Matthew Conrad Gosney v. Laura Lavender Gosney
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketCL-2026-0153
JudgeBowden, J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: November 20, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
_________________________
CL-2026-0153
_________________________
Matthew Conrad Gosney
v.
Laura Lavender Gosney
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(DR-21-901369.03)
BOWDEN, Judge.
Matthew Conrad Gosney ("the father") appeals from two judgments
of the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court"). The first judgment was
entered on November 20, 2025 ("the November 20, 2025, judgment"). The
November 20, 2025, judgment modified the visitation provisions of a
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previous child-custody judgment that had been entered in January 2024
("the previous child-custody judgment") regarding O.T.G. ("the child"),
who is the parties' child. The November 20, 2025, judgment also found
the father in civil and criminal contempt and required the father to purge
his contempt by paying the attorney's fees of Laura Lavender Gosney
("the mother").
The father raises three arguments regarding the November 20,
2025, judgment. He argues (1) that the circuit court exceeded its
discretion by modifying the visitation provisions of the previous child-
custody judgment, (2) that the evidence did not support the circuit court's
finding that he was in civil and criminal contempt, and (3) that the circuit
court exceeded its discretion by requiring him to pay the mother's
attorney's fees to purge his contempt.
The father's first two arguments are not persuasive. With respect
to the father's first argument, the father has not persuaded us that the
circuit court exceeded its discretion by modifying the visitation provisions
of the previous child-custody judgment because, based on the evidence,
the circuit court reasonably could have found that modifying visitation
was in the child's best interest. We further hold -- contrary to the father's
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second argument -- that there was sufficient evidence to support the
circuit court's findings of civil and criminal contempt. The father's third
argument is not sufficiently developed and is therefore unpersuasive on
its own; however, we can examine the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction
ex mero motu, and we conclude that the circuit court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to require the father to pay the mother's attorney's
fees to purge his contempt.
Accordingly, we affirm the November 20, 2025, judgment as it
pertains to the issues of child-custody modification and the findings of
civil and criminal contempt, vacate the November 20, 2025, judgment as
it pertains to the contempt sanctions imposed on the father, and remand
the cause for the circuit court to impose contempt sanctions in accordance
with this opinion.
The father also appeals from a judgment entered on January 23,
2026, that required him to pay a portion of the fees for the child's
guardian ad litem. That aspect of the father's appeal is properly before
us. See Roberts v. Roberts, 189 So. 3d 79, 81 (Ala. Civ. App.
2015)(treating mandamus petition challenging attorney-fee award for
guardian ad litem as an appeal because attorney-fee matters are separate
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and distinct from matters going to the merits of a dispute (citing Niezer
v. SouthTrust Bank, 887 So. 2d 919, 923 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004))); see also
Deaton v. Deaton, 416 So. 3d 1106, 1109 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(plurality
opinion)("[A]n award of guardian ad litem fees is itself a final judgment
โฆ."). The father contends that the circuit court did not ascertain the
reasonableness of the guardian ad litem's fees before it entered the
January 23, 2026, judgment and that he was denied due process because,
he says, the guardian ad litem submitted an affidavit pertaining to her
fees two months after the circuit court entered the November 20, 2025,
judgment. However, the father waived these issues because he did not
raise them in the circuit court. Therefore, we affirm the January 23, 2026,
judgment requiring the father to pay a portion of the guardian ad litem's
fees.
Facts and Procedural History
The parties entered into a settlement agreement ("the original
settlement agreement") that the circuit court incorporated into a "final
decree of divorce." Among other things, the original settlement
agreement provided that the parties would share joint legal custody of
the child, that the mother would be the child's "primary physical
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custodian," and that the father would pay $645.80 to the mother on the
first day of each month as child support. Under the terms of the original
settlement agreement, the father was entitled to "all reasonable rights of
physical custody with the minor child as agreed upon by the parties," and
each parent was entitled to telephone visitation with the child when the
child was in the custody of the other parent. The parties were to equally
split the child's medical expenses and to provide the other party with
evidence of any of the child's medical expenses within 60 days of receiving
a bill. Each party was also required to obtain a life-insurance policy for
the benefit of the child and to provide proof of that policy to the other
party each year.
In January 2024, the parties entered into a settlement agreement
("the January 2024 settlement agreement") to modify the original
settlement agreement. The circuit court incorporated the January 2024
settlement agreement into the previous child-custody judgment.
Although a copy of the previous child-custody judgment is not included
in the record, it is undisputed that, in the previous child-custody
judgment, the parties agreed that Tonya Brancato ("the visitation
supervisor") would supervise the father's visitation with the child. It is
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also undisputed that the parties agreed to limit the father's telephone
visitation to 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. on Sundays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays
on the weeks when he did not have supervised visitation with the child.
On September 30, 2024, the father filed an "emergency petition to
modify [the previous child-custody judgment] and rule nisi." Among other
things, the father alleged that there had been a material change in
circumstances since the entry of the previous child-custody judgment
because, according to him, he had moved to Texas in February 2024,
supervised visitation was "no longer reasonable nor necessary," and the
parties had been unable to agree on alternative times for him to exercise
telephone visitation. The father requested that the circuit court order
unsupervised visitation or, alternatively, allow supervised visitation by
a family member. The father also asked the circuit court to modify his
telephone visitation with the child and to hold the mother in contempt
because, he asserted, the mother had interfered with his telephone
visitation and had not allowed him to visit the child on the child's
birthday.
On October 3, 2024, the mother filed a verified "answer and
counterclaim to [the father]'s petition to modify and rule nisi." The
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mother denied the allegations contained in the father's petition, alleging
that the parties had contemplated the father's move to Texas when they
entered into the January 2024 settlement agreement, that the father had
either failed to schedule or had voluntarily ended nearly half of his
supervised visitations with the child, and that the father had failed on
numerous occasions to call or answer the child's calls during his
scheduled telephone visitations. The mother further alleged that there
had been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the
previous child-custody judgment because, according to her, the father
had refused to agree to alternate times for him to exercise telephone
visitation and because, the mother alleged, the father had attempted "to
involve third parties, such as unknown women, into his phone calls with
the โฆ child." The mother asked the circuit court to hold the father in
"civil and/or criminal contempt" because, she asserted, the father had
"continuously and willfully failed and refused" to timely pay his child-
support obligation to the mother, had "continuously and willfully failed
and refused to pay his portion of the medical expenses incurred for the
benefit of the โฆ child," had failed to schedule supervised visitations with
the child at least three times, had failed to exercise telephone visitations
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with the child, and had involved unknown third parties in telephone
visitations. The mother also requested that the circuit court order the
father to pay her reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.
The circuit court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child on
October 10, 2024, and ordered each party to pay $750 to the circuit-court
clerk as a "retainer" for the guardian ad litem's fees within 21 days of
that order. On September 13, 2025, the guardian ad litem filed a motion
to withdraw, citing personal medical reasons, and asked the circuit court
to award her fees. The circuit court entered an order on September 22,
2025, condemning the $1,500 that the parties had paid to the circuit-
court clerk and requiring each party to pay $4,011.66 to satisfy the
remaining balance of the guardian ad litem's fees. The circuit court
appointed a new guardian ad litem for the child on September 22, 2025,
and ordered each party to pay $750 to the circuit-court clerk as a
"retainer" for the new guardian ad litem's fees within 30 days of that
order.
On November 26, 2024, the mother filed a motion seeking to
suspend the father's contact with the child. The mother alleged, among
other things, that the father's phone conversations with the child had
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become harmful to the child. The father filed a response. On January 3,
2025, the circuit court held a hearing on the mother's motion to suspend
contact, and, on January 7, 2025, it issued an order suspending the
father's telephone visitation on Tuesdays and Thursdays on the weeks
when he did not have supervised visitation with the child.
The circuit court conducted a multiday trial on the father's petition
and the mother's counterpetition that concluded on October 23, 2025. The
circuit court subsequently entered the November 20, 2025, judgment
denying the father's petition and granting the mother's counterpetition.
Among other things, the circuit court made the following findings:
"The [father] failed to prove that there has been a
material change in circumstances to warrant his request for
relief since the entry of the [previous child-custody judgment]
or that the [mother] is in violation of said [judgment]. During
the prior trial in 2023 and 2024, the [father] had disclosed his
intent to move to Texas, and such was contemplated when the
parties reached an [a]greement on January 25th, 2024.
Additionally, the [father] failed to provide evidence that
modifying the visitation from supervised to unsupervised was
in the best interest of the minor child. The [father] failed to
provide evidence that modifying visitation from Alabama to
Texas was in the best interest of the minor child.
"The [mother]'s Counter Petition to Modify and Rule
Nisi is GRANTED based on the change of circumstances and
the best interest of the minor child as it was apparent in
hearings, pleadings, testimony, and evidence that the
[father]'s behavior has become increasingly erratic since
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January of 2024 including but not limited to multiple
hospitalizations, his inappropriate and harmful
communications with the minor child via FaceTime, his
behavior regarding the minor child's recital[,] and the
[father]'s pending DUI and concealed weapons charges in
Texas. The [circuit c]ourt would prefer a relative to supervise
visits, however while the [father] has family willing and able
to supervise, the [circuit] court has grave concerns as to the
ability of family members to control and monitor the [father]'s
behavior in front of the minor child."
(Capitalization in original.)
Based on those findings, the circuit court modified the visitation
provisions of the previous child-custody judgment by eliminating the
option to extend the father's twice-a-month supervised visitation with the
child from four to six hours and by limiting the father's telephone
visitation to 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. on Sundays on the weeks that he did
not have supervised visitation with the child. The circuit court further
found that the father "continuously and willfully violated" its prior
judgments because he had failed to timely pay his child-support
obligation on 18 occasions, had failed to provide the mother with proof of
his life-insurance policy, and had not timely paid $354.33 of the child's
medical expenses. Based on those findings, the circuit court found the
father in criminal and civil contempt of its prior judgments. The circuit
court sentenced the father to five days in jail "for each contempt,"
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allowing him to "purge himself of said contempt by paying the
[m]other['s] attorney fees in the amount of $45,370.86 within thirty (30)
days" of the November 20, 2025, judgment.
The circuit court further ordered the guardian ad litem to "submit
[the guardian ad litem's] bill directly to the [father] within seven (7) days"
of the November 20, 2025, judgment and ordered the father to pay the
guardian ad litem's fees within 30 days of that judgment. The circuit
court denied all other requested relief and stated that all other portions
of the "final decree of divorce" and the previous child-custody judgment
remained unchanged.
On December 19, 2025, the father filed a postjudgment motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the November 20, 2025, judgment. The father
argued, among other things, that the circuit court had erred by finding
that his move to Texas was not a material change in circumstances, that
modifying the visitation provisions of the previous child-custody
judgment was not in the best interest of the child, that the evidence did
not support finding him in criminal and civil contempt, and that
requiring him to pay the mother's attorney's fees to purge himself of
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contempt was improper. The circuit court entered an order on January
12, 2026, denying the father's postjudgment motion.
On January 20, 2026, the guardian ad litem filed an "affidavit in
support of legal fees," in which the guardian ad litem attested, among
other things, that she had spent at least 52.5 hours working on the
matter and that she had not received any payment in connection with her
work. The circuit court entered a judgment on January 23, 2026, finding
that the guardian ad litem's fees totaled $13,125 and were reasonable.
The circuit court ordered the father to pay $12,375 toward the guardian
ad litem's fees.
The father filed a notice of appeal to this court on February 23,
2026.
Analysis
I. Whether the circuit court exceeded its discretion by modifying the
father's visitation
"[A] parent seeking to modify the visitation rights of a
noncustodial parent must demonstrate a material change in
circumstances and that the proposed change in visitation
would serve the child's best interests. Ex parte Dean, 137 So.
3d 341, 342 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013); In re Stewart, 481 So.
2d 899, 901 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). Further,
" '[t]he trial court has broad discretion in
deciding on visitation rights of the noncustodial
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parent. Wallace v. Wallace, 485 So. 2d 740 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1986). This discretion applies to
modification proceedings as well as to the original
custody proceeding. Id. "When the issue of
visitation is determined after oral proceedings, the
trial court's determination of the issue will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or a
showing that it is plainly in error. Andrews v.
Andrews, 520 So. 2d 512 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)."
Dominick v. Dominick, 622 So. 2d 402, 403 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1993).'
"Flanagan v. Flanagan, 656 So. 2d 1228, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995)."
Griffin v. Griffin, 159 So. 3d 67, 70 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)(emphasis added).
The father's argument is essentially twofold: he argues that the
circuit court erred by denying him the relief that he requested in his
petition with respect to visitation (i.e., a change to unsupervised
visitation or, alternatively, to allow supervised visitation by a family
member) and that it erred by granting the mother the relief that she
requested in her counterpetition with respect to visitation (i.e., limiting
the father's telephone visitation with the child). With respect to the
denial of the father's petition, the circuit court found that the father had
not demonstrated that a material change in circumstances had occurred,
and the father challenges that finding on appeal. However, we pretermit
discussion of that part of the father's argument because the evidence
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demonstrates that the circuit court reasonably could have found that
denying the father's request to modify his visitation rights and granting
the mother's request to modify the father's visitation rights was in the
best interest of the child.1 See Hoag v. Stinson, 268 So. 3d 66, 69 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2018)("[A] petitioner who seeks a modification of a previous
visitation judgment must โฆ demonstrate both a material change in
circumstances and that the proposed change in visitation will serve the
best interests of the child at issue.").
When a trial court is deciding whether a proposed course of action
is in the best interest of a child,
"[t]he sex and age of the children are indeed very important
considerations; however, the court must go beyond these to
consider the characteristics and needs of each child, including
their emotional, social, moral, material and educational
needs; the respective home environments offered by the
parties; the characteristics of those seeking custody, including
age, character, stability, mental and physical health; the
capacity and interest of each parent to provide for the
emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs of
the children; the interpersonal relationship between each
child and each parent; the interpersonal relationship between
the children; the effect on the child of disrupting or continuing
an existing custodial status; the preference of each child, if the
child is of sufficient age and maturity; the report and
1The father does not argue that the mother failed to demonstrate a
material change in circumstances; accordingly, we likewise decline to
consider that issue.
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recommendation of any expert witnesses or other
independent investigator; available alternatives; and any
other relevant matter the evidence may disclose."
Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981)(emphasis added).
In this case, the circuit court granted the mother's counterpetition
because it found that "it was apparent in hearings, pleadings, testimony
and evidence that the [father]'s behavior ha[d] become increasingly
erratic" since the previous child-custody judgment. In support of that
finding, the circuit court referenced the father's "inappropriate and
harmful communications" with the child on FaceTime, a
videoconferencing application, his behavior regarding the child's dance
recital, his multiple hospitalizations, and his pending criminal charges
in Texas.
With respect to the father's telephone visitation, there was evidence
indicating that the father had called the child using FaceTime when he
was in the bathroom and had discussed his bowel movement with the
child on the call. There was also evidence indicating that the father had
allowed third parties to be on FaceTime calls with the child and that he
had called the child from restaurants in violation of the circuit court's
prior judgments.
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With respect to the child's dance recital, the father admitted that
the mother's attorney had informed him of the dance recital more than a
month in advance. The record indicates that the mother's attorney
welcomed the father and his family to attend the dance recital and
invited the father to take the child out to dinner with the visitation
supervisor after the recital. Instead, the father filed an "emergency
motion for expedited teleconference," alleging that the mother and her
attorney had arbitrarily canceled his visitation without cause. The circuit
court conducted a hearing and subsequently entered an order allowing
the father to either attend the dance recital and take the child out to
dinner with the visitation supervisor or to exercise supervised visitation
the following day. The evidence indicates that the father elected to
exercise supervised visitation the day following the dance recital and did
not attend the child's dance recital.
The circuit court also referenced evidence indicating that the father
had been transported to the hospital in February, April, and May 2024
for "altered mental status" and/or "suspected alcohol intoxication" and
that he had been charged with driving under the influence and carrying
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a concealed weapon while engaged in a criminal activity in Texas in April
2025.
Furthermore, when denying the father's request to have
unsupervised visitation or, in the alternative, supervised visitation by a
family member, the circuit court found that it had "grave concerns" about
the ability of the father's family members to control and monitor the
father's behavior in front of the child. The paternal grandfather testified
at the trial, and the circuit court had the ability to observe and monitor
the paternal grandfather.
"To the extent the circuit court made factual findings
based on oral testimony, those factual findings are entitled to
deference by this Court under the ore tenus standard of
review. Under that standard, ' "we must accept as true the
facts found by the trial court if there is substantial evidence
to support the trial court's findings." ' Allsopp v. Bolding, 86
So. 3d 952, 959 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Beasley v. Mellon Fin.
Servs. Corp., 569 So. 2d 389, 393 (Ala. 1990)). This standard
is based on a recognition of the trial court's unique position of
being able to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to
assign weight to their testimony. See, e.g., Justice v. Arab
Lumber & Supply, Inc., 533 So. 2d 538, 543 (Ala. 1988)."
Wehle v. Bradley, 195 So. 3d 928, 934 (Ala. 2015)(emphasis added).
Notably, the paternal grandfather's testimony supports the circuit
court's finding that the father's family members were unlikely able to
control and monitor the father's behavior in front of the child. The
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paternal grandfather responded "no" when he was asked if he was aware
that it was the visitation supervisor's job to intervene when the father is
inappropriate with the child and to have eyes and ears on everything that
is said between the father and the child. He also testified that nothing
that the father had done justified a supervised visitation requirement for
the father, and he deflected when he was asked whether he could say that
the father had ever made a bad parenting decision regarding the child.
The paternal grandfather also testified that he had no concerns about the
father's ability to parent the child, but he testified, on that same date,
that he did not think that the father could take care of himself or the
child at that time. Based on the foregoing and the ore tenus standard of
review, we are not persuaded that the circuit court's decision to refuse to
consider the father's relatives as visitation supervisors was not supported
by the evidence.
Before the November 20, 2025, judgment, the father had agreed --
in the January 24, 2024, settlement agreement -- to twice-a-month in-
person visitation supervised by the visitation supervisor for four hours,
with the potential to increase that visitation to six hours, and to
telephone visitation on Sundays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays from 5:30
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p.m. to 5:45 p.m. on the weeks when he did not have supervised visitation
with the child. The father's telephone visitation on Tuesday and
Thursday was then suspended on January 7, 2025, pending a final
hearing. After the November 20, 2025, judgment, the father kept his
twice-a-month in-person visitation but lost the option to extend that
period from four hours to six hours and lost telephone visitation on
Tuesday and Thursdays. Thus, in total, the November 20, 2025,
judgment resulted in the father losing 30 minutes of telephone visitation,
which the January 7, 2025, pendente lite order had already removed. In
light of the foregoing evidence and our standard of review, we are not
persuaded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion when it
determined that eliminating 2, 15-minute phone visitations and
maintaining the requirement of supervised visitation by a third party
was in the best interest of the child.2
2The father argues that visitation restrictions "must be supported
by evidence that the parent's conduct is detrimental to the child or poses
a risk of anticipated harm" and that the record "does not demonstrate
that the extensive restrictions [in this case] โฆ serve a protective
function." The father's brief, pp. 44, 48. But the father did not make that
argument to the circuit court; therefore, it was not preserved for
appellate review, and we cannot consider it. See Duke v. Walmart, Inc.,
[Ms. SC-2026-0074, Mar. 20, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ n.4 (Ala.
2026)(" 'Issues not raised before the trial court will not be considered for
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II. Whether the evidence supported the circuit court's finding that the
father was in civil and criminal contempt
The father argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
the circuit court's findings that he was in criminal and civil contempt of
the previous child-custody judgment. The circuit court found that the
father was in civil and criminal contempt because he had "failed to timely
pay the child support obligation on eighteen (18) occasions," because he
had "failed to provide the [mother] the declarations page of a life
insurance policy on his life in the face amount of $150,000.00 naming the
[mother] as beneficiary, as Trustee for the child during her minority,"
and because he was "in arrears for non-payment of medical expenses in
the amount of $354.33."
Civil contempt is defined as the "willful, continuing failure or
refusal of any person to comply with a court's lawful writ, subpoena,
process, order, rule, or command that by its nature is still capable of being
complied with." Rule 70A(a)(2)(D), Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). " 'A
the first time on appeal.' " (quoting ITEC, Inc. v. Automated Precision,
Inc., 623 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Ala. 1993))). We also note that the father had
agreed to many of the restrictions that he now asserts are
"extraordinarily restrictive," including supervised visitation and limited
phone visitation, before the November 20, 2025, judgment had even been
entered.
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key element of a finding of civil contempt is that such a finding is
intended to compel compliance, and sanctions for civil contempt may
exceed the limits provided by ยง 12-11-30(5)[, Ala. Code 1975,] and "may
continue indefinitely until the contemnor performs as ordered." ' " Lester
v. Lester, 378 So. 3d 555, 563 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (emphasis added;
citations omitted). " '[A] finding of civil contempt must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence.' " Id. at 564 (citation omitted).3
Criminal contempt is not intended to compel compliance with a
court order and is defined, in part, as the "willful disobedience or
resistance of any person to a court's lawful writ, subpoena, process, order,
3
" ' "[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a
judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in
which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial
court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-
finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly
establish the fact sought to be proved. Even if an appellate
court in considering the evidence of record would reach its
own conclusion that the evidence presented does not clearly
and convincingly establish the fact sought to be proved, it is
not for that court to act upon its own factual determination
but to determine instead whether the fact-finder below
reasonably could have made a different finding based on the
same evidence." ' "
Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1056 (Ala. 2022) (citations omitted).
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rule, or command, where the dominant purpose of the finding of contempt
is to punish the contemnor." Rule 70A(a)(2)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).
Punishment for criminal contempt is statutorily limited to a maximum
fine of $100 and imprisonment not to exceed five days. ยง 12-11-30(5), Ala.
Code 1975. This court reviews a finding of criminal contempt to
determine " ' " ' "whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the trial
judge, as trier of the facts, in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was guilty, and that such evidence is inconsistent with any
reasonable hypothesis of โฆ innocence." ' " ' " Knighton v. Knighton, [Ms.
CL-2024-0863, May 23, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)
(citations omitted).
The father's arguments as to why he should not have been found in
either civil contempt or criminal contempt are essentially the same.
Thus, we discuss the circuit court's contempt findings concurrently.
The father contends that the circuit court erred by finding him in
contempt because, he says, the evidence demonstrated that he was
current on his child-support obligation at the time of the trial. That
argument is underdeveloped and inconsistent with the relevant law.
Child-support payments become separate final judgments as of the date
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due, see Corwin v. Corwin, 29 So. 3d 913, 914 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), and
the father was required under the previous child-custody judgment to
make child-support payments to the mother on the first day of each
month. Thus, whether the father had paid the outstanding balance of his
child-support arrearage at the time of the trial is immaterial to whether
he had willfully failed to timely pay his child-support obligation to the
mother each month in compliance with the previous child-custody
judgment. The evidence indicated that the father had failed to timely pay
his child-support obligation to the mother in all but one month between
January 2024 to October 2025. There was also evidence indicating that
the father waited to pay his child-support obligation until shortly before
a scheduled hearing. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the
circuit court's finding that the father had willfully failed to comply with
the previous child-custody judgment.
Alternatively, the father contends that he presented "a plethora of
evidence" indicating that he did not always have the means to timely pay
his child-support obligation; thus, he argues, the burden of proof shifted
to the mother to prove that he had the ability to pay. We agree that there
was evidence indicating that the father relied on his parents to pay for
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his housing, transportation, health insurance, and other expenses,
including child support. However, there was also evidence indicating that
the father's inability to pay his child-support obligation, if any, was
voluntary. The father testified that he was a licensed attorney in
Alabama, but the evidence indicated that he moved to Texas because the
child's paternal grandfather had promised to financially support him if
he moved there. In May 2025, the father testified that he had registered
to take the Texas bar exam in July 2025, but he testified on October 22,
2025, that he did not take the exam. Furthermore, the father testified
that he had a part-time job working for a "meat distributor and processor
of wild game and exotic animals" and that he had made around $20,000
from October to December 2024. The circuit court could have reasonably
concluded from that evidence either that the father had the financial
means to timely pay his child-support obligation or, if he did not, that he
had chosen to be underemployed. See Chunn v. Chunn, 183 So. 3d 985,
997 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)("[T]he evidence supports a conclusion that,
after he lost his job in July 2013, the father[, in that case,] had methods
of meeting his child-support obligation or at least making a more
substantial contribution to the support of his children but that he elected
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not to do so."); see also T.K.W. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res. ex rel. J.B.,
119 So. 3d 1187, 1193 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)("The juvenile court found that
the [failure of T.K.W., the father in that case,] to pay [his child-support
obligation] was due to his own 'neglect,' i.e., that [T.K.W.] chose to incur
certain additional expenses rather than first meeting the requirements
of the November 20, 2009, judgment. Thus, the record supports a
conclusion that [T.K.W.] failed to present evidence demonstrating that
he lacked the financial ability to pay the $500 monthly obligation
required by the November 20, 2009, judgment.").
The father also contends that the circuit court erred by finding him
in contempt because, he says, he had previously provided the mother with
the declarations page of his life-insurance policy. However, the father
was required to provide the mother with proof of his life-insurance policy
each year. The mother testified that the father had not provided her with
proof of the life-insurance policy. The father testified during the trial that
he "provided it to her before," but he also testified that did not know the
name of the insurance provider. The circuit court was in the unique
position of observing the parties during a multiday trial and had the
discretion to consider their credibility as witnesses. See Freeman v.
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Freeman, 84 So. 3d 939, 950 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(" 'In ore tenus
proceedings, the trial court is the sole judge of the facts and of the
credibility of the witnesses, and it should accept only that testimony
which it considers worthy of belief.' " (quoting Clemons v. Clemons, 627
So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993))). Accordingly, the trial court could
have properly accepted the mother's testimony and rejected the father's
testimony when it found that the father had willfully failed to comply
with the previous child-custody judgment by failing to provide the mother
with proof of a life-insurance policy each year.
The father also contends that the circuit court erred by finding him
in contempt because, he says, he had paid his share of the child's
outstanding medical expenses at the time of the trial. The father fails to
acknowledge that he was required under the previous child-custody
judgment to pay his share of the child's medical expenses within 60 days
of receiving proof of the amount owed from the mother. The mother
testified that the father had failed to timely pay his share of the child's
medical expenses in May, June, July, September, and November 2024,
and in January, February, April, and September 2025. Thus, there was
sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's conclusion that the
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CL-2026-0153
father had willfully failed to comply with the previous child-custody
judgment requiring the timely payment of his share of the child's medical
expenses. Alternatively, the father contends that he should not have been
held in contempt because, he says, he did not have the ability to pay his
share of the child's medical expenses. As we have stated, the circuit court
could have reasonably concluded from the evidence that the father either
had the financial means to timely pay his share of the child's medical
expenses or, if he did not, that he had chosen to be underemployed.
The father also contends that he should not have been held in
contempt because, he says, the mother admitted that she does not always
send the father proof of the child's medical expenses immediately upon
receiving them. The record indicates that the mother was required to
send the father proof of the child's medical expenses within 60 days of
receipt of the amount owed from the medical provider. The father does
not cite any evidence indicating that the mother failed to send him proof
of the child's medical expenses within 60 days of receipt of the amount
owed.
Finally, the father contends that there is no evidence to support the
circuit court's finding that he was $354.33 in arrears for his share of the
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child's medical expenses because, he says, the only evidence presented
was that he had not paid a total of $249. We disagree. The mother
testified on October 23, 2025, that the father had not paid certain medical
expenses totaling approximately $249 but that the father had also not
paid his share of the cost of the child's therapy sessions that had accrued
since September 2025, which she testified was approximately $210.
Furthermore, the circuit court could have i