplemental briefing; that request was granted by this Court. The Secretary represents that, '[t]oday, [the p]laintiffs have all either been paid in full or received administratively final denials, such that even a favorable decision from this Court "would accomplish nothing" now.' Secretary's supp. brief p. 6 (quoting Rogers v. Burch Corp., 313 So. 3d 555, 560 (Ala. 2020)). The plaintiffs deny the Secretary's contention and request that this Court remand this case to the circuit court for that court to make a determination on whether the case is now moot. " ' "The general rule in this state is that if, pending an appeal, an event occurs which makes determination of the case unnecessary, the appeal will be dismissed." ' Slawson v. Alabama Forestry Comm'n, 631 So. 2d 953, 957 (Ala. 1994)(quoting Adams v. Warden, 422 So. 2d 787, 790 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)). Here, the plaintiffs have requested only injunctive relief. If the Secretary's averment that '[the p]laintiffs have all either been paid in full or received administratively final denials' is accurate, there would be no need for a determination of this case. However, the plaintiffs do not concede the accuracy of that statement. "Although this Court may receive facts concerning whether a case has become moot, see Aliant Bank v. Carter, 197 So. 3d 981, 984 (Ala. 2015), here, the supplemental briefs reveal a factual dispute germane to the issue of mootness that is better resolved by the circuit court. Therefore, we remand this cause to the circuit court to determine whether this case has become moot. See Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 409 U.S. 75, 76 (1972)(remanding the case 'to the United 7 SC-2022-0897 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to determine whether th[e] case ha[d] become moot'); Crosby v. Seminole Landing Prop. Owners Ass'n, 265 So. 3d 266, 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)(remanding the case 'to the trial court with instructions for it to determine whether [the issue on appeal] is moot')." Johnson II, ____ So. 3d at ____ (footnote omitted). On remand, the parties submitted filings and documentary evidence to the circuit court regarding the issue of mootness. The circuit court thereafter conducted a hearing, at which it heard oral arguments from the parties' attorneys and heard ore tenus testimony from one witness. On October 23, 2025, the circuit court entered an order determining that this action is moot. In so doing, the circuit court stated: "Upon consideration of [the arguments and evidence presented] and weighing the evidence before the Court, the Court finds that [the p]laintiffs have either been paid in full or received administratively final determinations on their claims for unemployment benefits." On return to remand, we permitted the parties to file new briefs in this Court addressing the circuit court's October 23, 2025, order. Analysis As noted in the summary set forth above, the plaintiffs' operative complaint in this action sought various forms of injunctive relief from the 8 SC-2022-0897 Secretary, many of which related to the timely processing of applications for unemployment benefits. As indicated by the circuit court's October 23, 2025, order, the Secretary's position is that this case has now become moot because, he asserts, the "[p]laintiffs have all either been paid in full or received administratively final denials." Secretary's brief on return to remand at 5. Therefore, he continues to assert, a decision by this Court in the plaintiffs' favor at this stage " 'would accomplish nothing.' " Id. (citation omitted). See Rogers v. Burch Corp., 313 So. 3d 555, 561 (Ala. 2020)(quoting Eagerton v. Corwin, 359 So. 2d 767, 769 (Ala. 1977)). See also Ex parte Carter, 275 So. 3d 115, 123-24 (Ala. 2018)("As this Court has held, a matter is moot where 'there is no effective remedy upon which relief can be granted' based on subsequent events. AIRCO, Inc. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 360 So. 2d 970, 971 (Ala. 1978). 'To render an opinion based solely upon ... alleged improper actions (without seeking a remedy therefrom) ... would be to render impermissible advisory opinions.' Id. Moreover, '[a]n action that originally was based upon a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions raised in it have become moot by subsequent acts or events.' Case v. Alabama State Bar, 939 So. 2d 881, 884 (Ala. 2006). See also Underwood 9 SC-2022-0897 v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 39 So. 3d 120, 127 (Ala. 2009)(' "This Court has often said that, as a general rule, it will not decide questions after a decision has become useless or moot." ' (quoting Arrington v. State ex rel. Parsons, 422 So. 2d 759, 760 (Ala. 1982)))."). For their part, the plaintiffs' brief on return to remand separates out their requests for injunctions pertaining to delays in the Secretary's handling of their applications for unemployment benefits ("the delay claims") from their request for injunctive relief requiring the Secretary to issue better notices regarding the Department's administrative processes ("the notice claim"). Specifically, the plaintiffs "do not now dispute that," "with the ending of the COVID-19 emergency, things have changed, and there is no likelihood of a repeat of the delays that claimants suffered from in 2020 and 2021." Plaintiffs' brief on return to remand at 27. The plaintiffs do not suggest that any further relief is available at this stage regarding their requests that the Secretary be ordered to timely process their applications for unemployment benefits. Therefore, it appears undisputed that the delay claims have become moot. 10 SC-2022-0897 However, the plaintiffs argue that "at least several of" them still have "live claims." Id. at 20. "Instead of presenting arguments for each claimant," however, they have "focus[ed] on" only three in their brief. Id. The asserted "live claims" pertaining to each plaintiff discussed are their "claims based on the deprivation of due process notice." Id.1 Thus, the only request for injunctive relief that the plaintiffs apparently contend is not moot at this stage is the notice claim, i.e., their request for "a permanent injunction directing [the Secretary] to provide 'all information about the unemployment compensation program and all notices to claimants using language and format making them easily read and understood by people with an eighth[-]grade education.' " Johnson I, 387 So. 3d at 141. The plaintiffs contend that their notice claim is a "different matter" from their delay claims. Plaintiffs' brief on return to remand at 27 (emphasis added). In considering the plaintiffs' argument in this regard, we must first observe that their contention that their notice claim is a "different 1Although the plaintiffs' brief on return to remand focuses on only three plaintiffs and their remaining claims, for the sake of convenience our opinion continues to refer to all the plaintiffs and their claims collectively. 11 SC-2022-0897 matter" from their delay claims highlights the fact that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams did not address any separate notice claim asserted by the plaintiffs. Id. As explained above, Williams did not address § 1983 claims broadly. Indeed, the Court expressly declined to hold that its existing precedents "categorically bar both federal and state courts from applying state administrative-exhaustion requirements to § 1983 claims." Williams, 602 U.S. at 174 n.2. Instead, the Court narrowly held that, "where a state court's application of a state exhaustion requirement in effect immunizes state officials from § 1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process -- state courts may not deny those § 1983 claims on failure-to- exhaust grounds." Id. at 174 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned: "Alabama's exhaustion requirement operates to immunize state officials from a narrow class of claims brought under § 1983 -- namely, claims of unlawful delay in the administrative process. Under Alabama's exhaustion requirement, state courts cannot review claims of unlawful delays under § 1983 unless and until the claimants first complete the administrative process and receive a final decision on their claims. In essence, Alabama has said that to challenge delays in the administrative process under § 1983, you first have to exhaust the administrative process. Of course, that means that you can never challenge delays in the administrative process. That catch-22 prevents the claimants here from obtaining a merits resolution of their § 1983 claims 12 SC-2022-0897 in state court and in effect immunizes state officials from those kinds of § 1983 suits for injunctive relief." Williams, 604 U.S. at 175-76 (emphasis other than on "never" added). Accordingly, although Williams clearly reversed this Court's judgment in Johnson I, the United States Supreme Court held only that this Court had erred in its consideration of the plaintiffs' now-moot delay claims; it does not appear that Williams held this Court in error regarding any separate notice claim asserted by the plaintiffs. Williams simply did not address states' statutory administrative-exhaustion requirements and § 1983 claims broadly and, more pointedly, did not specifically address such statutory requirements and § 1983 claims predicated on allegedly unconstitutional notices issued by a state administrative agency. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346 n.18 (1979)("The doctrine of law of the case comes into play only with respect to issues previously determined."); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Rels. of Kan., 267 U.S. 552, 562 (1925)(" 'A judgment of reversal is not necessarily an adjudication by the appellate court of any other than the questions in terms discussed and decided.' " (quoting Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 553 (1904))(emphasis added)); and Mutual Life 13 SC-2022-0897 Ins., 193 U.S. at 554 ("An actual decision of any question settles the law in respect thereto for future action in the case." (emphasis added)).2 However, out of an abundance of caution, we will examine the plaintiffs' argument that their notice claim remains viable at this stage. 2In light of the foregoing, after receiving the parties' briefs on return to remand, this Court issued a show-cause order to the parties regarding the effect of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams with respect to the plaintiffs' notice claim. Whereas the plaintiffs' initial brief on return to remand had argued that the delay claims and the notice claim were "different matter[s]," and that the notice claim is, therefore, not moot, plaintiffs' brief on return to remand at 27, the plaintiffs now argue in response to this Court's show-cause order that the delay claims and the notice claim are instead "intertwined." Plaintiffs' response to show-cause order at 6 (emphasis added). They assert that Williams "applies with identical force to confusing notices -- if [the Secretary] offers notices that are so confusing that claimants are unable to make effective use of appeals, they cannot exhaust. In the words of the [United States] Supreme Court, this 'in effect immunizes state officials from those kinds of § 1983 suits for injunctive relief' exactly like delays do." Id. (quoting Williams, 604 U.S. at 176). This Court cannot logically adopt both of the plaintiffs' inconsistent positions. Williams clearly applies to the plaintiffs' delay claims, but the plaintiffs concede that the delay claims are now moot. Either their notice claim is a "different matter" from their delay claims, with the potential to survive the mootness of the delay claims, or their notice claim is "intertwined" with their delay claims and, like the delay claims, is now moot. Therefore, this opinion presumes that the plaintiffs are maintaining their initial position that the notice claim is not moot. 14 SC-2022-0897 In so doing, it appears that, to remedy the alleged deprivation of due process caused by the Department's notices, the plaintiffs are now asserting that the Secretary should be required to reopen their currently closed applications for unemployment benefits. According to the plaintiffs, "[i]f this Court rejects the circuit court's recommendation [regarding mootness] and remands, the circuit court could order [the Secretary] to redress these issues by sending constitutionally adequate notices to [the three plaintiffs discussed] or affording them an opportunity to apply for benefits now." Plaintiffs' brief on return to remand at 25-26 (emphasis added). The primary authority that the plaintiffs cite in support of their argument in this regard are two federal cases -- Day v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1994), and Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiffs' brief includes no substantive analysis regarding those decisions and, in addition to their bare citations, includes only a parenthetical quotation from Day indicating that the plaintiffs are now seeking a reopening of their applications for unemployment benefits. However, neither Day nor Gonzalez involved § 1983 claims. In both of those cases, the plaintiffs at issue had sought judicial review in federal district court regarding an administrative agency's decision declining to 15 SC-2022-0897 reopen the plaintiffs' claims for disability benefits pursuant to the separate statutory procedure created by the Social Security Act. Strikingly, given the history of this case, the plaintiffs entirely ignore the fact that the federal statutory scheme at issue in cases like Day and Gonzalez entails its own jurisdictional and administrative- exhaustion considerations under federal law apart from any that have been addressed by any court considering this case thus far. See Day, 23 F.3d at 1059 (discussing and applying "three factors to be considered in deciding whether to waive an exhaustion requirement"); and Gonzalez, 914 F.2d at 1202-03 ("Generally, courts do not have jurisdiction to review the Secretary's decision not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim. See Krumpelman v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Krumpelman v. Bowen, 475 U.S. 1025, 106 S. Ct. 1222, 89 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1986); Davis v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1982). If, however, a person makes a colorable constitutional claim that the decision not to reopen violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment, this court has jurisdiction. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109, 97 S. Ct. 980, 986, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977)(constitutional argument an exception to rule)."). 16 SC-2022-0897 Regarding the pertinent statutory scheme under the Social Security Act, the United States Supreme Court recently explained the following in Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 475-76 (2019): "Congress provided for judicial review of 'any final decision of the [agency] made after a hearing.' [42 U.S. C.] § 405(g). At the same time, Congress made clear that review would be available only 'as herein provided' -- that is, only under the terms of § 405(g). § 405(h); see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-615 (1984). "…. "Modern-day claimants must generally proceed through a four-step process before they can obtain review from a federal court. First, the claimant must seek an initial determination as to his eligibility. Second, the claimant must seek reconsideration of the initial determination. Third, the claimant must request a hearing, which is conducted by an [administrative-law judge]. Fourth, the claimant must seek review of the [administrative-law judge]'s decision by the Appeals Council. See 20 CFR § 416.1400. If a claimant has proceeded through all four steps on the merits, all agree, § 405(g) entitles him to judicial review in federal district court." The Court further explained: "Section 405(g), as noted above, provides for judicial review of 'any final decision ... made after a hearing.' This provision, the Court has explained, contains two separate elements: first, a 'jurisdictional' requirement that claims be presented to the agency, and second, a 'waivable ... requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted.' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976). This case involves the latter, nonjurisdictional element of administrative exhaustion. 17 SC-2022-0897 While § 405(g) delegates to the [Social Security Administration] the authority to dictate which steps are generally required, see Sims [v. Apfel], 530 U.S. [103,] 106 [(2000),] exhaustion of those steps may not only be waived by the agency, see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767 (1975), but also excused by the courts, see Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1986); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330.7" "___________________ "7While Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), can be read to cabin Eldridge and Salfi to only constitutional claims, the Court's subsequent decision in City of New York demonstrates that this understanding of § 405(g) can extend to cases lacking Eldridge's and Salfi's constitutional character. See City of New York, 476 U.S. at 474-475, and n.5, 482-484; see also City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1124-1125 (EDNY 1984)(ruling that the agency's actions violated the Social Security Act and its own regulations and thus declining to reach the plaintiffs' constitutional argument)." Smith, 587 U.S. at 478. See also Carr v. Saul, 593 U.S. 83, 88 and 92 (2021)(discussing "issue-exhaustion rules" in the context of "structural constitutional challenges"). Obviously, the plaintiffs' present action before this Court does not involve a request for judicial review made pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 405(g), and, presumably, the plaintiffs are not actually suggesting that it does. See Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007)("Here, it is undisputed that § 405(g) makes the federal courts the exclusive forum in 18 SC-2022-0897 which claimants may challenge final decisions of the Commissioner [of the Social Security]. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)('Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides ....'). The Montgomery County Circuit Court in which [the plaintiff] filed her claim was not a court of competent jurisdiction over her claim." (emphasis added)). Instead, it appears that the plaintiffs are perhaps suggesting in a roundabout way that the potential judicial relief of requiring that an administrative agency reopen an application for benefits that may be ordered by federal district courts in certain circumstances under the Social Security Act should also be available in state courts for actions brought pursuant to § 1983. Put yet another way, it appears that the plaintiffs are suggesting that § 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for requiring the Secretary to reopen their applications for unemployment benefits by way of analogy to the sort of judicial review that may be available in federal courts under the Social Security Act. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs' analogy theoretically holds together, their cursory citations to Day and Gonzalez fall woefully short 19 SC-2022-0897 of demonstrating that this Court should order the Secretary to reopen their applications for benefits in this case. As already noted, the plaintiffs have provided absolutely no argument to this Court regarding how the administrative-exhaustion principles generally applicable to Social Security cases brought in federal court are typically applied. See Smith, 587 U.S. at 482 ("To be clear, 'the doctrine of administrative exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the particular administrative scheme at issue,' [Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. [749,] 765 [(1975)] …."). Notably, even if this Court were inclined to look to the statutory procedure for federal Social Security cases as an analog, as the plaintiffs appear to advocate, we cannot simply assume that the plaintiffs' notice claim under § 1983 would be immune from the administrative-exhaustion principles accompanying that specific statutory scheme.3 3See, e.g., Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016)("No doubt, judge- made exhaustion doctrines, even if flatly stated at first, remain amenable to judge-made exceptions. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)('The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies ... is, like most judicial doctrines, subject to numerous exceptions'). But a statutory exhaustion provision stands on a different footing. There, Congress sets the rules -- and courts have a role in creating exceptions only if Congress wants them to. For that reason, mandatory exhaustion statutes like the [Prison Litigation Reform Act] establish mandatory 20 SC-2022-0897 Indeed, the controlling authority regarding states' statutory administrative-exhaustion requirements and § 1983 claims is the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams, which deliberately addressed only a "narrow class of claims brought under § 1983 -- namely, claims of unlawful delay in the administrative process." Williams, 604 U.S. at 175. As already explained, Williams did not address the plaintiffs' notice claim at all, much less whether or how a § 1983 claim of that sort can be an appropriate vehicle to require a state agency to reopen an application for unemployment benefits in the same way that § 405(g) may exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion. See, e.g., McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111, 113 (1993)('We are not free to rewrite the statutory text' when Congress has strictly 'bar[red] claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies'). Time and again, this Court has taken such statutes at face value -- refusing to add unwritten limits onto their rigorous textual requirements. See, e.g., id., at 111; Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 12-14 (2000); see also 2 R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.3, p. 1241 (5th ed. 2010)(collecting cases)." (emphasis added)); and Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004)("Despite its literal applicability, however, § 1983 must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute, with its attendant procedural and exhaustion requirements, where an inmate seeks injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his sentence." (emphasis added)). 21 SC-2022-0897 be an appropriate avenue for judicial review in federal district court under the appropriate circumstances.4 Finally, we note that the plaintiffs have not argued to this Court that we should equate their notice claim under § 1983 with any request brought under Alabama law for judicial review of a decision by the 4In a separate part of their brief on return to remand, the plaintiffs also cite decisions of two federal district courts in support of the notion that the Secretary could be ordered "to provide new notices with new opportunities for the [plaintiffs] to establish a right to an amount of unemployment compensation benefits to be determined administratively." Plaintiffs' brief on return to remand at 19. However, as with Day and Gonzalez, assuming for the sake of argument that the circumstances underlying those decisions are analogous to the circumstances of this case, those decisions took into consideration jurisdictional or prudential limitations on judicial review, the discussion of which the plaintiffs have entirely omitted from their briefs in this Court. See Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046, 1059-60 (D. Del. 1985)("With regard to the federal law and federal constitutional claims, it is well-established that a federal court must decide claims under federal statutes before deciding constitutional claims, in order to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 692, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 2553, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1979); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543, 94 S. Ct. 1372, 1382, 39 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1974). Accordingly, each of defendants' contested practices will be examined in light of the applicable federal statutes and regulations and, if found lawful, will be examined under constitutional principles."); and David v. Heckler, 591 F. Supp. 1033, 1039-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)(analyzing, "[a]s the basis of jurisdiction," plaintiffs' reliance "upon section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361"). 22 SC-2022-0897 Secretary declining to reopen any of their applications for unemployment benefits. Indeed, they do not assert that the Secretary has made such a decision with regard to any of their applications for benefits. In short, the plaintiffs have not connected the necessary dots to warrant the relief they now appear to seek, and it is not this Court's function to do so for them. See Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994)("We have unequivocally stated that it is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument."). The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the circuit court erred in determining that this action has become moot.5 5The plaintiffs also assert, as an exception to mootness, that the "[United States] Supreme Court has found that claims relating to unemployment compensation procedures can be 'capable of repetition but evading review.' " Plaintiffs' brief on return to remand at 26-27. However, the citation from an earlier brief that the plaintiffs appear to reference in support of their assertion is actually a citation to Justice Marshall's dissent from the Court's decision to remand a case for a determination of mootness. See Indiana Emp. Sec. Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540, 542 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "dissents … carry no legal force. … '[C]omments in [a] dissenting opinion' about legal principles and precedents 'are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.' Railroad Retirement Bd. v. 23 SC-2022-0897 Conclusion The plaintiffs do not suggest that any further relief is available at this stage regarding their requests that the Secretary be ordered to timely process their applications for unemployment benefits; consequently, those claims are moot. Regarding the plaintiffs' notice claim, it appears that, to remedy the alleged deprivation of due process caused by the Department's notices, the plaintiffs are now asserting that the Secretary should be required to reopen their currently closed applications for unemployment benefits. The primary authority provided to this Court by the plaintiffs in support of that asserted remedy, however, are two cursory citations to decisions of United States Courts of Appeals made in the context of cases seeking judicial review pursuant to the federal statutory scheme created by the Social Security Act. However, the plaintiffs entirely ignore the fact that such cases brought pursuant to that particular federal statutory scheme entail their own jurisdictional and administrative-exhaustion requirements that the plaintiffs have left unaddressed. Moreover, they have provided this Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177, n.10 (1980)." Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 590 U.S. 255, 273 (2020). 24 SC-2022-0897 Court with no argument regarding whether or how those principles apply to § 1983 claims brought in state court, much less with any discussion or consideration of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams. In light of the foregoing, we express no opinion concerning the multifaceted issues raised by the plaintiffs' limited argument in this Court regarding their notice claim. However, we have no difficulty in concluding that the plaintiffs have failed to adequately demonstrate that a remedy still exists for their notice claim. Accordingly, they have likewise failed to demonstrate that the circuit court erred in determining that this action has become moot. "[T]herefore, this appeal is no longer justiciable and has become moot. The appeal is due to be dismissed." Cochran v. CIS Fin. Servs., Inc., 375 So. 3d 800, 812 (Ala. 2022). APPEAL DISMISSED. Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook, and McCool, JJ., concur. Wise and Parker, JJ., recuse themselves. 25