S.P. v. M.D.

Rel: November 13, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CL-2026-0237 _________________________ N.H. v. M.D. _________________________ CL-2026-0251 _________________________ S.P. v. M.D. Appeals from Barbour Juvenile Court (JU-21-6.02) _________________________ CL-2026-0238 _________________________ N.H. CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 v. C.B. _________________________ CL-2026-0252 _________________________ S.P. v. C.B. Appeals from Barbour Juvenile Court (JU-22-18.03) MOORE, Presiding Judge. In these consolidated appeals, S.P. ("the mother") and N.H. ("the father") challenge separate judgments entered by the Barbour Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating their parental rights to their children, K.P. ("the older child") and No.H. ("the younger child") based on petitions filed by M.D. ("the maternal great-aunt") and C.B. ("the custodian"), respectively. Background The mother and the father have never been married, but they are the legal parents of K.P. and No.H. ("the children"). On December 15, 2 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 2020, the mother gave birth to the older child, who allegedly tested positive for illegal drugs. The Barbour County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") commenced dependency proceedings relating to the older child, and the juvenile court awarded custody of the older child to the maternal great-aunt. The younger child was born on April 5, 2022, also allegedly with illegal drugs in her system. DHR commenced dependency proceedings relating to the younger child, and the juvenile court awarded custody of the younger child to the custodian, a licensed foster parent. At one point, the maternal great-aunt obtained custody of both children, but she returned the younger child to the custodian, and the juvenile court eventually formally awarded the custodian custody of the younger child. On October 31, 2024, the maternal great-aunt and the custodian filed separate petitions seeking to terminate the parental rights of the mother and of the father to the children. On February 24, 2026, the juvenile court conducted a trial on those petitions, and, on March 5, 2026, the juvenile court entered separate, but materially identical, judgments terminating the parental rights of the mother and of the father. In the judgments, the juvenile court found, among other things, that the mother 3 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 and the father were unable or unwilling to properly care for and parent the children, that there were no viable alternatives to the termination of their parental rights, and that termination was in the best interests of the children. The juvenile court awarded permanent custody of the older child to the maternal great-aunt, and it awarded permanent custody of the younger child to the custodian. On March 18, 2026, the mother and the father filed separate postjudgment motions; on the following day, the juvenile court entered separate orders denying those motions. The mother and the father timely filed notices of appeal. The Evidence Between 2020 and 2025, the mother and the father resided together in Eufaula, but they separated in 2025, and the father moved to Lewisville. The maternal great-aunt and her husband reside in Dothan, at an address known to both the mother and the father. The maternal great-aunt testified that, when she had custody of both children beginning in 2022, she had notified the mother and the father that they could visit with the children in her home at any time. According to the maternal great-aunt, even though she had provided the mother and the father with gas money for the trip from Eufaula to Dothan, the mother 4 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 had visited the children in Dothan only four or five times, with the last visit having occurred two or three years before the trial. The father had visited the children only two or three times in Dothan, with the last visit having occurred at least three years before the trial. The maternal great- aunt stated that, on his last visit, which had occurred at her residence, the father was observed on camera rolling a marijuana joint in front of the children, at which time, she said, she had asked the mother and the father to leave. The children's guardian ad litem testified that the mother and the father had never contacted her about arranging further visits with the children. The mother testified that she always wanted to see the children, and she acknowledged that the maternal great-aunt had consistently told her that it would not be a problem for her to visit them in Dothan. However, the mother said that she did not have transportation to travel to Dothan. The mother said that she had attempted to travel to Dothan to see the older child one time, but, after the maternal great-aunt informed her that the older child was at a daycare facility, the mother did not visit the older child because she did not know the address for the facility. 5 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 The maternal great-aunt testified that the father and the mother would see the children in Eufaula when the children were brought to the juvenile court for a hearing, but, she said, the father and the mother had not visited with the children after court hearings, although she had offered them visitation. The maternal great-aunt also said that she and the older child had tried to visit the mother in Eufaula approximately two months before the trial but that they had been unable to locate the mother at her job or at her residence. The maternal great-aunt testified that the mother had contacted her regarding the children by text message or telephone call approximately seven or eight times since 2022, mainly on their birthdays, but that, despite having had her contact information, the father had never contacted her to check on the welfare of the children. The mother testified that the maternal great-aunt would not inform her when the older child was going to be in Eufaula. The mother said that she had learned that the maternal great-aunt and the older child had tried to visit her two months before the trial only after they had already left Eufaula. The mother testified that she had regularly telephoned and texted the maternal great-aunt about the children but 6 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 that, after DHR closed its case, the maternal great-aunt often had not responded to her calls and text messages. The custodian testified that she and her husband reside in Clio, approximately 40 minutes from Eufaula. The custodian said that the younger child was placed with her in April 2022 and was then placed with the maternal great-aunt. According to the custodian, after the younger child was placed with the maternal great-aunt, she had visited with the younger child on the weekends for a few months, before the maternal great-aunt relinquished custody of the younger child back to her. According to the custodian, since that time, the father had not contacted her about the younger child, and the mother had contacted her by telephone and text message on only a few occasions. Sometimes, the mother had asked the custodian to bring the younger child to Eufaula to visit with her. The custodian said that she had taken the younger child to see the mother in Eufaula on two occasions, including once on the younger child's third birthday in April 2025, after the mother had said that she had a gift for the younger child. However, the custodian said, the mother did not have a gift for the younger child, and, during the visit, the mother had whispered to the child: "I'm your real mother." The 7 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 custodian had found that statement concerning because, she said, the younger child was too young "to understand something of that magnitude." According to the custodian, the mother had never visited the child in the custodian's home or offered to travel to Clio to see the child, despite having had every opportunity to do so. The custodian said that the mother and the father had not emotionally supported the child and that she considered them to have abandoned the younger child. The mother testified that she had never had custody of the younger child and that she had seen her only three times. The mother said that she did not know that the custodian had obtained custody of the younger child until a maternal cousin had informed her. The mother said that she had talked to the custodian about the child but that she had not made any attempt to telephone the younger child, and she could not explain why. The mother said that she had last seen the younger child on the younger child's third birthday. The mother denied that she had told the custodian that she had a gift for the child; she said that she had wanted to get a gift for the child but that the custodian had not provided her with an address to which she could send the gift. When asked what she could do to have more contact with the children, the mother said: "[T]he phone 8 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 works both ways, I feel like." However, the guardian ad litem testified that it was not the responsibility of the maternal great-aunt and the custodian to prompt the mother and the father to visit the children. The juvenile court had entered an order requiring the mother to pay child support for the benefit of the children. The mother testified that she had paid child support for the older child but not for the younger child. In 2023, the mother's income-tax refund was intercepted to pay part of a child-support arrearage that she owed to the state. The maternal great-aunt testified that the mother and the father had never paid her any child support for the benefit of the older child. On one occasion, the maternal great-aunt had asked the mother to buy shoes for the older child, but the mother did not do so. The custodian also testified that the mother and the father had not provided any financial support to her for the younger child. The mother acknowledged that she had not attempted to provide for the younger child's material needs, but, she said, she had tried to provide for the older child's needs. The mother claimed that she was unaware of any child-support order having been entered relating to the younger child. The mother said that she had offered to purchase gifts 9 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 for the children and to provide money to the maternal great-aunt for the older child, but, she said, the maternal great-aunt had responded that the older child had everything she needed. The maternal great-aunt testified that she loves the older child like she is her daughter and that she can provide shelter, clothing, and food for the older child. When asked whether she would keep the older child regardless of whether the parents' parental rights were terminated and the status quo was maintained, the maternal great-aunt stated: "If it took that." When asked whether it was her intent to adopt the older child, the maternal great-aunt responded that she has "full custody of [the older child]" and that she "[doesn't] need to adopt her." The custodian testified that she and her husband planned to adopt the younger child but that they were willing to take care of the younger child even if the parents' parental rights were not terminated and they could not adopt the younger child. The custodian said that, if the mother's parental rights were not terminated, she would "possibly" help the mother establish a relationship with the younger child. The mother testified that, at the time of the trial, she was residing in Eufaula with her youngest son, N.H., Jr. ("the youngest son"), who was 10 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 two years old.1 The mother testified that she had been told that the youngest son had tested positive for marijuana and cocaine when he was one year old. She stated that, at that time, she had not tested positive for any drugs but that the father had had marijuana in his system. The mother denied that the father had had cocaine in his system at that time. After being informed that she could not maintain custody of the youngest son if the father remained in the household, the mother separated from the father at some point in 2025. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order providing that the father was not to have any contact with the youngest son. The mother stated that, even without those directives, she "was going to put him out anyway." When asked if her house is "safe now," the mother stated: "Yes, because I got rid of the problem." The mother testified that she loves the children and that she was able and willing to raise the children. She said that she had been planning on filing a petition to regain the custody of the children. The mother stated that she was no longer using drugs, that she had 1The mother had three other children. The record contains little information regarding her oldest child. Her next two oldest children had been removed from her custody in 2019, after one of them ingested opioids in the mother's residence. The guardian ad litem testified that the mother had consented to the termination of her parental rights to those two children and that they were adopted by their foster parent. 11 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 maintained the same residence for six years, that she was working as a manager at a McDonald's fast-food restaurant, and that she had obtained a vehicle the day before the trial. The guardian ad litem stated that the mother had improved her circumstances since her previous cases and that DHR had reported to the juvenile court that she was able to properly care for the youngest son. According to the guardian ad litem, the mother was allowed to maintain custody of the youngest son because the father had moved out of the mother's home. Although the juvenile court had ordered that the father was not to have any contact with the youngest son, the mother admitted that she had picked the father up and that they had traveled to court together with the youngest son on the day of the termination trial. The mother explained that someone at DHR had told her that the father could be in the presence of the youngest son if he was supervised. Standard of Review A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which is " ' " [e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high 12 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. " ' " C.O. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)). " '[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly … establish the fact sought to be proved.' "KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749] at 761 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)]. "… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. ' § 25-5-81(c)[, Ala. Code 1975]." Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile 13 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id. We review the legal conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Analysis Both the mother and the father argue on appeal that the juvenile court erred in terminating their parental rights. "A juvenile court may terminate parental rights only when the petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence showing: (1) grounds for termination, see § 12-15- 319(a), Ala. Code 1975, (2) the absence of a viable alternative to termination, and (3) that the termination will serve the best interests of the child[ren]." R.D. v. G.A.W., 418 So. 3d 604, 613 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). The father argues that the juvenile court did not have grounds to terminate his parental rights and that there was a viable alternative to termination. The mother argues those same points, and, additionally, she maintains that termination of her parental rights did not serve the best interests of the children. The Father's Appeals 14 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 Section 12-15-319, Ala. Code 1975, sets forth the grounds for termination of parental rights by providing, in pertinent part: "(a) If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature, that the parents of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or condition of the parents renders them unable to properly care for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, it may terminate the parental rights of the parents. In a hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the best interests of the child." The father asserts that "DHR did not adduce any evidence to establish the necessary facts to be proven" for the termination of his parental rights. The father's brief, p. 28. To the extent that argument amounts to a challenge to the juvenile court's conclusion that grounds exist for termination, we reject that challenge. The juvenile court heard evidence from which it could have been clearly convinced that the father has a long-standing drug-abuse problem. The juvenile court heard evidence indicating that the father had exposed the children to his drug habit while visiting with the children in 2022 at the maternal great-aunt's residence. The juvenile court also heard evidence indicating that his substance-abuse problem was ongoing because the youngest son had recently tested positive for 15 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 illegal drugs during his association with the father, and the father was still prohibited from having contact with the youngest son at the time of the trial. Additionally, the juvenile court considered evidence indicating that the father had not consistently visited with or supported the children. The juvenile court properly determined that those factors demonstrated that the father was unable or unwilling to properly care for the children. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-319(a)(2), (a)(9), (a)(10), and (a)(11). The father next argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that there were no viable alternatives to terminating his parental rights. Alabama law clearly provides that, before terminating parental rights, a juvenile court must first exhaust all viable alternatives to preserve the relationship between the child and his or her natural parents. See Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990). In these cases, the juvenile court stated in its judgments that it had "considered all known alternatives to termination and reject[ed] the same as not being viable or in the best interests of [the] children"; it "specifically reject[ed] maintenance of the status quo because such is contrary to the child[ren]'s best interests." 16 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 The father argues that the juvenile court misapplied the law when determining that a viable alternative did not exist. According to the father, the record indisputably discloses that the children could remain in the permanent custody of the maternal great-aunt and the custodian while he is allowed supervised visitation. However, the father points out that the juvenile court refused to implement that option because it determined that it was not in the best interests of the children. The father maintains that, in determining whether a viable alternative exists, the juvenile court should not have considered the best interests of the children. We disagree. In P.M. v. Lee County Department of Human Resources, 335 So. 3d 1163, 1172 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), the Lee Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of P.M., who had lost her custody rights to G.M., the child at issue, due to an alcohol addiction. On appeal, P.M. argued that the judgment should be reversed because there was a viable alternative to terminating her parental rights. Paternal relatives had obtained custody of G.M. through dependency proceedings. During the termination trial, the paternal relatives indicated that they intended to adopt G.M. but that they would be amenable to maintaining custody of G.M., without 17 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 adoption, to allow the child to keep visiting with P.M., which they considered to be a suitable arrangement serving the best interests of G.M. The Lee Juvenile Court said, in pertinent part: "The relative foster parents might desire to adopt [G.M.], but they clearly indicated that they both intended and expected [P.M.] to have continued involvement in [G.M.]'s life. [The relative foster mother] specifically commented that [P.M.] had 'made steps in the right direction' and remarked that she felt that [P.M.] deserved additional 'chances' to establish and maintain her progress toward rehabilitation. Although there was no bonding assessment performed to determine the level of bonding between [P.M.] and [G.M.], [a Lee County DHR witness] testified that she could not opine that [P.M.] and [G.M.] lacked a bond, and [another witness] testified that she had observed what appeared to be a bond between [P.M.] and [G.M.]. The relative foster parents both testified that they would be there to provide care to [G.M.] and to give him the stability he needed for as long as was necessary. Thus, the evidence supports a conclusion that continued placement with the relative foster parents would serve [G.M.]'s best interest while also maintaining [P.M.]'s relationship with the child. See Ex parte A.S., 73 So. 3d 1223, 1228 (Ala. 2011) (determining that continued custody with a grandmother was a viable alternative to termination of parental rights when the grandmother had indicated that she would want the mother to have visitation with the children). The evidence does not clearly and convincingly support the juvenile court's conclusion that no viable alternative to the termination of [P.M.]'s parental rights existed or establish a basis for rejecting continued placement with the relative foster parents." 335 So. 3d at 1172. See also C.C. v. C.T., 375 So. 3d 38 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022); accord A.B. v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 370 So. 3d 18 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 822, 831 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022); R.H. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 383 So. 3d 667 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). Unlike in P.M. and its progeny, in these cases, the evidence indicates that the father has a serious drug problem and that the father was not bettering himself so that the children could benefit from associating with him. The latest information regarding the father indicated that he was prohibited by the juvenile court from even contacting the youngest son, who had tested positive for illegal drugs while associating with the father. Even more pointedly, the evidence shows that the father was not engaging in visitation with the children to develop or maintain a positive emotional bond with them. Plainly, the juvenile court properly determined that the father did not have a beneficial relationship with the children to preserve. See S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) ("As the juvenile court correctly determined, maintaining the status quo will not harm the child, but it certainly will do nothing to preserve any beneficial aspect of her relationship with the father, which is nonexistent."). As P.M. illustrates, "maintaining the status quo is a viable option to terminating parental rights when the parent and the child enjoy a 19 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 relationship with some beneficial aspects that should be preserved such that it would be in the child's best interests to continue that relationship." S.N.W., 127 So. 3d at 1230; see also T.W. v. C.B., [CL-2025-0412, Jan. 23, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026). In Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1068 (Ala. 2022) (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result), then-Chief Justice Parker wrote in a special concurrence that "the existence of a parent-child bond … has no place within the no-viable-alternative element." Based on that writing, the father argues that Alabama law does not allow a juvenile court to consider the best interests of a child when deciding whether to maintain the status quo. The father contends that, so long as that custodial alternative is available, the juvenile court has no choice but to implement it, regardless of whether it serves the best interests of the child by promoting a positive emotional bond between the parent and the child. However, our decisions are not governed by special writings authored by a single justice sitting on the supreme court; we are bound only by the decisions of a majority of that court. KGS Steel, Inc. v. McInish, 47 So. 3d 780, 781 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). 20 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 In Ex parte T.V., supra, the evidence showed that, through visitation, a beneficial emotional bond was developing between a rehabilitating parent and her dependent child, who had been placed in the care of a third party. Under those circumstances, a majority of the supreme court held that a judgment terminating parental rights should be reversed because maintaining the status quo would serve the best interests of the dependent child by allowing that developing bond to be nurtured. Through that reasoning, the supreme court implicitly recognized that a juvenile court should consider the best interests of the child when deciding whether to maintain the status quo as a viable alternative to terminating parental rights. Although Chief Justice Parker argued in his special writing in Ex parte Bodie that considering the best interests of the child and the emotional bond between a parent and a dependent child when deciding whether to maintain the status quo infringes on the constitutional rights of the parent, the father in these cases did not argue to the juvenile court that it had violated his constitutional rights, and he does not argue that point on appeal. Therefore, that argument has been waived. See J.M.L. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 402 So. 3d 832, 835 (Ala. Civ. 21 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 App. 2024). Instead, he argues only that, despite clear precedent to the contrary, we should adopt Chief Justice Parker's analysis on this point as a proper statement of Alabama law. This we cannot do. Thus, the father has not proven that the juvenile court erred in considering the best interests of the children when deciding whether maintaining the status quo was a viable alternative. The father does not argue that the juvenile court did not have sufficient evidence to sustain its determination that maintaining the status quo would not be in the best interests of the children or that it would not be in the best interests of the older child for his parental rights to be terminated because the maternal great-aunt did not plan to adopt her. Accordingly, those arguments have been waived. See J.M.L., supra. Thus, based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgments terminating the father's parental rights to the children. The Mother's Appeals The mother argues on appeal that the maternal great-aunt and the custodian failed to present clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination of her parental rights exist. First, she asserts that the maternal great-aunt and the custodian failed to prove by clear and 22 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 convincing evidence that she had abandoned the children and that, because abandonment was not established, the maternal great-aunt and the custodian were required to prove that there were no viable alternatives to termination of her parental rights. See H.K. v. D.D., 423 So. 3d 373, 377 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025) (noting that, in that case, because the mother had abandoned the child, the juvenile court was not required to consider whether there were viable alternatives to the termination of her parental rights). Section 12-15-319(a) directs a juvenile court to consider a nonexclusive list of factors in determining whether there are grounds for terminating a parent's parental rights, including abandonment, see § 12-15-319(a)(1). In their petitions, the maternal great-aunt and the custodian asserted, among other things, that the mother had abandoned the children. We note, however, that the juvenile court did not make a finding in its judgments that the mother had abandoned the children, and it expressly determined that there were no viable alternatives to the termination of her parental rights. Thus, we decline to further address the mother's argument regarding abandonment. 23 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 The mother also argues that the evidence does not support the juvenile court's conclusion that she was unwilling to parent the children. She acknowledges that the maternal great-aunt and the custodian proved that her visits with the children were "infrequent" and that she had failed "to pay regular direct support"; she argues, however, that there was also evidence indicating that she had communicated with the maternal great-aunt and the custodian and that she had continued to claim a parental relationship with the children. We acknowledge that there was conflicting evidence presented regarding the mother's efforts to communicate with the maternal great-aunt and the custodian. We conclude, however, that the evidence was sufficient to allow the juvenile court to determine that the mother's efforts to communicate with the maternal great-aunt and the custodian and to maintain a relationship with the children were minimal and did not indicate a willingness on her part to discharge her responsibilities to and for the children. This court may not reweigh the evidence to find otherwise. See Ex parte T.V., supra. The mother next argues that the juvenile court was required to consider her current conditions and conduct regarding her inability or unwillingness to care for the children. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d at 5 24 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 (affirming that the existence of evidence of current conditions or conduct relating to a parent's inability or unwillingness to care for his or her children is implicit in the requirement that termination of parental rights is based on clear and convincing evidence). We do not discern from the record that the juvenile court disregarded the evidence of the mother's current circumstances. Although the mother emphasizes her testimony indicating that, at the time of the trial, she was sober, was residing in a suitable residence, was independent of the father, was stably employed, was driving her own automobile, was raising the youngest son, and was trying to facilitate visitation with the children, the juvenile court also heard evidence indicating that the mother had consistently failed to contact the maternal great-aunt and the custodian until only recently before the trial, that she continued to blame them for her failure to maintain a relationship with the children, and that she still was not providing support for the children. Additionally, in the judgments, the juvenile court noted "that the mother … was in direct violation of an order from [the juvenile court] concerning another child of hers, [the youngest son]," which order, the juvenile court stated, directed "that custody of [the youngest son] would 25 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 be returned to her as long as she did not let the child be around the … father." The juvenile court acknowledged that the mother had admitted during her testimony that she had traveled to court in the same vehicle as the father and the youngest son "and [had] claimed she did not know of the court's order." The juvenile court could have concluded that the mother's continued interactions with the father and her failure to abide by a court order intended to protect the youngest son from the father demonstrate her inability to recognize the danger in allowing him around the youngest son and the children, that the mother's residence is therefore unsafe for the children, that the mother has failed to achieve stability, and that she remained unable and unwilling to properly care for the children. See § 12-15-319(a). The mother notes that the juvenile court made a finding in its judgments that DHR had made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the mother and the father despite no evidence having been presented identifying any such efforts and despite no witnesses from DHR having testified, She asserts that those findings "underscore[] that the judgments were not closely tied to the evidence presented in these two cases." The mother's brief, p. 19. However, the mother has failed to 26 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 show how those findings prejudice her substantial rights. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. The juvenile court made sufficient findings supporting grounds for termination, and the mother does not explain how that additional finding, even if erroneous, detracts from the conclusion that she was unable or unwilling to properly care for the children. In the absence of any argument that the finding prejudices her rights, we cannot reverse the judgment. The mother next argues that maintenance of the status quo is a viable alternative to the termination of her parental rights and that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interests of the children. As to the younger child, the evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that maintaining the status quo would not preserve a beneficial relationship with the mother, see S.N.W., supra, and that it would be in the best interests of the younger child for the mother's parental rights to be terminated so that the custodian and her husband, who had been providing primary care for the younger child since her birth, could provide the younger child permanency through adoption. See J.A. v. S.L., 406 So. 3d at 140 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). We, thus, affirm the judgment terminating the mother's parental rights to the younger child. 27 CL-2026-0237, CL-2026-0238, CL-2026-0251, and CL-2026-0252 We reach a different conclusion regarding the older child. The juvenile court determined t