Sarah Gordon v. Charles Gordon
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketCL-2026-0436
JudgeFridy, J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: November 20, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
_________________________
CL-2026-0436
_________________________
Sarah Gordon
v.
Charles Gordon
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(DR-24-900170)
FRIDY, Judge.
Sarah Gordon ("the wife") appeals from a judgment of the Baldwin
Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing her from Charles Gordon ("the
husband"). For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand the case for further proceedings.
CL-2026-0436
Background
The husband and the wife married on May 14, 2011. The husband
finished medical school that year and later completed an internship, a
five-year orthopedic-surgery residency, and a spine-surgery fellowship.
While the husband completed his medical training, the wife worked as a
nanny and held other jobs that helped pay the household's expenses.
The husband finished his fellowship in 2018. That year, the parties
moved to Baldwin County and the husband began working for Baldwin
Bone and Joint, an orthopedic practice. After the move, the wife became
a full-time homemaker and had no separate income. The husband
became a partner at Baldwin Bone and Joint in 2020 or 2021. He
borrowed money from First Horizon Bank to buy into the partnership.
On February 13, 2024, the wife initiated a divorce action against
the husband. The next day, the trial court entered a status quo order.
That order required the parties to pay their debts and regular monthly
obligations "from the same sources as they have customarily been paid
during the marriage." It also barred the parties from disposing of assets
"acquired during the marriage without leave of court."
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In May 2024, the wife filed a motion to hold the husband in
contempt, alleging that he had revoked her use of credit cards that she
used and had limited her access to certain bank accounts in violation of
the status quo order. In September 2024, the wife amended her motion
to allege that the husband had also removed about $183,000 from the
parties' joint checking account.
The parties entered into a temporary agreement to resolve those
issues. On October 30, 2024, the trial court adopted that agreement in a
temporary order, requiring the husband to place the $183,000 in an
interest-bearing account, to resume depositing his paychecks into the
parties' joint account, and to deposit $20,000 into that account. It also
required him to reinstate the wife as an active user on the parties' bank
and credit-card accounts.
In January 2025, the wife filed a renewed contempt motion. She
alleged that the husband had deposited the $20,000 but then
immediately wrote three checks totaling $19,400. She also alleged that
he again had limited her ability to access the money he deposited into the
joint account.
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On July 15, 2025, the wife filed another renewed contempt motion.
She alleged that the husband had again stopped depositing his paychecks
into the joint account. The husband asked the trial court to declare that
motion moot because, he asserted, he was "continuing to pay the [wife]
her monthly temporary support payments in compliance with the Status
Quo Order." Alternatively, he asked the trial court to carry the motion to
the final trial, which had been set for August 25, 2025.
On July 17, 2025, the trial court entered an order indicating that it
would carry the motion to the trial. On August 7, 2025, the trial judge
recused herself, and the case was reassigned. The parties then jointly
asked the trial court to set a new trial date because the first trial judge's
recusal had required the cancellation of the August 25 trial. On
September 8, 2025, the trial court set the pending motions for a hearing
on October 14, 2025. The next day, the trial court set the case for a trial
to be held on December 8, 2025.
On October 22, 2025, the wife moved to increase her temporary
spousal support. Among other grounds, she asserted that she needed
expert witnesses to evaluate the husband's assets. She asked for a
$30,000 lump sum to cover the cost of hiring experts and attorney's fees.
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On November 17, 2025, the trial court stated that it would hear the issues
raised in the motion at the trial.
On Friday, December 5, 2025, the last business day before the trial,
the wife moved to continue the trial. That same day, she supplemented
her discovery responses to identify an expert witness, and the husband
objected. The trial court denied the motion to continue.
At the start of the trial on December 8, 2025, the wife's counsel
renewed her motion to continue, stating that the wife had never had the
money to hire a forensic accountant to review the records. Counsel also
stated that the wife had recently found a bank account and credit card
for which she had received no records. The trial-court judge again denied
the motion to continue, explaining: "I believe the case has been pending
since February 2024, sufficient time to conduct discovery."
Before the first witness testified, the attorneys described the
parties' assets for the record. The husband's counsel stated that the
husband owned an interest in Baldwin Bone and Joint and had "made an
initial payment into that group of $220,000." The wife's counsel
responded that the husband's initial investment was $350,000 but that
the evaluation of that investment valued it at $220,000. The husband's
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counsel stated that the husband had made an "initial investment" of
$150,000 in a surgery center. He disputed that the trial court had
jurisdiction over either interest.
The wife offered a document that calculated an estimated value of
$219,491 for a 15.38% interest in Baldwin Bone and Joint Medical
Center, LLC. That calculation relied on a September 30, 2025, balance
sheet. The husband's counsel objected that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over the business entity and its assets or value. The trial-
court judge admitted the document, stating: "I'm going to allow it to come
in but not necessarily for the consideration of any kind of division just to
have some background on what his interest is but his business is a
separate estate."
The wife also offered a tax document regarding the surgery center,
arguing that the surgery center was an asset just like Baldwin Bone and
Joint. The trial court excluded that document because it was a K-1 tax
form rather than a valuation. On cross-examination, the husband
testified that a tax document showed that the interest was "worth 142,"
but he added that the surgery center was "in the red and those shares
are worth nothing."
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The husband admitted that he had stopped depositing his
paychecks into the joint account around May 2024. He testified that, after
the temporary order, he had deposited the $20,000 and then wrote three
checks totaling about $19,600. He testified that he had spent that money
on legal fees and other expenses and that he had done so in accordance
with the order. He admitted that he had again stopped depositing his
paychecks into the joint account around February 2025. He also testified
that, at some point, he had removed the wife as an authorized user of the
credit cards because, he said, she was spending more than he could afford
to pay.
On February 6, 2026, the trial court entered a final judgment
divorcing the parties. The trial court divided the parties' retirement and
investment accounts by awarding specific accounts to each party. It found
that the husband's share of the dollar value of the accounts exceeded the
wife's share by about $64,000 and stated that it would adjust the division
later in the judgment. The trial court then found that the husband's
interest in his medical practice, the surgery center, and any other
medical consulting company (collectively referred to as "the business
interests") were not marital assets, and it awarded the business interests
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to the husband "without claim by" the wife. The judgment made the
husband solely responsible for any debt on the business interests and
specifically for the debt owed to First Horizon Bank for the money he had
borrowed from it to purchase his interest in the medical practice. The
judgment did not assign a value to any of the business interests.
The trial court also awarded the wife a $70,000 property
settlement. It made that award "[t]o further balance the equities on the
retirement division, to assist the [w]ife in moving from the residence, to
account for the [h]usband's separate estate in his LLCs, and also due to
the [h]usband's violations of previous orders." The trial court described
those violations as the husband's failure to deposit his paychecks as
ordered and his failure to reinstate the wife as an active user on the
accounts and credit cards until months later.
On March 6, 2026, the wife filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate
the judgment under Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. She challenged the trial
court's ruling on the business interests and argued that the parties had
invested in the surgery center and in Alabama Spine Consulting, LLC,
during the marriage with marital funds. She also argued that the trial
court had not properly divided the marital assets. On April 17, 2026, the
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trial court clarified its award of the marital home and denied all other
requested relief. The wife timely appealed.
Standard of Review
Each of the wife's arguments challenges a ruling that rests within
the trial court's discretion. " 'A trial court's award of alimony and division
of property following an ore tenus presentation of the evidence is
presumed correct.' " Kaufman v. Kaufman, 934 So. 2d 1073, 1080 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2005) (quoting Courtright v. Courtright, 757 So. 2d 453, 456
(Ala. Civ. App. 2000)). " 'The property division need not be equal, but it
must be equitable.' " Id. (citation omitted). "The determination whether
property is marital property or belongs to the separate estate of one of
the parties is a matter generally within the trial court's discretion." Id.
"A decision to deny a motion for a continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court." Daniels v. Daniels, 4 So. 3d 479, 481 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2007). " '[A] trial court's denial of a motion for a continuance
will be reversed only where the movant shows that the denial was a
palpable abuse of the trial court's discretion.' " Id. (quoting Washington
v. ORIX Credit All., Inc., 825 So. 2d 828, 830 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)).
Likewise, "whether a party is in contempt of court is a determination
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committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Stack v. Stack, 646
So. 2d 51, 56 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). This court will affirm a contempt
ruling "absent an abuse of that discretion or unless the judgment of the
trial court is unsupported by the evidence so as to be plainly and palpably
wrong." Id.
Analysis
The wife first contends that the trial court should have continued
the trial so that she could hire a forensic accountant to examine the
parties' finances. She argues that the husband's conduct during the
litigation left her without the money to hire a forensic accountant sooner.
A trial court should grant a continuance on the ground that a
witness or evidence is absent when the movant satisfies three elements:
"(1) the expected evidence must be material and competent; (2) there
must be a probability that the evidence will be forthcoming if the case is
continued; and (3) the moving party must have exercised due diligence to
secure the evidence." Ex parte Saranthus, 501 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Ala.
1986).
The record supports the trial court's decision to deny the wife's
motion to continue. The wife filed her complaint in February 2024, nearly
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22 months before the trial. On September 9, 2025, the trial court set the
case for a trial on December 8, 2025. In October 2025, the wife told the
trial court that she needed expert witnesses to evaluate the husband's
assets. She did not move to continue the trial, however, until the last
business day before the trial.
The wife also did not show that the evidence she sought was
material or that it would probably be available if the trial court granted
a continuance. Her counsel identified one credit card and one bank
account for which the wife lacked records. He did not explain what a
forensic accountant would have found or how that evidence would have
affected the trial. He also did not explain when the wife could hire a
forensic accountant or obtain the missing records. The wife attributes her
delay to a lack of funds, but the trial court could weigh that explanation
against the length of time the case had been pending. We cannot say that
the trial court palpably abused its discretion by denying her motion to
continue.
The wife next contends that the trial court erred by failing to
require the husband to respond adequately to her discovery requests. Her
argument contains only a single citation to Daniels v. Daniels, 4 So. 3d
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479 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), a case that has nothing to do with a trial court's
authority over discovery disputes. "Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App. P.,]
requires that arguments in briefs contain discussions of facts and
relevant legal authorities that support the party's position. If they do not,
the arguments are waived." White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998
So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008). Consequently, the wife has waived this
argument.
The wife next contends that the trial court erred by holding that the
business interests were not marital assets. Section 30-2-51(a), Ala. Code
1975, provides that the trial court
"may not take into consideration any property acquired prior
to the marriage of the parties or by inheritance or gift unless
the judge finds from the evidence that the property, or income
produced by the property, has been used regularly for the
common benefit of the parties during their marriage."
Thus, "the separate estate of the parties in a divorce proceeding includes
property owned prior to the marriage and property received by gift or
inheritance during the marriage." Davis v. Davis, 237 So. 3d 892, 898
(Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (citation modified). By contrast, "marital property
generally includes property purchased or otherwise accumulated by the
parties during the marriage." Id. (citation modified).
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In Kaufman, supra, the evidence indicated that the disputed assets
"were accumulated during the marriage," and "there [was] no evidence
indicating that any of those assets were received by gift or by
inheritance." 934 So. 2d at 1080. This court held that those assets "were
marital assets subject to the property division." Id. Similarly, in Davis,
237 So. 3d at 899, the husband in that case bought a farm during the
marriage. This court held that the farm "was a marital asset subject to
division" because "there is no question that the farm was acquired during
the marriage." Id.
A spouse's ownership interest in a business entity may be a marital
asset. In TenEyck v. TenEyck, 885 So. 2d 146, 149 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003),
the husband in that case held a 99% membership interest in a limited-
liability company. This court held that the trial court "was free to include
[the company's] worth in its computation of the parties' marital assets
and its equitable distribution of those assets." Id. at 154.
The evidence indicates that the husband acquired the business
interests during the marriage. The husband finished his medical training
in 2018, seven years after the parties married. He acquired his interest
in Baldwin Bone and Joint in 2020 or 2021, and he paid for that interest
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with a bank loan. He also invested $150,000 into the surgery center. The
husband did not contend at the trial, and no other evidence
demonstrated, that he acquired any of the business interests before the
parties' marriage or by gift or inheritance. Moreover, the trial court did
not find that the husband acquired any of the business interests before
the parties' marriage or by gift or inheritance.
When it admitted the valuation document, the trial court stated
that it did so "not necessarily for the consideration of any kind of division"
and that "his business is a separate estate." It then held that the business
interests "are not marital assets." However, the record contains no
evidence that would support classifying the business interests as the
husband's separate estate under ยง 30-2-51(a). The evidence therefore
does not support the trial court's conclusion that the business interests
were not marital assets. See Kaufman, 934 So. 2d at 1080; Davis, 237 So.
3d at 899.
The husband argues that the trial court accounted for the business
interests when it awarded the wife a $70,000 property settlement. The
trial court gave four reasons for that award: (1) to further balance the
equities on the retirement division; (2) to assist the wife in moving from
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the marital residence; (3) to account for "the [h]usband's separate estate
in his LLCs"; and (4) because the husband had violated the trial court's
previous orders. Only the third reason concerned the business interests,
and it rested on the premise that those interests were the husband's
separate estate, which the trial court had awarded to him "without claim
by the [w]ife." The trial court did not value the business interests, did not
determine what share of their value the wife would receive if they were
marital property, and did not state what portion of the $70,000 it
attributed to them. Because the award was a single lump sum that served
four purposes, one of which was to sanction the husband's conduct, we
cannot tell whether or to what extent it compensated the wife for the
business interests. The award therefore does not show that the trial court
treated the business interests as marital property when it divided the
marital estate, and it does not cure the error in classifying them as the
husband's separate estate.
The husband also relies on his testimony that the surgery-center
shares were "worth nothing." The trial court, however, made no finding
about the value of the surgery-center interest or any other business
interest. It held only that the business interests were not marital assets.
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The parties presented conflicting evidence about the value of the business
interests, and the trial court did not resolve that conflict in its judgment,
opting, instead, to conclude that the business interests were not part of
the marital estate.
The judgment awarded the marital home to the husband and
stated: "By stipulation and agreement, the Court finds there is [$100,000]
of equity in the property." The wife argues that the parties did not
stipulate to that amount and that the equity was $150,000, the difference
between a $1.5 million appraisal and a $1.35 million mortgage. The
record does not show a clear stipulation. At the start of the trial, the
husband's counsel offered $100,000 as a "best ball park estimate" that
accounted for needed repairs. The wife's counsel responded "we don't
really know" and agreed only that the figure would fluctuate. At the trial,
an appraisal was admitted, and the husband testified that the home
needed $150,000 to $200,000 in repairs. Because we reverse the property
division, we need not decide whether the evidence supports a finding of
$100,000 of equity in the marital home. On remand, unless the parties
clearly stipulate to a figure, the trial court should determine the equity
in the marital home from the evidence.
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The judgment declined to award the wife a vehicle because she did
not have a driver's license at the time of the trial, but it awarded her half
of the equity in the Porsche 911 GTS vehicle. The wife argues that she
had obtained a driver's license by the trial date, but the record does not
support that argument. She testified that she had no valid driver's
license, that her previous driver's license had expired, and that she had
misplaced documents she needed to renew it. We cannot say that the trial
court exceeded its discretion by declining to award her a vehicle in kind.
The judgment also held that the Mercedes G-Wagon vehicle is "property
of an LLC and not part of the marital estate." That holding rests on the
same premise as the ruling on the business interests. See TenEyck, 885
So. 2d at 154. On remand, the trial court shall consider the G-Wagon
together with its valuation of the business interests.
Based on the trial court's failure to include the business interests
in the parties' marital estate, we reverse the trial court's division of the
marital estate. Importantly, we do not hold that the trial court must
award the wife any particular share of the business interests or their
value. See Davis, 237 So. 3d at 899. Instead, on remand, the trial court
shall treat the business interests as marital property, determine their
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value, and consider that value in fashioning an equitable division of the
marital property. See Shewbart v. Shewbart, 19 So. 3d 223, 233 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009).
The wife also argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion by
awarding her too little alimony. Property division and alimony "are
interrelated and are to be considered together." Id. Because we reverse
the property division, we pretermit discussion of the wife's argument
about the amount of alimony she was awarded. On remand, the trial
court may reconsider its alimony award in light of its new property
division.
Finally, the wife contends that the trial court exceeded its
discretion by failing to hold the husband in contempt and by failing to
award her a monetary sanction and an attorney's fee. She points to the
husband's admissions that he stopped depositing his paychecks into the
joint account and that he removed her as an authorized user of the credit
cards.
The wife's argument on this issue recites the standard of review
and summarizes the husband's conduct. She cites no authority holding
that a trial court that finds a violation of its earlier orders must hold the
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violating party in contempt or impose a separate sanction. She also does
not address the trial court's decision to account for the violations in its
property settlement. Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires "that
arguments in briefs contain discussions of facts and relevant legal
authorities that support the party's position." White Sands Grp., 998 So.
2d at 1058. Because the wife has not shown that the trial court exceeded
its discretion, we affirm the judgment as to this issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment insofar as the trial court denied the wife's
motion to continue and declined to hold the husband in contempt or to
sanction him. We reverse the judgment insofar as it divided the marital
property, and we remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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