In re: Melanie Beth Brown v. Colin Newmeyer
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Date FiledJuly 24, 2026
DocketCL-2026-0549
JudgeEdwards, J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: July 24, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
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CL-2026-0549
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Ex parte Colin Newmeyer
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Melanie Beth Brown
v.
Colin Newmeyer)
(Perry Circuit Court: DR-26-900005)
EDWARDS, Judge.
Colin Newmeyer ("the father") has filed a petition for the writ of
mandamus seeking an order from this court directing the Perry Circuit
Court to vacate its order denying his motion to "expeditiously" hold a
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hearing on his motion to transfer the underlying paternity and custody
action from the Perry Circuit Court to the Elmore Circuit Court, to hold
a hearing on his motion to transfer, and to rule on his motion to transfer.
Upon consideration of the petition and the answer to that petition filed
by Melanie Beth Brown ("the mother"), we conclude that the father is
entitled to the relief he seeks. We therefore grant the petition and issue
the writ.
On April 16, 2026, the mother filed a petition in the Perry Circuit
Court seeking to establish the father as the legal father of L.A.N. ("the
child").1 The mother also requested that she be awarded sole legal and
sole physical custody of the child, subject to an award of visitation to the
father, and that the father be ordered to pay child support for the child.
On May 8, 2026, the father filed a motion to transfer the action from the
Perry Circuit Court to the Elmore Circuit Court. He asserted that he had
been a resident of Elmore County since 2013, that the child was a lifelong
resident of Elmore County, that the child had always attended school in
Elmore County, that the mother had been a resident of Elmore County
1The child was nine years old when the mother filed her petition.
The mother and the father were never married.
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until shortly before she filed her petition in the Perry Circuit Court, and
that he believed that the mother retained a residence in Elmore County.
The father supported his motion with an affidavit that further stated that
the parties had "exercised 50/50 custodial time [with the child] since he
was 2 years of age" and that the child's extracurricular activities, school,
pediatrician, dentist, and counselor were located in and around Elmore
County.
On May 15, 2026, the Perry Circuit Court set the father's motion
for a hearing to be held on June 4, 2026. On May 26, 2026, the mother
filed a verified response to the father's motion in which she asserted that
she was a resident of Perry County and that, "[a]s the sole legal and
custodial parent of [the child,] the child's residence is the same as [the]
mother's residence." Also on May 26, 2026, the Perry Circuit Court
entered an order noting the mother's response and rescheduling the
hearing on the father's motion from June 4, 2026, to September 28, 2026.
On May 27, 2026, the father filed a motion requesting that the
Perry Circuit Court either enter an order reinstating the hearing on June
4, 2026, or, in the alternative, conduct a hearing on his motion to transfer
the action "on the first available setting before the [Perry Circuit C]ourt."
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The father simultaneously filed an amended motion to transfer the action
in which he fully incorporated his May 8, 2026, motion and attached
additional documents purporting to demonstrate that the child had
attended school and had participated in extracurricular activities solely
in Elmore County and had consistently attended medical appointments
in and around Elmore County. The father's amended motion also
included affidavits from the father's father, Brian Newmeyer; the father's
mother, Kristi Newmeyer; the father's mother-in-law, Melanie Boulware;
and the father's father-in-law, William Boulware, attesting that the child
was a lifelong resident of Elmore County and that the child has strong
familial ties to Elmore County.2 On May 28, 2026, the Perry Circuit
Court denied the father's May 27, 2026, motion to reinstate the June 4,
2026, hearing date and noted that the matter remained set for a hearing
on September 28, 2026. The Perry Circuit Court's order further provided
that the "[p]arties are encouraged to work toward[] a resolution during
this time." The order did not address the father's amended motion to
transfer the action.
2Although the father has not indicated that he is married, the
Boulwares' affidavits indicate that the father is their son-in-law.
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On June 4, 2026, the father renewed his motion, requesting that
the Perry Circuit Court conduct a hearing on his motion to transfer before
September 28, 2026. The father specifically noted that the child had
attended Holtville Elementary School in Elmore County his entire
academic career and that the September 28, 2026, hearing date would
occur after the 2026-2027 academic year had commenced. The father,
relying on Ex parte Windom, 776 So. 2d 799 (Ala. 2000), and Ex parte
Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Co., 276 So. 3d 674 (Ala. 2018),
argued that trial courts generally should rule on motions alleging
improper venue as expeditiously as possible. The father concluded his
renewed motion by requesting that the Perry Circuit Court conduct a
hearing on his motion to transfer and enter a ruling on that motion before
July 31, 2026, to prevent undue disruption to the child's life and so that
the "matter may be taken up in the proper venue." The Perry Circuit
Court did not rule on the father's June 4, 2026, motion. On June 23,
2026, the father filed the present petition for the writ of mandamus with
this court.
" ' "The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy; it will not be issued unless the petitioner
shows ' " '(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
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respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal
to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court.' " ' Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So.
2d 153, 156 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte Gates,
675 So. 2d 371, 374 (Ala.1996)); Ex parte Pfizer,
Inc., 746 So. 2d 960, 962 (Ala. 1999)." '
"Ex parte Vest, 68 So. 3d 881, 884 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)
(quoting Ex parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 931 So. 2d 1,
5-6 (Ala. 2005))."
Ex parte M.A.G., 160 So. 3d 22, 24 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).
The father seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the Perry Circuit
Court to promptly hold a hearing on his motion to transfer. A writ of
mandamus is an appropriate method by which to seek review of a trial
court's failure to rule on a motion to transfer in a timely manner. Ex
parte International Paper Co., 263 So. 3d 1035, 1040 (Ala. 2018). We
note that "[v]enue is a threshold matter, and, 'as a general rule, a trial
court should rule on a motion alleging improper venue as expeditiously
as possible.' " Ex parte Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 276 So. 3d at
678 (quoting Ex parte Windom, 776 So. 2d at 803). By resetting the June
4, 2026, hearing for September 28, 2026, the Perry Circuit Court
effectively deferred its decision on the father's motion to transfer to a date
nearly five months after the father made the motion. The Perry Circuit
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Court also directed the parties to attempt to work toward a resolution of
the action pending consideration of the motion to transfer the underlying
action. However, despite the mother's assertion to the contrary, parties
should not be expected to participate in pretrial motions, discovery, or
pretrial negotiations or mediation before the issue of proper venue is
resolved. See id.; see also Ex parte International Paper Co., 263 So. 3d
at 1040 (concluding that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to
fail to rule on a motion to dismiss a third-party complaint for improper
venue while directing the parties to proceed with discovery, setting
deadlines for summary-judgment motions, and setting a trial date).
We also note that Alabama law favors an expeditious resolution of
cases involving the custody of children. See generally Ex parte T.C., 96
So. 3d 123, 129 (Ala. 2012) ("[I]n resolving issues involving juveniles,
time is of the essence."); see also Weldon v. Ballow, 200 So. 3d 654, 659
(Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (providing that issues of "child custody … should be
decided as expeditiously as possible"). The Perry Circuit Court's delay in
holding a hearing on the father's motion to transfer the action and issuing
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a ruling on that motion is not consistent with an expeditious resolution
of the issue of the child's paternity and custody.3
Accordingly, we issue the writ and direct the Perry Circuit Court
to, within seven days of the date of this opinion, either hold a hearing and
rule on the father's motion to transfer the underlying action or rule on
the father's motion without holding a hearing. In doing so, we express
no opinion on the merits of the father's motion to transfer.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
3We note that the father has alleged that the mother has attempted
to withdraw the child from school in Elmore County and to enroll the
child in school in Perry County. The mother correctly notes in her answer
to the father's petition for the writ of mandamus that she is within her
rights to enroll the child in school in Perry County because she is the
child's sole legal parent. However, in this particular case, the child is due
to begin school before the Perry Circuit Court will consider the father's
motion to transfer the action, and any determination on pendente lite
issues concerning the child's custody should be made by the proper court.
Thus, delaying that decision until after the school year commences could
needlessly disrupt the child's education.
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