Full Opinion

Rel: November 20, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CL-2026-0955 _________________________ CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc. v. Camirea Hughes and Eddie Hughes Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CV-24-902659) MOORE, Presiding Judge. CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc. ("CarMax"), appeals from an order entered by the Mobile Circuit Court ("the circuit court") denying its motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against it by Camirea CL-2026-0955 Hughes and Eddie Hughes ("the Hugheses"). We reverse the circuit court's order and remand the case with instructions. Background On October 15, 2024, the Hugheses commenced, in the circuit court, an action against CarMax and Express Oil Change. In the complaint, the Hugheses asserted against CarMax a claim of breach of warranty relating to a vehicle that they had purchased from CarMax. On November 15, 2024, CarMax removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ("the federal court"), alleging diversity jurisdiction. On June 12, 2025, the federal court remanded the case back to the circuit court on the basis that the requisite amount in controversy had not been established. On July 25, 2025, the circuit court held a status conference, and, on October 24, 2025, the circuit court conducted a status review. On November 14, 2025, CarMax moved the circuit court to compel arbitration. CarMax supported its motion with an affidavit; a bill of sale signed by the parties, containing an arbitration provision; and excerpts from the rules of the American Arbitration Association ("the AAA") and of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services ("the JAMS"). The 2 CL-2026-0955 arbitration provision in the bill of sale provides, in pertinent part, that the parties agree to arbitrate any claim arising out of the sale of the vehicle purchased from CarMax by the Hugheses, including disputes about the "validity, enforceability, arbitrability or scope of this Arbitration Provision or this Contract." The arbitration provision further states that arbitration shall comply with the applicable rules and procedures of the organization administering the arbitration and identifies the AAA and the JAMS as the organizations that may administer arbitration. Finally, the arbitration provision states that the rules of the selected organization shall apply to the arbitration proceedings. Rule 7(a) of the American Arbitration Association's Consumer Rules ("the AAA Consumer Rules") empowers an arbitrator to decide objections concerning the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. Rule 11(b) of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services Consumer Rules ("the JAMS Consumer Rules") requires jurisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes concerning the formation, existence, 3 CL-2026-0955 validity, interpretation, or scope of the agreement, to be submitted to and decided by an arbitrator. CarMax argued that the arbitration provision in the bill of sale incorporated the AAA Consumer Rules and the JAMS Consumer Rules that assigned questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. However, the Hugheses opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that CarMax had waived its right to arbitration by substantially invoking the litigation process, see Companion Life Ins. Co. v. Whitesell Mfg., Inc., 670 So. 2d 897, 899 (Ala. 1995), and that the circuit court should decide the waiver issue.1 On February 3, 2026, the circuit court entered an order denying CarMax's motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court concluded that CarMax had waived its right to arbitration by removing the action to the federal court and litigating federal jurisdiction, by failing to answer or timely assert its right to arbitration in the circuit court, and by delaying the filing of its motion to compel arbitration in the circuit court until more 1The Hugheses did not dispute the existence of the arbitration provision or that it was contained in an agreement regarding a transaction affecting interstate commerce, see Hoover Gen. Contractors- Homewood, Inc. v. Key, 201 So. 3d 550, 552 (Ala. 2016), so the general validity of the arbitration provision is not at issue. 4 CL-2026-0955 than a year after the action had been commenced and more than five months after the case was remanded from the federal court. On February 26, 2026, CarMax filed a timely notice of appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court; that court transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, ยง 12-2-7(6). Issues CarMax argues that the circuit court erred in determining that CarMax had waived its right to arbitrate the dispute. In making that argument, CarMax contends, among other things, that, pursuant to the arbitration provision, the question of waiver should have been decided by an arbitrator. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with CarMax on this "[g]ateway question[]," Regions Bank v. Rice, 209 So. 3d 1108, 1110-11 (Ala. 2016), so we do not address whether the circuit court properly found that CarMax had waived its right to arbitration. See Key v. Warren Averett, LLC, 372 So. 3d 1132, 1139-40 (Ala. 2022) (reversing the denial of a motion to compel arbitration without deciding whether the right to arbitration had been waived because the parties had agreed that any questions regarding waiver of the right to arbitration would be decided by an arbitrator). 5 CL-2026-0955 Standard of Review We review de novo the circuit court's denial of CarMax's motion to compel arbitration, including its determination whether the arbitration agreement assigns questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. D.R. Horton, Inc.-Birmingham v. Carlton, 419 So. 3d 1, 4-6 (Ala. 2024). Analysis The law in Alabama is clear that "a trial court considering a motion to compel arbitration should resolve โ€ฆ waiver โ€ฆ issues unless the subject arbitration provision clearly and unmistakably indicates that those arguments should instead be submitted to the arbitrator." Federal Ins. Co. v. Reedstrom, 197 So. 3d 971, 976 (Ala. 2015). In Reedstrom, the Alabama Supreme Court held that, by incorporating Rule 7(a) of the AAA Consumer Rules into the arbitration agreement at issue in that case, the question whether the defendant had waived arbitration was delegated to the arbitrator. Id. In D.R. Horton, supra, the arbitration agreement at issue did not expressly delegate questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator, but the Alabama Supreme Court held that, by incorporating the AAA Consumer Rules providing that questions of arbitrability shall 6 CL-2026-0955 be decided in arbitration, the parties had effectively reserved all questions of arbitrability for arbitration. D.R. Horton, 419 So. 3d at 6-7. In this case, the arbitration provision generally states that any disputes as to its enforceability shall be decided in arbitration. The arbitration provision also incorporates the applicable AAA Consumer Rules and the JAMS Consumer Rules, both of which provide that any questions regarding arbitrability of a claim shall be decided by an arbitrator. Thus, like in Reedstrom and D.R. Horton, the arbitration provision clearly and unmistakably provides that the question whether CarMax waived its right to arbitration, a question of arbitrability, shall be decided in arbitration. Another distinct part of the arbitration provision states that the Hugheses waive their right to participate in any class action against CarMax, and it clearly states that only a court, and not an arbitrator, may determine the validity and effect of the class-action waiver. The class-action-waiver clause only highlights that the arbitration provision could have been written differently to clearly provide that all questions of waiver should be decided only by a court; however, this clause relates solely to the validity and effect of the class-action waiver. This class- 7 CL-2026-0955 action-waiver clause does not conflict with the other terms of the arbitration provision, which clearly and unmistakably leaves it to the arbitrator selected by the parties to decide the question of any alleged waiver of the right to arbitration. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration by determining the threshold issue of whether CarMax waived its right to arbitration instead of referring that question to arbitration. Reedstrom, 197 So. 3d at 976 & n.2. Conclusion We reverse the circuit court's order denying CarMax's motion to compel arbitration, and we remand the case with instructions to the circuit court to enter an order granting the motion to compel arbitration. See Reedstrom, 197 So. at 977. On remand, the arbitrator shall decide the disputed issue of waiver, and the case shall proceed accordingly. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur. 8