Full Opinion

Rel: November 13, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ SC-2026-0206 _________________________ William D. Carpenter v. Shirley H. Jacobs; Tracey E. Martin; Sharon Baber Turner; Marjory Klusman; Leonard W. Mikkelsen; Frank Roberts, Jr.; Wide Open Enterprises, LLC; Yvette H. Jones; Victoria Lynn Dumas Turner; Lorenzo Evans, Jr.; Ramona Evans; Edward R. Slaughter, Jr.; Frances A. Jones; Deborah Ann Gollotte Mabry; Donna Leanne Gollotte; Belinda Faye Gollotte Armour; Annis McGraw; Janine E. Wallace; Estate of Betty Smith Lott, deceased; Janet Lyn Graves; Bradford R. Graves; and Myrtle F. Smith Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CV-24-902172) SC-2026-0206 COOK, Justice. William D. Carpenter alleges that, since 2018, stormwater runoff from adjoining properties in the Crown Pointe subdivision ("the subdivision") has been flowing onto his property and causing damage. In 2020, Carpenter sued the Crown Pointe Owners' Association, Inc. ("the CPOA"), and the four owners of the properties within the subdivision that are nearest his property, asserting various tort claims arising from the alleged runoff. In April 2022, Carpenter obtained a jury verdict for $200,000, resulting in a judgment against the CPOA. Before that case proceeded to trial, Carpenter had entered into written pro tanto settlement agreements containing releases with three of the lot owners -- Janine E. Wallace ("Wallace"), Betty Smith Lott ("Lott"), and Myrtle F. Smith ("Smith").1 1The fourth adjoining lot owner, Bradford R. Graves, received a final judgment in his favor. The trial court reduced the $200,000 jury verdict for the cumulative amounts from the pro tanto settlement agreements so that the final judgment against the CPOA was for $126,504.64, including costs. 2 SC-2026-0206 According to Carpenter, the drainage problems continued after the entry of the 2022 judgment. Carpenter also experienced problems in collecting the 2022 judgment. In response, in August 2024, Carpenter commenced the present action in the Mobile Circuit Court against (1) the CPOA; (2) the individual owners and residents of each of the subdivision's lots ("the 21 Lot Owners");2 (3) a newly created homeowners' association, Crown Pointe West Homeowners' Association, Inc. ("the CPWHA"), and (4) fictitiously named defendants. In his complaint, Carpenter also styled certain claims against "the CPOA Board" and "the CPWHA Board," but those terms are simply shorthand for the six individuals who served on one or both of those boards. Each of those six board members owns or resides on a lot and is thus also one of the 21 Lot Owners. The 21 Lot Owners therefore consists of the six board members and the remaining lot owners, who did not serve on either board ("the non-board-member lot 2We note that the term "the 21 Lot Owners" comes directly from Carpenter's second amended complaint and refers to the fact that there are 21 lots in the subdivision. It is not meant to imply that there are only 21 individual lot-owner defendants; some lots have multiple owners. This defendant group is composed of lot owners who served on the CPOA Board and/or the CPWHA Board as well as non-board-member lot owners. 3 SC-2026-0206 owners"). In the present action, Carpenter alleges claims related to the continued discharge of stormwater runoff onto his property and claims related to the defendants' alleged efforts to avoid paying the earlier 2022 judgment. After some procedural back and forth, and the filing of a second amended complaint, most of the 21 Lot Owners sought dismissal of the claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.3 As explained below, the chief claim against the 21 lot owners is that they allegedly own an undivided interest in a common area that is draining onto Carpenter's property. Those defendants dispute the claim of ownership. They argue that the CPOA instead owns the drainage easement at issue and that, even if they owned an undivided interest in this property, there are no allegations that they have done anything to create this alleged drainage problem. Among the 21 Lot Owners are Wallace and Smith, who 3Nearly all the 21 Lot Owners joined the motion to dismiss filed by Marjory Klusman apart from Edward R. Slaughter, Jr., and Frances A. Jones (the owners of Lot 15) and Mary Roberts (a CPOA board member and resident of Lot 7). The former two defendants filed their own separate motions while the latter, Mary Roberts, according to the record, did not file a motion to dismiss despite the fact that the other resident of Lot 7, Frank Roberts, Jr., did so. 4 SC-2026-0206 additionally argue that their written pro tanto settlement agreements should be enforced and thus bar any further claims against them. The circuit court eventually granted both the motion to dismiss Carpenter's claims against the non-board-member lot owners (see note 3, supra) and the motion to enforce Wallace and Smith's settlement agreements. Although claims against the CPOA and the six board members -- including the claims asserted against those board members as lot owners -- remain pending, the circuit court certified its orders as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Carpenter now appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred in dismissing his claims against the non-board-member lot owners and in enforcing Wallace's and Smith's settlement agreements. Before we may consider the merit of those arguments, however, we must first determine whether the circuit court properly certified its dismissal orders as final under Rule 54(b). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper and, therefore, that this appeal is due to be dismissed. Facts and Procedural History I. The Subdivision 5 SC-2026-0206 The subdivision is a 21-lot residential development in Mobile County that is subject to a recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, restrictions, and easements ("the Declaration"). Every lot owner in the subdivision is a member of the CPOA. The Declaration provides that "[e]ach conveyance of Lots 1 through and including 21 of the herein described Property shall also include for each such Lot an undivided 1/21st interest in and to the Common Property subject to the provisions hereinafter contained." The map of the recorded plat depicts a 10-foot "drainage and utility easement" adjacent to and south of Lots 18 through 21 ("the drainage easement"). Carpenter alleges that, since 2018, stormwater has flowed downhill from the drainage easement behind lots 18 through 21 and has damaged his property. II. Carpenter's 2020 Action and the Pro Tanto Releases In July 2020, Carpenter filed suit against the CPOA, Wallace, Lott, Smith, and Bradford R. Graves (see note 1, supra) in the Mobile Circuit Court.4 In his complaint, Carpenter alleged claims of negligence, 4Wallace (Lot 18), Lott (Lot 19), Graves (Lot 20), and Smith (Lot 21) were named in the 2020 action because of their ownership of the lots in the subdivision closest to Carpenter's property. 6 SC-2026-0206 wantonness, trespass, nuisance, and "negligent channelization" arising from the stormwater runoff onto his property ("the 2020 action"). Before trial, Carpenter entered into pro tanto settlements with Wallace, Lott, and Smith. The release Carpenter executed in favor of Wallace on March 5, 2021, provided, in part: "In keeping with the foregoing, this Pro Tanto Release shall preclude any actions or claims for any future water intrusions or other water related claims against Releasees unless such claims arise from material changes made to Releasee's property after the execution of this document." The release Carpenter executed in favor of Smith on April 3, 2022, provided, in part: "This Pro Tanto Release shall preclude any actions or claims by … Carpenter (or those succeeding to the rights of Carpenter) against Myrtle Smith for future water intrusions alleged to occur on Carpenter's property unless such claims arise from a material change to the drainage on or from Myrtle Smith's property. Examples of a material change or material changes to Myrtle Smith's property would be removing or altering the existing berm; altering changing or adding underground piping; installing additional gutters and/or down spouts; and/or taking any other action that would materially change or alter the presently existing stormwater drainage on Myrtle Smith's property." The claims against Wallace and Smith in the 2020 action were dismissed with prejudice. 7 SC-2026-0206 On April 7, 2022, a jury returned a $200,000 verdict in Carpenter's favor against the CPOA. That verdict was reduced by the $84,000 paid in the pro tanto settlements, and Carpenter recorded a judgment against the CPOA for $126,504.64, including costs ("the 2022 judgment"). III. Events After the Entry of the 2022 Judgment Carpenter alleges that, after the entry of the 2022 judgment, the CPOA Board took steps to keep him from collecting it. In early August 2022, Carpenter garnished the CPOA's bank account for $1,516.18. Carpenter alleges that, on August 26, 2022, the CPOA Board opened a checking account in the names of board members Barbara W. Cain and Mary M. Roberts and directed the lot owners to pay their dues and assessments to Cain or Roberts rather than to the CPOA. The CPOA filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on June 9, 2023. In August 2023, the CPOA Board voted to form the CPWHA, and the lot owners were later instructed to pay their dues to the CPWHA. The bankruptcy court dismissed the CPOA's petition for cause on July 23, 2024. During the same period, the CPOA arranged for drainage work behind Lots 18 through 21. The minutes of an August 18, 2022, special meeting of the CPOA Board state: 8 SC-2026-0206 "We are still going to have to fix the problem of water onto Mr. Carpenter's property. Wade Jones, Brad Graves and Barbara Cain met with Daniel Leggett to get an estimate of the fix. Have not received a bid from him yet." On September 19, 2022, The Grounds Guys submitted a proposal addressed to "Crown Pointe HOA" for "[d]rainage for behind the first 4 houses." In November 2022, the CPOA levied a special assessment on the owners of each of the subdivision's 21 lots that included $11,119.59 for The Grounds Guys. According to Carpenter, The Grounds Guys performed the work in March 2023. IV. The Present Action On August 21, 2024, Carpenter commenced this action against the CPOA, the CPWHA, and the owners of the subdivision's 21 lots in the Mobile Circuit Court. Certain counts are styled as allegations against "the CPOA Board" and/or "the CPWHA Board." In his operative pleading, the second amended complaint filed on August 25, 2025, Carpenter defines "the CPOA Board" as six individuals: Wade L. Jones, Barbara W. Cain, Mary E. Jackson, Diane Mikkelsen, Janice Gollotte, and Mary M. Roberts; and defines "the CPWHA Board" as the same group, with the exception of Roberts. Because every member of the CPWHA Board also served on the CPOA Board, we refer to these individuals in our discussion 9 SC-2026-0206 as "the six board members" even though Roberts served only on the CPOA Board. The second amended complaint refers to the defendants that are owners and residents of each lot as "the 21 Lot Owners."5 Each of the six board members owns or resides on a lot and is therefore also one part of the 21 Lot Owners. Wade Jones and Diane Mikkelsen own their lots jointly with their spouses, Yvette H. Jones (Lot 9) and Leonard W. Mikkelsen (Lot 6); and Mary Roberts resides on Lot 7, which is owned by Frank Roberts, Jr.; and Mary Jackson and Janice Gollotte reside on Lots 1 and 16 respectively. Thus, due to these overlapping definitions, Carpenter effectively makes allegations against each of the six board members both as a member of the CPOA Board and/or the CPWHA Board, and as members of the 21 Lot Owners. The remainder of the 21 Lot Owners group are the non-board-member lot owners, including Wallace and Smith, against whom all claims have been dismissed. These non-board-member lot owners are the defendants before us in the present appeal. 5See note 2, supra. 10 SC-2026-0206 In his second amended complaint, Carpenter asserts 15 counts, the first 5 of which concern the stormwater runoff. In counts 1 through 5, Carpenter asserted negligence, wantonness, trespass, nuisance, and "negligent channelization" against "the CPOA," "the CPOA Board," "the CPWHA," "the CPWHA Board," and "the 21 Lot Owners." Under those first five counts, the second amended complaint alleges that "[t]he owners of the twenty-one (21) lots are also 1/21st undivided interest owners of the Subdivision’s Common Property, including, but not limited to, the Drainage Easement," and that "[t]he Drainage Easement is specifically identified on the recorded plat for the Subdivision along the southern boundary of Lots 18, 19, 20 and 21." (Emphasis added.) Carpenter attached to the second amended complaint this plat and the Declaration. Building on that premise, each count alleges that, since April 7, 2022, the defendants have failed to "construct, install, preserve, maintain and/or repair the Drainage Easement," causing water to be "piped, diverted, channelized, collected, cast onto and/or inundate and damage Carpenter and his real property." Whether the drainage easement is "Common Property" at all, however, is disputed. As is alleged in the complaint, the Declaration 11 SC-2026-0206 defines "Common Property" as "those areas of land shown on the recorded plat of the Property not shown as individual Lots but shown as 'Detention & Planting Area,' 'Detention Area,' 'Common & Detention Area' and also any property which may be in the future conveyed to the Association." Carpenter reads that definition to reach the drainage easement, which he describes as part of the subdivision's stormwater system, carrying water "from west to east to a concrete ditch and storm water detention area." The 21 Lot Owners who moved to dismiss read it differently. They contend that the drainage easement lies within Lots 18 through 21 rather than on "Common Property," which is defined as "those areas of land shown on the recorded plat of the [subdivision] not shown as individual Lots." They also note that, unlike the detention area, which the plat labels "Detention Area (Common Area)" and which the developer deeded to the CPOA in 1999, the drainage easement carries no "common area" label. And they point out that the Declaration separately reserves drainage easements "as shown on the recorded plat" to the developer. They further contend that, whatever the Common Property includes, title to it rests with the CPOA, not the individual lot owners. We do not resolve 12 SC-2026-0206 that dispute; we note it only because it bears on the discussion below regarding the relationship between the dismissed claims and those still pending. See Part I.A of the "Discussion" section, infra. Counts 6 through 15 concern the 2022 judgment. Count 6, which alleges a violation of the Alabama Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, see § 8-9B-1, et seq., Ala. Code 1975, and count 7, which alleges a conspiracy, are captioned against the CPOA, the CPOA Board, Cain, Roberts, the CPWHA, and the CPWHA Board, but each also seeks relief from the 21 Lot Owners. Count 8 alleges negligence by the CPOA Board and the CPWHA Board. Count 9 alleges that the 21 Lot Owners negligently paid their dues and assessments to Cain or Roberts, as the CPOA Board had directed, and later to the CPWHA. Counts ten, eleven, and twelve, which are asserted against both the CPOA Board and the 21 Lot Owners, allege the negligent failure to pay the 2022 judgment, the negligent filing of the bankruptcy petition, and the negligent creation of the CPWHA. Count 13 seeks a judgment declaring each lot owner liable for 1/21st of the 2022 judgment. Counts 14 and 15 seek to pierce the corporate veil and to impose successor liability, and each demands "[t]he 13 SC-2026-0206 amount of Carpenter's 4/7/22 unsatisfied judgment" from the CPOA, the CPOA Board, the CPWHA, the CPWHA Board, and the 21 Lot Owners. V. The Wallace and Smith Release Rulings On September 27, 2024, Wallace moved to dismiss the claims against her or, alternatively, to enforce her release, and Smith joined that motion on November 19, 2024. Carpenter filed a response in opposition. After a hearing on December 20, 2024, the circuit court granted the motion on February 18, 2025, and dismissed Carpenter's claims against Wallace and Smith. Carpenter appealed that decision to this Court on February 18, 2025. However, we dismissed that appeal on November 20, 2025, for lack of appellate jurisdiction because no final judgment had been entered. See Carpenter v. Wallace (No. SC-2025-0552, Nov. 20, 2025)(order). VI. The Non-Board-Member Lot Owners' Dismissals and the Rule 54(b) Certification On August 25, 2025, while that appeal was pending, Carpenter filed his second amended complaint, which continued to name Wallace and Smith among the 21 Lot Owners. After their appeal was dismissed by our Court, Carpenter moved on December 18, 2025, for the circuit court to certify the order dismissing the claims against Wallace and Smith as 14 SC-2026-0206 final under Rule 54(b). He argued that the releases "are unique to Wallace and Smith" and that, absent immediate review, the circuit court might have to "hold another trial that includes Wallace and Smith as defendants." Marjory Klusman, Edward R. Slaughter, Jr., and Frances A. Jones each moved to dismiss the claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6), and they renewed their motions after Carpenter filed the second amended complaint. Many of the other 21 Lot Owners moved to join the Klusman motion, including the five of the six board members that were also on the CPWHA Board -- Wade Jones, Diane Mikkelsen, Janice Gollotte, Barbara Cain, and Mary Jackson -- and the circuit court granted all the motions for joinder. The dismissal motions made several overlapping arguments. First, the moving defendants argued that Carpenter sought to hold them liable solely because of their membership in the CPOA and that the Declaration's grant of an "undivided interest" in the Common Property did not make them responsible for the drainage easement. They argued that Alabama's nonprofit-corporation statutes shield members from personal liability for a corporation's obligations. Their final argument 15 SC-2026-0206 was that the second amended complaint failed to state a claim by not alleging any conduct by any of them that could support the veil-piercing or successor-liability counts. Carpenter's response in opposition contended that his second amended complaint makes direct tort claims against the 21 Lot Owners "as co-owners of the Subdivision’s Common Property, including the Drainage Easement, for their individual negligent and wanton failure to maintain it," not derivative claims for the CPOA's debts. (Emphasis added.) He additionally argued that the nonprofit-corporation statutes protect members from vicarious liability for corporate obligations but not from liability for their own torts. After a hearing in January 2026, the circuit court entered an order on February 13, 2026, dismissing the claims against the non-board member lot owners, a subset of the 21 Lot Owners, and identifying the CPOA and the six board members, the remaining subset of the 21 Lot Owners, as the defendants against whom the case would proceed. Carpenter then asked the circuit court to certify the dismissal order as to all the dismissed non-board-member lot owners as final. 16 SC-2026-0206 On February 23, 2026, the circuit court entered an amended order. The amended order again dismissed the claims against the non-board- member lot owners -- many of whom submitted briefs in the present appeal. The amended order stated that the case would proceed against the CPOA and the six board members -- Barbara Cain, Mary Jackson, Diane Mikkelsen, Wade Jones, Janice Gollotte, and Mary Roberts.6 It noted that default judgments had been previously entered against the CPWHA via a separate order. The order then granted Carpenter's motion for the entry of a final judgment as to Wallace and Smith and the other non-board-member lot owners, stating: "Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment … as to Wallace and Smith is hereby GRANTED. "The Court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and directs entry of Final Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against all the dismissed Defendants." Following the entry of the amended order, Lott's Estate moved for clarification, noting that as an owner of an adjacent lot, it was potentially in a different position in terms of liability from the other parties joining 6Joyce Jackson Moon, the trustee of the trust that owns Lot 1, joined the motion to dismiss but is neither listed as dismissed nor listed among the remaining defendants. 17 SC-2026-0206 the Klusman motion to dismiss, which it had also joined, because "plaintiff alleges there has been work on and off the drainage easement since the pro tanto settlement of April 3, 2022 which has materially altered drainage so as to damage the Carpenter property." The circuit court denied the motion, on February 26, 2026, stating: "There is nothing to clarify. All claims against the estate of Betty Smith [Lott], of whatever nature, arising from this action were dismissed in their entirety as stated in the Amended Order." All the claims against the CPOA and the six board members remain pending in front of the circuit court. Standard of Review In reviewing a circuit court's order certifying its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the standard of review is as follows: " 'Whether the action involves separate claims and whether there is a final decision as to at least one of the claims are questions of law to which we will apply a de novo standard of review. Whether there was "no just reason for delay" is an inquiry committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, as to that issue, we must determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion.' " Rogers v. Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Dep't, 387 So. 3d 131, 135 (Ala. 2023) (quoting Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988, 996 (Ala. 2006)). 18 SC-2026-0206 Discussion As an initial matter, we note that the parties all appear to agree that the circuit court's Rule 54(b) certification was proper and that the present appeal is properly before us. However, because the propriety of a Rule 54(b) certification is a jurisdictional matter, this Court must make an independent, de novo, determination of the Rule 54(b) certification before we can consider the merits of the arguments being raised by the parties in this appeal. See Martin v. PEI Ohio, Inc., 423 So. 3d 354, 357- 58 (Ala. 2025) (citing Fuller v. Birmingham-Jefferson Cnty. Transit Auth., 147 So. 3d 907, 911 (Ala. 2013)); see, e.g., Richey v. Morris, 389 So. 3d 347, 348 (Ala. 2023). For this Court to exercise jurisdiction, the appeal must be from a final judgment or from a judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b). See Foster v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605, 609-10 (Ala. 1984). Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent part: "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." 19 SC-2026-0206 "Nevertheless, ' " [t]he trial court cannot confer appellate jurisdiction upon this [C]ourt through directing entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) if the judgment is not otherwise 'final.' " ' " Hulsey v. Build Art, LLC, [Ms. SC-2025-0564, Apr. 17, 2026] ____ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala. 2026) (quoting Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 362 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 360 So. 2d 299, 302 (Ala. 1978)). This Court has described Rule 54(b) as containing three requirements: "(1) the action must involve separate claims; (2) at least one of the claims must have been finally decided; and (3) the trial court must expressly determine that there is no just reason for delay." Martin, 423 So. 3d at 358 (citing Scrushy, 955 So. 2d at 996). The first two requirements are met here because the amended order disposed of all of Carpenter's claims against each of the non-board- member lot owners. The amended order also recited that there was no just reason for delay, which is " ' sufficient to indicate an intent to certify an order as a final order under Rule 54(b),' " even though the order does not cite the rule. Bowling v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 380 So. 3d 1030, 1033 n.1 (Ala. 2023) (quoting Elkins v. Carroll, 220 So. 3d 290, 297 (Ala. 2016)). 20 SC-2026-0206 Turning to the third requirement, we review the circuit court's determination that there was no just reason for delay "for excess of discretion." Bowling, 380 So. 3d at 1033. In reviewing that determination, we begin with the settled principle that Rule 54(b) certifications are disfavored by our Court. As we recently reiterated: " ' " It bears repeating, here, that ' " [c]ertifications under Rule 54(b) should be entered only in exceptional cases and should not be entered routinely." ' State v. Lawhorn, 830 So. 2d 720, 725 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Baker v. Bennett, 644 So. 2d 901, 903 (Ala. 1994), citing in turn Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. 1987)). ' " ' Appellate review in a piecemeal fashion is not favored.' " ' Goldome Credit Corp. [v. Player, 869 So. 2d 1146, 1148 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)] (quoting Harper Sales Co. v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 742 So. 2d 190, 192 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999), quoting in turn Brown v. Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)) (emphasis added)." " ' Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 363 (Ala. 2004). Also, a Rule 54(b) certification should not be entered if the issues in the claim being certified and a claim that will remain pending in the trial court " ' are so closely intertwined that separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results.' " Clarke-Mobile Counties Gas Dist. v. Prior Energy Corp., 834 So. 2d 88, 95 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala. 1987)).' " Hulsey, ____ So. 3d at ____ (quoting Schlarb v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418, 419- 20 (Ala. 2006)). Rule 54(b) certifications " ' " should be granted only in 21 SC-2026-0206 exceptional cases and 'should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel.' " ' " Martin, 423 So. 3d at 358 (quoting Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala. 1987)). This Court considers five factors to help determine whether a trial court has exceeded its discretion in finding no just reason for delay: " ' " ' (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the [trial] court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in a set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.' " ' " Martin, 423 So. 3d at 358 (quoting Lighting Fair, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 63 So. 3d 1256, 1264 (Ala. 2010), quoting in turn MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 855 (4th Cir. 2010), quoting Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335-36 (4th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis added). Underlying those factors and this Court's analysis is a concern for judicial economy: " ' It is uneconomical for an appellate court to review facts on an appeal following a Rule 54(b) certification that it is likely to be required to consider again when another appeal is 22 SC-2026-0206 brought after the [trial] court renders its decision on the remaining claims or as to the remaining parties. " ' An appellate court also should not hear appeals that will require it to determine questions that remain before the trial court with regard to other claims.' " Centennial Assocs., Ltd. v. Guthrie, 20 So. 3d 1277, 1281 (Ala. 2009) (quoting 10 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2659 (1998)). Carpenter argues that the dismissals "turned on issues unique to the dismissed defendants," that "no remaining claim requires the trial court to determine the scope or enforceability of [the releases]," and that, unlike Hulsey, this appeal does not involve "identical claims based upon identical theories remain[ing] pending against another defendant." Carpenter's brief at xi-xii. We disagree. The possibility of mootness weighs decisively against certification here. See, e.g., Lighting Fair, 63 So. 3d at 1264-66. I. The Possibility of Mootness "Our Court construes the mootness factor broadly, and we frequently decline to consider appeals of orders certified under Rule 54(b) when pending claims 'c[an] cause some of the claims at issue on appeal to become moot.' " Martin, 423 So. 3d at 358-59 (quoting Rogers, 387 So. 23 SC-2026-0206 3d at 136; see, e.g., Cox v. Parrish, 292 So. 3d 312 (Ala. 2019); Richardson v. Chambless, 266 So. 3d 684 (Ala. 2018). In Rogers, for example, the trial court certified as final a summary judgment for two fire-service organizations that had been sued on the theory that they were vicariously liable for the actions of a volunteer firefighter, while the claim against the firefighter himself remained pending. 387 So. 3d at 132-35. Because the organizations' liability depended on whether the firefighter would be found liable at trial, our Court determined that review "would require this Court to resolve claims that are potentially moot," and we dismissed the appeal. Id. at 137. In other words, if a jury ultimately found for the remaining defendant (the firefighter), it would not matter whether the organizations could be legally liable for the firefighter's actions. Although the possibility of mootness is not always immediately dispositive, the principle of mootness, as discussed in cases like Rogers, dictates our conclusion here. Carpenter's complaint can be broken into two categories of claims that were dismissed against the non-board- member lot owners: (1) counts 1 through 5 ("the drainage counts") seek recovery of damages for stormwater runoff since April 7, 2022, and (2) counts 6 through 15 ("the judgment-collection counts") ultimately seek 24 SC-2026-0206 payment of the 2022 judgment while alleging misconduct on the part of the defendants to evade its collection. Carpenter alleges those same two groups of counts against the remaining defendants -- the CPOA and the six board members. And, like the organizations in Rogers, the non-board member lot owners' alleged liability as to these two groups of counts largely turns on the conduct of others -- the CPOA, which commissioned the drainage work behind Lots 18 through 21, and the six board members, who allegedly directed to whom the non-board-member lot owners should pay their dues. As a result, the resolution of the claims that remain pending below could eliminate the need for us to review any of the dismissals now before us. That is so for every dismissed non-board-member lot owner, including Wallace and Smith.7 7Wallace and Smith also contend that their pro tanto releases from the 2020 action bar Carpenter's claims against them. This additional defense only reinforces this analysis. To prevail against Wallace and Smith, Carpenter would need to defeat both the same defenses that all of the non-board-member lot owners have and defeat the releases that Wallace and Smith have. And Carpenter's argument that the releases' exceptions apply rests on the same CPOA-commissioned drainage work at issue in the claims still pending against the CPOA and the six board members. We express no opinion on the scope or enforceability of either release. 25 SC-2026-0206 A. The Drainage Claims (Counts 1 Through 5) Counts 1 through 5 assert negligence, wantonness, trespass, nuisance, and "negligent channelization" against the "CPOA, the CPOA Board, CPWHA, the CPWHA Board, and the 21 Lot Owners." Those counts assert the same allegations as to every defendant: that each lot owner holds an undivided 1/21st interest in the subdivision's "Common Property," which Carpenter says includes the drainage easement, and that, since April 7, 2022, all the defendants' actions or inactions have caused stormwater to be piped, diverted, and channelized onto his property. Those same counts remain pending against the CPOA and the six board members (all of whom, as part of the 21 Lot Owner group own lots and are therefore alleged to be 1/21st owners of the Common Property). The resolution of the pending claims could moot the ones before us. The factfinder may determine that the drainage easement is not "Common Property," and, thus, an essential argument of Carpenter for the liability of the non-board-member lot owners would be defeated. Or, a factfinder may determine that the drainage conditions on the Common Property -- including the work the CPOA commissioned from The 26 SC-2026-0206 Grounds Guys -- did not cause the damage Carpenter alleges or that no defendant breached a duty owed to him. If so, Carpenter's identical claims against the dismissed non-board-member lot owners, which rest on their alleged shared interest in that same property, would fail for the same reason, and there would be nothing left for us to review. See Rogers, 387 So. 3d at 137; see also Bowling, 380 So. 3d at 1035 (holding Rule 54(b) certification improper because adjudicated and pending claims arose "out of the same fact pattern and involve[ed] overlapping allegations and evidence" and "ultimately center[ed] on the same basic theory"). B. The Judgment-Collection Claims (Counts 6 Through 15) The possibility of mootness equally applies to the counts concerning the 2022 judgment. Counts 6 through 15 all concern whether, and from whom, Carpenter may collect the 2022 judgment. Counts 6 through 8 and 10 through 12 challenge the conduct of the CPOA and the six board members after that judgment was entered -- directing dues to an account held by Cain and Roberts, filing a bankruptcy petition, and forming the CPWHA -- and those counts remain pending against the CPOA and the six board members. The factfinder will have to determine if that alleged conduct by the CPOA and the six board members was wrongful. 27 SC-2026-0206 Carpenter's claims against the dismissed non-board member lot owners depend on the outcome of those pending claims. Count 9 alleges that the 21 Lot Owners, and thus also the subset of dismissed non-board- member lot owners before us, negligently paid their dues and assessments to Cain or Roberts, and later to the CPWHA, as the CPOA Board had directed. Counts 14 and 15 seek to hold the defendants responsible for the CPOA's debt by piercing its corporate veil or by imposing successor liability. Whether those payments were actually wrongful is bound up with the pending counts 6 and 7 against the six board members, challenging the same transfers as voidable, as part of a conspiracy. If the factfinder determines that the six board members did nothing wrong in directing those payments, Carpenter's claim before us that the non-board-member lot owners were negligent in following that direction would appear to be irrelevant. As in Rogers, then, the non-board-member lot owners' alleged liability on these counts depends on the outcome of claims that have not yet been tried. 387 So. 3d at 136-37. We express no opinion on how the circuit court should resolve any of the pending claims. We hold only that, because the resolution of those 28 SC-2026-0206 claims could moot some or all the claims presented in this appeal, the second factor weighs sufficiently against certification. II. Remaining Considerations No remaining considerations justify piecemeal review. Carpenter argued to the circuit court that, if this Court were to wait until after trial and then reverse the dismissal orders, the circuit court "would have to hold another trial that includes Wallace and Smith as defendants." That possibility, however, exists whenever a trial court resolves the claims against fewer than all the defendants, and it is not the sort of harsh effect that justifies piecemeal review