CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc. v. Camirea Hughes and Eddie Hughes
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketCL-2026-0955
JudgeMoore, P.J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: November 20, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
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may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
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CL-2026-0955
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CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc.
v.
Camirea Hughes and Eddie Hughes
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-24-902659)
MOORE, Presiding Judge.
CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc. ("CarMax"), appeals from an order
entered by the Mobile Circuit Court ("the circuit court") denying its
motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against it by Camirea
CL-2026-0955
Hughes and Eddie Hughes ("the Hugheses"). We reverse the circuit
court's order and remand the case with instructions.
Background
On October 15, 2024, the Hugheses commenced, in the circuit court,
an action against CarMax and Express Oil Change. In the complaint,
the Hugheses asserted against CarMax a claim of breach of warranty
relating to a vehicle that they had purchased from CarMax. On
November 15, 2024, CarMax removed the action to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ("the federal court"),
alleging diversity jurisdiction. On June 12, 2025, the federal court
remanded the case back to the circuit court on the basis that the requisite
amount in controversy had not been established. On July 25, 2025, the
circuit court held a status conference, and, on October 24, 2025, the
circuit court conducted a status review.
On November 14, 2025, CarMax moved the circuit court to compel
arbitration. CarMax supported its motion with an affidavit; a bill of sale
signed by the parties, containing an arbitration provision; and excerpts
from the rules of the American Arbitration Association ("the AAA") and
of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services ("the JAMS"). The
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arbitration provision in the bill of sale provides, in pertinent part, that
the parties agree to arbitrate any claim arising out of the sale of the
vehicle purchased from CarMax by the Hugheses, including disputes
about the "validity, enforceability, arbitrability or scope of this
Arbitration Provision or this Contract." The arbitration provision further
states that arbitration shall comply with the applicable rules and
procedures of the organization administering the arbitration and
identifies the AAA and the JAMS as the organizations that may
administer arbitration. Finally, the arbitration provision states that the
rules of the selected organization shall apply to the arbitration
proceedings.
Rule 7(a) of the American Arbitration Association's Consumer
Rules ("the AAA Consumer Rules") empowers an arbitrator to decide
objections concerning the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration
agreement or the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. Rule 11(b)
of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services Consumer Rules ("the
JAMS Consumer Rules") requires jurisdictional and arbitrability
disputes, including disputes concerning the formation, existence,
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validity, interpretation, or scope of the agreement, to be submitted to and
decided by an arbitrator.
CarMax argued that the arbitration provision in the bill of sale
incorporated the AAA Consumer Rules and the JAMS Consumer Rules
that assigned questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. However, the
Hugheses opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that
CarMax had waived its right to arbitration by substantially invoking the
litigation process, see Companion Life Ins. Co. v. Whitesell Mfg., Inc., 670
So. 2d 897, 899 (Ala. 1995), and that the circuit court should decide the
waiver issue.1
On February 3, 2026, the circuit court entered an order denying
CarMax's motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court concluded that
CarMax had waived its right to arbitration by removing the action to the
federal court and litigating federal jurisdiction, by failing to answer or
timely assert its right to arbitration in the circuit court, and by delaying
the filing of its motion to compel arbitration in the circuit court until more
1The Hugheses did not dispute the existence of the arbitration
provision or that it was contained in an agreement regarding a
transaction affecting interstate commerce, see Hoover Gen. Contractors-
Homewood, Inc. v. Key, 201 So. 3d 550, 552 (Ala. 2016), so the general
validity of the arbitration provision is not at issue.
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than a year after the action had been commenced and more than five
months after the case was remanded from the federal court. On February
26, 2026, CarMax filed a timely notice of appeal to the Alabama Supreme
Court; that court transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Ala.
Code 1975, ยง 12-2-7(6).
Issues
CarMax argues that the circuit court erred in determining that
CarMax had waived its right to arbitrate the dispute. In making that
argument, CarMax contends, among other things, that, pursuant to the
arbitration provision, the question of waiver should have been decided by
an arbitrator. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with CarMax
on this "[g]ateway question[]," Regions Bank v. Rice, 209 So. 3d 1108,
1110-11 (Ala. 2016), so we do not address whether the circuit court
properly found that CarMax had waived its right to arbitration. See Key
v. Warren Averett, LLC, 372 So. 3d 1132, 1139-40 (Ala. 2022) (reversing
the denial of a motion to compel arbitration without deciding whether the
right to arbitration had been waived because the parties had agreed that
any questions regarding waiver of the right to arbitration would be
decided by an arbitrator).
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Standard of Review
We review de novo the circuit court's denial of CarMax's motion to
compel arbitration, including its determination whether the arbitration
agreement assigns questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. D.R.
Horton, Inc.-Birmingham v. Carlton, 419 So. 3d 1, 4-6 (Ala. 2024).
Analysis
The law in Alabama is clear that "a trial court considering a motion
to compel arbitration should resolve โฆ waiver โฆ issues unless the
subject arbitration provision clearly and unmistakably indicates that
those arguments should instead be submitted to the arbitrator." Federal
Ins. Co. v. Reedstrom, 197 So. 3d 971, 976 (Ala. 2015). In Reedstrom, the
Alabama Supreme Court held that, by incorporating Rule 7(a) of the AAA
Consumer Rules into the arbitration agreement at issue in that case, the
question whether the defendant had waived arbitration was delegated to
the arbitrator. Id. In D.R. Horton, supra, the arbitration agreement at
issue did not expressly delegate questions of arbitrability to an
arbitrator, but the Alabama Supreme Court held that, by incorporating
the AAA Consumer Rules providing that questions of arbitrability shall
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be decided in arbitration, the parties had effectively reserved all
questions of arbitrability for arbitration. D.R. Horton, 419 So. 3d at 6-7.
In this case, the arbitration provision generally states that any
disputes as to its enforceability shall be decided in arbitration. The
arbitration provision also incorporates the applicable AAA Consumer
Rules and the JAMS Consumer Rules, both of which provide that any
questions regarding arbitrability of a claim shall be decided by an
arbitrator. Thus, like in Reedstrom and D.R. Horton, the arbitration
provision clearly and unmistakably provides that the question whether
CarMax waived its right to arbitration, a question of arbitrability, shall
be decided in arbitration.
Another distinct part of the arbitration provision states that the
Hugheses waive their right to participate in any class action against
CarMax, and it clearly states that only a court, and not an arbitrator,
may determine the validity and effect of the class-action waiver. The
class-action-waiver clause only highlights that the arbitration provision
could have been written differently to clearly provide that all questions
of waiver should be decided only by a court; however, this clause relates
solely to the validity and effect of the class-action waiver. This class-
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action-waiver clause does not conflict with the other terms of the
arbitration provision, which clearly and unmistakably leaves it to the
arbitrator selected by the parties to decide the question of any alleged
waiver of the right to arbitration.
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in denying the
motion to compel arbitration by determining the threshold issue of
whether CarMax waived its right to arbitration instead of referring that
question to arbitration. Reedstrom, 197 So. 3d at 976 & n.2.
Conclusion
We reverse the circuit court's order denying CarMax's motion to
compel arbitration, and we remand the case with instructions to the
circuit court to enter an order granting the motion to compel arbitration.
See Reedstrom, 197 So. at 977. On remand, the arbitrator shall decide
the disputed issue of waiver, and the case shall proceed accordingly.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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