Full Opinion

Rel: November 20, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CL-2026-0153 _________________________ Matthew Conrad Gosney v. Laura Lavender Gosney Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (DR-21-901369.03) BOWDEN, Judge. Matthew Conrad Gosney ("the father") appeals from two judgments of the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court"). The first judgment was entered on November 20, 2025 ("the November 20, 2025, judgment"). The November 20, 2025, judgment modified the visitation provisions of a CL-2026-0153 previous child-custody judgment that had been entered in January 2024 ("the previous child-custody judgment") regarding O.T.G. ("the child"), who is the parties' child. The November 20, 2025, judgment also found the father in civil and criminal contempt and required the father to purge his contempt by paying the attorney's fees of Laura Lavender Gosney ("the mother"). The father raises three arguments regarding the November 20, 2025, judgment. He argues (1) that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by modifying the visitation provisions of the previous child- custody judgment, (2) that the evidence did not support the circuit court's finding that he was in civil and criminal contempt, and (3) that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by requiring him to pay the mother's attorney's fees to purge his contempt. The father's first two arguments are not persuasive. With respect to the father's first argument, the father has not persuaded us that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by modifying the visitation provisions of the previous child-custody judgment because, based on the evidence, the circuit court reasonably could have found that modifying visitation was in the child's best interest. We further hold -- contrary to the father's 2 CL-2026-0153 second argument -- that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's findings of civil and criminal contempt. The father's third argument is not sufficiently developed and is therefore unpersuasive on its own; however, we can examine the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu, and we conclude that the circuit court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction to require the father to pay the mother's attorney's fees to purge his contempt. Accordingly, we affirm the November 20, 2025, judgment as it pertains to the issues of child-custody modification and the findings of civil and criminal contempt, vacate the November 20, 2025, judgment as it pertains to the contempt sanctions imposed on the father, and remand the cause for the circuit court to impose contempt sanctions in accordance with this opinion. The father also appeals from a judgment entered on January 23, 2026, that required him to pay a portion of the fees for the child's guardian ad litem. That aspect of the father's appeal is properly before us. See Roberts v. Roberts, 189 So. 3d 79, 81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)(treating mandamus petition challenging attorney-fee award for guardian ad litem as an appeal because attorney-fee matters are separate 3 CL-2026-0153 and distinct from matters going to the merits of a dispute (citing Niezer v. SouthTrust Bank, 887 So. 2d 919, 923 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004))); see also Deaton v. Deaton, 416 So. 3d 1106, 1109 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(plurality opinion)("[A]n award of guardian ad litem fees is itself a final judgment โ€ฆ."). The father contends that the circuit court did not ascertain the reasonableness of the guardian ad litem's fees before it entered the January 23, 2026, judgment and that he was denied due process because, he says, the guardian ad litem submitted an affidavit pertaining to her fees two months after the circuit court entered the November 20, 2025, judgment. However, the father waived these issues because he did not raise them in the circuit court. Therefore, we affirm the January 23, 2026, judgment requiring the father to pay a portion of the guardian ad litem's fees. Facts and Procedural History The parties entered into a settlement agreement ("the original settlement agreement") that the circuit court incorporated into a "final decree of divorce." Among other things, the original settlement agreement provided that the parties would share joint legal custody of the child, that the mother would be the child's "primary physical 4 CL-2026-0153 custodian," and that the father would pay $645.80 to the mother on the first day of each month as child support. Under the terms of the original settlement agreement, the father was entitled to "all reasonable rights of physical custody with the minor child as agreed upon by the parties," and each parent was entitled to telephone visitation with the child when the child was in the custody of the other parent. The parties were to equally split the child's medical expenses and to provide the other party with evidence of any of the child's medical expenses within 60 days of receiving a bill. Each party was also required to obtain a life-insurance policy for the benefit of the child and to provide proof of that policy to the other party each year. In January 2024, the parties entered into a settlement agreement ("the January 2024 settlement agreement") to modify the original settlement agreement. The circuit court incorporated the January 2024 settlement agreement into the previous child-custody judgment. Although a copy of the previous child-custody judgment is not included in the record, it is undisputed that, in the previous child-custody judgment, the parties agreed that Tonya Brancato ("the visitation supervisor") would supervise the father's visitation with the child. It is 5 CL-2026-0153 also undisputed that the parties agreed to limit the father's telephone visitation to 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. on Sundays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays on the weeks when he did not have supervised visitation with the child. On September 30, 2024, the father filed an "emergency petition to modify [the previous child-custody judgment] and rule nisi." Among other things, the father alleged that there had been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the previous child-custody judgment because, according to him, he had moved to Texas in February 2024, supervised visitation was "no longer reasonable nor necessary," and the parties had been unable to agree on alternative times for him to exercise telephone visitation. The father requested that the circuit court order unsupervised visitation or, alternatively, allow supervised visitation by a family member. The father also asked the circuit court to modify his telephone visitation with the child and to hold the mother in contempt because, he asserted, the mother had interfered with his telephone visitation and had not allowed him to visit the child on the child's birthday. On October 3, 2024, the mother filed a verified "answer and counterclaim to [the father]'s petition to modify and rule nisi." The 6 CL-2026-0153 mother denied the allegations contained in the father's petition, alleging that the parties had contemplated the father's move to Texas when they entered into the January 2024 settlement agreement, that the father had either failed to schedule or had voluntarily ended nearly half of his supervised visitations with the child, and that the father had failed on numerous occasions to call or answer the child's calls during his scheduled telephone visitations. The mother further alleged that there had been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the previous child-custody judgment because, according to her, the father had refused to agree to alternate times for him to exercise telephone visitation and because, the mother alleged, the father had attempted "to involve third parties, such as unknown women, into his phone calls with the โ€ฆ child." The mother asked the circuit court to hold the father in "civil and/or criminal contempt" because, she asserted, the father had "continuously and willfully failed and refused" to timely pay his child- support obligation to the mother, had "continuously and willfully failed and refused to pay his portion of the medical expenses incurred for the benefit of the โ€ฆ child," had failed to schedule supervised visitations with the child at least three times, had failed to exercise telephone visitations 7 CL-2026-0153 with the child, and had involved unknown third parties in telephone visitations. The mother also requested that the circuit court order the father to pay her reasonable attorney's fees and court costs. The circuit court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child on October 10, 2024, and ordered each party to pay $750 to the circuit-court clerk as a "retainer" for the guardian ad litem's fees within 21 days of that order. On September 13, 2025, the guardian ad litem filed a motion to withdraw, citing personal medical reasons, and asked the circuit court to award her fees. The circuit court entered an order on September 22, 2025, condemning the $1,500 that the parties had paid to the circuit- court clerk and requiring each party to pay $4,011.66 to satisfy the remaining balance of the guardian ad litem's fees. The circuit court appointed a new guardian ad litem for the child on September 22, 2025, and ordered each party to pay $750 to the circuit-court clerk as a "retainer" for the new guardian ad litem's fees within 30 days of that order. On November 26, 2024, the mother filed a motion seeking to suspend the father's contact with the child. The mother alleged, among other things, that the father's phone conversations with the child had 8 CL-2026-0153 become harmful to the child. The father filed a response. On January 3, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on the mother's motion to suspend contact, and, on January 7, 2025, it issued an order suspending the father's telephone visitation on Tuesdays and Thursdays on the weeks when he did not have supervised visitation with the child. The circuit court conducted a multiday trial on the father's petition and the mother's counterpetition that concluded on October 23, 2025. The circuit court subsequently entered the November 20, 2025, judgment denying the father's petition and granting the mother's counterpetition. Among other things, the circuit court made the following findings: "The [father] failed to prove that there has been a material change in circumstances to warrant his request for relief since the entry of the [previous child-custody judgment] or that the [mother] is in violation of said [judgment]. During the prior trial in 2023 and 2024, the [father] had disclosed his intent to move to Texas, and such was contemplated when the parties reached an [a]greement on January 25th, 2024. Additionally, the [father] failed to provide evidence that modifying the visitation from supervised to unsupervised was in the best interest of the minor child. The [father] failed to provide evidence that modifying visitation from Alabama to Texas was in the best interest of the minor child. "The [mother]'s Counter Petition to Modify and Rule Nisi is GRANTED based on the change of circumstances and the best interest of the minor child as it was apparent in hearings, pleadings, testimony, and evidence that the [father]'s behavior has become increasingly erratic since 9 CL-2026-0153 January of 2024 including but not limited to multiple hospitalizations, his inappropriate and harmful communications with the minor child via FaceTime, his behavior regarding the minor child's recital[,] and the [father]'s pending DUI and concealed weapons charges in Texas. The [circuit c]ourt would prefer a relative to supervise visits, however while the [father] has family willing and able to supervise, the [circuit] court has grave concerns as to the ability of family members to control and monitor the [father]'s behavior in front of the minor child." (Capitalization in original.) Based on those findings, the circuit court modified the visitation provisions of the previous child-custody judgment by eliminating the option to extend the father's twice-a-month supervised visitation with the child from four to six hours and by limiting the father's telephone visitation to 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. on Sundays on the weeks that he did not have supervised visitation with the child. The circuit court further found that the father "continuously and willfully violated" its prior judgments because he had failed to timely pay his child-support obligation on 18 occasions, had failed to provide the mother with proof of his life-insurance policy, and had not timely paid $354.33 of the child's medical expenses. Based on those findings, the circuit court found the father in criminal and civil contempt of its prior judgments. The circuit court sentenced the father to five days in jail "for each contempt," 10 CL-2026-0153 allowing him to "purge himself of said contempt by paying the [m]other['s] attorney fees in the amount of $45,370.86 within thirty (30) days" of the November 20, 2025, judgment. The circuit court further ordered the guardian ad litem to "submit [the guardian ad litem's] bill directly to the [father] within seven (7) days" of the November 20, 2025, judgment and ordered the father to pay the guardian ad litem's fees within 30 days of that judgment. The circuit court denied all other requested relief and stated that all other portions of the "final decree of divorce" and the previous child-custody judgment remained unchanged. On December 19, 2025, the father filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the November 20, 2025, judgment. The father argued, among other things, that the circuit court had erred by finding that his move to Texas was not a material change in circumstances, that modifying the visitation provisions of the previous child-custody judgment was not in the best interest of the child, that the evidence did not support finding him in criminal and civil contempt, and that requiring him to pay the mother's attorney's fees to purge himself of 11 CL-2026-0153 contempt was improper. The circuit court entered an order on January 12, 2026, denying the father's postjudgment motion. On January 20, 2026, the guardian ad litem filed an "affidavit in support of legal fees," in which the guardian ad litem attested, among other things, that she had spent at least 52.5 hours working on the matter and that she had not received any payment in connection with her work. The circuit court entered a judgment on January 23, 2026, finding that the guardian ad litem's fees totaled $13,125 and were reasonable. The circuit court ordered the father to pay $12,375 toward the guardian ad litem's fees. The father filed a notice of appeal to this court on February 23, 2026. Analysis I. Whether the circuit court exceeded its discretion by modifying the father's visitation "[A] parent seeking to modify the visitation rights of a noncustodial parent must demonstrate a material change in circumstances and that the proposed change in visitation would serve the child's best interests. Ex parte Dean, 137 So. 3d 341, 342 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013); In re Stewart, 481 So. 2d 899, 901 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985). Further, " '[t]he trial court has broad discretion in deciding on visitation rights of the noncustodial 12 CL-2026-0153 parent. Wallace v. Wallace, 485 So. 2d 740 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986). This discretion applies to modification proceedings as well as to the original custody proceeding. Id. "When the issue of visitation is determined after oral proceedings, the trial court's determination of the issue will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or a showing that it is plainly in error. Andrews v. Andrews, 520 So. 2d 512 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)." Dominick v. Dominick, 622 So. 2d 402, 403 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).' "Flanagan v. Flanagan, 656 So. 2d 1228, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)." Griffin v. Griffin, 159 So. 3d 67, 70 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)(emphasis added). The father's argument is essentially twofold: he argues that the circuit court erred by denying him the relief that he requested in his petition with respect to visitation (i.e., a change to unsupervised visitation or, alternatively, to allow supervised visitation by a family member) and that it erred by granting the mother the relief that she requested in her counterpetition with respect to visitation (i.e., limiting the father's telephone visitation with the child). With respect to the denial of the father's petition, the circuit court found that the father had not demonstrated that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and the father challenges that finding on appeal. However, we pretermit discussion of that part of the father's argument because the evidence 13 CL-2026-0153 demonstrates that the circuit court reasonably could have found that denying the father's request to modify his visitation rights and granting the mother's request to modify the father's visitation rights was in the best interest of the child.1 See Hoag v. Stinson, 268 So. 3d 66, 69 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)("[A] petitioner who seeks a modification of a previous visitation judgment must โ€ฆ demonstrate both a material change in circumstances and that the proposed change in visitation will serve the best interests of the child at issue."). When a trial court is deciding whether a proposed course of action is in the best interest of a child, "[t]he sex and age of the children are indeed very important considerations; however, the court must go beyond these to consider the characteristics and needs of each child, including their emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs; the respective home environments offered by the parties; the characteristics of those seeking custody, including age, character, stability, mental and physical health; the capacity and interest of each parent to provide for the emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs of the children; the interpersonal relationship between each child and each parent; the interpersonal relationship between the children; the effect on the child of disrupting or continuing an existing custodial status; the preference of each child, if the child is of sufficient age and maturity; the report and 1The father does not argue that the mother failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances; accordingly, we likewise decline to consider that issue. 14 CL-2026-0153 recommendation of any expert witnesses or other independent investigator; available alternatives; and any other relevant matter the evidence may disclose." Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981)(emphasis added). In this case, the circuit court granted the mother's counterpetition because it found that "it was apparent in hearings, pleadings, testimony and evidence that the [father]'s behavior ha[d] become increasingly erratic" since the previous child-custody judgment. In support of that finding, the circuit court referenced the father's "inappropriate and harmful communications" with the child on FaceTime, a videoconferencing application, his behavior regarding the child's dance recital, his multiple hospitalizations, and his pending criminal charges in Texas. With respect to the father's telephone visitation, there was evidence indicating that the father had called the child using FaceTime when he was in the bathroom and had discussed his bowel movement with the child on the call. There was also evidence indicating that the father had allowed third parties to be on FaceTime calls with the child and that he had called the child from restaurants in violation of the circuit court's prior judgments. 15 CL-2026-0153 With respect to the child's dance recital, the father admitted that the mother's attorney had informed him of the dance recital more than a month in advance. The record indicates that the mother's attorney welcomed the father and his family to attend the dance recital and invited the father to take the child out to dinner with the visitation supervisor after the recital. Instead, the father filed an "emergency motion for expedited teleconference," alleging that the mother and her attorney had arbitrarily canceled his visitation without cause. The circuit court conducted a hearing and subsequently entered an order allowing the father to either attend the dance recital and take the child out to dinner with the visitation supervisor or to exercise supervised visitation the following day. The evidence indicates that the father elected to exercise supervised visitation the day following the dance recital and did not attend the child's dance recital. The circuit court also referenced evidence indicating that the father had been transported to the hospital in February, April, and May 2024 for "altered mental status" and/or "suspected alcohol intoxication" and that he had been charged with driving under the influence and carrying 16 CL-2026-0153 a concealed weapon while engaged in a criminal activity in Texas in April 2025. Furthermore, when denying the father's request to have unsupervised visitation or, in the alternative, supervised visitation by a family member, the circuit court found that it had "grave concerns" about the ability of the father's family members to control and monitor the father's behavior in front of the child. The paternal grandfather testified at the trial, and the circuit court had the ability to observe and monitor the paternal grandfather. "To the extent the circuit court made factual findings based on oral testimony, those factual findings are entitled to deference by this Court under the ore tenus standard of review. Under that standard, ' "we must accept as true the facts found by the trial court if there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings." ' Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 959 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Beasley v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp., 569 So. 2d 389, 393 (Ala. 1990)). This standard is based on a recognition of the trial court's unique position of being able to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony. See, e.g., Justice v. Arab Lumber & Supply, Inc., 533 So. 2d 538, 543 (Ala. 1988)." Wehle v. Bradley, 195 So. 3d 928, 934 (Ala. 2015)(emphasis added). Notably, the paternal grandfather's testimony supports the circuit court's finding that the father's family members were unlikely able to control and monitor the father's behavior in front of the child. The 17 CL-2026-0153 paternal grandfather responded "no" when he was asked if he was aware that it was the visitation supervisor's job to intervene when the father is inappropriate with the child and to have eyes and ears on everything that is said between the father and the child. He also testified that nothing that the father had done justified a supervised visitation requirement for the father, and he deflected when he was asked whether he could say that the father had ever made a bad parenting decision regarding the child. The paternal grandfather also testified that he had no concerns about the father's ability to parent the child, but he testified, on that same date, that he did not think that the father could take care of himself or the child at that time. Based on the foregoing and the ore tenus standard of review, we are not persuaded that the circuit court's decision to refuse to consider the father's relatives as visitation supervisors was not supported by the evidence. Before the November 20, 2025, judgment, the father had agreed -- in the January 24, 2024, settlement agreement -- to twice-a-month in- person visitation supervised by the visitation supervisor for four hours, with the potential to increase that visitation to six hours, and to telephone visitation on Sundays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays from 5:30 18 CL-2026-0153 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. on the weeks when he did not have supervised visitation with the child. The father's telephone visitation on Tuesday and Thursday was then suspended on January 7, 2025, pending a final hearing. After the November 20, 2025, judgment, the father kept his twice-a-month in-person visitation but lost the option to extend that period from four hours to six hours and lost telephone visitation on Tuesday and Thursdays. Thus, in total, the November 20, 2025, judgment resulted in the father losing 30 minutes of telephone visitation, which the January 7, 2025, pendente lite order had already removed. In light of the foregoing evidence and our standard of review, we are not persuaded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion when it determined that eliminating 2, 15-minute phone visitations and maintaining the requirement of supervised visitation by a third party was in the best interest of the child.2 2The father argues that visitation restrictions "must be supported by evidence that the parent's conduct is detrimental to the child or poses a risk of anticipated harm" and that the record "does not demonstrate that the extensive restrictions [in this case] โ€ฆ serve a protective function." The father's brief, pp. 44, 48. But the father did not make that argument to the circuit court; therefore, it was not preserved for appellate review, and we cannot consider it. See Duke v. Walmart, Inc., [Ms. SC-2026-0074, Mar. 20, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ n.4 (Ala. 2026)(" 'Issues not raised before the trial court will not be considered for 19 CL-2026-0153 II. Whether the evidence supported the circuit court's finding that the father was in civil and criminal contempt The father argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court's findings that he was in criminal and civil contempt of the previous child-custody judgment. The circuit court found that the father was in civil and criminal contempt because he had "failed to timely pay the child support obligation on eighteen (18) occasions," because he had "failed to provide the [mother] the declarations page of a life insurance policy on his life in the face amount of $150,000.00 naming the [mother] as beneficiary, as Trustee for the child during her minority," and because he was "in arrears for non-payment of medical expenses in the amount of $354.33." Civil contempt is defined as the "willful, continuing failure or refusal of any person to comply with a court's lawful writ, subpoena, process, order, rule, or command that by its nature is still capable of being complied with." Rule 70A(a)(2)(D), Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). " 'A the first time on appeal.' " (quoting ITEC, Inc. v. Automated Precision, Inc., 623 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Ala. 1993))). We also note that the father had agreed to many of the restrictions that he now asserts are "extraordinarily restrictive," including supervised visitation and limited phone visitation, before the November 20, 2025, judgment had even been entered. 20 CL-2026-0153 key element of a finding of civil contempt is that such a finding is intended to compel compliance, and sanctions for civil contempt may exceed the limits provided by ยง 12-11-30(5)[, Ala. Code 1975,] and "may continue indefinitely until the contemnor performs as ordered." ' " Lester v. Lester, 378 So. 3d 555, 563 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (emphasis added; citations omitted). " '[A] finding of civil contempt must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.' " Id. at 564 (citation omitted).3 Criminal contempt is not intended to compel compliance with a court order and is defined, in part, as the "willful disobedience or resistance of any person to a court's lawful writ, subpoena, process, order, 3 " ' "[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact- finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly establish the fact sought to be proved. Even if an appellate court in considering the evidence of record would reach its own conclusion that the evidence presented does not clearly and convincingly establish the fact sought to be proved, it is not for that court to act upon its own factual determination but to determine instead whether the fact-finder below reasonably could have made a different finding based on the same evidence." ' " Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1056 (Ala. 2022) (citations omitted). 21 CL-2026-0153 rule, or command, where the dominant purpose of the finding of contempt is to punish the contemnor." Rule 70A(a)(2)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). Punishment for criminal contempt is statutorily limited to a maximum fine of $100 and imprisonment not to exceed five days. ยง 12-11-30(5), Ala. Code 1975. This court reviews a finding of criminal contempt to determine " ' " ' "whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the trial judge, as trier of the facts, in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, and that such evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of โ€ฆ innocence." ' " ' " Knighton v. Knighton, [Ms. CL-2024-0863, May 23, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025) (citations omitted). The father's arguments as to why he should not have been found in either civil contempt or criminal contempt are essentially the same. Thus, we discuss the circuit court's contempt findings concurrently. The father contends that the circuit court erred by finding him in contempt because, he says, the evidence demonstrated that he was current on his child-support obligation at the time of the trial. That argument is underdeveloped and inconsistent with the relevant law. Child-support payments become separate final judgments as of the date 22 CL-2026-0153 due, see Corwin v. Corwin, 29 So. 3d 913, 914 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009), and the father was required under the previous child-custody judgment to make child-support payments to the mother on the first day of each month. Thus, whether the father had paid the outstanding balance of his child-support arrearage at the time of the trial is immaterial to whether he had willfully failed to timely pay his child-support obligation to the mother each month in compliance with the previous child-custody judgment. The evidence indicated that the father had failed to timely pay his child-support obligation to the mother in all but one month between January 2024 to October 2025. There was also evidence indicating that the father waited to pay his child-support obligation until shortly before a scheduled hearing. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's finding that the father had willfully failed to comply with the previous child-custody judgment. Alternatively, the father contends that he presented "a plethora of evidence" indicating that he did not always have the means to timely pay his child-support obligation; thus, he argues, the burden of proof shifted to the mother to prove that he had the ability to pay. We agree that there was evidence indicating that the father relied on his parents to pay for 23 CL-2026-0153 his housing, transportation, health insurance, and other expenses, including child support. However, there was also evidence indicating that the father's inability to pay his child-support obligation, if any, was voluntary. The father testified that he was a licensed attorney in Alabama, but the evidence indicated that he moved to Texas because the child's paternal grandfather had promised to financially support him if he moved there. In May 2025, the father testified that he had registered to take the Texas bar exam in July 2025, but he testified on October 22, 2025, that he did not take the exam. Furthermore, the father testified that he had a part-time job working for a "meat distributor and processor of wild game and exotic animals" and that he had made around $20,000 from October to December 2024. The circuit court could have reasonably concluded from that evidence either that the father had the financial means to timely pay his child-support obligation or, if he did not, that he had chosen to be underemployed. See Chunn v. Chunn, 183 So. 3d 985, 997 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)("[T]he evidence supports a conclusion that, after he lost his job in July 2013, the father[, in that case,] had methods of meeting his child-support obligation or at least making a more substantial contribution to the support of his children but that he elected 24 CL-2026-0153 not to do so."); see also T.K.W. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res. ex rel. J.B., 119 So. 3d 1187, 1193 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)("The juvenile court found that the [failure of T.K.W., the father in that case,] to pay [his child-support obligation] was due to his own 'neglect,' i.e., that [T.K.W.] chose to incur certain additional expenses rather than first meeting the requirements of the November 20, 2009, judgment. Thus, the record supports a conclusion that [T.K.W.] failed to present evidence demonstrating that he lacked the financial ability to pay the $500 monthly obligation required by the November 20, 2009, judgment."). The father also contends that the circuit court erred by finding him in contempt because, he says, he had previously provided the mother with the declarations page of his life-insurance policy. However, the father was required to provide the mother with proof of his life-insurance policy each year. The mother testified that the father had not provided her with proof of the life-insurance policy. The father testified during the trial that he "provided it to her before," but he also testified that did not know the name of the insurance provider. The circuit court was in the unique position of observing the parties during a multiday trial and had the discretion to consider their credibility as witnesses. See Freeman v. 25 CL-2026-0153 Freeman, 84 So. 3d 939, 950 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(" 'In ore tenus proceedings, the trial court is the sole judge of the facts and of the credibility of the witnesses, and it should accept only that testimony which it considers worthy of belief.' " (quoting Clemons v. Clemons, 627 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993))). Accordingly, the trial court could have properly accepted the mother's testimony and rejected the father's testimony when it found that the father had willfully failed to comply with the previous child-custody judgment by failing to provide the mother with proof of a life-insurance policy each year. The father also contends that the circuit court erred by finding him in contempt because, he says, he had paid his share of the child's outstanding medical expenses at the time of the trial. The father fails to acknowledge that he was required under the previous child-custody judgment to pay his share of the child's medical expenses within 60 days of receiving proof of the amount owed from the mother. The mother testified that the father had failed to timely pay his share of the child's medical expenses in May, June, July, September, and November 2024, and in January, February, April, and September 2025. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's conclusion that the 26 CL-2026-0153 father had willfully failed to comply with the previous child-custody judgment requiring the timely payment of his share of the child's medical expenses. Alternatively, the father contends that he should not have been held in contempt because, he says, he did not have the ability to pay his share of the child's medical expenses. As we have stated, the circuit court could have reasonably concluded from the evidence that the father either had the financial means to timely pay his share of the child's medical expenses or, if he did not, that he had chosen to be underemployed. The father also contends that he should not have been held in contempt because, he says, the mother admitted that she does not always send the father proof of the child's medical expenses immediately upon receiving them. The record indicates that the mother was required to send the father proof of the child's medical expenses within 60 days of receipt of the amount owed from the medical provider. The father does not cite any evidence indicating that the mother failed to send him proof of the child's medical expenses within 60 days of receipt of the amount owed. Finally, the father contends that there is no evidence to support the circuit court's finding that he was $354.33 in arrears for his share of the 27 CL-2026-0153 child's medical expenses because, he says, the only evidence presented was that he had not paid a total of $249. We disagree. The mother testified on October 23, 2025, that the father had not paid certain medical expenses totaling approximately $249 but that the father had also not paid his share of the cost of the child's therapy sessions that had accrued since September 2025, which she testified was approximately $210. Furthermore, the circuit court could have i