Michael David Belcher v. State of Alabama

Rel: June 26, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________ CR-2023-0206 _________________________ Michael David Belcher v. State of Alabama Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court (CC-16-161.60) On Application for Rehearing COLE, Judge. The opinion issued on August 22, 2025, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor. CR-2023-0206 Michael David Belcher, an inmate on Alabama's death row, appeals the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. Facts and Procedural History In January 2016, Belcher was indicted for the murder of Samantha Payne,1 which was made capital because it was committed during the course of a kidnapping. Belcher was convicted of the capital murder of Samantha during a kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and, on March 18, 2019, the jury unanimously recommended that Belcher be sentenced to death after also unanimously finding that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital 1Four other individuals -- Chylli Bruce, Steven George, Alyssa Watson, and Marcus George -- were also indicted for their roles in Samantha's murder. Belcher v. State, 341 So. 3d 237, 238 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020). Bruce and Steven George testified at Belcher's trial. "Bruce had pleaded guilty to felony murder in exchange for a 20-year sentence that would be split to require her to serve 5 years in prison." Id. "The circuit court conditionally accepted Bruce's plea and delayed sentencing her until after she testified at her codefendants' trials." Id. "Steven George pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole." Id. "The court also conditionally accepted Steven's plea and delayed his sentencing." Id. 2 CR-2023-0206 offenses." (C. 28, 34.)2 On April 3, 2019, the trial court sentenced Belcher to death in accordance with the jury's recommendation. (C. 30-52.) On April 10, 2019, Belcher was appointed postconviction counsel. The facts of Belcher's crime were set forth in this Court's opinion affirming Belcher's conviction and sentence on direct appeal as follows: "[O]n November 9, 2015, a hunter discovered the nude, decapitated, and decomposed body of Samantha Payne tied to the base of a tree in Talladega National Forest. Samantha's hands were stretched upward and bound to the base of the tree with a leather belt, and 'coaxial cable' was tied around Samantha's wrists. (R. 920.) Her head was approximately 14 feet from her body. Dr. Steven Dunton, a medical examiner with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that because Samantha's body was so decomposed it was impossible for him to determine her exact cause of death. (R. 923.) He said that X-rays revealed that Samantha had fractures to four of her ribs and that those fractures were caused by a 'crushing trauma of some type.' (R. 928.) Samantha was alive, he said, when she was tied to the tree. Dr. Dunton testified that, based on his experience, he did 'not believe' that Samantha died of natural causes. (R. 928.) "Two of Belcher's codefendants testified in exchange for plea agreements with the State. Chylli Bruce testified that she pleaded guilty to her role in the kidnapping and murder of Samantha and that, as part of that agreement, she agreed to testify truthfully at her codefendants' trials. (R. 464.) She testified that she was a drug addict; that she was using crystal methamphetamine at the time of the murder; that she met 2"C" refers to the clerk's record in this case. "SC" refers to the supplemental record in this case. "TC" and "TR" refer to the clerk's record and to the reporter's transcript from Belcher's trial. 3 CR-2023-0206 Belcher when she was 18 years old; and that they 'hung out' together for several months before the murder. (R. 469.) On the night of the murder, Bruce said, she, Belcher, Steven George, Alyssa Watson, and Marcus George were at a place called Wee Racing ('the Shop'), a motorcycle-repair shop that was owned by Belcher's father, when Samantha arrived at around 2:00 a.m. At around 3:00 a.m., Belcher forced Samantha into the backseat of his vehicle and held her down while Bruce drove the vehicle to Belcher's house. Steven, Alyssa, and Marcus[] followed in a separate vehicle. When Belcher got out of his vehicle, Samantha was screaming and Belcher was hitting her in the face. (R. 478.) Instead of going into Belcher's house, they got back into the vehicles and drove to an abandoned trailer on Highway 82. According to Bruce: " '[Samantha] is taken out of the car. [Belcher] is trying to tie her up in the back seat, but she won't be still. So I place my foot on her face, and I guess he's tying her up with the belt or something. The next thing I remember she's laying on the ground, she's tied up. I'm asked to take her fingernails off.' "(R. 480.) Bruce got a knife and 'popped' off Samantha's artificial fingernails (R. 480), Belcher and Marcus beat and kicked her, and then they put Samantha into the trunk of one of the vehicles and drove to Talladega National Forest. At one point, Samantha fell out of the trunk when the vehicle hit a pothole, and Bruce helped Belcher put Samantha back into the trunk and they drove into the forest. Bruce testified: " 'We come to a bridge. Marcus says that -- tells [Belcher] that we're going to have to kill her. [Belcher] says that we will have to. So we get back on the road, and we keep going into this forest. We run out of gas.' "(R. 484.) At that point, Marcus and Alyssa drove past them in their vehicle. Belcher and Steven then took Samantha out 4 CR-2023-0206 of the trunk and led her into the forest. Shortly thereafter, Bruce said, Steven returned and she and Steven walked to a campsite and called Steven's brother to bring them gas. After Bruce and Steven put gas in the car and tried to leave, police arrived. Belcher's vehicle was searched, and Bruce was arrested, charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, and taken to jail. About four days after she was released from jail, Bruce said, she saw Belcher and he confessed to her that he had killed Samantha by stabbing her. "Steven testified that he pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for his testimony at his codefendants' trials. He testified that in September 2015, he started spending a lot of time with Belcher and the two would hang out together and 'do drugs' at the Shop. (R. 547.) On the evening of November 1, 2015, Belcher, Marcus, Alyssa, and Samantha were at the Shop. Steven said that he took Samantha's vehicle when she went to the bathroom and left her keys on a counter. He and Marcus drove down Highway 219, but he decided that he wanted the vehicle's catalytic converter, so he drove back to the Shop. After removing the catalytic converter, he set the vehicle on fire. He and Marcus then went to Belcher's house so that he could change clothes. When they returned to the Shop, Steven said, Belcher and Bruce were in Belcher's vehicle and were driving away from the Shop. They followed them to Belcher's house. Belcher pulled Samantha from the backseat of his vehicle and started kicking and slamming Samantha into the floor. Samantha's face was bleeding badly. (R. 562.) The group then got into two vehicles and drove to an abandoned trailer and house. (R. 563.) When they arrived, Belcher continued to kick and stomp Samantha in the face. Belcher told Steven to get something he could use to tie up Samantha, so Steven went and got some cable wire from the trailer. Samantha was crawling around and telling them that she 'loved them' and that she would not tell anyone what they had done. (R. 565.) Belcher, Bruce, and Steven then left in Belcher's vehicle with Samantha in the trunk and Belcher driving. Samantha fell out of the trunk and Belcher stopped. 5 CR-2023-0206 Bruce helped Belcher put Samantha back in the trunk. Belcher said that he knew a place that they could take her, and they headed to the Talladega National Forest. They ran out of gas. According to Steven: " 'And then [Belcher] said, "We got to get her out of the car." So he gets her out of the car, starts dragging her in the woods. [Belcher] told me to come help him. So I get out of the car, go help him drag her in the woods.' "(R. 572.) " '[S]he kept trying to get loud with him. So [Belcher] started stomping her in the face. Said, Shut up. If you don't shut up, I'm going to kill you. He told me to get some more rope out of the car. So I was fixing to go get -- He said, Well, hand me your knife. I gave him the knife, and I went to the car. When I got to the car, [Bruce] was already walking back. I told [Bruce] to get in the car. I got the car cranked up. It might have went a few feet and cut off. Then me and her went up the hill to the firing -- shooting range. We got in a conversation with the game wardens, asking for some gas. They didn't have no gas, so we kept walking. So I got up the road.' "(R. 575.) The last time he saw Samantha, Steven said, she was fully dressed and alive. "Deputy Enoch Rose of the Hale County Sheriff's Department testified that he was dispatched to Talladega National Forest on November 2, 2015, in response to an emergency 911 call that 'somebody was up there, supposedly one of Tuscaloosa County's most wanted ... and that subject was up there walking on the road and asking for gas.' (R. 615.) He approached a vehicle and found Steven and Bruce. Deputy 6 CR-2023-0206 Rose said that he verified with dispatch that the vehicle belonged to Belcher. After searching the vehicle and the surrounding area, he found a knife near the passenger side front tire of the vehicle. (R. 627.) That knife was identified as belonging to Steven and as the knife that Steven said he gave to Belcher before Samantha was taken into the forest. ".... "James Harvey testified that on the morning of November 2, 2015, Lauren [Harvey] telephoned him and said that a 'half-naked man' was beating on her door and trying to get into her house. (R. 655.) He lived about four miles from Lauren, so he got into his vehicle and drove to her house. As Harvey approached Lauren's driveway, he said, Lauren called him. The man had left her house, and she told Harvey the direction that the man was walking. Harvey found a man, who he identified at trial as Belcher, sitting on the guardrail of a bridge. He said that Belcher had no shirt and had scratches all over him, and that there was a 'red tint' to his hands that Harvey believed was some type of blood. (R. 662.) Harvey said that Belcher told him that his friends had played a trick on him; that they had left him in the woods; and that he had been walking all night. Harvey drove Belcher to a local store. Lauren called Harvey and told him that deputies wanted to talk to Belcher. Harvey said that he then drove Belcher back to where he had picked up Belcher and that deputies were waiting for them. "Lieutenant Al Jackson with the Tuscaloosa County Sheriff's Office testified that he was called to South Sandy Road in response to a call about a 'wanted person.' (R. 668.) When he arrived, he found a vehicle on the side of the road and two people in custody, Steven and Bruce. While there he received another call from dispatch regarding a person knocking on doors on Bear Creek Road. Eventually, he met up with Harvey; a man who he identified as Belcher was in the 7 CR-2023-0206 car with Harvey. Belcher had no shirt on, was wearing shorts, and had 'scratches on him, like briar scratches.' (R. 675.) "Investigator J.C. Bryant of the Tuscaloosa Police Department testified that he was called to the scene when a body was discovered in Talladega National Forest on November 9, 2015. He said that, after he learned that Steven and Bruce had been detained a week earlier in the general area where the body was found, he spoke to Steven, who was still in police custody. He said that Steven told him what had happened to Samantha, and he then interviewed Belcher on November 9, 2015. Belcher denied all involvement in Samantha's murder. On November 10, 2015, Inv. Bryant obtained a search warrant for Belcher's house. As a result of the search, he discovered a car battery inside a clothes dryer. "Investigator Richard Wilkins of the Tuscaloosa Police Department testified that he was the lead investigator into Samantha's death. He testified that a search was conducted at the location where Steven and Bruce said that Samantha had first been tied up. The cable retrieved from that location was consistent, he said, with the cable wire that had been used to tie Samantha's wrists. "A forensic biologist with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, Hannah Payne, testified that she conducted biological tests on swabs and clothing that had been collected from the crime scene and sent to her office. She testified that Belcher's DNA was found on the handle of Steven's pocketknife (R. 896), and that Samantha's blood was found on a jacket that had been taken from Belcher's vehicle and on Steven's shirt. "Belcher's defense was that, although he participated in the events that ultimately led to Samantha's murder, Steven was the person who actually killed her. Belcher testified on his own behalf that on the evening of November 1, 2015, he was at the Shop working on a customer's motorcycle when he 8 CR-2023-0206 'looked up' and saw Samantha. (R. 957.) He was surprised, he said, to see her because he had already told her not to have any contact with him. Belcher said that he, Steven, Marcus, Alyssa, and Bruce were 'snorting methamphetamine.' (R. 959.) Sometime later, he said, Samantha 'stormed' into where he had been working and asked him what happened to her vehicle because it was missing from the Shop. (R. 960.) He said that the 'others' had a 'violent argument' with Samantha and that Alyssa and Bruce physically attacked Samantha. (R. 963.) They all drove to his house, Belcher said, and all the others, except himself, were debating about what to do with Samantha. He testified that Steven and Bruce pulled Samantha from the car and started punching and stomping her face. He watched it all happen and did not intervene to help Samantha. According to Belcher, Marcus handed Steven a hammer, Steven hit Samantha in the head, and then they put Samantha in a vehicle and took her to [Alyssa's] father's house off Highway 82. He testified: " 'Steven opens the trunk up. And me and Steven take [Samantha] out of the trunk. [Bruce is] still in the car. Me and Steven are still arguing. And it's -- we didn't just leave her in the middle of the road. We sat her a few feet off on the edge of the woods in the bushes. At that point, Steven was walking around the car. I turn around and walk back off up the road the way we had just came in. I didn't know where I was at. I didn't know where the road led to. I knew we came in the way we came in, and I just walked. I continued to walk, took several different roads; but I didn't remember where we come from. It was daylight at this point.' "(R. 975.) A man picked him up, he said, and took him to a store. Shortly thereafter, he was taken into custody. On cross- examination, Belcher said that he just 'followed the crowd.' (R. 990.) 9 CR-2023-0206 "At the penalty phase of the trial, Belcher called several witnesses to testify in mitigation. Deputy Mike Byars of the Tuscaloosa County Sheriff's Office testified that while incarcerated Belcher had been a well-behaved inmate. Dr. Randall Griffith, a psychologist, testified that he conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of Belcher and that he interviewed Belcher at the Tuscaloosa County jail. It was his opinion that Belcher suffered from a 'mild neuro-cognitive disorder,' which, he said, means that Belcher had 'some degree of impairment in one area of his thinking ability.' (R. 1109.) Belcher also presented the testimony of several family members who said that Belcher was a doting father, that he was a kind and loving person, and that he loved animals. Belcher's mother testified that since Belcher had been arrested his faith had grown and that when she spoke to him they frequently prayed together." Belcher v. State, 341 So. 3d 237, 249-54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (footnotes omitted). On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Belcher's conviction and sentence. See Belcher, supra. On May 21, 2021, after the Alabama Supreme Court denied Belcher's petition for a writ of certiorari, this Court issued a certificate of judgment. Belcher filed his first direct-appeal brief on February 14, 2020, and he filed the instant postconviction petition on May 12, 2021, during the pendency of his direct appeal, after paying the filing fee and receiving a single, 90-day extension from the circuit court as permitted by the Fair 10 CR-2023-0206 Justice Act ("the FJA"), § 13A-5-53.1, Ala. Code 1975.3 (C. 53.) The State filed its answer to Belcher's petition on July 6, 2021, and moved the circuit court to summarily dismiss the petition on the grounds that Belcher's claims were insufficiently pleaded and meritless. Belcher submitted a response and opposition to the State's answer on August 31, 2021. On September 18, 2021, Belcher sought leave to amend the first claim in his petition. The State moved to strike the proposed amendment, contending that it failed to satisfy the successive-petition requirement established by the FJA. On September 30, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss and Belcher's request for leave to amend his petition. The same judge who had presided over Belcher's trial presided over the postconviction proceedings, and, on February 15, 2023, the circuit court entered an extensive order summarily dismissing Belcher's petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing because, it determined, the claims therein were insufficiently pleaded, meritless, or both. This appeal follows. 3Because Belcher was sentenced to death after August 2017, his postconviction efforts were governed by the FJA. See § 13A-5-53.1, Ala. Code 1975. 11 CR-2023-0206 Standard of Review It is well settled that a circuit court may summarily dismiss a postconviction petition pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., "[i]f the court determines that the petition is not sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief under this rule and that no purpose would be served by any further proceedings ...." See also Hannon v. State, 861 So. 2d 426, 427 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); Cogman v. State, 852 So. 2d 191, 193 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); Tatum v. State, 607 So. 2d 383, 384 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). " '[W]here there are disputed facts in a postconviction proceeding and the circuit court resolves those disputed facts, "[t]he standard of review on appeal ... is whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the petition." ' Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113, 1122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Elliott v. State, 601 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)). However, 'when the facts are undisputed and an appellate court is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo.' Ex parte White, 792 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001). 'The sufficiency of pleadings in a Rule 32 petition is a question of law' and is reviewed ' "de novo." ' Ex parte Beckworth, 190 So. 3d 571, 573 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Ex parte Lamb, 113 So. 3d 686, 689 (Ala. 2011)). Moreover, when a trial court makes its judgment 'based on the cold trial record,' we apply a de novo standard of review. Ex parte Hinton, 172 So. 3d 348, 352 (Ala. 2012)." Harris v. State, 365 So. 3d 1075, 1089 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021). 12 CR-2023-0206 Some of Belcher's claims were summarily dismissed on the ground that they were insufficiently pleaded. "Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., states that '[t]he petitioner shall have the burden of pleading ... the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.' Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., states that '[t]he petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.' As this Court noted in Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003): " ' "Rule 32.6(b) requires that the petition itself disclose the facts relied upon in seeking relief." Boyd v. State, 746 So. 2d 364, 406 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). In other words, it is not the pleading of a conclusion "which, if true, entitle[s] the petitioner to relief." Lancaster v. State, 638 So. 2d 1370, 1373 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). It is the allegation of facts in pleading which, if true, entitle a petitioner to relief. After facts are pleaded, which, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief, the petitioner is then entitled to an opportunity, as provided in Rule 32.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., to present evidence proving those alleged facts.' "913 So. 2d at 1125. " 'The burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b) is a heavy one. Conclusions unsupported by specific facts will not satisfy the requirements of Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). The full factual basis for the claim must be included in the petition itself. If, assuming every factual allegation in a Rule 32 petition to be true, a court 13 CR-2023-0206 cannot determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the petitioner has not satisfied the burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). See Bracknell v. State, 883 So. 2d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).' "Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 356 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). " 'Although postconviction proceedings are civil in nature, they are governed by the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Rule 32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. The "notice pleading" requirements relative to civil cases do not apply to Rule 32 proceedings. "Unlike the general requirements related to civil cases, the pleading requirements for postconviction petitions are more stringent...." Daniel v. State, 86 So. 3d 405, 410-11 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., requires that full facts be pleaded in the petition if the petition is to survive summary dismissal. See Daniel, supra. Thus, to satisfy the requirements for pleading as they relate to postconviction petitions, Washington was required to plead full facts to support each individual claim.' "Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 26, 59 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012). 'The pleading requirements of Rule 32 apply equally to capital cases in which the death penalty has been imposed.' Taylor v. State, 157 So. 3d 131, 140 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)." Harris, 365 So. 3d at 1089-90. The circuit court also summarily dismissed some of Belcher's claims on the merits. Importantly, the circuit judge who ruled on Belcher's postconviction petition was the same judge who had presided over 14 CR-2023-0206 Belcher's capital-murder trial. When the judge who rules on a petition is the "same judge who presided over [the] trial," the judge has personal knowledge of facts underlying the allegations and has had the " 'opportunity to observe counsel's performance throughout the proceedings.' " Partain v. State, 47 So. 3d 282, 286 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008). It is well settled that a judge may summarily dismiss a claim, including an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, without further proceedings based on his own personal knowledge. Id. (citing Ex parte Walker, 800 So. 2d 135 (Ala. 2000)). See also Harris, 365 So. 3d at 1090 ("This is true even with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."). Indeed, " '[n]either this Court nor the Alabama Supreme Court has ever held that an evidentiary hearing must be conducted on every postconviction petition that raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Such a requirement would burden an already overburdened judiciary. "An evidentiary hearing on a coram nobis petition [now Rule 32 petition] is required only if the petition is 'meritorious on its face.' Ex parte Boatwright, 471 So. 2d 1257 (Ala. 1985)." Moore v. State, 502 So. 2d 819, 820 (Ala. 1986).' "Jackson v. State, 133 So. 3d 420, 444-45 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). See also Ex parte Hill, 591 So. 2d 462, 463 (Ala. 1991) ('[A] judge who presided over the trial or other proceeding and observed the conduct of the attorneys at the trial or other proceeding need not hold a hearing on the effectiveness of those attorneys based upon conduct that he observed.'); and 15 CR-2023-0206 Partain v. State, 47 So. 3d 282, 286 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) ('[A] circuit judge who has personal knowledge of the facts underlying an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel may summarily deny that allegation based on the judge's personal knowledge of counsel's performance.')." Harris, 365 So. 3d at 1089-90. Finally, "[w]ith certain exceptions not applicable here, 'this Court may affirm the judgment of the circuit court for any reason, even if it is not for the reason stated by the circuit court.' " Harris, 365 So. 3d at 1091 (quoting Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012)). Analysis Belcher asserts six general arguments on appeal: that the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing his claim that Juror J.D.H. committed misconduct by failing to disclose his son's criminal convictions, that the circuit court erred by refusing to equitably toll the deadline to amend his petition, that the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing his claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his capital-murder trial, that the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing his claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the guilt phase of his capital-murder trial, that the circuit court erred by failing to grant him discovery, and that application of the 16 CR-2023-0206 FJA deprived him of a fair opportunity to obtain postconviction relief. None of these arguments entitles Belcher to relief. I. Juror-Misconduct Claim Belcher first contends that the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing his postconviction claim that "Juror J.D.H. failed to disclose, in response to multiple questions on the [juror] questionnaire, that his son, P.D.H., had been arrested four times in the year leading up to Belcher's trial." (Belcher's brief, p. 10.) More specifically, the juror questionnaire, completed on March 5, 2019, asked if "you, a family member or relative, or a close friend" had "ever been involved in a criminal case as a defendant, victim, witness, or complainant," and J.D.H. responded "no." (C. 57; J.D.H.'s juror questionnaire.) The questionnaire also asked if "you or a family member or relative or close friend" had "ever been arrested for or charged with an offense other than a simple traffic violation," and J.D.H. responded affirmatively, but he stated "only that he personally had been charged with a crime that was not a felony." (C. 57; J.D.H.'s juror questionnaire.) Finally, when asked if he personally knew "anyone who has been convicted or pleaded guilty to a crime," J.D.H. responded "yes," but he left the section blank that 17 CR-2023-0206 asked prospective jurors who responded affirmatively to state "each person, ... that person's relationship to you and the name of the crime and sentence imposed, including probation." (C. 57-58; J.D.H.'s juror questionnaire.) According to Belcher, J.D.H. failed to include the following information about his son on the juror questionnaire: "[o]n March 15, 2018, J.D.H.'s son, P.D.H., was arrested in Jefferson County for first- degree theft of property" and was released on bond on March 26, 2018; "[o]n March 26, 2018, P.D.H. was arrested for third-degree burglary in Tuscaloosa County and placed in the Tuscaloosa County Jail and was released on bond on May 8, 2018; "[o]n July 21, 2018, P.D.H. was arrested for public intoxication in Tuscaloosa County and was released on bond the next day"; and "[o]n August 14, 2018, P.D.H. was arrested for carrying a pistol without a permit in Tuscaloosa County and was released on bond." (C. 57-58.) Belcher further alleged that, "[o]n August 18, 2018, this Court revoked P.D.H.'s bond on the burglary charge" and that he was "placed back in the Tuscaloosa County Jail on August 27, 2018." (C. 58.) "On October 25, 2018, P.D.H. [pleaded] guilty to the burglary and was sentenced to 46 months split with 6 months to serve in the county jail," 18 CR-2023-0206 and to 90 days on the pistol charge, which was ordered to run concurrently. (C. 58.) "On January 22, 2019, P.D.H. was released from jail and placed on probation." (C. 58.) Belcher then contended in his petition that defense counsel "would have used a peremptory strike to remove [J.D.H.] from the jury" had he known about P.D.H.'s arrests and convictions. (C. 59.) In support of this contention, Belcher noted that counsel struck "several other jurors who disclosed that their family members had been charged with crimes." (C. 59 (citing C.C.'s, M.H.'s, T.T.'s, T.C.'s, and E.J.'s juror questionnaires).) According to Belcher, "[n]o one who disclosed that they had a relative who had been convicted of a felony served on the jury." (C. 59.) Belcher further contended in his petition that if counsel had known about P.D.H.'s arrests and convictions, counsel would have also learned that P.D.H. and Belcher had been housed in the same cell and had a dispute, which resulted in the changing of cells and Belcher and P.D.H. avoiding each other, which, he said, jail records and a witness, James Wilson, could have confirmed. Belcher also alleged that, because the address listed for P.D.H. in court records was the same address listed for J.D.H. on the venire list, "J.D.H. and P.D.H. lived together at the time of 19 CR-2023-0206 Belcher's trial." (C. 60.) Belcher then speculated that "there is a reasonable likelihood that P.D.H. discussed his interactions with Belcher at the jail with J.D.H. before or during Mr. Belcher's trial." Belcher complained that this "extraneous information also violates [his] rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury." (C. 60.) In its order summarily dismissing Belcher's petition, the circuit court found that this juror-misconduct claim was insufficiently pleaded and "merely speculative." (C. 706-07.) We agree that Belcher did not meet his burden of pleading his juror-misconduct claim with specific facts that, if true, would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. "The proper standard for determining whether juror misconduct warrants a new trial ... is whether the misconduct might have prejudiced, not whether it actually did prejudice, the defendant." Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d 763, 771 (Ala. 2001). However, we need not consider whether Belcher pleaded facts that, if true, might have prejudiced him had they been known because Belcher did not plead any facts to show that J.D.H. was aware of P.D.H.'s criminal history and interactions with Belcher, much less that he failed to answer the questionnaire truthfully. Belcher alleged that P.D.H. was arrested and convicted for crimes near the time 20 CR-2023-0206 of Belcher's trial, in 2018 and 2019, and, moreover, that P.D.H., for a time, shared a cell and had "negative" interactions with Belcher. Belcher even alleged that had counsel known this information they would have used a peremptory challenge or even struck J.D.H. for cause. However, these allegations rest on layers of speculation. "First and foremost, when pursuing a claim of juror misconduct, the [defendant] must establish the misconduct actually occurred." Jackson v. State, 133 So. 3d 420, 441 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). " 'A defendant [seeking relief] on the basis of juror misconduct has the initial burden to prove that a juror or jurors did in fact commit the alleged misconduct.' " Id. (quoting Dawson v. State, 710 So. 2d 472, 475 (Ala. 1997)). "Parties ... are entitled to true and honest answers to their questions on voir dire." Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d at 771. But, for any juror misconduct to occur, the juror must first know about the information and fail to truthfully disclose it. Id. Belcher, however, never alleges that J.D.H. was aware of P.D.H.'s alleged recent arrests and convictions. Rather, he speculates that J.D.H. was aware based on his familial relationship to P.D.H. and the fact that P.D.H. had provided his father's address on an unknown document and his further speculation that P.D.H.'s having 21 CR-2023-0206 provided his father's address meant that they actually lived together. (C. 60.) Here, Belcher never alleges that J.D.H. was aware of any of his son's arrests, much less that P.D.H. had told him about interactions with Belcher in jail. Rather, Belcher speculates that J.D.H. was aware of P.D.H.'s arrests based on unspecified "court records" indicating that P.D.H. had provided the same address that J.D.H. provided as a juror and that he "believed" they lived together. (C. 60.) Belcher does not allege that J.D.H. actually knew about P.D.H.'s criminal difficulties, such as by alleging that he posted P.D.H.'s bond or paid for his counsel or appeared at hearings with P.D.H. Rather, Belcher speculates that, because P.D.H. provided his father's address as his residence in a court record, P.D.H. must have lived with his father and, further, that his father must have been aware of those arrests. This is pure speculation. Belcher alleged no facts to show that J.D.H. knew P.D.H.'s criminal history, much less that J.D.H. was aware of P.D.H.'s alleged interactions with Belcher, particularly when the petition notes that at least one of the arrests occurred in a different county. (C. 58.) See Brownfield v. State, 266 So. 3d 777, 792-93 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (" 'Unless a juror is asked a question which applies to him in a manner demanding response, it is 22 CR-2023-0206 permissible for a juror to remain silent; the juror is under no duty to disclose.' "(quoting Parish v. State, 480 So. 2d 29, 30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985))). It is also notable that J.D.H. was forthcoming during voir dire when asked if anyone had seen or heard information about the case, stating that he had hunted in the area and had heard rumors from others about the case, which he explained in detail. He explained that the information he had heard or read about was "around the time that … [i]t happened," but not since that time. (TR. 196.) He indicated that he did not know of anything that would affect his ability to be fair and impartial and that he could set aside any extraneous "scuttlebutt" he had heard. J.D.H. further stated during voir dire that he did not know any of the people involved personally and had no opinion about what happened, making Belcher's speculations that J.D.H. knew about his son's negative interactions with Belcher even less likely. Belcher simply did not plead any facts that J.D.H. was, in fact, aware of any criminal matters regarding P.D.H., much less that J.D.H. was aware of his son's alleged acquaintance with Belcher from jail. Belcher thus failed to plead facts that, if true, showed juror misconduct. 23 CR-2023-0206 Second, "[t]he form of prejudice that would entitle a party to relief for a juror's nondisclosure or falsification in voir dire would be its effect, if any, to cause the party to forgo challenging the juror for cause or exercising a peremptory challenge to strike the juror." Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So. 2d at 772. Again, Belcher failed to plead facts that, if true, indicate that he might have been prejudiced. Indee