Full Opinion

Rel: October 23, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CL-2026-0334 _________________________ T.J.L.H. v. J.C.M. Appeal from Madison Juvenile Court (CS-25-900190) MOORE, Presiding Judge. T.J.L.H. ("the mother") appeals from a judgment entered by the Madison Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") determining that J.C.M. ("the father") is the legal father of her child, R.M. ("the child"), and awarding him custody of the child. The mother argues that the juvenile CL-2026-0334 court erred by failing to join her former husband C.H. ("the former husband"), as a party to the case. The facts essential to the disposition of this appeal are as follows. The mother married the former husband in 2023. The mother and the former husband separated in August 2024. After the separation, the mother engaged in a sexual relationship with the father, and they conceived the child together. Genetic testing administered while the mother was pregnant proved that the father was the biological father of the child. The former husband commenced a divorce action against the mother, and, on May 4, 2025, he and the mother executed a notarized divorce settlement agreement providing, in pertinent part, that the former husband acknowledged that the mother was pregnant and that he "t[ook] no custody, liability, or responsibility for [the child], the unborn child of [the mother]. Any and all [of his] custodial rights [were] surrendered to [the mother]." The settlement agreement was filed in the divorce action on May 14, 2025. The child was born on May 16, 2025, while the mother and the former husband remained married. On May 30, 2025, the father commenced the underlying paternity and custody action relating to the 2 CL-2026-0334 child. The father named only the mother as a defendant in the action, and the juvenile court did not join the former husband as a party to the action. The mother and the former husband were divorced by a judgment the Cullman Circuit Court entered on November 14, 2025. The divorce judgment incorporated the settlement agreement that the former husband had executed. The juvenile court conducted a trial in the paternity and custody action in January and March 2026. On the last date of the trial, the former husband, who had been subpoenaed to appear as a witness, testified that, when he first learned of the mother's pregnancy with the child, he had believed that the child could be his biological child, but, he said, after Christmas 2024, he had reviewed the results of genetic testing that proved that he was not the biological father. The former husband testified that, after receiving the results of the genetic testing, the mother and the father texted him repeatedly for several months asking him to sign over his custodial rights to the child before, he said, he had agreed to execute the divorce settlement agreement surrendering his custodial rights to the child on May 4, 2025. The former husband stated that he knew that for the father to be declared the legal father of the child he had 3 CL-2026-0334 to sign away his rights to the child and that he had signed the settlement agreement because he was not claiming any rights to the child. The former husband said that, because he did not know the father and because he was suspicious of the father, he had assigned his custodial rights to the mother. On April 1, 2026, the juvenile court entered a judgment adjudicating the father to be the legal father of the child and awarding him sole legal and sole physical custody of the child. The mother and the father filed postjudgment motions to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. In her postjudgment motion, the mother did not argue that the juvenile court had erred in failing to join the former husband as a party to the case. In his postjudgment motion, the father also did not raise that argument. The juvenile court denied the postjudgment motions, and the mother timely appealed. Although the mother did not raise the issue whether the juvenile court erred in failing to join the former husband as a necessary party to the underlying action, we may address the issue for the first time on appeal. See Capitol Farmers Mkt., Inc. v. Delongchamp, 320 So. 3d 574, 579 (Ala. 2020). 4 CL-2026-0334 Section 26-17-603, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act ("the AUPA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-101 et seq., provides: "The following individuals must be joined as parties in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage: "(1) the mother of the child; and "(2) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated." In A.Ho. v. R.J., 347 So. 3d 270 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), this court held that, pursuant to § 26-17-603, when a child is born during a marriage, the husband must be joined as a party to a paternity action before the court can declare another man to be the legal father of the child. Accord A.S. v. M.W., 100 So. 3d 1112 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012); R.D. v. S.S., 309 So. 3d 146 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). The purpose of joining the husband as a party in such a case, of course, is to notify him that the paternity of the child born during the marriage is in legal dispute and to afford the husband the opportunity to be heard on the paternity issue. The AUPA provides that the husband is the presumed father of a child born during a marriage, see Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-204(a)(1), and, if the husband persists in his presumption 5 CL-2026-0334 of paternity, no one may maintain a paternity action to contest his paternity. See Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-607(a). By joining the husband as a party, a court ensures that he will be provided a meaningful opportunity to persist in his presumed fatherhood or to disclaim his paternity of the child. In any case, a court presiding over a paternity action involving a child born during a marriage should join the husband so that the judgment can conclusively settle the paternity controversy. See J.W. v. C.H., 988 So. 2d 560 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (applying former version of the AUPA). Considering those purposes, in E.J.B. v. State ex rel. A.C., 669 So. 2d 992 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), this court recognized that, if a former husband has been adjudicated not to be the legal father of a child by a prior judgment in an action to which he was a party, he does not need to be joined in a subsequent paternity action. In E.J.B., a child was born to A.C. in 1977, while she was married to W.C. They divorced in 1983, and, in 1994, the divorce judgment was amended to declare that W.C. was not the legal father of A.C.'s child. On the same date the divorce judgment was amended, A.C. commenced a paternity action against E.J.B., who moved for a dismissal of the paternity action for the failure of A.C. to join 6 CL-2026-0334 W.C. as an indispensable party. This court held that, because it had already been judicially established in the amended divorce judgment that W.C. was not the legal father of A.C.'s child, the presumption that W.C. was the legal father of the child had been rebutted under Ala. Code 1975, former § 26-17-5, thereby eliminating the requirement that W.C. be joined as a party in the paternity action. Thus, no error was committed by proceeding to a judgment declaring E.J.B. to be the legal father of the child without the joinder of W.C. In this case, unlike in E.J.B., the judgment divorcing the mother and the former husband does not make any finding regarding the paternity of the child. Although the divorce judgment incorporates the agreement of the parties, the former husband, in that agreement, only disclaimed any custodial rights to the child; he did not admit that he was not the legal father of the child. The divorce judgment also does not expressly or implicitly find that the former husband was not the legal father of the child. Nevertheless, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in adjudicating the paternity of the child without formally joining the former husband as a party to the case. The record clearly shows that the former husband appeared at the 7 CL-2026-0334 trial through service of judicial process and that he was questioned regarding his claim to the paternity of the child. Thus, the former husband was effectively notified of the paternity action and afforded the opportunity to be heard on the paternity issue. During the questioning, the former husband testified that, upon discovering that the mother had conceived the child with the father, he had agreed to sign away his custodial rights to the child because he did not intend to enforce those rights. His testimony clearly conveyed to the juvenile court that he was not persisting in his paternity of the child. Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., requires joinder of persons needed for a just adjudication of the action. The rule is based on equitable principles. See Toomey v. Riverside RV Resort, LLC, 328 So. 3d 228, 232 (Ala. 2020). "The basic principle underlying this joinder argument is that a court should not adjudicate an individual's rights in his absence and without giving him the opportunity to be heard." Moody v. Moody, 339 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976). If a person with an interest in a justiciable controversy appears in a judicial proceeding to resolve that controversy and is afforded an opportunity to be heard, the appearance acts as a substitute for formal joinder of the person as a party under Rule 8 CL-2026-0334 19, making entry of a judgment affecting his or her interests valid. See Posey v. Cumens, 564 So. 2d 864, 865 (Ala. 1990) (holding that judgment would not be set aside for nonjoinder when third parties testified as witnesses during trial of boundary-line dispute affecting their property lines). We conclude that § 26-17-603 should be applied similarly to Rule 19. When a former husband who is a presumed father of a child appears as a witness in a paternity action and the court provides him a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the paternity issue, any failure to formally join the former husband as a party does not amount to reversible error. In those circumstances, the court has substantially complied with § 26-17-603 by notifying the former husband of the paternity action and providing him with due process to enforce any paternity rights he may have to the child. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in failing to formally join the former husband in this case as a party in the underlying paternity and custody action.1 The mother does not argue that the juvenile court erred in 1For that reason, we do not discuss whether the failure to formally join the former husband as a party resulted in a jurisdictional defect, as the mother contends. 9 CL-2026-0334 adjudicating the father to be the legal father of the child for any other reason. The mother also does not argue that the juvenile court erred in awarding the father custody of the child. Because the mother has failed to demonstrate that any reversible error was committed in the proceedings below, we affirm the judgment. AFFIRMED. Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur. Bowden, J., concurs in the result, without opinion. 10