Traci S. Rose v. Paradise Island RV Park, Terry Hope, Judy Hope, and Deanna Hope
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Date FiledJuly 31, 2026
DocketCL-2026-0207
JudgeEdwards, J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: July 31, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
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_________________________
Traci S. Rose
v.
Paradise Island RV Park, Terry Hope,
Judy Hope, and Deanna Hope
Appeal from Talladega Circuit Court
(CV-25-900537)
EDWARDS, Judge.
In October 2025, Traci S. Rose filed in the Talladega Circuit Court
("the trial court") an emergency petition for injunctive relief and a
request for an emergency hearing; Rose alleged that her landlords, Terry
Hope, Judy Hope, and Deanna Hope ("the landlords"), and Paradise
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Island RV Park ("the RV Park") had disconnected the electric service to
a lot she rented located in the landlords' and the RV Park's premises. At
the October 22, 2025, hearing on her petition, Rose admitted that electric
service had been restored. The trial court entered an order and an
amended order on October 23, 2025, granting Rose a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the landlords and the RV Park from "caus[ing]
electrical services to be disconnected pending further orders of the [trial]
court."1 The order and amended order also required Rose to pay her
monthly lot rent and electric-bill amount into the trial court by November
3, 2025.2 In addition, the order and the amended order both indicated
that the landlords had indicated that they had served an eviction notice
on Rose and that Rose had admitted receipt of that eviction notice. In
the amended order, the trial court set a status conference for December
18, 2025.
1The trial court amended its order the same day to make a few
irrelevant changes to the text of the order, which are irrelevant to this
appeal, and to change the date of the status conference from December
19, 2025, to December 18, 2025.
2The record reflects that Rose's monthly lot rent was $500.
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On November 3, 2025, Rose filed an "emergency motion for sewage
contamination abatement, eviction stay, and suspension of [her] escrow
bond," i.e., the obligation that she pay her monthly lot rent and electric-
bill amount into the trial court. In that motion, Rose alleged that raw
sewage had "backed up" on the leased premises on September 17, 2025,
and again on November 3, 2025. Rose further indicated that the October
23, 2025, order and amended order had required her to pay her monthly
lot rent and electric-bill amount into the trial court "if payment[] was
rejected by the [landlords]." Rose alleged that the dispute over her
monthly lot rent and electric bill, about which the landlords had
complained at the October 22, 2025, hearing, had been prompted by her
report of the September 17, 2025, sewage spill to the authorities. She
further alleged that, although she had tendered funds to pay her
November 2025 monthly lot rent and electric bill to the landlords, the
landlords had rejected that payment and that she had paid the money
into the trial court on November 3, 2025, as directed in the October 23,
2025, order and amended order.3
3The clerk's record supports Rose's statement in her November 3,
2025, motion and her statement at the December 18, 2025, status
conference, a transcript of which is contained in the record on appeal,
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Without apparent cause, the trial court issued another amended
order relating to the October 22, 2025, hearing on November 3, 2025 ("the
second amended order"). In the second amended order, the trial court
inexplicably ordered that the landlords and the RV Park "shall cause
electrical services to be disconnected pending further orders of the [trial]
court."4 The second amended order also reset the status conference to
December 19, 2025, the date specified in the original order and not the
first amended order.
On December 1, 2025, Rose filed a motion seeking an expedited
hearing on her motion relating to the sewage contamination. In that
motion, she reiterated that she desired that the trial court suspend the
requirement that she pay her monthly lot rent and electric-bill amount
into the trial court based on the failure of the landlords to abate the
sewage hazard, thus restoring the habitability of the leased premises.
She also stated that she could not "help but perceive the requirement of
indicating that she had paid money into the trial court on November 3,
2025. However, the clerk's record indicates that she paid into the trial
court the sum of $500, which is Rose's monthly lot rent and does not
include an amount for her electric bill.
4In response to the second amended order, the landlords and the RV
Park apparently again disconnected electrical service to Rose's trailer.
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the escrow bond as being punitive, rather than constructive." The case-
action-summary sheet indicates that the trial court set Rose's motions for
a hearing to be held on January 7, 2026, and set the case for a trial to be
held on January 22, 2026.
On December 19, 2025, after the December 18, 2025, status
conference, the trial court entered an order memorializing that status
conference. The order indicated that Rose had informed the trial court
that she did not intend to voluntarily leave the premises and that the
landlords had informed the trial court that they intended to proceed with
formal eviction proceedings. The trial court set aside the provision of its
second amended order relating to the October 22, 2025, hearing, which
had directed the landlords and the RV Park to disconnect electric service
at the premises, and restored its original directive that the electric
service not be disconnected pending further order of the trial court.
Regarding rent, the trial court ordered that Rose pay her December 2025
monthly lot rent and electric-bill amount into the trial court by the close
of business on December 19, 2025, and that she pay her January 2026
and February 2026 monthly lot rent and electric-bill amounts into the
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trial court by January 3, 2026, and February 3, 2026, respectively.
Finally, the trial court reset the trial to February 10, 2026.
Rose filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the December 19,
2025, order. Among other things, Rose contended that the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order her to pay her monthly lot rent
and electric-bill amount into the trial court because, she said, the
landlords and the RV Park did not have a pending action seeking
possession of the leased premises. See Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A-405(a)
(providing, in pertinent part, that, "[i]n an action for possession or in an
action for rent when the tenant is in possession, the tenant may
counterclaim for any amount the tenant may recover under the rental
agreement or [Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A-101 et seq.,] this chapter," that
"[i]t is in the court's discretion whether the tenant is to remain in
possession," and that "[t]he tenant shall pay into court rent accrued and
thereafter accruing as it comes due"). She also complained that, if the
payment of her monthly lot rent and electric-bill amount into the trial
court was intended to be security for the preliminary injunction under
Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., the monthly lot rent was not part of any damages
that would be proximately caused by the preliminary injunction
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prohibiting the landlords and the RV Park from disconnecting electric
service to the leased premises. Rose further contended that the entry of
the trial court's December 19, 2025, order denied her due process.
On December 23, 2025, the landlords and the RV Park filed an
answer to Rose's petition and a counterclaim seeking possession of the
leased premises and $1,231.43 in past-due monthly lot rent and electric
bills. Rose moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that the trial
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over what she characterized as
the landlords' and the RV Park's unlawful-detainer claim. She also
contended that the eviction notice the landlords served on her had not
claimed that the eviction was based on nonpayment of monthly lot rent
and electric bills and that her cotenant, Jim Mims, was a necessary party
to the attempt to recover possession of the leased premises. On January
6, 2026, the landlords and the RV Park amended their counterclaim to
request that Rose be held in contempt for failing to comply with the
December 19, 2025, order by failing to pay her January 2026 monthly lot
rent and electric-bill amount into the trial court.
After the trial, on March 12, 2026, the trial court entered an order
holding Rose in contempt but imposing no sanction, restoring possession
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of the leased premises to the landlords and the RV Park, and awarding
the landlords and the RV Park a judgment in the amount of $2,537.89.
Rose filed a notice of appeal on March 17, 2026. We dismiss the appeal.
The trial court ordered Rose to pay her monthly lot rent and
electric-bill amount into the trial court in its October 23, 2025, and
December 19, 2025, orders. The clerk's record indicates that, on
November 3, 2025, Rose paid $500 into the trial court, in apparent partial
compliance with the October 23, 2025, order and amended order.
Although the trial court indicated at the October 22, 2025, hearing that
it would determine whether the money paid into the trial court would be
returned to Rose or disbursed to the landlords and the RV Park, nothing
in the record reflects that the trial court ordered the disbursement of that
money during the pendency of the litigation. The trial court's March 12,
2026, order also fails to direct the disposition of the $500 Rose paid into
the trial court.
The failure of the trial court to address the money paid into it
renders the March 12, 2026, order nonfinal. See Jackson v. Sasser, 158
So. 3d 469 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (determining that the failure of the
Covington Circuit Court to disburse all the interpleaded funds on deposit
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with the clerk rendered the purported final judgment, which had directed
disbursement of only a portion of those funds, a nonfinal judgment); see
also § 35-9A-405(a) (providing, in pertinent part, that, in an action
between a landlord and a tenant, "[t]he party to whom a net amount is
owed shall be paid first from the money paid into court, and the balance
by the other party"); Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-351(c) (requiring that, upon
disposition of an appeal of an unlawful-detainer judgment to a circuit
court from a district court, "the [circuit] court shall direct the clerk as to
the disposition of the funds paid to the clerk"); Rule 67, Ala. R. Civ. P.
(providing, in pertinent part, that any "fund so deposited [with the clerk
of the court] … shall be paid only upon the check of the clerk of the court,
annexed to its certified order for the payment, and in favor of the person
to whom the order directs the payment to be made"); McGhee v. Housing
Auth. of Birmingham Dist., 890 So. 2d 122, 127 and n.4 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003) (quoting § 6-6-351(c) and affirming the disbursement of money for
rent payments deposited with the clerk during the pendency of an appeal
from an unlawful-detainer judgment to the successful landlord and
indicating that the tenant could "properly claim a setoff … in the amount
of the [money] paid into court"). A judgment must be final to support an
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appeal. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-22-2; Wingard v. Wingard, 625 So. 2d 441,
442 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss Rose's appeal as
having been taken from a nonfinal judgment.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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