Norman Horton v. David Colvin

Rel: July 10, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________ CL-2025-0041 _________________________ Norman Horton v. David Colvin Appeal from Dale Circuit Court (CV-24-3) On Application for Rehearing EDWARDS, Judge. This court's opinion of February 27, 2026, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor. In February 2024, Norman Horton filed in the Dale Circuit Court ("the trial court") a complaint against David Colvin in which Horton CL-2025-0041 alleged that Colvin had defamed him by posting certain comments on various social-media accounts -- specifically stating: "When are you going to do something about the METH HOUSE that you sponsor!!!!" -- and by making comments at a political meeting indicating that Horton was associated with a prostitution ring.1 In the complaint, Horton further alleged that Colvin's defamatory comments had resulted in "election interference" in a state senate race in which Horton had been a candidate. Horton also alleged that Colvin had interfered with his business relationships and had harassed certain persons by discharging a firearm during their visit to tour Horton's business premises for the purpose of considering whether to lease the premises, which adjoins property owned by Colvin.2 Finally, Horton averred that Colvin had 1Horton properly categorized the statements made in comments on various social-media accounts as libel and the statements made at the political meeting as slander. Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corp., 768 So. 2d 386, 390 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (explaining that "[t]here are two types of defamation: libel, which involves the use of print media to publish the defamatory comment, and slander, which involves the oral expression of a defamatory comment"). 2We note that the act alleged to have been committed by Colvin -- discharging a firearm -- was not directed at Horton; in fact, based on the complaint and the affidavits appended to the complaint, Horton was not present at the time of the alleged act. 2 CL-2025-0041 converted to his own use a driveway that Horton had allegedly been using pursuant to an agreement Horton had with another property owner, Buddy Skelton. In March 2024, Colvin filed a handwritten answer generally denying the allegations of the complaint; once he secured counsel, Colvin amended his answer. In his amended answer, Colvin admitted to having made the social-media comments. He also asserted the affirmative defenses of truth, "substantial truth," "fair comment," and consent. Colvin further asserted a "qualified privilege" and alleged that Horton was a public figure and, therefore, that Horton must prove that the statements were made with "actual malice."3 Horton filed a motion in which he sought to add his wife, Roslyn, as a plaintiff, but, after Colvin objected, the trial court denied that motion. 3Technically, a public figure must establish "constitutional malice," not "actual malice." See Wiggins v. Mallard, 905 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 2004) (discussing the two types of malice and stating that the evidence required to prove them often overlaps). To prove "constitutional malice," a plaintiff must establish that the defendant made his or her statement " 'with actual knowledge of its falsity or ... with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.' " Wiggins, 905 So. 2d at 786 (quoting Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Ala. 1979), disapproved of on other grounds by Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1092 (Ala. 1988)). 3 CL-2025-0041 Horton also moved to compel Colvin to answer certain of his discovery requests. Although Colvin responded and Horton replied to that response, the trial court did not rule on Horton's motion. On July 17, 2024, well after he had filed his answer to the complaint, Colvin filed a document that he titled "Motion to Dismiss." In that motion, regarding the defamation claims, Colvin argued that Horton was a "limited public figure" and therefore that he was required to prove actual malice; that the "meth house" statement was "hyperbolic and constitute[d] an opinion"; that the allegedly slanderous statement regarding the "prostitution ring" did not actually accuse Horton of any connection to such activity; and that Horton had not provided evidence that Colvin's allegedly defamatory statements had impacted the election. Regarding Horton's other claims, the motion to dismiss argued that Horton could not maintain an action against Colvin arising out of the erection of a barrier across the driveway because, he said, Skelton, the owner of the property over which the driveway runs, had erected the barrier. Colvin disavowed knowledge of any incident involving discharging a firearm and also contended that Horton lacked standing to 4 CL-2025-0041 bring the "harassment with display of deadly force" claim.4 Colvin appended several documentary exhibits to his motion. The trial court set the motion to dismiss for a hearing to be held on August 12, 2024, but, on Horton's motion, the trial court continued that hearing to October 15, 2024. After the hearing, the trial court entered an order on November 8, 2024, dismissing Horton's complaint without stating its reasoning. On December 9, 2024, Horton filed a timely postjudgment motion and a separate motion seeking leave to amend his complaint. The trial court 4In his motion to dismiss, Colvin referred to a lack of standing; however, his argument appears to be that, because other persons and not Horton had endured the alleged harassment, Horton cannot maintain an action arising from any such harassment, which is, instead, an argument that Horton is not the real party in interest. State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Dennis v. Magic City Dodge, Inc., 524 So. 2d 616, 618 (Ala. 1988), quoting in turn 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1542 (1971)) (" ' "[T]he real party in interest principle is a means to identify the person who possesses the right sought to be enforced. Therefore, the term directs attention to whether [the] plaintiff has a significant interest in the particular action he has instituted." ' "). Rule 17(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest." 5 CL-2025-0041 denied those motions by separate orders entered on December 10, 2024. Horton filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Horton argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint. He argues that, because Colvin attached documentary evidence to his motion to dismiss, the motion was converted to a motion for a summary judgment and that the trial court committed error by failing to grant him leave to amend his complaint, by dismissing the complaint without prejudice after the applicable statute-of-limitations periods had run, by failing to compel discovery as requested, and by granting the motion to dismiss while discovery was still pending. He further contends that the facts that he alleged regarding his defamation claims were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. He also argues that he adequately stated claims of "election interference," tortious interference with his business relationships, harassment, and conversion. Finally, he contends that the trial court was required to afford him "nonprejudicial treatment" as a pro se litigant, that he was denied due process because of "procedural 6 CL-2025-0041 irregularities," and that the trial court was required to enter a "reasoned order" on the dispositive motion to dismiss.5 Before considering the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of Horton's claims, we will first consider Horton's procedural arguments in support of reversal. Initially, we must reject Horton's contention that the trial court was required to afford him "nonprejudicial treatment" and construe his pro se pleadings under "less stringent standards" than pleadings drafted by counsel. Horton relies on federal caselaw, like Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), to support his argument. Although federal authorities require the federal courts to take a more 5In his brief on appeal, Horton also raises an argument relating to the assessment of attorney fees against a pro se party; however, the record does not contain any order of the trial court directing Horton to pay any or all of Colvin's attorney fees. See Rule 28(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P. (stating, in pertinent part, that, "[i]n civil cases, a statement of the case [in a parties' brief on appeal] should also identify the adverse ruling or rulings from which the appeal is taken and asserted as error on appeal .…"). We therefore decline to consider Horton's attorney-fee argument. See Ramer v. Ramer, 289 So. 3d 819, 823 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) (quoting Lewis v. Providence Hosp., 483 So. 2d 398, 398 (Ala. 1986)) (" 'Only adverse rulings by the trial court are reviewable on appeal.' "). 7 CL-2025-0041 lenient approach to the evaluation of pro se pleadings, Alabama law treats pro se parties no differently than those represented by counsel.6 "While we are not unsympathetic to pro se litigants …, a pro se litigant must nonetheless comply with legal procedure and court rules. Jones v. Seibert, 624 So. 2d 639 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). '[T]he operation of the courts of this state is governed by rules which are no more forgiving to a pro se litigant than to one represented by counsel.' Black v. Allen, 587 So. 2d 349, 349 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). See also Lockett v. A.L. Sandlin Lumber Co., 588 So. 2d 889 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)." Overy v. Murphy, 827 So. 2d 804, 806 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); see also Bowman v. Pat's Auto Parts, 504 So. 2d 736, 737 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) ("The rules of procedure which govern the operation of the trial courts thereby leading to the orderly transaction of its business are no more 6In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court held that "a pro se complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' " 429 U.S. at 106 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). In addition, the Estelle Court stated that pro se complaints "can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears ' "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." ' " Id. (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 521, quoting in turn Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). As discussed infra, Alabama courts use the "no set of facts" standard when evaluating any Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss. See Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) (stating that "a Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief"). 8 CL-2025-0041 forgiving to a pro se litigant than to one represented by counsel."). We find no error in the trial court's alleged failure to have treated Horton more leniently based on his status as a pro se plaintiff. Similarly, we reject Horton's contention that the trial court was required to enter a detailed or "reasoned" dismissal order. Although findings of facts and conclusions of law are required to be included in certain judgments or orders in limited instances under particular statutes, see, e.g., Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-88 (requiring that a judgment in a workers' compensation case contain findings of facts and conclusions of law), a trial court is not required to state its reasoning for entering a dispositive order or judgment in every action. In fact, Rule 52(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., specifically states that "[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule[] 12[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]." See Ex parte Williamson, 329 So. 3d 664, 672 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (explaining that Rule 52(a) indicates that a trial court need not state its reasoning in an order dismissing a party's claims). Horton's argument that Colvin's motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for a summary judgment is also unavailing. Although Colvin appended materials outside the pleadings to his July 2024 motion, 9 CL-2025-0041 under current supreme-court precedent, this court is not permitted to presume that the trial court considered the materials that were appended to Colvin's July 2024 motion in deciding whether to dismiss the complaint. See Ex parte Price, 244 So. 3d 949, 955 (Ala. 2017) (holding that, unless the trial court indicates that it considered materials submitted outside the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, an appellate court must presume that the trial court did not consider those materials and that the motion was therefore not converted to a Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion for a summary judgment); Ray v. Ray, 413 So. 3d 733, 736 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (explaining that, "for a motion to dismiss to be converted to a motion for a summary judgment[,] the record must affirmatively reflect that the trial court, when making its decision to grant a motion to dismiss, considered matters outside the pleadings"); but see Newman's Med. Servs., Inc. v. Mobile Cnty., 370 So. 3d 228, 231 (Ala. 2022) (treating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as having been converted to a Rule 56 motion for a summary judgment when "[n]othing in the record … indicate[d] that the trial court specifically excluded any [submitted] evidence from its consideration"). The record does not definitively establish that the trial court considered the 10 CL-2025-0041 materials appended to Colvin's motion to dismiss, and we therefore cannot consider the motion to dismiss to have been converted to a motion for a summary judgment. Although Horton argues that "the [t]rial court [e]rred by allowing a [Rule] 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion after discovery had commenced and before it's [sic] completion," Horton's brief, p. 44, he cites no authority indicating that a trial court may not consider a motion to dismiss while discovery is pending. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. (requiring that an appellant support his or her arguments with appropriate legal authorities); White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008) ("Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] requires that arguments in briefs contain discussions of facts and relevant legal authorities that support the party's position."). Neither of the two Alabama authorities Horton provides for the stated proposition -- Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So. 2d 932, 938 (Ala. 1997), and Ex parte Harrington, 450 So. 2d 99, 100 (Ala. 1984) -- address any issue regarding pending discovery. To the extent that he relies on Reeves v. Porter, 521 So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala. 1988), and Hope v. Brannan, 557 So. 2d 1208, 1212 (Ala. 1989), which both address the issue whether a summary-judgment 11 CL-2025-0041 motion may be granted when discovery remains pending, his reliance is misplaced because, as we have explained, Colvin's motion to dismiss was not converted to a motion for a summary judgment. Thus, Horton has failed to present a legally supported argument on this issue, and we decline to further consider this basis for his challenge to the trial court's November 8, 2024, dismissal order. See Walden v. Hutchinson, 987 So. 2d 1109, 1120 (Ala. 2007) (indicating that a legally unsupported argument results in a failure of the appellant to effectively challenge a judgment based on that argument). Likewise, Horton's arguments that the trial court erred by failing to compel discovery and by dismissing his action without prejudice after the applicable statute-of-limitations periods on his claims had run are unconvincing. Certainly, Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P., "contemplates a broad right of discovery," Ex parte AMI West Alabama Gen. Hosp., 582 So. 2d 484, 485 (Ala. 1991), but Horton has not presented a legally supported argument that the trial court's decision to withhold a ruling on Horton's motion to compel discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss was error. He has also failed to provide authority to support his contention that a trial court may not dismiss an action if the applicable 12 CL-2025-0041 statute-of-limitations periods have run on the claims asserted in that action.7 His failure to present arguments supported by legal authority permits us to reject those arguments. See Walden, 987 So. 2d at 1120. We also reject Horton's argument that the trial court erred in failing to permit him to amend his complaint. Horton relies on Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the principle expressed therein that amendments "shall be freely allowed when justice so requires." Horton does not, however, cite any authority requiring that a trial court allow an amendment after the dismissal of an action or explain how Rule 15(a) requires reversal of the trial court's judgment under the circumstances present in this case. Our court has long cautioned that an appellant should "present his [or her] issues 'with clarity and without ambiguity' " and "fully express his [or her] position on the enumerated issues" in the argument section of his or her brief. Bishop v. Robinson, 516 So. 2d 723, 724 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (quoting Thoman Eng'g, Inc. v. McDonald, 57 7The citation that Horton includes in his brief -- Jones v. City of Decatur, 53 So. 3d 885 (Ala. 2010) -- is an incorrect citation for that case, which is reported at 53 Ala. App. 470, 301 So. 2d 235 (Crim. App. 1974); in any event, Jones, which addresses an appeal from a criminal conviction for driving while intoxicated, is not authority for any proposition relating to dismissals without prejudice or the expiration of statute-of-limitations periods. 13 CL-2025-0041 Ala. App. 287, 290, 328 So. 2d 293, 294 (Civ. App. 1976)); accord United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones."). We have similarly admonished that "mere citation to general propositions without developed arguments applying applicable legal principles to the facts of the case on appeal does not satisfy an appellant's duty under Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P." D.I. v. I.G., 262 So. 3d 651, 660 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). Horton failed to present in his brief on original submission a well-developed argument for reversal; accordingly, we need not consider his argument.8 Finally, we reject Horton's arguments that he was deprived of due process by not being notified of witness subpoenas and by "procedural irregularities" allegedly committed by the trial court. Horton's allegations of procedural irregularities include allegations that the trial 8In his application for a rehearing, Horton presents for the first time legal authority regarding postdismissal amendments. That argument comes too late. See Riscorp, Inc. v. Norman, 915 So. 2d 1142, 1155 (Ala. 2005) (indicating that the presentation of an argument with additional authority for the first time on rehearing was not a sufficient basis to grant a rehearing). 14 CL-2025-0041 court applied the incorrect standard to evaluate his complaint, that the trial court improperly considered matters outside the pleadings, and that the trial court failed to compel discovery. He also complains that the trial court denied his postjudgment motion too quickly. We have already addressed Horton's complaints regarding the motion to compel discovery and the trial court's alleged consideration of extraneous materials. Our discussion of the merits of the dismissal of Horton's complaint, infra, will adequately address any concerns about the appropriate standard for reviewing his complaint. The trial court's swift ruling on Horton's postjudgment motion is, as far as we know, not a basis for finding error. To the extent that Horton further complains that these "procedural irregularities," coupled with the fact that Colvin's wife works at the courthouse, creates an "appearance of impropriety," Horton admits that he did not request that the trial-court judge recuse himself. Thus, we need not further consider Horton's argument relating to any appearance of impropriety. See Ross v. Luton, 456 So. 2d 249, 255 (Ala. 1984) (indicating that "disqualification of a trial judge for interest or prejudice may be waived" if not asserted before entry of a particular order or judgment). 15 CL-2025-0041 Before we begin our review of Horton's arguments that his complaint adequately stated claims of defamation, "election interference," tortious interference with his business relationships, harassment, and conversion, we must first determine the proper standard of review of the November 8, 2024, order. Our supreme court has explained that a "[Rule] 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion should not be used to test the sufficiency of a complaint after a responsive pleading has been filed"; this is so because "Rule 12(b) provides that a motion asserting the defense of failure to state a claim 'shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.' " Sims v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 298, 301 (Ala. 1979). Thus, Colvin's July 2024 motion was not a timely filed Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Instead, as our supreme court has explained, "a defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, although typically raised pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), can be raised after an answer has been filed by moving for a judgment on the pleadings," pursuant to Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 562 (Ala. 2005). Our supreme court has further observed that, " 'often times, after a responsive pleading has been filed, a defendant will move to dismiss for failure to state a claim 16 CL-2025-0041 under Rule 12(c), even though there may be no need to refer to the responsive pleading, such that it would have been proper to move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In such an instance, it is proper to treat the motion in the manner as one brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See [5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368] at 515 [(2d ed. 1990)]. Moreover, where the pleadings are closed but a defendant mistakenly moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), instead of Rule 12(c), the Sixth Circuit has held that "where the substance of the motion is plain," it is proper to treat a motion styled as one under Rule 12(b)(6) as if it were brought under Rule 12(c). See Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 188 (6th Cir. 1985).' " Pontius, 915 So.2d at 562 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (S.D. Ohio 2003)). Thus, the July 2024 motion filed by Colvin, in which he sought a dismissal of Horton's complaint based on its alleged failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, was untimely. However, the trial court could properly have considered that motion in one of two ways. The trial court could have considered the July 2024 motion as a Rule 12(c) motion seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and could have therefore applied the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in evaluating that motion. See Hall v. Environmental Litig. Grp., P.C., 248 So. 3d 949, 957 (Ala. 2017) (treating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed after the close of the pleadings as a 17 CL-2025-0041 12(c) motion seeking relief based on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief and reviewing the motion under the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). The trial court could also have treated Colvin's motion as a Rule 12(c) motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law based on the facts contained in the pleadings, i.e., Horton's complaint and Colvin's answer. See Ex parte Mutual Sav. Life Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 649, 650 (Ala. 1998) (explaining that an appellate "[c]ourt looks to the essence of a motion, not just to its title, to determine how the motion should be treated under our Rules of Civil Procedure"). In his brief, Horton argues that he properly pleaded his libel claim (see note 1, supra) by providing the following statement allegedly posted by Colvin on various social-media pages: "When are you going to do something about the METH HOUSE that you sponsor!!!!," by alleging that the statement was false, and by alleging harm to his reputation. He further asserted that Colvin's statement was either made with knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless disregard as to its truthfulness. Horton further explains that he alleged that Colvin had taken certain actions that could support a determination that he was acting out of personal ill will or malice when he made the alleged "meth house" 18 CL-2025-0041 statement. Moreover, Horton contends that the alleged "meth house" statement imputed criminal conduct that would render the statement libel per se, which would not require Horton to establish special damages. Upon review of Horton's argument, we conclude that, whether we analyze the trial court's order by applying the standard of review applicable to an order granting a motion under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c), the trial court could not have properly determined that Horton's complaint, insofar as it is premised on his allegations of libel arising from the alleged "meth house" statement, should be dismissed. " 'To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must show [1] that the defendant was at least negligent, [2] in publishing [3] a false and defamatory statement to another [4] concerning the plaintiff, [5] which is either actionable without having to prove special harm (actionable per se) or actionable upon allegations and proof of special harm (actionable per quod).' " Delta Health Grp., Inc. v. Stafford, 887 So. 2d 887, 895 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1091 (Ala. 1988)). "Spoken words that impute to the person of whom they are spoken the commission of an indictable criminal offense involving infamy or moral turpitude constitute slander actionable per se." Nelson, 534 So. 2d at 1091. Moreover, 19 CL-2025-0041 "[t]he effect and tendency of the language used, not its form, is the criterion determining its actionable quality. It is not necessary to render words defamatory and actionable that they make defamatory charges in direct terms; they are equally actionable if the charge is made indirectly or by necessary inference, and it matters not how artful or disguised their meaning is concealed, if they are in fact defamatory. In determining their actionable character, they are to be taken in their natural meaning, and according to the sense in which they appear to have been used, and the idea they are adapted to convey to those who heard them. A forced construction is not to be put upon them in order to relieve the defendant from liability." Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 18-19, 114 So. 357, 359 (1927). If the July 2024 motion is evaluated as a Rule 12(c) motion requesting that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), this court must evaluate it under the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and may not consider anything but the allegations of the complaint. " ' "On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [him] to relief. In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [he] may possibly prevail. We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." ' " 20 CL-2025-0041 Flickinger v. King, 385 So. 3d 504, 511 (Ala. 2023) (quoting Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So. 2d 784, 791 (Ala. 2007), quoting in turn Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993)). Horton alleged that the "meth house" statement was published by Colvin on several posts on Horton's own social-media page related to his campaign for state senate and on various pages associated with other groups, including a dog-hunting association and multiple "buy, sell, and trade" groups. Horton alleged that the statement was false, that it had made him the subject of "disgrace, ridicule, odium, and/or contempt," and that it had negatively impacted the election for state senate. Moreover, although Horton contended in his complaint that he was not required to establish malice, he alleged that Colvin had knowledge of the falsity of his statement or had acted with a reckless disregard as to its truthfulness. See note 3, supra. He also alleged facts indicating that Colvin held a possible personal animus toward him, including that Colvin was not a constituent of the district in which Horton conducted his campaign, that Colvin had taken steps to interfere with Horton's access to his business property, which is located on property adjoining property owned by Colvin, and that Colvin knew or could possibly have 21 CL-2025-0041 ascertained the fact that Horton did not "sponsor a meth house"; those allegations, if proven, could be sufficient to establish malice or negligence on the part of Colvin.9 Finally, Horton contended that the statement accused him of a crime and, that, therefore, the "meth house" statement was defamatory per se.10 The allegations contained in the complaint 9We note that "the determination of malice in defamation cases is particularly in the province of the jury." Cousins v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 514 So. 2d 904, 906 (Ala. 1987). Furthermore, regarding the requirement that the defendant be negligent if the plaintiff is a private person, we note that, "[i]n determining whether the defendant acted as a reasonable, prudent person under the circumstances in publishing the defamatory communication the finder of fact may take into account the thoroughness of the check that a reasonable person would make before publishing the statement, the nature of the interests that the defendant was seeking to promote in publishing the statement, and the extent of damage to which the statement exposed the plaintiff's reputation." Mead Corp. v. Hicks, 448 So. 2d 308, 312 (Ala. 1983). 10The word "sponsor" connotes "one who assumes responsibility for some other person or thing" or "a person … that pays for or plans and carries out a project or activity." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1206 (11th ed. 2020). Thus, the statement could be read to indicate that Horton bears some responsibility for, or is involved in some way in, the activities of a "meth house" and therefore in the production of methamphetamine. The production of methamphetamine is illegal. See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 13A-12-217 and 13A-12-218. 22 CL-2025-0041 regarding the statement associating Horton with a "meth house" are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss reviewed under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. That is, his complaint alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle Horton to relief. If, instead, the motion is considered to be a Rule 12(c) motion for a judgment on the pleadings, which would require this court to consider both the complaint and the answer in our analysis, Horton's libel claim based on the "meth house" statement still survives. "When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is made by a party, 'the trial court reviews the pleadings filed in the case and, if the pleadings show that no genuine issue of material fact is presented, the trial court will enter a judgment for the party entitled to a judgment according to the law.' B.K.W. Enters., Inc. v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So. 2d 989, 991 (Ala. 1992). See also Deaton, Inc. v. Monroe, 762 So. 2d 840 (Ala. 2000). A judgment on the pleadings is subject to a de novo review. Harden v. Ritter, 710 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). A court reviewing a judgment on the pleadings accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 1255- 56. … [I]n deciding a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the trial court is bound by the pleadings. See Stockman v. Echlin, Inc., 604 So. 2d 393, 394 (Ala. 1992)." Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81, 82-83 (Ala. 2000). " 'A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings disposes of a case when the material facts are not in dispute.' " Harden v. Ritter, 710 23 CL-2025-0041 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (quoting McCullough v. Alabama By-Prods. Corp., 343 So. 2d 508, 510 (Ala. 1977)). Colvin admitted in his answer that he had made the "meth house" statement in social-media posts. However, Colvin asserted in his answer the defenses of truth, substantial truth, "fair comment/opinion," and consent. He also contended that Horton was a public figure and was therefore required to show malice to succeed on his defamation claims. Finally, Colvin asserted in his answer that Horton had "not shown that [Colvin] published the question or statement … with negligence" and that Colvin had not "caused or contributed to the alleged injury that [Horton] may have sustained." In Colvin's answer, he included factual averments that Horton owned a rental house in Colvin's community and that the tenants of that house "were known to local law enforcement for their illegal activities and drug use or sale" and that Horton had "ignored or failed to respond to [Colvin] and others in the community about their concerns [regarding] the rental house." Colvin also asserted that, because Horton had indicated to Colvin that "it was of no concern to [Colvin] what was happening at the rental home," he had used the statements he published 24 CL-2025-0041 on the social-media pages to address the issue of public concern created by the tenants of the rental house. Thus, Colvin contended that the "meth house" statement was true, substantially true, or a matter of public concern giving rise to a right of "fair comment." A review of the complaint and the answer does not convince this court that no issue of material fact exists. Horton alleges that the "meth house" statement is false, and Colvin asserts that it is true or "substantially true." Even if the trial court concluded that Horton was a public figure and was required to prove constitutional malice, facts alleged in the complaint indicate that Colvin knew that the statement that Horton "sponsored" a "meth house" was not true or that he had made the statement recklessly, despite having the ability to ascertain its truth or falsity. Thus, the complaint, insofar as it alleged libel based on the "meth house" statement, was not subject to being resolved on a motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Having determined that the complaint's allegations regarding the libel claim stemming from the alleged "meth house" statement state a claim and that issues of material fact exist regarding that claim, we cannot affirm the trial court's 25 CL-2025-0041 November 8, 2024, order dismissing Horton's libel claim, and we therefore reverse the order insofar as it dismisses that claim. We reach a similar result regarding Horton's other defamation allegation -- that Colvin slandered Horton when Colvin "publicly linked [Horton] to a 'prostitution ring' " at a political meeting. Horton did not provide in his complaint the specific statement that Colvin allegedly made linking Horton to a "prostitution ring."11 However, Horton alleged in his complaint that the "prostitution ring" statement had been made with the intent to "slander him … and [to] link [him] to illegal activities." Horton alleged that the "prostitution ring" statement was false, that it had resulted in the loss of respect of unnamed political leaders, that it had cost him a political endorsement, and that it had likely negatively 11Although the alleged "prostitution ring" statement was produced in discovery and presented as an exhibit to the July 2024 motion, this court is precluded from considering that exhibit in reviewing the November 8, 2024, order granting that motion under either the Rule 12(b)(6) standard or the Rule 12(c) standard. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 2000) (stating that, because the record was silent regarding whether a trial court had considered an affidavit submitted with a motion on the pleadings, the appellate court would not consider the affidavit and