Jordaan Stanly Creque v. State of Alabama

Rel: June 26, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________ CR-2023-0654 _________________________ Jordaan Stanly Creque v. State of Alabama Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court (CC-11-844.60) COLE, Judge. Jordaan Stanly Creque, an inmate on Alabama's death row, appeals the Morgan Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief. CR-2023-0654 Facts and Procedural History Creque, who was employed at Krystal fast-food restaurant, was arrested on August 24, 2011, after confessing to shooting the Krystal manager, Jeffrey Mark Graff, and a coworker, Jessie Jose Aguilar, during a robbery of the restaurant earlier that morning. Creque told police that he planned and committed the robbery with his two friends, Cassandra Eldred, who also worked at Krystal, and Ezekiel Gholston. On August 26, 2011, Creque was appointed two trial counsel. (C. 8.) 1 On November 16, 2011, a Morgan County grand jury returned an indictment charging Creque with three counts of capital murder for the intentional murders of Graff and Aguilar, which were made capital because they were committed during the course of a robbery of both individuals and because the two victims were murdered by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, violations of §§ 13A-5-40(a)(2) and (10), Ala. Code 1975, respectively. (C. 8-9.) Creque's trial commenced on September 30, 2013. On October 11, 2013, the jury found Creque guilty on all three counts of capital murder charged in the indictment. On October 14, 2013, after the 1"C" refers to the clerk's record in this case. "TC," "TR," and "STR" refer to, respectively, the clerk's record, the reporter's transcript, and the supplemental record from Creque's trial. 2 CR-2023-0654 penalty phase, the jury recommended that Creque be sentenced to death by a vote of 11 to 1. On January 15, 2014, the trial court sentenced Creque to death in accordance with the jury's recommendation. This Court affirmed Creque's convictions and sentence on direct appeal on February 9, 2018. Both the Alabama Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied Creque's petitions for a writ of certiorari. On September 21, 2018, the certificate of judgment was entered. Creque timely filed a Rule 32 petition on September 12, 2019, and his filing fee was paid the next day. On July 23, 2020, counsel entered their appearance on behalf of Creque. On November 24, 2020, Creque filed an "amended" Rule 32 petition, which counsel stated was not a true "amendment" but was merely a resubmission of Creque's original petition in "a form that complies with the procedural requirements of Rule 32." (C. 169.) On November 1, 2021, Creque filed an "Amended Petition."2 On June 10, 2022, the State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal of Creque's petition. (C. 581-683.) Creque filed a reply to the 2The State refers to this November 1, 2021, petition as the "second amended" Rule 32 petition, but this Court will simply refer to Creque's "Amended Petition" as the "petition" because, as Creque recognizes, it is the "operative pleading." 3 CR-2023-0654 State's request for summary dismissal. (C. 687-761.) The circuit court subsequently issued an order summarily dismissing Creque's amended Rule 32 petition, finding that Creque's claims were insufficiently pleaded, without merit, or both. (C. 764-85.) This appeal follows. The facts of Creque's crimes were set forth in this Court's opinion affirming Creque's convictions and sentences on direct appeal: "Creque admitted at trial that he and two friends, Cassandra Eldred and Ezekiel Gholston, made a plan to steal money from the Krystal fast-food restaurant where Creque and Eldred were employed. Creque purchased a 9mm handgun and ammunition on August 23, 2011, the day before the murders. In the early morning hours of August 24, 2011, Eldred drove the two men to the restaurant. Creque had been scheduled to work the overnight shift but had failed to do so. Two employees were working at the restaurant that morning -- Graff, the manager, and Aguilar. Creque got Graff's attention by knocking on the drive-thru window, and Graff opened the side door to let him in. Creque and Gholston rushed into the restaurant; Gholston was armed with Creque's 9mm gun. They gathered money from the cash registers, and they took the money from the store's safe, which Creque had forced Graff to open. Graff attempted to diffuse the situation and told Creque and Gholston that they could leave and he would wait 10 minutes before he called the police. Creque and Gholston planned to force Graff and Aguilar into the restaurant's cooler. Graff asked if he could get a jacket for Aguilar, and he was allowed to do so. "Creque gave a statement to the police on the morning of the murders, and he admitted that he had intentionally shot and killed both men. At trial Creque admitted that he shot Graff, but claimed it was unintentional and that he had 4 CR-2023-0654 fired the shot while wrestling over the cooler door with Graff, who was pulling on the cooler door in an attempt to keep it closed. Creque shot Graff one time, in the neck; the bullet pierced his spinal column, and he was paralyzed immediately. Aguilar was shot four times. Creque alleged at trial that after he shot Graff, Gholston took the gun from him and shot Aguilar. Both men died at the scene. Eldred drove them from the scene, and the three divided the money. "Creque went to the apartment he shared with his girlfriend, Brittany Orr. Creque put his share of the stolen money in a stereo speaker, and he told her that someone had been shot at the restaurant. He was not injured when he arrived at the apartment but, while at the apartment, with the intention that it would appear that he had been assaulted and forced to take part in the crimes, he cut himself with a razor on his arms and chest and had [Brittany] hit him on the head and chest with a can of peaches. [Brittany] and Creque went to the emergency room. A nurse contacted the police after Creque told medical personnel that he had been assaulted by men who had shot one or more employees at a fast-food restaurant. "Creque was interviewed at the hospital by police officers as a possible witness to the shootings at the restaurant. He initially told the lead investigator, [Det.] Rick Archer, that he had been riding around with 'Taurus,' 'Quincy,' and 'Wodie,' and that he had been showing them the gun he had purchased earlier that day. He said that they had taken his gun, tortured him, and had forced him to take part in their plan to steal money from the restaurant. However, when the police received additional information from officers investigating the crime, including the fact that Gholston had been at the restaurant, [Det.] Archer presented that information to Creque and, [Det.] Archer said, Creque's story 'evolved' to account for that information. In Creque's final version of the events, he said that he, Gholston, and Eldred had planned the robbery and that Eldred drove them to and 5 CR-2023-0654 from the restaurant. He described the crime in detail and admitted that he intentionally shot Graff and Aguilar. "The police recovered cash from Eldred's residence and from the apartment Creque shared with [Brittany]. Gholston led the police to a lake where he had disposed of the gun Creque had purchased, and forensic testing established that the recovered gun was the one from which the fatal shots were fired. "The trial court instructed the jury on the three counts of capital murder charged in the indictment. The court also instructed the jury on felony-murder and robbery as lesser- included offenses. The jury found Creque guilty of the three counts of capital murder as charged in the indictment. "At the penalty phase, Creque presented a variety of evidence offered as support for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, including: testimony about his chaotic upbringing that included physical and emotional abuse; evidence about his learning disabilities, educational deficiencies, and the lack of appropriate parental role models; evidence of his chronic abuse of drugs and alcohol; and evidence that he had sustained numerous concussions and other physical injuries during his childhood. The jury recommended that the trial court sentence Creque to death, and the trial court imposed the death sentence." Creque v. State, 272 So. 3d 659, 673-74 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (footnote omitted). 6 CR-2023-0654 Standard of Review In Belcher v. State, [Ms. CR-2023-0206, June 26, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2026), this Court set forth the standard that we use to review a postconviction petition as follows: "It is well settled that a circuit court may summarily dismiss a postconviction petition pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., " '[i]f the court determines that the petition is not sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief under this rule and that no purpose would be served by any further proceedings ....' "See also Hannon v. State, 861 So. 2d 426, 427 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); Cogman v. State, 852 So. 2d 191, 193 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); Tatum v. State, 607 So. 2d 383, 384 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). " ' " [W]here there are disputed facts in a postconviction proceeding and the circuit court resolves those disputed facts, '[t]he standard of review on appeal ... is whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the petition.' " Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113, 1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Elliott v. State, 601 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)). However, "when the facts are undisputed and an appellate court is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo." Ex parte White, 792 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001). "The sufficiency of pleadings in a Rule 32 petition is a question of law" and is reviewed 7 CR-2023-0654 " 'de novo.' " Ex parte Beckworth, 190 So. 3d 571, 573 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Ex parte Lamb, 113 So. 3d 686, 689 (Ala. 2011)). Moreover, when a trial court makes its judgment "based on the cold trial record," we apply a de novo standard of review. Ex parte Hinton, 172 So. 3d 348, 352 (Ala. 2012).' "Harris v. State, 365 So. 3d 1075, 1089 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021). "Some of [Creque's] claims were summarily dismissed on the ground that they were insufficiently pleaded. " 'Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., states that "[t]he petitioner shall have the burden of pleading ... the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief." Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., states that "[t]he petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings." As this Court noted in Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003): " ' " 'Rule 32.6(b) requires that the petition itself disclose the facts relied upon in seeking relief.' Boyd v. State, 746 So. 2d 364, 406 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). In other words, it is not the pleading of a conclusion 'which, if true, entitle[s] the petitioner to relief.' Lancaster v. State, 638 So. 2d 1370, 1373 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). It is the allegation of facts in pleading which, if true, entitle a petitioner to relief. After facts are pleaded, which, if true, entitle 8 CR-2023-0654 the petitioner to relief, the petitioner is then entitled to an opportunity, as provided in Rule 32.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., to present evidence proving those alleged facts." " '913 So. 2d at 1125. " ' "The burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b) is a heavy one. Conclusions unsupported by specific facts will not satisfy the requirements of Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). The full factual basis for the claim must be included in the petition itself. If, assuming every factual allegation in a Rule 32 petition to be true, a court cannot determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the petitioner has not satisfied the burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). See Bracknell v. State, 883 So. 2d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)." " 'Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 356 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). " ' "Although postconviction proceedings are civil in nature, they are governed by the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Rule 32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. The 'notice pleading' requirements relative to civil cases do not apply to Rule 32 proceedings. 'Unlike the general requirements related to civil cases, the pleading requirements for postconviction petitions are more stringent....' Daniel 9 CR-2023-0654 v. State, 86 So. 3d 405, 410-11 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., requires that full facts be pleaded in the petition if the petition is to survive summary dismissal. See Daniel, supra. Thus, to satisfy the requirements for pleading as they relate to postconviction petitions, Washington was required to plead full facts to support each individual claim." " 'Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 26, 59 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012). "The pleading requirements of Rule 32 apply equally to capital cases in which the death penalty has been imposed." Taylor v. State, 157 So. 3d 131, 140 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).' "Harris, 365 So. 3d at 1089-90." ___ So. 3d at ___. In addition, "[s]ummary disposition is also appropriate when the petition is obviously without merit or where the record directly refutes a Rule 32 petitioner's claim." Lanier v. State, 296 So. 3d 341, 343 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019). Moreover, " ' [t]he procedural bars of Rule 32 apply with equal force to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed.' " Brownlee v. State, 666 So. 2d 91, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (citation omitted). "Finally, ' [w]ith certain exceptions not applicable here, "this Court may affirm the judgment of the circuit court for any reason, even if it is not for the reason stated by the circuit 10 CR-2023-0654 court." ' Harris [v. State], 365 So. 3d [1075,] 1091 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2021)] (quoting Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012))." Belcher, ___ So. 3d at ___. Analysis Creque asserts on appeal that the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing the following five general claims in his petition: that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to "effectively marshal evidence of [his] intoxication and mental state," that trial counsel ineffectively "handle[d] jury selection and juror misconduct," that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty and sentencing phases of his trial, that trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective "in myriad other ways," and that the circuit court committed numerous legal errors in summarily dismissing his petition. (Creque's brief, pp. 25, 46, 59, 88, 91.) None of these arguments entitle Creque to relief. Before addressing Creque's claims on appeal, we note that the majority of his arguments on appeal concern claims that the circuit court erroneously dismissed his multiple ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 11 CR-2023-0654 claims without an evidentiary hearing. In considering Creque's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, we apply the following well- settled legal principles: " ' "To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). " ' " 'Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 12 CR-2023-0654 action "might be considered sound trial strategy." There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.' " ' "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. " ' " '[T]he purpose of ineffectiveness review is not to grade counsel's performance. See Strickland [v. Washington], [466 U.S. 668,] 104 S. Ct. [2052] at 2065 [(1984)]; see also White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 1992) ("We are not interested in grading lawyers' performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately."). We recognize that "[r]epresentation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another." Strickland, [466 U.S. at 693,] 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Different lawyers have different gifts; this fact, as well as differing circumstances from case to case, means the range of what might be a reasonable approach at trial must be broad. To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable. …' " ' "Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313- 14 (11th Cir. 2000) (footnotes omitted). 13 CR-2023-0654 " ' "An appellant is not entitled to 'perfect representation.' Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). '[I]n considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, "we address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled." ' Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987)." " 'Yeomans v. State, 195 So. 3d 1018, 1025-26 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013). ... " 'We also recognize that when reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel "the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).' " Belcher, ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Marshall v. State, 182 So. 3d 573, 582- 83 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)). "In determining whether a petitioner was prejudiced by any deficient performance, " ' " 'a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' … In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence." ' " 14 CR-2023-0654 Belcher, ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Gaddy v. State, 952 So. 2d 1149, 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), quoting in turn Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003), quoting in turn Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). With these principles in mind, we review Creque's arguments on appeal. I. Ineffective Assistance Regarding Intoxication/Mental State Creque first contends, as he did in his petition, that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to "effectively" present evidence of his intoxication and mental state at the time of his confession and at the time of the offenses. More specifically, Creque argues that his trial counsel failed to "effectively" challenge the admissibility of his confession, failed to "adequately" argue that the confession should not be believed, and failed to argue that he lacked the specific intent to kill based on his intoxication and mental state at the time of the offenses. A. Motion to Suppress Creque first argues that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in moving to suppress his statements. 15 CR-2023-0654 This Court addressed Creque's preserved argument on direct appeal that "the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements." Creque, 272 So. 3d at 675. After a thorough analysis, this Court rejected Creque's underlying, substantive claim that his motion to suppress was erroneously denied. Id. at 675-88. Creque argued at trial and on direct appeal that the statements he provided at the hospital were inadmissible because he was not Mirandized3 and "that the post-waiver statement was involuntary because, he says, he was under the influence of Ativan and the drugs and alcohol he had ingested before he went to the hospital and he was coerced." Id. at 675, 679. Creque also argued that "he was 'drowsy and incapacitated' at the police station when [Det.] Archer went over his statement with him." Id. at 679. This Court rejected each of Creque's arguments. We held that "the trial court here correctly determined that Creque was not in custody when he spoke to [Det.] Pinion, and that [Det.] Pinion was not required to advise Creque of his Miranda rights before questioning him about what had happened." Id. at 679. We then rejected Creque's contentions that his statements 3Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 16 CR-2023-0654 were involuntary based on his use of drugs and alcohol and the shot of Ativan he received at the hospital. As this Court explained: "Creque … was not so impaired as to make him unconscious of the meaning of his words so as to render his Miranda waiver or his statement involuntary. To the contrary, it is clear from the testimony and from Creque's own statement that he was so alert and so aware of the circumstances and the meaning of his words that he adjusted his version of events to respond to [Det.] Archer's questions and comments about information from the investigation that conflicted with what Creque had initially told [Det.] Archer. Furthermore, Creque did not request that [Det.] Archer stop the review of his written statement because he was tired and incapable of continuing, and he engaged in further discussion with [Det.] Archer about certain details of the statement and wrote additional information on the statement at the conclusion of the review of the written statement." Id. at 684. This Court also rejected Creque's contention on direct appeal that his statement was involuntary because of the combined effects of alcohol, drugs, and sleep deprivation. "Having reviewed the videotape, this Court agree[d] with the trial court's determination that Creque was obviously tired and sleepy, but not to the degree that rendered his statement involuntary." Id. at 685. In sum, we held that, "[c]onsidering all of Creque's arguments as to the voluntariness of his Miranda waivers and statements in light of the totality of the circumstances, … the trial court did not 17 CR-2023-0654 err in ruling that Creque's statements were voluntary, so they were properly admitted into evidence." Id. at 686. Creque's postconviction claim that trial counsel were ineffective in moving to suppress his statements was likewise properly dismissed. See Lee v. State, 44 So. 3d 1145, 1173 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) ("Because the substantive claim underlying the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has no merit, counsel could not be ineffective" based on his alleged deficient presentation of this motion.). Although Creque's petition asserts that other experts would have been more effective in showing how Creque's statements to authorities may have been influenced by his consumption of alcohol and different controlled substances, he failed to sufficiently plead information that his statements would have been inadmissible considering the circuit court's review of other evidence already presented, including its review of Creque's confession itself. Moreover, because the motion to suppress was properly denied, the timing of the meritless motion could not result in constitutionally ineffective assistance. In short, Creque pleaded no facts that would even suggest a reasonable probability of prejudice -- that either the trial court's or this Court's merits analysis would have been 18 CR-2023-0654 different had the trial court been given more time to consider the motion. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, [Ms. CR-21-0109, Aug. 22, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2025) ("Although Wilson makes the bare allegation that, if his counsel had 'timely' filed the motion, then 'the motion would have been granted,' Wilson does not plead any facts as to how the trial court's merits analysis would have differed had his counsel filed the motion earlier."). Likewise, although the State's mentioning Creque's confession in opening statements may have been prejudicial had the confession been held to be inadmissible, no prejudice could have resulted because the confession was properly admitted at trial. Creque's allegations were insufficiently pleaded because he pleaded no facts that, if true, show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged untimeliness, the result of Creque's trial would have been different, particularly because the underlying substantive claims were without merit. To the extent that Creque contends on appeal that "[i]t violates the Sixth Amendment for counsel to wait until the middle of trial to come up with a defense theory" (Creque's brief, p. 34), that claim is deemed waived because it does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. 19 CR-2023-0654 App. P. See, e.g., Woodward v. State, 276 So. 3d 713, 746 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (holding that Woodward's argument was waived because he "reassert[ed] this claim from his petition, but he made no argument regarding why he believe[d] the circuit court's findings were incorrect"). Furthermore, to the extent that Creque argues that trial counsel could not prepare for trial until they knew that Creque's confession would be admitted into evidence, it is clear that counsel had to prepare for trial with the assumption that the confession would be admitted into evidence for the jury's consideration at least until a suppression motion was filed and the trial court made a ruling. Thus, the trial court's mid-trial ruling that the confession was admissible could not have changed counsel's strategy that was necessarily in place at least until the suppression motion was filed. Although Creque cites two cases from other circuits, Creque does not cite to the trial record or make any argument on appeal in support of this claim and what alternative theory he believed counsel failed to make, much less explain how counsel's failure to pursue such a theory prejudiced him. Later, in providing a laundry list of the additional "myriad other ways" that counsel were ineffective, Creque states that his counsel should have "present[ed] an alternative theory that Gholston was 20 CR-2023-0654 the real shooter of both victims." (Creque's brief, p. 89.) However, again, Creque offers no argument but merely cites allegations in his petition that Gholston allegedly "had far more motive to commit a robbery" and that a witness, Justin Creque, could have testified that Gholston suggested to Creque that they should "hit a lick." (C. 426, 454.) Neither allegation, however, supports a theory that Gholston was the real shooter, especially in light of Creque's pretrial (and properly admitted) confession that he shot both victims, as well as his trial testimony that he shot Graff. Moreover, the circuit court properly dismissed this claim because it was both insufficiently pleaded and without merit. Because the evidence against Creque -- Creque's detailed confessions and ample corroborating evidence -- was overwhelming, there was no reasonable probability that a defense theory that contradicted Creque's confessions and argued that Gholston was the shooter of both victims would have resulted in a different outcome. The defense "theory of the case at trial was that [Creque] shot only Graff and that he did so accidentally." Creque, 272 So. 3d at 698. That theory could be reconciled with Creque's admissible confession, but the 21 CR-2023-0654 theory proffered in Creque's Rule 32 petition and on appeal cannot. The defense theory pursued at trial was not "unreasonable," particularly given Creque's own admissions. Creque's alternative postconviction theory that Gholston was responsible directly contradicted Creque’s confession, and, thus, counsel could not be ineffective for failing to present a theory contradicted by Creque's own confession, which this Court held was properly admitted on direct appeal and which was amply corroborated at trial. Even at trial, Creque acknowledged going to Tucker’s Gas Station and Pawn Shop to buy a pistol on August 23, 2011. Creque was convinced to join Gholston in the robbery because they had a "greater chance" with Creque’s gun and because Creque "knew the ins and outs" of Krystal. (TR. 2280-81.) Creque testified that he was "convinced" only because he was going to merely "stand at the door and watch guard." (TR. 2281.) However, Creque admitted that he loaded the gun with bullets. (TR. 2349.) Creque acknowledged shooting Graff, although he claimed that it was an accident that occurred when Graff was trying to get out of the cooler. (TR. 2293-94.) However, Creque also testified that Graff had "grabbed [Aguilar] a jacket" on their way to the cooler, indicating that Graff was complying with going in it and not going 22 CR-2023-0654 to try to prevent going in. Creque and Gholston ran from the scene after Aguilar was shot and then split the money between themselves and Eldred. (TR. 2293-96.) Creque admitted throwing his clothes and shoes and bandana in a dumpster. (TR. 2303.) Creque admitted he "c[a]me up with a story that would pretty much cover what took place." (TR. 2306.) Brittany Orr drove him to the hospital, and he indeed "told [the nurses] that [he] had been beaten up and knew something about [what had happened] at Krystal." (TR. 2307.) Creque said that his initial story involved Taurus and "Quincy and … [his] being forced to commit a robbery." (TR. 2309.) He also admitted that, before that story, he had told Eldred and Brittany Orr that he had helped Gholston with the robbery, but that Gholston had shot two people. Creque hid money in the stereo speaker in Megan Orr's apartment, where he lived. Creque admittedly cut himself before going to the hospital to corroborate the story that he was forced to participate in the robbery. (TR. 2297, 2309, 2305.) Brittany also testified that she helped injure him to corroborate his "story." Moreover, trial counsel bolstered Creque's trial testimony with the testimony of "Janice Johnson, a self-employed crime-scene analyst who had experience in crime-scene reconstruction." Creque, 272 23 CR-2023-0654 So. 3d at 698. On direct appeal, this Court recounted how Johnson's testimony supported Creque's accidental-shooting theory and how trial counsel relied upon it in the guilt-phase closing argument. Id. at 698- 700. In sum, "because the chosen theory of defense [accidental shooting of Graff] was reasonable, 'it is immaterial that some other reasonable courses of defense … existed.' " Brooks v. State, 929 So. 2d 491, 503 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1316 n.16 (11th Cir. 2000)). Moreover, " 'the mere existence of a potential alternative defense theory is not enough to establish ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to present that theory.' " Hunt v. State, 940 So. 2d 1041, 1067 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Rosario- Dominguez v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 500, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). Creque also failed to plead facts to show that additional evidence of Creque's alcohol and drug use leading up to the crimes would have changed the result, particularly considering the trial court's finding at trial and this Court's finding on appeal that Creque's statements were admissible. The trial court considered the audio and video recordings of Creque's statements to police and found "no indication … that Mr. Creque 24 CR-2023-0654 was under the influence of any kind of drugs legal or otherwise" (TR. 2065), and, after reviewing those recordings, this Court agreed with the trial court on direct appeal. The trial testimony was that, although Creque was "tired" and "sleepy," none of those circumstances "impact[ed] his ability to make coherent statements." (TR. 2065-66.) In short, "[i]f the court cannot determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief after considering all of the factual assertions to be true, then the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of pleading pursuant to Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P." Lee v. State, 44 So. 3d 1145, 1156 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). Creque also argues that trial counsel "failed to effectively marshal the evidence supporting suppression of [his] statement." (Creque's brief, p. 35.) More specifically, Creque contends that counsel should have elicited lay witnesses to testify about his alcohol and drug use in the hours before the murders. Creque twice contends on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "present evidence from lay witnesses about [his] mental state" and for failing to "elicit any evidence at the suppression hearing or trial from the multiple available lay witnesses who observed [him] in the hours leading up to the offense and could have 25 CR-2023-0654 testified about just how intoxicated and sleep-deprived [he] was." (Creque's brief, pp. 35-36.) Creque, however, makes no arguments on appeal regarding this contention but merely cites his petition and alleges in a footnote that Megan Orr, Brittany Orr, Eldred, Gholston, and Taurus Pickett "could have" testified. Bare contentions without argument do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., and are, thus, waived. Moreover, this contention was insufficiently pleaded. Although Creque identified who "could have"